* THE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN IBERIAN WORLD *

From Al-Andalus to the Americas (13th-17th Centuries)

Destruction and Construction of Societies

Edited by
Thomas F. Glick, Antonio Malpica, Félix Retamero and Josep Torró

BRILL

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From Al-Andalus to the Americas (13th–17th Centuries)

The Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World

(formerly medieval iberian peninsula)

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One Conquest, Two Worlds: An Introduction

Félix Retamero and Josep Torró

The majority of the articles contained in this volume derive from the works presented at the International Colloquium 'The Unending Conquest. Al-Andalus and the Americas (13th–17th c.). Destruction and Construction of Societies,' held in Granada between 28 and 30 January 2010. This meeting was organised in order to celebrate Professor Miquel Barceló's retirement. Sadly, neither he nor Professor Manuel Ardit have lived to see this publication.

The essence of the colloquium's spirit can be summarised in the title of Charles Verlinden's famous *Precédents médiévaux de la colonie en Amérique*, published for the first time in Mexico in 1954.[1] This title, for its part, evoked Jaume Vicens Vives's 'Precedentes mediterráneos del virreinato colombino,' published in 1948.[2] In this article, Vicens Vives discussed the "logical and direct predecessors [of the administration of the Indies] in the Crown of Aragon." Verlinden's booklet included a list of topics which, once fully developed, could be used to build a solid and precise narrative of the 'filiation' of different colonial experiences, from the medieval Mediterranean to the modern Atlantic. Verlinden thus presented an ambitious attempt at comparative history which amply transcended not only Vicens Vives's institutional perspective, but also challenged traditional academic "compartments" and provided new perspectives which are far from being exhausted even today.

Verlinden was neither the first nor the only scholar to draw a connection between medieval and modern social and colonial practices.[3] Shortly prior to Verlinden's booklet, Merril Jensen and Robert Reynolds referred to the

1 Charles Verlinden, *Précédents médiévaux de la colonie en Amérique* (México: Editorial Fournier S.A, 1954).

2 Jaume Vicens-Vives, "Precedentes mediterráneos del virreinato colombino." *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* V (1948): 571–614.

3 For example, in the early 20th century, Albert G. Keller highlighted some precedents of the Atlantic expansion in the medieval Iberian Peninsula: "the religious unity and political coherence forced upon them by the western crusade against the Moslem invader; the enthusiasm, love of adventure, taste for gambling with large hazards, impatience with a humdrum existence, and the overpowering greed begotten of preceding generations of war and rapine; and finally the benefits derived from the presence and efforts of an alien industrious people, and the deep national disaster incurred or about to be incurred through its expulsion." Albert G. Keller, *Colonization. A Study of the Founding of New Societies* (Boston-New York-Chicago-London: Ginn & Company, 1908): 168.

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Mediterranean and American projection of the Italian expansion by pointing out "the oneness of the two colonising enterprises."[4] For his part, Luis Weckmann stressed that in studies on the early colonisation of America, little attention was paid to the experience of what he called "the land of perennial crusading."[5] In a similar sense, Charles Bishko observed that studies about colonial America were peppered with sporadic references to the "Iberian background."[6] Some Spanish examples of these "sporadic" references are Juan Pérez de Tudela's connections between 'Castilian commerce and population' and the colonisation of America, the already-mentioned work by Vicens Vives, and, more lately, Claudio Sánchez Albornoz's notion that the conquest of America could only be explained by evoking the essential components of the Spanish "enigma": "the hyper-dynamism, the religious hyper-sensitivity, and the colonising tradition."[7]

However, a full historiographical account of the relationship between the medieval and modern colonial experiences is well beyond the scope, and the aim, of this introduction. Few scholars question that this connection exists, and the "elements of conceptual continuity," as called by Fernández-Armesto, between the conquest and colonisation of the Peninsula, the Canaries and the New World have already been the subject of many noteworthy studies.[8] Nevertheless, some connections still need to be explored in depth. In a recent example, the book coordinated by José Roldán and René Chipana juxtaposes "ancestral" irrigation systems in the Peninsula and America in different periods, but the relationship between late medieval and later agricultural practices is not developed.[9] Similarly, some recent compendia which examine the growing importance of historical archaeology for the study of the American colonial societies restrict the link with the Iberian precedents with vague allusions to

4 Merril Jensen, M. and Robert L. Reynolds, "European Colonial Experience: A Plea for Comparative Studies," in *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto*, vol. 4. (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1950), 75–90. Reprinted in *The Medieval Frontiers of Latin Christendom* ed. James Muldoon and Felipe Fernández-Armesto (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 37–52.

5 Luis Weckman, "The Middle Ages in the Conquest of America," *Speculum* 26:1 (1951): 130–141.

6 Charles J. Bishko, "The Iberian Backgroun of Latin American History: Recent Progress and Continuing Problems." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 36:1 (1956): 50–80.

7 Juan Pérez de Tudela, "Castilla ante los comienzos de la colonización de las Indias," *Revista de Indias* 15 (1955): 11–88. Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, *La Edad Media española y la empresa de América* (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1983), 28.

8 Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus. Exploration and Colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229–1492* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 212.

9 José Roldán and René Chipana, eds., *Sistemas ancestrales de riego a ambos lados del Atlántico* (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2011).

the "Reconquista."[10] It seems that the Iberian precedents are an accepted fact, but imprecise, which explains why Jeremy Mumford commences his excellent work on the massive displacement of populations in the Andes after 1569 by claiming that the sudden transformations undergone by the indigenous societies were 'something new in the history of European colonialism,' to cite but one example.[11] This statement presupposes a breach between Iberian (and European) earlier colonisation processes and that which took place in America in the Modern Age. This book aims to stress that such a breach does not exist: we present new materials with which to reinforce Verlinden's powerful argument and expand this avenue of enquiry.

I

The conquests with which this volume is concerned were not merely ways to impose political and tributary control structures without fundamentally altering the composition and social structure of the subject population. Far from it. All the articles in the volume refer the reader to colonial orders that extended over time, that substantially reduced indigenous populations, that imposed new productive strategies and created a new social hierarchy. It is difficult – if not inappropriate in heuristic terms – to draw a distinction between strictly military expeditions, the arrival of armed migrants and the operations launched in order to subjugate the vanquished by different strategies (including captivity and exile). If we understand these "unending" conquests as a process, it seems inadvisable to determine causes *a priori*, as though these causes were unrelated to the actual process.

The medieval expansion of northern Christian societies at the expense of al-Andalus was driven by non-centralised political orders which operated under the rule of monarchies whose authority and scope were only partial. The dynastic pretensions of kings were subordinated to the task of conquering, the legitimacy of which was conferred by the Church; their military and political power was always counterbalanced by that of competitive aristocracies, in a model that varied widely according to the period and the geographical area. In the Iberian Peninsula, the process certainly involved the enlargement of kingdoms and the progressive reinforcement of monarchic hegemony, but this is

10 For example, Martin Hall and Stephen W. Silliman, eds., *Historical Archaeology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

11 Jeremy R. Mumford, *Vertical Empire. The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes* (Durham-London: Duke University Press, 2012), 1.

not enough evidence to consider the Iberian case a full exception within the general framework of Latin Christendom.

Towards the end of his magnificent work, *The Making of Europe*, Robert Bartlett points out that the driving force behind the expansion of the West in the Middle Ages was not the kings, but rather *consortia* or associations which could well have involved aristocrats, churchmen, merchants and urban communities.[12] The Catalan conquest of Tortosa (1148), Lleida (1149) and even Mallorca (1229), which were preceded by the signing of *convenientiae* and solemn vows for the allocation of responsibilities and profits, fits well within this framework. It is also true that in Catalonia the control of the high aristocracy by the Crown proved to be more problematic than it had been in the western Iberian kingdoms, at least until well into the 13th century, forcing the Crown to resort to this sort of agreement.[13] At any rate, even if the kings in Castile and Leon had the ability to muster large armies, these were always heterogeneous and unstable forces which combined the king's own and the aristocratic retinues, groups of autonomous knights, urban militias and, from a certain period, also paid men. Each of these units had their own identity, were organised more or less independently and enjoyed considerable freedom of action: they did not need to operate within a larger force to be effective. Their military might, moreover, was kept constantly honed by the frontier that invariably preceded the Christian advance. Here resides one of the most characteristic features of the Iberian process. Naturally, frontiers were not exclusive to the medieval Iberian Peninsula (see for example the Celtic fringe, or the territories to the east of the Elbe), but nowhere else did they play such a decisive role as sources of wealth and social promotion. Unsurprisingly, Castilians and Portuguese were soon to transfer typically Iberian frontier tactics to their footholds in Northern Africa, the Atlantic islands and the New World.

It is important not to lose sight to the fact that frontiers exist because there is booty for grabs. Those operating at the frontier acted on the basis of what could be obtained and what needed to be done to obtain it – Antoni Virgili's "balance between risk and profit." Resource-pooling agreements were thus presided over by risk-profit considerations, regardless of whether we are

12 Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (London: Allen Lane, 1993), 306–307.

13 On Catalan *convenientiae*, see Adam J. Kosto, *Making Agreements in Medieval Catalonia: Power, Order, and the Written Word, 1000–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

dealing with a small band of one-off raiders or a large army bent on territorial conquest. In every case, profits were distributed proportionally; in the Iberian Peninsula, booty-distribution techniques reached unequalled degrees of sophistication.[14] There is, moreover, no rupture between earlier – when the booty consisted chiefly of movable property, including livestock and captives snatched during rapid raids – and plunder-allocation techniques, with the systematic distribution of land in the *repartimientos* that followed the major 13th-century conquests (reproduced again with variations in the conquest of Granada and the Canaries in the 15th century, and even the conquest of Oran in 1509), and the apportionment of the conquered groups in America, the *repartimientos* of Indians, without whom the land was valueless for the conquerors.

The chapters by Josep Torró, Enric Guinot and Antoni Virgili demonstrate that the permanent presence of the frontier was a key factor in the maintenance of the military nature of urban communities, a point made obvious not only by the formation of militias under the authority of the town councils, but also by the emergence of autonomous raiding associations (*cabalgadas*) with close links to the structure of the militia. As shown by Carmen Mena and Josep Torró, these associations of raiders, which continued operating at the frontier of Granada throughout the Late Middle Ages and evolved into coastal raids launched against the North African coast, became the ideal model for the associations of adventurers which were to have such success in the New World.

The fact that America was largely conquered by these small armed bands, instead of large royal armies, is at the root of one of the most characteristic aspects of the process: the extreme violence and the systematic terror with which the raids were executed. Antonio Espino's contribution presents and discusses the details of a pattern of behaviour developed during the war against the infidel, which was also transplanted to the conquest of the Canaries or the African beachheads. Adopting an argument originally set forth by Joanna Bourke, Espino points out that the military success of these groups depended on them acting with extreme brutality. This was particularly important in the American case. Conquering bands were isolated, small and, therefore, fragile, and could afford no mistakes. The same can be said of the bands of *almogávares* operating in the Iberian frontiers or even the Catalan Company in Greece. Las Casas's claim, quoted by Antonio Espino, is therefore exact, that massacre is a common technique for the few to break the will to fight of the many, especially when extreme cruelty is systematically applied over time in order to subjugate the vanquished on a permanent basis: a never ending conquest.

14 James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War. The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 162–187.

Although murderous behaviour cannot be explained merely as a reaction against a hostile and unpredictable environment, the stress generated by such conditions can sometimes be behind extreme actions taken on the part of autonomous and isolated bands which often severed all links with the world from which they came, either by way of sedition – epitomized in Lope de Aguirre and his *marañones* – or by way of integration into the foreign medium in which they operated. The latter may be noted in relation to the *tornadizos* or "renegades," which so prominently featured in the frontier of Granada in the 14th and the 15th centuries, and the Portuguese *degenerados* of Guinea described in António de A. Mendes's chapter and termed by the scandalised Jesuits in 1604 as "idolaters, perjurers, miscreants, murderers, degenerates, traitors and thieves."

Those armed bands were organised according to the same principles that inspired the formation of commercial companies: pooling resources and men, distributing risks and costs in order to obtain a profit. The technical terms used to define both kinds of enterprise were virtually exchangeable. Based on this notion, Carmen Mena claims that the American conquest was undertaken by private companies led by leader-entrepreneurs which were open to the participation of the king, who could shoulder some, and in exceptional circumstances all, of the capital needs of the enterprise. Obviously, the investors, the military leaders and the representatives of the Crown were chiefly responsible for the success of the expedition but also kept the lion's share of the profits. Military groups sometimes formed larger "free companies," such as the Catalan Company in Greece, whereas merchant associations tended to merge into huge monopolistic corporations which, in addition to their commercial activity, also could, and did, make use of armed force. In the early 17th century, within the context of the English and Dutch expansions, these processes led to the formation of the colossal East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch East India Company (VOC), but this had already been put into practice in the late medieval period by 'commercial' companies that tried their hand at colonial, political and military control.

This is clearly the case with the companies supported by the Italian urban communes, for example the Genoese *maona*, considered "the direct forerunners of the Portuguese and Spanish empires, to the shaping of which the Italians contributed so heavily, and in the profits of which they so largely shared."[15]

15 Thomas A. Brady, Jr., "The Rise of Merchant Empires, 1400–1700: A European Counterpoint," in *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 150.

The military dimension of the commercial companies was not limited to the control of colonies and the imposition of monopolies, but was also a crucial factor in the transport and control of slave contingents. Despite the innovations introduced by Atlantic slavery (the plantation system, the lack of ransom mechanisms), rightly pointed out by Adela Fábregas, it is not possible to deny the connection between captivity in the medieval Mediterranean and the Atlantic slave trade. The conquest of Ceuta in 1415 may be seen as a symbolic landmark of this sequence; although this episode laid the foundations for the Portuguese expansion in Atlantic Africa, it is still closely connected with the flow of Mediterranean slaves towards Valencia, where large numbers of captives taken were sold. António de A. Mendes regards this episode as "the first mass deportation of human beings in modern times," making it clear that this would not have been possible without the participation of Florentine and Genoese mercantile companies. Later, when the Portuguese Crown extended its manhunts to the south, it not only transplanted the slave-managing model used in the Maghreb to sub-Saharan Africa, but entrusted this task to Italian agents. From 1510 onwards, Dutch financiers also participated in these activities, and contributed to redirecting the flow of slaves towards the Atlantic plantations. Mendes's chapter thus emphasises the connections between the Portuguese expansion in Morocco, the beginnings of the slave trade in Senegambia and the growing use of slaves in the Atlantic islands with the beginning of the sugar economy around 1525.

The fact that commercial companies shared so much with others which were more clearly military in character underlines the idea that all these associations were to some extent based on the Christian discourse on fidelity (*fidelitas*). This discourse was an essential factor in the shaping of social relations in medieval Europe, where the state was weak or simply non-existent. Fidelity was not only the vehicle of vassal-lord relationships, but also of alliances between peers: to a degree, *convenientiae* and *pacta amicitiae* played the part that kinship did in other societies.[16] Urban communities were also built on the basis of multifaceted and changing associative structures: political factions, professional collegia, commercial companies, and, naturally, military societies.[17] It is significant, writes Josep Torró, that the Catalan Company, formed

16 Gerd Althoff, *Family, Friends and Followers: Political and Social Bonds in Early Medieval Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 65–101; Joseph Morsel, *L'aristocratie médiévale. La domination sociale en Occident* (*Ve-XVe siècle*) (Paris: Armand Colin, 2004), 88–128.

17 See Pierre Michaud-Quantin, *Universitas. Expressions du mouvement communautaire dans le Moyen Age* (Paris: Vrin, 1970). This was not, from our perspective, a horizontal

by military associations of urban origin, adopted the institutional model of the *universitas*, or urban citizen community, and that it ultimately reverted to a colonial urban corporation in Athens and Thebes. Equally significant, according to Carmen Mena, is the apparent casualness with which the members of conquering bands turned into *vecinos* with military obligations, reproducing the practices of Castilian *concejos* in American towns.

In the medieval West, the urban community was an institution based on principles of mutual fidelity and harmony for the furthering of common goals (even if that only partially masked the existence of internal hierarchical divisions), and it ruled according to its own norms and government structures. This formed the basis of the political autonomy of towns, and was an easily replicable model which was to have an enormous impact on conquest and expansion processes. Maritime Italian cities reproduced their communal constitutions in their colonial foundations in Syria, the Bosporus (Pera) and Crimea (Caffa), but these are extreme cases which can only be explained by the absence of an overarching royal authority. Enric Guinot explores in his chapter an interesting Iberian example: the role played by Aragonese and Catalan urban militias in the conquest of Valencia (1238). The city and its hinterland were divided into blocks and distributed among the different urban corporations (*universitates*) taking part in the conquest; these blocks were thereafter allocated between the corporations' individual members according to their own internal rules. However, the king invested the city of Valencia with its own legal personality, thus creating a new urban unit that reproduced the essential features of those that had taken part in the conquest, but without having any organic link with them: it was a controlled replica.

Iberian medieval monarchies managed the warrior impulse of towns by implementing an ambivalent policy towards their militias, which were encouraged and reined in equal measure. As a result, towns ultimately became an instrument of monarchic supremacy. This process of political centralisation was a requirement for further expansionism. Autonomous companies, militias and other armed partnerships were impotent before well-fortified strongholds armed with cannons, such as those that had to be subjugated during the War of Granada. To a large extent, as Antonio Malpica points out, conquering armies, including professional soldiers, artillery, formal supply systems and stable camps, were beyond the reach of any purse but the king's.

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alternative to the hierarchical links typical of vassalage, as claimed by Susan Reynolds in *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), but rather a network of relations presided over by a common logic.

This, naturally, contributed to reinforce the hegemony of the Crown, which rewarded the frontier aristocracy handsomely (*mercedes*) while preventing the aristocratic control of large blocks of land. In the New World, where paradoxically these huge royal armies were not used, a decisive further step was taken, with the legal blocking of the formation of seigneurial estates. According to David Abulafia, the system that came to replace traditional aristocratic estates, the *encomienda*, kept the beneficiaries under the control of the king while extending the authority of the Crown to all natives. The theoretically free status of the Indians favoured the monarch by preventing an excessive power from accumulating in the hands of the Spanish aristocracy. It may be said that the advance of the frontier in the Iberian Peninsula gained an imperial dimension in America that was in tune with the growing centralisation of the monarchy.

In any case, the unquestionable advance of the monarchy did not undermine the role of the towns, which still played a crucial part. As pointed out by Josep Torró, the urban community situated on the frontier had everything required to keep the process of expansion alive: legal conditions for the formation of companies, either for trading or raiding for booty and captives (activities that, especially in coastal cities, tended to become mixed), and a market for the commercialisation of the proceedings. These conditions were ideal for the intervention of the Crown, by way of taxes, particularly the *quinto* (the share set aside for the king, which gives plunder legal sanction). In addition, towns also operated as centres of settlement and consumption, as well as springboards for introducing the influence of aristocracy to new territories and imposing new agrarian models, as illustrated by Antonio Malpica in his analysis of the Castilian occupation of Granada.

II

The conditions of the migrants' departure to the newly conquered areas remains an understudied topic. In this volume, Antoni Virgili, referring to Tortosa in the 12th–13th centuries, and Carmen Mena, alluding to Darién in the early 16th century, coincide in that they present a quasi-Turnerian moving frontier dynamic in which the frustration of the expectations of the less successful settlers led to the continuation of the push towards ever more distant regions. More controlled migration initiatives, for instance in Granada after the conquest of 1492, with the arrival of, chiefly, former inhabitants of the Guadalquivir Valley, should not be neglected. Antonio Malpica stresses the need to explain the mechanics behind these movements of people: how were they

set in motion and how did the nobility and the Crown operate their pyramidal personal networks to further the settlement and colonisation of their new kingdom.

Naturally, as Malpica himself recognises, immigration in this case does not only involve the displacement of people, but also a process of transformation of agrarian ecosystems. The works included in Section II ('The agrarian organisation of the new colonial societies') cover a very wide chronological and geographical span, as well as very different topics and approaches. However, all focus on two fundamental issues which are concerned with the limitations posed by the agricultural practices in operation prior to the conquest, with the development of new productive choices afterwards, and finally with the destruction or transformation of agricultural landscapes and their associated management models. This question was synthesised by Miquel Barceló in a single sentence contained in his seminal work on the principles that governed Andalusi irrigation systems: 'Continuity is in the technological unit – the hydraulic network – and not in the social unit that maintains it and manages it'.[18] Barceló was referring to Andalusi irrigation systems, but it is our belief that his claim can be applied to all agricultural systems, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Atlantic and America alike.

The chapters of this section examine the implementation of new productive priorities in the pre-existing agricultural spaces, the size and morphology of which responded to these different choices. For instance, after the 13th-century conquest, cereal and vines became the new hegemonic crops in the Balearic Islands and the Kingdom of Valencia, as shown by Helena Kirchner and Manuel Ardit. The hegemony of these crops is a European-wide phenomenon and is well documented in both the written and the archaeological record in various 13th-century conquest scenarios. A key factor in the "cerealisation of Europe" was the preference for species with naked grains, which were particularly suitable for milling; this preference was behind the process of substitution of *Triticum aestivum* for *Triticum spelta* and the partnership of rye and oats in central and western France, especially from the mid-9th century onwards.[19]

18 Miquel Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados en al-Andalus: un enunciado de principios generales," in *El agua en zonas áridas: arqueología e historia. I Coloquio de historia y medio físico* (Almería: Diputación de Almería, 1989), xxii. Reedited in Miquel Barceló, Helena Kirchner and Carmen Navarro, *El agua que no duerme. Fundamentos de la arqueología hidráulica andalusí* (Granada: El legado andalusí, 1996), 51–71 (55).

19 Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 152–156. Jean-Pierre Devroey, "La céréaliculture dans le monde franc," in *L'ambiente vegetale nell'Alto Medioevo. XXXVII Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo* (Spoleto: CISAM, 1990), 240–241.

Other Iberian examples of this is the planting, in post-conquest Granada, of sugar cane in areas previously used to grow cereal, as shown by Adela Fábregas, and the systematic planting of vines in pre-existing irrigated areas in the Balearic Islands, as presented by Helena Kirchner. The demands of new lords introduced new production criteria, which were more specialised and market-oriented, as also demonstrated by Manuel Ardit, in his work on Valencian Moriscos, and Inge Schjellerup's examination of the agrarian practices in colonial Peru.

The tension between new productive criteria and the pre-existing agrarian landscape was solved in different ways. Often, many fields were abandoned, as documented by Helena Kirchner in relation to the Balearics and Inge Schjellerup in relation to Peru. It is obvious that the decimation of the population caused by murder, expulsion, captivity and the arrival of new diseases was a determinant factor in this abandonment. At any rate, it seems clear that the colonial production priorities were also key factors in the selection of which agricultural spaces were to remain in use as well as in the "contrasting patterns of setlement," in Fernández-Armesto's words.[20]

Also, pre-existing agricultural systems were enlarged, and new ones were built from scratch, for instance in some regions of Aragon and Valencia in the 12th and the 13th centuries, as illustrated by Helena Kirchner, in Casarabonela (Málaga) from the late 15th century onwards, as shown by Félix Retamero and Virgilio Martínez-Enamorado, and, very soon after in the Atlantic islands and America, as evidenced by Adela Fábregas in her study of the expansion of sugar cane overseas. Although the position of pre-existing agricultural areas determined the location of new ones, colonial productive criteria played an essential role in the shaping of these new fields.

In any case, it should be stressed that the expansion of pre-existing agricultural spaces always took place within a context of notably diminished populations which often took centuries to reach pre-conquest levels, in spite of the arrival of colonists. Indeed, the expansion of agricultural systems responded to new productive choices in which local demands often played but an ancillary role. Thus, Madeira, Tenerife and Gran Canaria witnessed the emergence of sugar cane – and to a lesser extent vine – plantations at the expense of areas which were suitable for cereal, to the point that these islands suffered permanent wheat shortages.[21] The primary target of these new strategies was

20 Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus*, 213.

21 Fernández-Armesto, *The Canary Islands After the Conquest* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 76–92.

to supply supra-local, sometimes overseas markets, as indicated by Adela Fábregas's study of sugar production, or to satisfy the taste of the colonial and hegemonic elites, as Inge Schjellerup illustrates in relation to the production of European crops in Peru.

Another aspect which Barceló mentions that is also present throughout Section II of this volume is the friction between old and new agricultural regimes, involving agricultural calendars and tools, working systems, the uses of and the relationship between cultivated and uncultivated areas, and the emergence and development of political institutions related to agricultural ownership and production as well as the new management of agricultural productions. In the Balearic Islands, Helena Kirchner presents the relationship between the new hegemonic role of milling and the decreasing importance of irrigation for post-conquest hegemonic crops, cereals and vines, within the framework of the traditional Andalusi irrigation networks. Conversely, when the new crops demanded abundant irrigation, for example with sugar cane on the coast of Granada, these additional demands had to be fitted into the pre-existing water distribution procedures. Eventually, the extra strain of the new demands threatened the stability of these hydraulic systems, which were tailored to suit very different productive demands, as demonstrated by Félix Retamero and Virgilio Martínez-Enamorado. These examples clearly illustrate the important political dimension of the management of agrarian systems. Changing water distribution systems or species hierarchies, transforming work regimes and tools, as Inge Schjellerup discusses for colonial Peru, not only dismantled traditional peasant practices, but also the associated social networks.

Sometimes the combined result of these processes was the annihilation of indigenous groups and the obliteration of traditional organisation regimes. This, naturally, did not happen overnight, and in some areas the indigenous groups remained and adapted to the new order. In Valencia and Granada, for example, the *Mudéjar* and *Morisco* communities yielded to the pressure of the new lords and adopted the agricultural production to their demands. Yet, as pointed out by Ardit, they stuck until the end to one "typically Andalusi" feature: the small size of agricultural plots and the dispersion of land holdings. In consonance with this, these communities presented little social differentiation, as also underlined by Ardit. Indeed, the smallness of fields and the dispersion of possessions were stubbornly maintained, which suggests that these choices formed part of the foundations of the social order now under threat. More study is needed if we are to ascertain whether these features, the small size and dispersion, were also involved in the genesis of said social order and whether they were the last 'pre-colonial' traits to disappear.

III

The survival of indigenous population 'pockets' demanded the formulation of status categories which could be used to justify and legitimise their subservient condition. David Abulafia addresses the possible influence of the categories applied to Jews and Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula on the way indigenous Americans were treated. Specifically, he is concerned with the consideration of these 'infidels' as *servi* of the Crown, which certainly posed a challenge to the exercise of the traditional jurisdictional rights of the aristocracy. This principle, on the other hand, could be regarded as a form of protection bestowed by the monarch, but also as a potential argument for expropriation or expulsion. In fact, the order of expulsion of Spanish *Moriscos* in the early 17th century was proof of the consolidated supremacy of the Crown over the nobility.

Although subject to the *encomienda* and forced labour regimes, American Indians were considered "free subjects and vassals," and thus clearly distinct from captives and slaves, a category that was reserved for Africans and "war Indians" – the *bravos* of the new frontiers that were never quite conquered.[22] We must also keep in mind that the "freedom" of the Indians was closely related to their categorisation as tribute-payers, which leads David Abulafia to point out an important analogy between their status and that of Jews and *Mudéjares* in late medieval Iberia. The role assigned to *caciques* as community leaders is also reminiscent of the forms of self-government allowed to the Jewish and Muslim *aljamas*, which occupied their own, clearly segregated, districts.

According to Abulafia, the novelty in the New World was a disconcerting combination of forced labour, tribute and "free status" (which means that Indians could not be made slaves privately) among indigenous populations. This seems to confirm Karen Spalding's cycle of labour obligations, wages established by tariff (at necessarily low rates) and the payment of tribute. Josep M. Fradera's chapter focuses on this cycle and makes it a crucial part of his argument for the Spanish being the first "genuinely multi-ethnic" empire, owing to its ability to integrate different social and ethnic groups into its colonial structure. These characteristics are clearly in evidence when the Spanish colonial empire is compared with those of its rivals, for example the English colonisation of New England or the French settlement in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which tried to reproduce agricultural societies and landscapes from

22 David J. Weber, *Bárbaros. Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

north-western Europe. Naturally, the Spanish model was also very different from the Portuguese empire largely based on the importation of colonial crops produced in plantation regimes that were themselves based on large-scale slave labour. Slavery was not absent from the Spanish Empire, but as Fradera suggests, its economic role was only secondary to that of indigenous forced labour.

For Josep M. Fradera, the key to the originality of the Spanish Empire was the emergence of mining hubs fostered by the international demand of precious metal – especially silver – which was made possible by the labour regimes imposed upon the indigenous population. The remains of the major agrarian civilisations of the Andes and Mesoamerica played a prominent part in this process: none of the Spanish Crown's colonial competitors found anything remotely similar in their own spheres of action. Although these populations suffered gravely during the 16th century, enough survived to make the systematic appropriation of indigenous labour viable and the basis for the social reconstruction of the conquered territories. Most Spanish colonists settled in towns, which became the centres of economic activity and colonial institutions. This system stands out from the model followed by both settler colonialism and slavery-based plantations, and also from the feature which both these systems shared: the expulsion or virtual extermination of indigenous populations. As concluded by Fradera, the will to build new colonial social structures and to use them, which characterises Spanish imperial peculiarities, anticipates the modern colonialism that unfolded in the 19th century.

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PART 1

The Organisation of the Conquests: Political, Military and Financial Aspects

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CHAPTER 1

Partners-in-Arms. Medieval Military Associations: From the Iberian *cabalgada* to the American *entrada*

Josep Torró

In one of his brief but insightful essays on the projection of the Iberian medieval conquests into America – "that never-ending conquest" – Miquel Barceló finds, among the proposals set forth by Bartolomé de Las Casas and the responses of his adversaries, remote bur clear echoes of the armed bands of "popular knights" that supported the Castilian-Leonese offensive upon al-Andalus during the 12th century. As shown by his arguments, the filiation between these groups and those that carried out the conquest of the New World is so obvious that it would be quite unjustifiable to ignore it.[1] In fact, this sort of argument appears in no small number of well-known works. What we are truly lacking are studies that focus specifically on this relationship, which involves examining the emergence and organisation of these groups from their earliest manifestations to the evolved forms present on American soil. The present work aims at palliating, to a certain extent, this problem, which I would like to blame on the pigeon-holing characteristic of academic organisation rather than on other motivations.

It would be unfair to ignore previous, and more or less ambitious, attempts carried out in this regard by the scholarship on the Spanish Indies. Everyone knows that America was not conquered by large royal or imperial armies directly sent forth and funded by the crown. It was, in contrast and as pointed out by Carmen Mena, a long process of territorial penetration enacted by groups of combatants under the authority of prestigious leaders, either self-funded or often financed with the contribution of investor partners.[2] The specific nature of these groups has prompted scholars to refer to them using particular terms that are unknown in the records of the time: *hueste indiana*, *milicia indiana* and *bandas de conquista*. The complete list of publications on the subject

1 Miquel Barceló, "Loquella barbarica (v)," *Faventia* 27:2 (2005): 83–99.

2 Carmen Mena, *El oro del Darién. Entradas y cabalgadas en la conquista de Tierra Firme (1509–1526)* (Seville and Madrid: Junta de Andalucía and CSIC, 2011), 221–222. See also her contribution, "Medieval factors in the conquest of America: organisation and war practices in the incursions into Darién," in this volume.

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would be too long to summarize here, but the work published by the Chilean Mario Góngora half a century ago must be given special regard. He recognised the decisive role of the expeditions launched by autonomous companies (*entradas*, *jornadas*, *bandeiras*) in the Spanish expansion in America in the 16th and 17th centuries, and did not hesitate to establish a filiation ("genetic relationship") between these enterprises and medieval frontier raids (*cabalgadas*) and, more directly, the later expeditions unleashed upon the Maghreb and the Canaries. In the balanced opinion of Góngora, the "persistence over time" of these "war bands" between the 12th and the 16th centuries is self-evident; in view of this conclusion, a full understanding of the processes of conquest can only be achieved through the "isolation of the social reality of these groups." This idea could well be used to entitle a research proposal.[3]

A few years later, the Spanish specialist in American history Demetrio Ramos dedicated many a page to showing the differences between medieval hosts and armed retinues on the one hand, and the wrongly termed *hueste indiana* on the other. What this author intended, at any rate, was to stress the "non-seigneurial" nature of the groups involved in the Spanish conquest of America, which in his view was as much as to say "non-medieval." He admitted that these expeditions operated under "rules established some centuries before" their implantation in America. Here he was not, however, referring to the medieval *cabalgada*, but to the launching of naval expeditions from the Cantabrian coast, initiated by 13th century whale hunting parties. His arguments were interwoven with a discourse dominated by a sense of ideological awe before "audacious men" supposedly bred from such enterprises ("school of intrepidity") and rich in "entrepreneurship." In order to sustain his proposals medieval frontier raids (*cabalgadas*) had to be fully expunged from the equation. This he did with uncharacteristic expeditiousness, in clear contrast with his thorough attention to detail shown in dealing with much less important points. He stated simply that the medieval raids had been executed by "closed" groups, necessarily cemented by relationships of vassalage or neighbourhood.[4] These two kinds of relationship were set together as though they were the same, and the reasons why they made for "closed" groups were also left quite unexplained.

These arguments are being brought forth because of the influence that they still have on more recent publications on the issue. I am referring, in particular, to the important work by Mena, in which an effort is made to reconcile the

3 Mario Góngora, *Los grupos de conquistadores en Tierra Firme (1509–1530). Fisonomía histórico-social de un tipo de conquista* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, 1962), 66–67, 95.

4 Demetrio Ramos, "Determinantes formativos de la 'hueste indiana' y su origen modélico," *Revista Chilena de Historia del Derecho* 4 (1965): 14–15, 25–33.

proposals of Góngora and Ramos. Her view on the genealogy of the conquest bands in the Spanish Indies thus presents some difficulties. She admits, for instance, that this sort of group already existed in the form of medieval Iberian *cabalgadas*, but not before the emergence of a later modality of expeditions sent across the sea (against the Canaries and the Maghreb), even assuming that the latter was inspired by the practices of "Muslim pirates." Another problem is raised when the targets of the *cabalgada* are made incompatible with operations aimed at territorial conquest. This is only true from a strictly formal point of view (the raids could eventually result in the conquest of territory, even if this was not their primary aim). According to Mena, the American *entradas* reproduced the warfare techniques of medieval raids, but were always aimed at creating new settlements and at territorial control.[5] Yet the *cabalgada* was not just a military technique, but a whole way of conceiving and organising war deeply rooted into the original violence of feudal society. The important thing was not the action itself, but the people who participated in it, resulting in such a singular and decisive phenomenon as the organisation of associations of combatants and military companies aimed at gaining a profit that went beyond the mere results of plunder. The *quid* of the question therefore resides in the genesis of these war bands, which will be the main concern of the present paper.

"We are all princes"

The host was defined not only in terms of size, the command of a king or prince, or the presence of armed retinues and paid combatants. The host fully exemplifies the *auxilium*, the military obligation of the vassal towards his lord. This does not imply that all vassals, especially the most important among them, would mobilise the entirety of their resources every time. The fact that from a certain point this obligation could be commuted or reduced with cash payments does not affect its fundamental nature as vassals' duty. As a service provided by vassals, more than anything else the host required the presence of knights and members of the nobility. In the Iberian Peninsula, however, the host was also joined by the quantitatively formidable forces mustered by urban militias.

The presence of warring colonists with no connection to the aristocracy can be tracked in Castile as far back as the 10th century. It is likely that small bands of these ventured at the time into the ample frontier region known as

5 Mena, *El oro del Darién*, 220.

Extremadura (between the river Duero and the Cordillera Central). The formal incorporation of these combatants into the king's forces was connected with the creation of urban councils (*concejos*) in the region from the last quarter of the 11th century. The obligation to provide military assistance was in this case referred to by the old term *fonsado* (Lat. *fossatum*). Although originally the term may have been loaded with a servile undertone, these *concejos*, supported and endorsed with charters or local laws (*fueros*), were corporations of free townsmen with no servile obligations. This not only laid down the legal basis for the organisation of urban militias but also for their obligation to assist the king militarily, like the rest of the king's vassals. The word *hueste*, in fact, did not become common to refer to urban-based military service in the Iberian Peninsula – with the exception of Catalonia – until well into the 12th century: it features for the first time in the local charter of Viguera (1120), given by Alfonso I the Battler. As pointed out by James F. Powers, the word, borrowed from French feudal terminology (Lat. *hostis*, Fr. *ost*), had entered the western Iberian Peninsula through Aragon and Navarre. The regular presence of urban militias in the royal armies favoured the adoption of the term "host" in Castile from the late 12th century (in León this had to wait until the early 13th), in coexistence with the word *fonsado* which survived as a synonym – similarly to *exercitus* – or was used to refer to second order expeditions.[6]

The unique character of the Hispanic urban militias seems beyond doubt, but it may have been overemphasised. According to Powers, the fact that military service was an obligation consubstantial with the condition of citizen is "an iberian phenomenon unique in the medieval West," but it is also true that, as with the Iberian Peninsula, urban militia were common throughout the whole of western Europe during the 12th and 13th centuries as a manifestation of the growing political autonomy of towns and cities, which in this way turned war into a collective, common endeavour. In communal Italy, most particularly, the phenomenon acquired dimensions at least comparable to the Iberian case.

Many other key features also make both cases comparable. The communes were set up as corporations of armed free men, some on foot and some mounted, gathered around *collaciones* and led by a group of privileged urban knights. Communes were capable of sending considerable forces into the battlefield

6 *Fuero de Viguera y Val de Funes*, ed. José M. Ramos Loscertales (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1956), Chap. 47; James F. Powers, "The origins and development of municipal military service in the Leonese and Castilian Reconquest, 800–1250," *Traditio* 26 (1970): 95–96; Carmela Pescador, "La caballería popular en León y Castilla," *Cuadernos de Historia de España* 33–40 (1961–64): [2]:123–126.

and could act on their own initiative; that is, regardless of royal or imperial orders.[7] These features can be applied almost to the letter to the Hispanic case; if anything, Italian militias were more autonomous that the Hispanic ones. The specificity of the Iberian case rests, instead, on the presence of an "external" factor: the frontier and its decisive impact on the action, composition and organisation of military corporations.

In the Extremadura and afterwards in the southern plateau – where extensive, largely uninhabited areas could be found – the militias became involved with the protection of itinerant livestock moving towards the borders of the most densely populated territories in al-Andalus (the Guadalquivir valley or the coastal areas to the east). Their key activity was, however, raiding. The frontier, despite the considerable risk and frequent failures, represented an inexhaustible source of booty or *ganancia*; this opportunity to come upon sudden riches also carried the possibility of social promotion, from *peón* (foot combatant) to knight, and life became organised around the seizing of loot. Mostly, this activity absorbed the energy of the knights – in certain towns this group comprised up to a fifth of the total adult male population – also committing, though to a lesser degree, the rest of the community.

The periodic injection of external resources gained outside their own human and social medium allowed Hispanic militias to grow in numbers, technical proficiency and organisational complexity. Italian communal militias and institutions were increasingly suffering from internecine strife and the lack of opportunity for breaking out and directing operations against external enemies (with the exceptions of the large maritime communes), whereas in the Iberian Peninsula *concejos* played a very prominent role in the expansion of the Christian kingdoms, sharing amply in the spoils of conquest and proliferating as fast as the frontier was being pushed to the south.[8]

7 Powers, "Origins," 91; Aldo A. Settia, *Comuni in guerra. Armi ed eserciti nell'Italia delle città* (Bologna: Clueb, 1993); Roberto Greci, "Esserciti cittadini e guerra nell'età di Federico II," in *Federico II e le città italiane*, ed. A. Paravicini Bagliani and Pierre Toubert (Palermo: Sellerio, 1994), 344–363; Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, *Cavalieri e cittadini. Guerra, conflitti e società nell'Italia comunale* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004); Paolo Grillo, *Cavalieri e popoli in armi. Le istituzioni militari nell'Italia medievale* (Roma: Laterza, 2008), 109–128.

8 Maire Vigueur, *Cavalieri e cittadini*, 140–147, recalls that Sardinia was the "Pisan Eldorado"; and during the Fifth Crusade (1217–21) several communes in northern Italy sent contingents to Egypt, including representatives of enemy urban factions: James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 69–74. Each of these cases demonstrates that external action was possible, but the absence of a terrestrial frontier made it unviable as a sustained effort.

In principle, however, the Iberian militias were less capable of autonomous action than the Italian. Communes had finally been recognised by the Emperor Frederick I precisely because of their proven combat worth. The *concejos*, in contrast, owed their existence to the king's will. During the second half of the 12th and the first half of the 13th century, the *fueros* defined the military service which urban communities owed the crown (the ultimate expression of this was the massive army mustered for the conquest of Seville, 1248), but also the different forms of autonomous armed action carried out outside this official duty. At any rate, in the 1130s, that is, before these institutional developments had taken place, the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* (*CAI*) already shows the existence of considerably well organised council armies capable of launching – either alone or in combination with forces from other towns – lengthy looting raids deep into Andalusi territory.

Far from undermining the authority of the crown, the autonomy of the councils could be understood, as long as it was exercised in the frontier, which was normally the case, like a projection of the king's sovereignty; in the words of Francisco García Fitz, these raids were effective in maintaining a "seasonal but recurrent military pressure" on Andalusi lands.[9] In fact, this type of action would soon be embraced by another notion extracted from the normative language of vassalage: the *cabalgada*, conceived as a complement to the host. Apart from its most common meaning, as a swift and minor expedition, the *cabalgada* (Lat. *cavalcata*, Fr. *chevauchée*) represents a form of, not always compulsory, military service. The term was introduced to the western Christian kingdoms of the Peninsula in the same *Fuero de Viguera* (1120) that also included the earliest mention of a "host," and is presented as a type of action not connected with the services due to the king, and from which, in consequence, no exemption can ensue.[10]

The term *cabalgada* spread in the charters granted in Leonese Extremadura by Alfonso IX (1188–1230) and in those that followed the model they set. In these charters the *cabalgada* is presented as the main type of military action as far as urban councils were concerned.[11] It was also mentioned in the *fueros* of Cuenca and Teruel (c. 1190–5) – perhaps the most complete among all local regulations, including the military dispositions – where the management of the booty was precisely defined (in the vernacular version *cabalgada* and *ganancia* become synonymous). They also showed that *cabalgadas* were open

9 Francisco García Fitz, *Las Navas de Tolosa* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2005), 214–215.

10 *Fuero de Viguera*, Ch. 61, 261, 265–267; Powers, "Origins," 103.

11 Pescador, "Caballería popular," [2]:136–142.

to foot combatants.[12] Both charters recognise the *cavalcata* as the second most important type of offensive action, after *exercitus*. The latter, not necessarily organised in conjunction with a royal host, was conceived as an expedition arranged by the local government and committing all townsmen to serve the *concejo* with arms.[13] The *exercitus* is regulated with great detail, providing for the defence of the town in its absence and establishing penalties for those trying to shirk from this collective obligation.

The official nature of these expeditions was made explicit – as with the defensive obligation of the *apellido* – by the presence of the standard of the *concejo* (*vexillum concilii*), in contrast with the autonomous raids launched aside from council discipline by groups of the local cavalry force or impromptu war bands. In this regard, Alfonso X's *Partidas* also made the distinction between *cabalgadas concejeras* and *encubiertas*. Obviously, the former type was that called for by the council (*se fazen concejeramente*), and in local charters is called *exercitum*: these were substantial enough as to be capable of staging an exhibition of force (including raising tents, lighting fires, etc.). Such was generally avoided in the latter, which were carried out by small fractions of the militia who tried not to be detected while in enemy territory due to the limited numbers employed.[14]

It has already been said that these offensive actions carried out by members of the *concejos* predate in fact the legal and institutional formalisation of the practice. A well-known passage of the *CA1* referring to the waning military initiative of the Almoravids against the Christians, around 1133, also mentions that, regardless, and before that date "the Christians living in the Transierra

12 *Fuero de Cuenca* [hereafter cited as *FC*], ed. Rafael de Ureña (Madrid: Academia de la Historia, 1935), 30.58–59, 30.63–64; *Fuero latino de Teruel* [hereafter cited as *FT*], ed. Jaime Caruana (Teruel: Instituto de Estudios Turolenses, 1974), Ch. 188, 257, 444–445, 463. I accept the chronology supported by James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War. The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 49–50, 220–228.

13 The *fuero* of Lorca (1271) establishes that if the militia marches with the king, they must follow no other flag but the king's, but when acting independently they must fly the standard given by the monarch to the council: *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia*, ed. Juan Torres Fontes (Murcia: Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, 1973–97), 3:123–131.

14 *FC* 30.39, 31.11; *FT* 436, 448, 451; *Las Siete Partidas del Rey don Alfonso el Sabio* [hereafter cited as *Partidas*], ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1807), II:II.23.28. In another passage, the *Partidas* (II.23.13) mention the council's flags, called *cabdales*, which are similar to those carried by military orders and by the lords with over a hundred knights at their command.

and the Extremadura used to gather every year" in their thousands (knights and infantrymen) to launch punishing and looting expeditions into Andalusi territory; although no evidence for this sort of action before the 12th century has been preserved, the *Anales Toledanos* (written in the early 13th century) date it to as far back as 1109.

The militias under the major *concejos* in the Extremadura seem to have played a particularly prominent role: Ávila (whose troops are known to have launched at least 26 expeditions), Segovia, and Salamanca, along with Toledo. In any case, the *CAI* does not use the term *cavalcata* or any other specific word to define the nature of these expeditions which, often, combined *cohortes praedatorias* from several different locations; in contrast, the distinction between autonomous campaigns and those carried out within the "imperial" host is always made clear. With this distinction, a factor of ambiguity which was to last for a long time was also introduced: on the one hand, these *viros bellatores* who lived on the frontier and scored important successes for the crown and the Church were regarded with admiration, but at the same time their aptitude for independent action was regarded with deep suspicion. "We are all princes and the masters of our own heads" (*omnes sumus principes et duces capitum nostrorum*), the defiant knights from Salamanca reputedly replied after being encircled and before being massacred by the Almoravid emir, who asked for their leader. This disaster and others before it were, according to the chronicler, due to an excess of pride ("they trusted their strength, not God"). In different circumstances, a section of the militias from the Extremadura decided to detach themselves (*sine praecepto imperatoris*) from the host mustered by Alfonso VII in 1138, in order to sack the regions beyond the Guadalquivir; on their return, the flood cut them off, and they readied themselves to die without chance of succour from the rest of the army. Among pious admonitions shouted across the river, the chiefs of the host reprimanded the lost expedition by using the river metaphorically: "a great chasm has opened between you and us." Although the chronicler emphasises the king's grief over the inevitable annihilation of the gallant combatants, the whole episode implicitly conveys the message that an excess of independence inevitably results in an evil – and deserved – outcome.[15]

15 *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* [hereafter cited as *CAI*], ed. Antonio Maya (Turnhout: Brepols, 1990), II.20, 228, 36–39; *Anales Toledanos, I y II* [hereafter cited as *AT*], ed. Julio Porres Martín-Cleto (Toledo: Diputación Provincial, 1993), 83. Miquel Barceló, "Loquella barbarica (V)," 83–92, identifies the "doers of iniquity" of *CAI* II.63 with frontier town combatants.

Castes and Confraternities

Commenting upon the famous passage in the *CAI* where the knights of Salamanca declare themselves their own masters, Luis M. Villar suggests that this shows "a rejection of princes and dukes," seen as competitors for riches and fame: *non demus nomen gloriae nostre ullo principi aut duci*.[16] The terms *princeps* and *dux* are not allusive to specific aristocratic ranks but are simply classic Latin terms to refer to the, obviously aristocratic, commanders of an army or host. In my opinion, however, the true significance of the passage lies instead in the affirmation of status equality between urban knights. The stress lies not upon the contraposition with the aristocracy, but the independence of their own actions; the subordinate and hierarchical nature of the host is contrasted with the freedom and voluntary character of their own association.

The possibility of setting up groups through associative links expressly for the organisation of military expeditions is clearly shown by the passages that the *CAI* dedicates to the actions of Munio Alfonso. Ashamed at the loss of Mora, of which he was governor, to the Muslims in 1138, he organised a force of *amicis viris bellatoribus* from different towns designed to fight independently. Soon afterwards the king appointed him as governor of Toledo with authority over the knights and foot combatants of the Transierra (the frontier zone to the south of the Cordillera Central). He seems, indeed, to have exercised this authority, by selecting nine hundred *milites* from among the best of Toledo, Ávila and Segovia, and one thousand *pedites electos*, to launch an expedition against the region around Córdoba (1143). It must, however, be noted that this chronicle exceptionally refers to Munio Alfonso's men as *sui socii*; this is done so insistently that there can be no doubt of intentionality. The text clearly declares that, regardless of being formally compelled to do it, the knights followed the governor willingly. This is, in any case, of little relevance. The truly significant point is that the troops were not marching under *signa principum*, that is, the ensigns of great nobles, but under those of Munio Alfonso – a simple *miles* acting as a warlord – and some of the King, as a reminder that the expedition was undertaken in his name. The chronicler implied that, following the lack of internal aristocratic hierarchies, the armed contingent was made up of equals.[17]

This equality, however, was limited to the very strict boundaries of a well-defined social group; that formed by men in possession of arms and horses and

16 Luis M. Villar, *La Extremadura castellano-leonesa. Guerreros, clérigos y campesinos (711–1252)* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1986), 195–196.

17 *CAI* II.48–49, 67–71, 74–78, 84, 87.

who periodically participated in raids. It does not seem strange that their inclination for warlike activities and the need to compensate their exclusion from the blood aristocracy (*milites per naturam*) soon favoured the emergence of a strong sense of caste which would eventually crystallise in the construction of crosscutting identities along frontier towns.[18] The term *pardo*, used to refer to certain combatants in the Extremadura is widely known and has been amply discussed. It is unfortunate that we know little about the criteria followed for its application. In its only occurrence in the *CAI* – around the unclear episode resulting in the death of Sayf al-Dawla in 1145 (*supervenerunt milites quos dicunt pardos*) – it seems that the chronicler is using the term as a way to clearly establish difference with the *milites* that march under the command of the counts as vassals or members of their armed retinue. The mention appears to stress the autonomy of the so-called *pardos* and, by association, to make them fully and uniquely responsible for the death of the emir. The first anonymous chronicle of Sahagún already recorded their existence around 1110–11 by indicating that the "men living beyond the Duero are popularly known as *pardos*," and that a great number of these *pardos* supported King Alfonso I the Battler, and caused great trouble in his struggle against Queen Urraca for the throne of León and Castile. They were not specifically defined as mounted troops, which certainly does not imply that they were not, but they were clearly associated with a specific region, between the Duero and the Cordillera Central: the Extremadura.

This connection between term and specific geographical context seems to be confirmed by the third and last text where the term is used; the *Historia Turpini* in the *Codex Calixtinus* (last quarter of the 12th century). This enumerates the regions supposedly conquered by Charlemagne in Hispania, among which are listed the "land of the highlanders" (*tellus Serranorum*) and the "land of the *pardos*" (*tellus Pardorum*), different from the lands of the Castilians, the Portuguese and the Navarre. In a different passage, the text lists *serranos* and *pardos* among the multitude of infidels enlisted in Agolant's army (also including Saracens, Moabites, Ethiopians and Africans). Their inclusion in this list seems to suggest the "wild" and untrustworthy nature of these frontier warriors.[19]

18 The Portuguese *fuero* of Leiria (1142) makes a distinction between *milites per naturam*, who regardless of whether they could afford horses or not always retained the honour of chivalry, and *milites qui non fuerint per naturam*, whose consideration was entirely dependent on the possession of a horse: Pescador, "Caballería popular," [I], 121–122.

19 *CAI* II.98; *Crónicas Anónimas de Sahagún*, ed. Antonio Ubieto (Zaragoza: Anubar, 1987), 24, 26. I have accessed the relevant passages of the *Historia Turpini* through Diego Catalán, *El Cid en la historia y sus inventores* (Madrid: Fundación Menéndez Pidal, 2002), 142.

The *serranos* are alluded to, and not exactly in laudatory terms, in the letter in which the Archbishop of Narbonne reports the result of the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212). Arnaud Amaury identifies them simply as Castilian horse and foot troops. On the other hand, the *Crónica de la Población de Ávila*, written in the vernacular in the mid-13th century, offers a much more detailed characterisation. According to this text, the *serranos* were a well-differentiated group among the settlers who arrived in Ávila in the late 11th century. The first reason for this distinction appears to be their alleged common geographical origin in the mountains of the Sistema Ibérico, and maybe the easternmost region of the Cordillera Central. It must be remembered that the so-called *serranos* in Salamanca, probably the earliest Castilian inhabitants of the city, kept their own separate identity (*natura*) in the neighbourhood (*collación*) around the old Cathedral *civitas*. Secondly, the chronicler from Ávila also singled out this group for their constant dedication to the military profession and to *cabalgadas*, without other occupation. This apparent specialisation would have been rewarded by the crown, which allowed them to hoard council offices. It is not unlikely, however, that the chronicler was trying to legitimise the position of power that had been achieved by this group by the time the chronicle was written.

According to José M. Monsalvo, the control exercised by non-noble knights over the *concejos* was a lengthy process initiated in the mid-12th century and not fully realised until the second quarter of the 13th century. It seems at any rate clear that until then the group had cultivated a strong sense of caste which, once the summit of local power had been taken, tended to disappear. According to the chronicle from Ávila, the members of this group never married into merchant or artisan families, and they would not do so for anything in the world; the only chance of marrying outside the group was with blood knights (*cavalleros fijosdalgo*), which were placed above them in the social hierarchy. This was not, however, a fully closed caste. Access to the group was achieved through wealth. All townsmen (*vecinos*) that could afford the horse and full mounted-warrior equipment could enter the group regardless of origin. Not all knights, on the other hand, took to military specialisation, which is the basis of the exclusivity enjoyed by this dominant section of the urban cavalry identified with the *serranos*.[20]

20 Marqués de Mondéjar and Francisco Cerdá, *Memorias históricas de la vida y acciones del rey don Alfonso el Noble, octavo del nombre* (Madrid: Imprenta Antonio de Sancha, 1783), cvi; *Crónica de la Población de Ávila*, ed. Amparo Hernández (Valencia: Anubar, 1966), 18–20, 22–23, 26–28; Ángel Barrios, *Estructuras agrarias y de poder en Castilla: el ejemplo de Ávila (1085–1320)* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1983), 1:179–183; Villar,

In the second half of the 12th century, as the distance between their bases and the frontier widened, the knights from the Extremadura slowly shifted their focus to the management of rents resulting from the growing agricultural wealth, and to the assumption of governmental responsibilities in increasingly complex and robust councils.

In this context, and in order to maintain the "symbolic capital" hitherto earned by their commitment to war at the frontier, some sectors of the warrior castes formed select, restricted groups, such as the confraternities. One of the earliest emerged precisely among the *serranos*: the *fratres* in Ávila, which in 1172 merged into the Order of Santiago. The Order, in fact, had emerged from another brotherhood, the *freiles* in Cáceres, created not long before with the objective of supporting the defence while the town stood as a Leonese outpost.

The confraternity of San Julián del Pereiro, created before 1176 by knights from Salamanca and the origin of the Order of Alcántara, possibly poses a similar case. Although the evidence available is rather late and imprecise, we may also mention the confraternity of *los Quiñones*, in Segovia, which unlike the others did not evolve into a military order.[21] According to Carlos de Ayala, this phenomenon is a kind of "sacralised council militia," or in other words, the sacralisation of the relationship between the members of certain factions within the council-cavalry. This author considers that their model is very different from that followed by the famous Aragonese confraternities in Belchite and Monreal, created by Alfonso I the Battler in the 1120s. Their key differential feature, besides royal patronage, resided in their commitment to take part in periodic campaigns against the Muslims as defined by the spirit of the crusade; this involved participating in the appropriate system of indulgences but without assuming any form of religious ordination.[22]

Extremadura, 186–198. José M. Monsalvo, "Frontera pionera, monarquía en expansión y formación de los concejos. Relaciones de poder en el realengo concejil entre el Duero y el Tajo (c. 1072–c. 1222)," *Arqueología y territorio medieval* 10:2 (2003): 69–83, has questioned this proposal, according to which the *concejos* were already under the control of the *serranos* and *caballería villana* (non-noble knights) by the early 12th century.

21 Monsalvo, "Frontera pionera," 93–103; Derek W. Lomax, *La Orden de Santiago, 1170–1250* (Madrid: CSIC, 1965), 4; Villar, *Extremadura*, 198; Julio González, *Regesta de Fernando II* (Madrid: CSIC, 1943), 91, 444–445; Juan de Vera, "El quiñón de San Martín de Segovia," *Estudios Segovianos* 23 (1973).

22 Carlos de Ayala, "Tópicos y realidades en torno a las Órdenes Militares," in *Tópicos y realidades de la Edad Media (II)*, ed. Eloy Benito (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2002), 114–116; Peter Rassow, "La cofradía de Belchite," *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 3 (1926), 200–226; José A. Lema, *Instituciones políticas del reinado de Alfonso I el Batallador, rey de Aragón y Pamplona (1104–1134)* (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1997), 219–221;

The trajectory of this second type of "crusader" confraternity was very short, because they must have disappeared around the mid-12th century at the very latest, after the consolidation of the Ebro frontier and the increasing presence of true military orders had made them redundant. In contrast, the proliferation of urban knight *cofradías* – in many different forms and shapes – continued throughout the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries. A key feature of these corporations seems to have been their pious and charitable activities (including compensations for the loss of a horse, payment of ransoms, repatriation of corpses, suffrage of funerals), for example with the confraternity of Nuestra Señora del Salor in Cáceres (1345) and the knights of San Ildefonso in Priego (1426).

At any rate, the main aim of these corporations was to distribute prestige among their members. In 16th century documents, the knights from Ciudad Rodrigo recalled that in past times the *cofradías* focused their energy on the organisation of parties, banquets, bullfights and other events. It is also true that in regions closer to the frontier the brotherhoods addressed more practical issues with a true military outlook; for example, the Sant Jordi *cofradía* of cavalry troopers from Murcia, created in the early 14th century (in fact, nothing more than a company of paid combatants organised as a "confraternity" as a way to commit the group to solidary compensation for the horses lost by individual members). Most commonly, these resulted in the creation of companies of crossbowmen, for example in Orihuela, Baeza and Calahorra. Another example is that of the brotherhoods organised in Jaén and nearby villages in the 15th century for the purchase and maintenance of *espingardas* (a kind of slender harquebus).[23] Evidence for the presence of this kind of military *cofradía* in war actions and operational performance is, on the other hand, almost completely lacking.

Alain Demurger, "Belchite, le Temple et Montjoie. La couronne d'Aragon et le Temple au XII[e] siècle," in *Knighthoods of Christ*, ed. Norman Housley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 123–135.

23 Pescador, "Caballería popular," [IV], 247–249; José-L. Martín, "Ordenamientos jurídicos de la 'Extremadura' medieval," *Revista de Historia Jerónimo Zurita* 78–79 (2004): 318–320; Miguel A. Ladero, "La organización militar de la Corona de Castilla durante los siglos XIV y XV," in *La incorporación de Granada a la corona de Castilla*, ed. Miguel A. Ladero (Granada: Diputación Provincial, 1993), 216; Maria T. Ferrer Mallol, *Organització i defensa d'un territorio fronterer. La Governació d'Oriola en el segle XIV* (Barcelona: CSIC, 1990), 194–201, 362–368; Juan A. Barrio, "Un repartimiento inédito: el repartimiento de Orihuela de 1330," in *VI Estudios de frontera. Población y poblamiento*, ed. F. Toro and J. Rodríguez (Jaén: Diputación, 2006), 80; Manuel González Jiménez, "La caballería popular en Andalucía (siglos XIII al XV)," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 15 (1985): 327–328.

The case of the confraternity of Calatayud during the *repartiment* of Valencia is in this regard exceptional. In 1240, the lands around the village of Montcada, very close to the city, were distributed among *centum confratres* from Calatayud. No further details are provided, but it seems that this group must have been created – we do not know when – by a faction within the council militia in order to draw a sacred bond between its members for the achievement of their collective targets and as a way to distinguish themselves from the rest of the force. On the other hand, the fact that all beneficiaries sold their allocated land-prize to the Templars, which successfully aimed at gaining control of the district around Montcada, within the following six years, suggests that these "hundred brethren" already possessed considerable wealth in their region of origin, making it not worth colonising the small amount of land received (barely a *jovada*: 3 ha).[24] It seems reasonable to suppose that these were top members of the militia; rich and well equipped knights; a closed group, as suggested by the ostensibly round figure chosen for their membership.[25]

Regarding the distribution of the territorial booty of the conquest, the "hundred brethren" from Calatayud acted as a unit. The group received the whole of the prize and distributed it afterwards among its members. This suggests that the group also operated militarily as a unit, during marches and in combat, but we lack similar cases with which to determine the true significance of this example. In fact, by this date more flexible and open forms of military association were already being assiduously practiced, as shown by documents recording the *repartiment* of Valencia from 1242. Despite their variability, as a rule confraternities maintained a clearly local character and, more importantly, very restricting exclusivity principles that turned these groups into classist, elitist, and difficult to access honour-based corporations.[26] Most of the

24 Enric Guinot, "El desplegament feudal sobre el País Valencià. Repartiment i colonització a l'Horta de València: Montcada (1239–1246)," in *El feudalisme comptat i debatut. Formació i expansió del feudalisme català*, ed. Miquel Barceló et al. (Valencia: PUV, 2003), 361–388; Enric Guinot and Ferran Esquilache, *Moncada i l'Orde del Temple en el segle XIII. Un comunitat rural de l'Horta de València en temps de Jaume I* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 2010), 39–43. See also his contribution, "Council and urban militias in the Crown of Aragon during the 13th Century: from conquering militias to monetary exemptions," in this volume.

25 One hundred is sometimes the number of members chosen for lay, not necessarily military, brotherhoods, for example Sant Jaume, created in Valencia in 1246, and made up of a hundred selected laymen: Robert I. Burns, *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia. Reconstruction on a Thirteenth Century-Frontier* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 1:126–127.

26 We may point out that the formula of the *cofradía* was used by James II of Aragon on a large scale in the expedition organized in 1315 against the Muslim corsairs. The confraternity

military brotherhoods created in the Guadalquivir Valley from the 13th century onwards (and to a lesser degree elsewhere in the kingdom of Castile), were corporations of noble knights; the lesser aristocracy of the *hidalgos*, which in some cases survived for a long time.[27] These groups, however, have no prominence in the numerous and detailed accounts of the feats of arms that occurred at the frontier with the kingdom of Granada. Everything seems to indicate that these corporations never had in practice a true military content.

Urban Militias as Organisational Model

Burdened by their own rigid nature and lacking the discipline of true military orders, confraternities proved to be an inadequate organisational model for those units operating outside the scheme of the aristocratic armed retinues. This role was instead performed by the societies organised within urban militias. Such a phenomenon was not exclusively Hispanic, because knights' associations were also organised within Italian communal militias for the autonomous management of the booty from their depredations and, above all, the ransoms obtained for their captives.[28] However, the Iberian frontier offered a uniquely favourable environment for this kind of association.

It was council militias, and not these alternative forms of corporation represented by confraternities, that were the origin of autonomous military associations, which therefore often closely reproduced their organisational patterns, shaped by the periodic experience of war. Initially the *exercitum*, organised collectively by the council, was formed of mixed troops – one unit per parish or *collación* – including horse and foot combatants. Each of these had a *cuadrillero* for the safe-keeping and distribution of booty. Operationally, however, the basic unit in both the march and in combat was smaller and was known as *posada* (Spanish) or *pausata* (Latin).

In spite of their importance, these smaller units have received little historiographical attention to date. As shown by their name, they were camp sections organised according to links of affinity and vicinity. These camp sectors were

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was advertised through public preaching and private visits, and joining up was rewarded with ecclesiastical indulgences in proportion to the amount of money put down by each subscriber. This non-military *cofradía* clearly reproduced the Crusader model of the period: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter cited as ACA] Cancillería, reg. 322 (*Registrum Confratrie ordinate per dominum regem pro divinis serviciis ac pro salute animarum fidelium et ad destruccionem Sarracenorum fetide nationis*).

27 González Jiménez, "Caballería popular," 327.

28 Maire Vigueur, *Cavaleri e cittadini*, 140–174; Grillo, *Cavalieri e popolo*, 125–127.

identified through a specific ensign known as *pendón posadero*. The central role played by the *posada* is shown by the *fueros* of Cuenca and Teruel, compiled in the 1190s and the most comprehensive texts for the regulation of the councils' war effort, as well as by the legal "offspring" of the former, both in the shape of local charters (Alarcón, Alcaraz, Huete, Zorita, Iznatoraf, Úbeda, Baeza, etc.) and in the so-called *Fuero del fecho las Cabalgadas*, which is examined below.[29]

The importance of the *posada* as a basic organisational and operational unit is shown by the rule according to which, if the detachment of a force (*algara*) from the camp or from the marching *exercitus* was deemed advisable, each *posada* had to contribute with half of its men while the rest remained in the rear.[30] On the other hand, the strength of the solidary bonds between the members of the *posada* was also displayed by the fact that, if a member of the group committed a serious offence such as robbery or treason and managed to escape unpunished, the whole group was considered collectively responsible for his crimes.[31] Additionally, the identity of the members of each *posada* was carefully recorded in writing: each member of the expedition was enlisted into a *posada* by the council's officials. This was aimed at dissuading the men from committing serious transgressions, but also at facilitating the fair allocation of the booty. Frauds such as double-enrolment were heavily penalised. It is interesting to note that the *Cantar de Mío Cid*, written around the same time as the *fueros* of Cuenca and Teruel, during the golden age of urban militias, clearly alludes to the practice of making lists of recruits with these same purposes.[32]

Another relevant normative aspect regarding *posadas* is the specific denomination for the relationship between their members. These were known as *socii* or *sociorum pausate*, while the *posada* in itself could be referred to as *societatis pausate*. In the vernacular, the terms used were equivalent to company (*companna*) and companions (*companneros*). The *posada* was therefore conceived as a company; a group of combatants organised according to the rules of the corresponding council militia. Aside from this, however, the regulations show the possibility of forming more spontaneous and informal

29 Pescador, "Caballería popular" [11], 142–145; Powers, *Society*, 101–104. On the *pendón posadero*, *Partidas* II.23.14.

30 *FC* 30.13; *Fuero sobre el fecho de las Cabalgadas* [hereafter cited as *FFC*], ed. *Memorial Histórico Español* 2 (1851), Ch. 69.

31 *FC* 30.37; *FT* Ch. 426; *FFC* Ch. 68.

32 *FC* 30.12, 30.37–38; *FT* Ch. 426, 433–434; *FFC* Ch. 68, 85–86; *Partidas* II.25.4, II.26.27, II.28.2, 8; *Cantar de Mío Cid*, ed. Ramón Menéndez Pidal (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1980), v. 1255–62. This system was still practiced during the war of Granada: María Martínez, "La cabalgada de Alhama (Almería) en 1500," *Miscelánea Medieval Murciana* 11 (1984): 73–74.

groups. It was indeed established that when the councils called for defensive mobilisation (*apellido*), those men that happened to be outside the town were not obliged to join (*societatem habere*, *aver companna*) other men with whom they had fortuitously met, thus implicitly recognising this as a possibility.[33] The *societas* could therefore supersede bonds of vicinity and the rules of local corporation based-militias. In fact, in the unification of local regulations carried out in Alfonso X's second *Partida*, references to the *posada*, which inevitably contextualises the grouping of *socii* within the council militia, almost totally disappear in favour of the more neutral "company." Additionally, the same text expressly stresses the operational and tactical capacity of this kind of group, considered the basic combat unit in battle (*tropel*, or "group of men making a company").[34]

If the *posada* can be identified with the *societas*/company, the latter was beyond doubt the subject of autonomous incursions (that is, expeditions conducted without previous summons by a lord of vassals). Although the term *cabalgada* was introduced into the western Iberian kingdoms at a relatively late date – in these regions the word *algara* (from the Arabic "*ghāra*," "incursion") was always more popular – the practice appears to be as old as urban-based cavalry. Describing certain events in 1133, the *CAI* narrates some incursions conducted outside royal authority (*sine imperio regis*) by groups of knights called *algaras* (*magnae turbae militum quod nostra lingua dicitur algaras*), thus confusing the action and the group carrying it out, as was to be, in fact, the norm thereafter. Moreover, the *fuero* of Cuenca, where *algara* and *cavalcata* coexist with some minor distinctions (the former is identified as an incursion detached from a larger expedition), also applies the second term to the booty, so the word *cabalgada* ends up simultaneously referring to the action, the group, and its captures. In contrast, the *fuero* of Teruel, written in the kingdom of Aragon, where the term had first been introduced, the denomination *cavalcata* and its related terms clearly predominate over *algara*, which is given a much more restricted meaning, similar to that reflected in Castile at a later date (in the second *Partida*).[35] The detailed regulation of these actions

33 *FC* 31.2; *FT* Ch. 448; *FFC* Ch. 103.

34 *Partidas* II.28.2, 9; II.23.16.

35 *CAI* I.36, 38; *FC* 30.13–15, 43, 58–59, 62, 64, 66; 31.11, 16; *FT* Ch. 188, 237, 257, 426, 444–445. The *Partidas*, II.23.28–29, do not clearly distinguish between *cabalgada* and *algara*, equally swift actions aimed only at looting: the only difference seems to lie in the superior cunning and knowledge of the terrain required for the *algara*, which in practice becomes a *cabalgada encubierta*.

was consigned for the first time in the *fuero* of Cuenca, which also shows that, despite their name, these operations were not limited to cavalry but were open to mixed or even infantry units.[36]

As is well known, the military rules of Cuenca are the most perfected of all local *fueros*, which is why they were fully incorporated into the controversial Castilian legal compilation known as *Fuero del Fecho de las Cabalgadas* or *Fuero del Emperador*. This text is only known through a late copy (15th century) and was apocryphally attributed to Charlemagne.[37] Despite the arguments presented in Carmela Pescador's classic analysis, where a connection is drawn between the compilation and Emperor Alfonso VII, suggesting an inverse sequence for the transmission of the text (the military chapter of the *fuero* of Cuenca would in this case be the copy of a pre-existing text, and not the other way around), it is clear that the text was put together during the reign of Alfonso X, to a large degree based upon the charter of Cuenca.[38] It must be stressed, however, that the text is divided into two well differentiated halves: the first, which with all certainty was composed later than the second, includes the most original entries; the second is little more than a transcription, with a few corrections, of Chapter 30 (*De regimine exercituum*) of the charter of Cuenca. The relevant fact, however, is that this compilation of rules for the execution of raids was successful, and remained the reference text for the solution of the booty-related disputes arising at the Nasrid frontier, both in the Guadalquivir valley and Murcia throughout the 14th and 15th centuries. To the best of my knowledge, the earliest appeal to the *Fuero del Emperador* known to date took place in 1334 for the settlement of a dispute between some Murcian knights involved in a raid. The document shows that during this period the compilation was ignored in the royal court but was very popular among expedition chiefs (*adalides*). This was so much the case that it was invoked even outside Castile. As early as 1290, at the southern frontier of the Crown of Aragon a local *adalid* was able to justify his actions with reference to the *Fur de l'Emperador* before the justice official in the town of Cocentaina without said official giving the slightest sign of surprise. This seems to suggest that the charter of *cabalgadas* is not as late as it is usually assumed to be. It must have been compiled during

36 *FC* 30.20, 30.58; *FFC* Ch. 64, 99.

37 Nearly half of the 103 entries (*FFC* Ch. 57–103) reproduce *FC* 30.1–64, 31.1–2 quite literally, and are to some degree a repetition of the contents of the first 56.

38 Pescador, "Caballería popular," [1], 166–173; Powers, "Origins," 106–108; Juan Torres Fontes, "Apellido y cabalgada en la frontera de Granada," *Estudios de Historia y Arqueología Medievales* 5–6 (1985–6): 186.

the years of Alfonso X's imperial aspirations, probably not much later than his failed proclamation in 1257.[39]

This law of *cabalgadas* or *del Emperador*, however, is not only relevant for its dissemination and the alternative it posed to other legal *corpora*, but for its far reaching implications. For one, it gave legal backing to the emancipation of raids from the corporate discipline of councils, contributing to the increasingly strong links drawn between this practice and the formation of companies (*companyas*), understood as groups of men (*companyeros*) freely associated for the occasion; these could be cavalry troopers, foot combatants or could even go by sea. The text regulated essential aspects such as the distribution of shares, the splitting up of the group, prizes, and penalties that could involve the loss of booty-rights (*desorteamiento*). This close connection between raids and companies is also clearly reflected in the second *Partida*; each *cabalgada* forms a company, and if two *cabalgadas* meet, they should ideally merge into a single company.[40]

As we have seen, companies emerged from council militias, where the appropriate operational scale was defined and where the relationship and mutual interdependence of the *socii* were drawn. This origin was the basis of the command principle adopted by the company, which was ultimately crucial for the cohesion and efficiency of these societies of combatants. I am referring to the figure of the *adalid*, the origins of which are, by the way, yet to be satisfactorily tracked down. The term is of course Arabic (*dalīl*, "guide"), and was apparently used in al-Andalus to designate those in charge of determining the offensive routes to be followed by the forward troops since the major campaigns carried out in the Umayyad period. The mechanism of its spread into the Christian kingdoms remains obscure. In the earliest references found in

39 Torres Fontes, "Apellido y cabalgada," 188; *Llibre de la Cort del Justícia de Cocentaina* (*1269, 1275–1278, 1288–1290*) [hereafter cited as *LCJC* I] ed. Josep Torró (Valencia: PUV, 2009), 505–506. An example of late dating in María Martínez, "La cabalgada: un medio de vida en la frontera murciano-granadina (siglo XIII)," *Miscelánea Medieval Murciana* 13 (1986): 54. The clear link with the text of the *Fuero de Cuenca* and other features disallow the suggestion that the *Fuero del Emperador* was inspired by the second *Partida*, as stated by Pedro A. Porras, "Dos casos de erechamiento de cabalgadas (Murcia, 1334–1392)," in *Estudos em Homenagem ao Professor Doutor José Marques* (Porto: Faculdade de Letras, 2006), 4:262. Catalan translations of the *Fur del emperador Carles Maynes* were available in the 15th century: Ramon d'Abadal, "Les 'Partidas' a Catalunya durant l'Edat Mitjana," in *Dels visigots als catalans*, (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1986), 2:350.

40 *FFC* Ch. 5, 12–6, 19–21, 26, 30, 32, 37, 43, 46, 50–53, 56; *Partidas*, II.28.21–23.

Leonese records the term is used as a toponym and, perhaps, as a nickname.[41] The *CAI* reserves the word to designate the famous Andalusi *adalid* Faraj of Calatrava, who doggedly fought the Christians of Toledo between 1133 and 1145.[42] Unless I am mistaken, the earliest references to *adalides* from the other side of the frontier are dated to immediately after this. After becoming a Christian outpost in 1147 the important frontier fortification of Calatrava became the base of a Christian *adalid*. A certain Don Melendo held this position from at least 1171, being replaced around 1185 by a Don Domingo, in his turn replaced by his son Pedro, who was in post by 1193. It is possible that this *adalid* "of Calatrava" (implying that he was the only, or at least the main one) served the homonymous military order, created in 1158 after the Templars renounced the defence of the stronghold, but we cannot forget that an urban council also existed here, under the *aegis* of the *fuero* issued immediately after the conquest and also under the lordship of the order.[43]

At any rate, the case of Calatrava cannot be isolated from the context of the frontier in the region of Toledo. The earliest Christian *adalid* that I have been able to find (Pedro Muñoz, 1150) seems to have had some connection with Toledo or with one of the councils in its territory. Additionally, the Arabic documents from the Toledan see include an interesting collection of *adalides* dated to between 1160 and the first quarter of the 13th century. In some cases, at least, these were members of the significant community of Arabic-speaking Christians or *Mozarabes* living in the region (such as Zināluh, Rodrigo ibn al-Zayd, Tamām and others). These men were therefore particularly suitable for incursions beyond the Andalusi frontier and for gathering intelligence regarding the

41 Évariste Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane, II. Le siècle du califat de Cordoue* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1950), 98–99; Dolores Oliver, "Los arabismos en la documentación del Reino de León (siglos IX–XII) y Glosario de arabismos," in *Orígenes de las lenguas romances en el reino de León: siglos IX–XII* (León, Centro de Estudios e Investigación San Isidoro: 2004), 2:159.

42 *CAI* II.15, 35, 83–85, 88, 95. In *AT* 121, 108 there is a mention of his death, as well as the demise of an earlier Andalusi *adalid* called *Nacar* (1125).

43 Ángel González Palencia, *Los mozárabes de Toledo en los siglos XII y XIII* (Madrid: Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan, 1926–30), I, docs. 98 (1171), 154 (1181), 172 (1185), 242 (1193); II, docs. 401 (1213), 407 (1214), 581 (1243); IV, doc. 1174 (1219); Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, "Documentos para el estudio de la Orden de Calatrava en la meseta meridional castellana (1102–1302)," *Cuadernos de Historia Medieval. Secc. Colecciones Documentales* 2 (1999): doc. 62 (1181); Julio González, *El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII* (Madrid: CSIC, 1960), III, doc. 730 (1202). On the village of Calatrava, Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, "Calatrava. Una villa en la frontera castellano-andalusí del siglo XII," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 30/2 (2000): 807–849.

lay of the terrain or the position of Muslim forces. In fact, the narration of the preliminaries to the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) offered in the *Chronica Latina* stresses the frequent expeditions led by Christian *adalides* across the hills that separated the Castilian plain (La Mancha) and the Guadalquivir valley.[44]

In the second half of the 12th century the *adalides* were not restricted to the most recent frontier south of Toledo and the Transierra. They were also active in the more northerly councils of the Extremadura, most particularly in the well-known case of Ávila. The *adalid* García Ximeno is already mentioned by 1151. He was in all probability related to other military chiefs of considerable prowess, as shown in the *Crónica de la Población de Ávila*: these include the *adalides* Sancho Ximeno and Gómez Ximeno, the commanders of Ávila's militia during the sack of Seville's countryside in 1158. The former was considered a good reader of omens (*buen agorador*) as well as a good warrior, despite being a hunchback (if we believe the Andalusi chronicler Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalā, who dedicates an entire passage to him, narrating his defeat and death after laying waste to Écija and Córdoba's hinterland in 1173). The latter was said to have taken part in 43 battles and to have been accompanied by his son, Don Yagüe, who also became a renowned *adalid*: his most famous actions took place in 1197 and 1214.[45] If the *Mozarabe* records from Toledo show the *adalides* as well-placed and respected men, worthy of the title of "don" and remembered by their sons and grandsons as a matter of family prestige, the chronicle from Ávila confirms the often hereditary nature of the occupation. The sons of these men were instructed in the art from an early age – we must remember that this was a very hazardous occupation, in which death and captivity were frequent – including not only combat abilities but also more subtle and arduously acquired skills such as finding and interpreting tracks. This may explain why they were sometimes credited with esoteric powers. We must bear in mind at all times, however, that the chronicle carefully distinguishes between these men and important knights in the town, some of whom led raids, such as the famous Zorraquín Sancho.

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44 M. Isabel Pérez de Tudela, *Infanzones y caballeros. Su proyección en la esfera nobiliaria castellano-leonesa* (*siglos IX–XIII*) (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1979), 396. In addition to those cited in the previous note, see González Palencia, *Mozárabes*, I, docs. 63 (1160), 154 (1181), 181 (1186), 205 (1189), 207 (1183–91), 278 (1197), 321 (1202), 333 (1204); II, doc. 447 (1219); III, docs. 826 (1282), 898 (1167), 903 (1188), 953 (1214), 984 (1217); *Chronica Latina Regum Castellae* [hereafter cited as *CLRC*] ed. Luis Charlo (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), Ch. 23.

45 Pérez de Tudela, *Infanzones*, 396; *Crónica de la población*, 23–26, 32–33, 37; *AT* 133–134, 181–182; García Fitz, *Las Navas*, 214–215.

The art of leading raids (*condux sive adalill*; *cavalgatam minaverit*) inevitably assumes the full command of the *adalid*; this authority was to be given legal shape in the late 12th century in the charters of Cuenca and Teruel, where his right to a double share of the booty was also laid down. In the case of autonomous raids, the power of the *adalides* becomes yet more apparent, as it was they and not the *cuadrilleros*, who decided upon the allocation of the booty. They also assumed the responsibility of putting aside the fifth of the captures due to the king, and of estimating the value of horses and supplies given to the expedition by persons not actively participating in it (these two responsibilities are not included in the charter of Teruel). Above anything, the *adalid* would have the power to resolve the disputes arising between members of the party.[46] This judicial dimension of the *adalid*, which is only reflected in the local regulations in question, is probably the most significant, and lies at the foundations of subsequent developments resulting in the future charter of *cabalgadas* (at least in its first half, which unlike the second does not literally copy the *fuero* of Cuenca). We must not forget that the earliest allusions to the implementation of this *Fuero del Emperador* refer precisely to judgements passed by *adalides*. One of the initial entries in the charter indicates that the purpose of the document is to guide the *adalides* in "laying the law" among the raiders. Nobody but an *adalid* could pass judgement as far as *cabalgadas* were concerned, and this function was rewarded with a tithe of the penalty imposed. In order to increase the efficiency of their judicial authority, they were allowed to impose fines on those who failed to respond to their summons and, more importantly, to pursue and incarcerate those accused of robbery without suffering the interference of lordly justice, as well as being able to impose heavy fines to those encumbering the process.[47]

The *Partidas* also recognises the *adalides*' judicial power in *cabalgadas* and a certain measure of responsibility in the distribution of prizes and compensations, but they completely overlook the basis of this jurisdiction. Furthermore, they carefully set the boundaries of this authority to within manageable limits (thus reinforcing the position of the king and aristocracy), without compromising their efficiency in the field. It is clearly stated that their appointment was the prerogative of the king or of some other lord, although the adequacy

46 *FC* 30.40, 59, 60, 62, 64–65; *FT* Ch. 188, 189, 426, 437, 444–445; *FFC* Ch. 88, 100, 102.

47 *FFC* Ch. 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 30, 40–41, 48–50. In contrast, the *fuero* of *cabalgadas* left the allocation of the booty to the *cuadrilleros*, although the *adalid* is given seven infantryman's shares or *peonías*. For an example see Torres Fontes, "Apellido y cabalgada," 188 (1329).

of the candidate to the post was reviewed and judged by a board of twelve *adalides*, who had to decide on the basis of a wide range of carefully inventoried abilities. The ceremony of acceptance into the post was ostentatious. The fact that a member of the high aristocracy had to fasten a sword around the new *adalid* is reminiscent of the ceremony with which knighthood was conferred, but it is also indicative of submission to the aristocracy. Additionally, Alfonso X's law clearly determined that the *adalid* could lead (*cabdillar*) his social superiors – noblemen and knights – by the use of the word alone; only infantrymen and mounted *almogávares* could be physically punished for not obeying his orders.[48] Inasmuch as it restricts the *adalid*'s judicial and punitive powers, the second *Partida* can be interpreted as a reaction to the *Fuero del Emperador*.

On the other hand, one aspect in the occupation of *adalid* is worth paying special attention to. The charters of Cuenca and Teruel only granted *adalides* the double share if they "were known" by the council, while contemplating the possibility of more than one *adalid* taking part in a single action; they even admitted the eventuality of having a Muslim *adalid*. This may have been the case of the "Moor that had turned Christian" who led the first Christian assault upon Cordoba in 1235. (In fact, throughout the 14th and 15th centuries the *adalides tornadizos*, opportunely converted and extremely useful former Muslims, abounded along the frontier with the emirate of Granada).[49] Similarly, *adalides* were not required to be from the town whose militia they served with, or to have, in fact, any connection with them whatsoever. The *adalides* mentioned in the *repartimiento* of Seville (1253) are not expressly connected with specific companies or groups, and were all granted houses in the same discrete areas.[50] We may therefore conclude that these men formed a proud corporation of specialists whose highly demanded trade – war at the frontier – could at least in part be supplied itinerantly. In a certain sense, they prolonged the concept of a warrior caste developed long before by the raiders known as *pardos* and *serranos*, at a time when the descendants of these men were increasingly concerned about maintaining a hegemonic position in the councils and promotion into the ranks of the *hidalgo* aristocracy. The *adalides*' ability to organise and lead expeditions would soon propitiate the creation of entire associations of combatants around their charismatic figures.

48 *Partidas* II.22.1–4.

49 *FC* 30.40, 59; 31.15; *FT* Ch. 437, 452; *FFC* Ch. 88; *CLRC* Ch. 69.

50 *Repartimiento de Sevilla*, ed. Julio González (Madrid: CSIC, 1951), 2:99–100, 104–105, 238, 249–250, 282–285.

Almogávares: The Value of Foot Combatants

From at least the mid-13th century, the *adalides* started to coexist with other, minor military chiefs: the so-called *almocadenes* (from the Arabic "*muqaddam*":"chief"). The use of this term was new in Castile, and in the crown of Aragon it would take longer still to hatch (it came into use there after 1270). The *Partidas* simply says that "those that we used to call commander of infantrymen (*cabdillos de los peones*) we now call *almocadenes*." The adoption of such a specific term, however, cannot have been accidental; it probably responded to the need to refer to changing models of military association which also demanded new forms of leadership.[51] Indeed, the *almocadenes* directed groups of foot combatants which were no longer integrated into the larger unit of the urban militia, but which soon acquired operational autonomy. The *repartimiento* of Seville refers to a total of 35 groups led by *almocadenes*, with between four and thirty men. The earliest attempt to regulate the action of these leaders can be found in the *Fuero del Emperador*, where it is determined that in order to access the position of *almocadén* a minimum of three raids must have been organised with the subsequent *almonedas* (auctions) to dispose of the booty having taken place in a walled town. In contrast, in the *Partidas* the appointment is left to the discretion of the *adalides*, who are thus given the authority to promote an infantryman to *almocadén*. Additionally, the ceremony performed on these occasions was inspired by the ritual carried out for the appointments of the *adalides* themselves, in which the newly appointed chief received a small ensign or *pendón posadero* as an emblem for his company. Obviously, the *Partidas* reflected the king's will to control companies by introducing a stable hierarchy and a formal route for promotion, from infantryman to *almocadén* to *almogávar a caballo* to *adalid*. In any case, the relevant point is that the text confirms that raids were also carried out by simple associations of combatants on foot.[52]

In fact, throughout the 13th century, and in particular after the major Christian conquests in the south and east of the Iberian Peninsula (Guadalquivir Valley, Murcia, Valencia) and Mallorca, infantrymen became increasingly

51 *Partidas* II.22.5.

52 *FFC* caps. 9, 56; moreover, in the absence of an *adalid*, three *almocadenes* could put aside the portion of the booty due to the king (*FFC* Ch. 30); *Partidas*, II.22.4–7. These hierarchic principles are clearly laid out in a letter by Alfonso X to the frontier council of Lorca (1265) in which the participants in *cabalgadas* are distributed by rank as follows: knights, *adalides*, mounted *almogávares*, *almocadenes*, crossbowmen and infantrymen: *Colección de documentos*, III, 86.

important in companies detached from or created outside council militias. The term *almogávares* was in use to refer to these groups by at least 1230. Once more, this is a loan word from Arabic: "*mughāwir*" literally means "he who takes part in incursions" (*ghāra*, sing.); that is, the *algaras* of Latin and Vernacular texts. The charter of Cuenca and its legal progeny granted certain privileges to those detaching themselves from the main militia force to launch *algaras* (*illi qui in algaram perrexerint*; "*algareros*" in Huete's Vernacular version). It seems likely that the most inclined to act autonomously when the occasion allowed it were the members of these vanguard forces, who knew the terrain and were both able hunters and good fighters.[53]

The *almogávares* start to feature almost simultaneously in the chronicles of the major conquests achieved by Castile and Aragon. The conquest of Córdoba, in 1236, began after a risky operation which, according to Lucas de Tuy, was carried out "by brave Catholic men that live on the frontier with the Moors and who are called *almogávares*," whereas Jiménez de Rada identified them as "knights (*milites*) who in the Arabic language are called *almogávares*." On the other hand, Alfonso X's *Estoria* (later in date, but more detailed) stresses that the action was carried out by a group of *hidalgos*, *adalides* and *almogávares*, mounted and on foot, from Andújar, including several who spoke the Arabic language well. The same chronicle mentions the "Christian *almogávares*" – a qualification upon which the author appears keen to insist – present in the host of Ferdinand III and the (not always successful) *cabalgadas* launched during the siege of Seville in 1248, "whenever they thought that something could be taken off the Moors."[54] The subsequent *repartimiento* of the city shows the prizes granted to foot (with their leaders, the *almocadenes*) and mounted *almogávares*. It was therefore inevitable that the great legal compilations sponsored by Alfonso X paid some attention to this increasingly well-defined breed of combatant, different from the cavalry and from the ordinary infantry enrolled in council militias. While the *Fuero del Emperador* only mentioned them briefly, the second *Partida* made a somewhat spurious attempt to meticulously regulate the position of the *almogávar* within the framework

53 *FC* 30.14; Pescador, "Caballería popular" [2]:172–176. The account offered in *CLRC* Ch. 53, of the coup that led Ibn Hūd to seize power in Murcia (1228) defines this frontier soldier of obscure origins as an *almogar plebeius*, a term closer to the Arabic *mughīr*, with the same root as *mughāwīr* and a similar meaning.

54 Lucas de Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, ed. Emma Falque (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), IV.101; Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. Juan Fernández (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987), IX.16; *Primera Crónica General de España*, ed. Ramón Menéndez-Pidal (Madrid: Gredos, 1977), II, 729–730, 759. *CLRC* Ch. 69 narrates the same episode, but without using the term explicitly.

of formal military hierarchy, distinguishing once more between the mounted (superior to the *almocadén* and subordinate to the *adalid*) and the foot *almogávar*, which is simply referred to as *peón* (infantryman).[55]

Regarding the crown of Aragon, James I's *Book of Deeds* described several actions carried out by the *almogávares* during the conquest of Mallorca and Valencia in 1230 and 1233–44 respectively. These men are shown as taking part in the *cabalgadas* organised by noblemen, military orders, and the king himself, launched in combination with other cavalry and infantry forces, urban militias and armed retinues (*mesnadas*). No express mention of mounted *almogávares* exists. It seems that in the crown of Aragon – less responsive to attempts at classification made in Castile by Alfonso X's laws – this role was performed by mounted parties whose members were generically referred to as *adalides*; indeed, as we shall soon see, from the 1270s the *almogávares* of the Catalan-Aragonese texts were, almost without exception, infantry troops. At first they were, in any case, small groups; in the royal *cabalgada* down the river Júcar (1233) there were only 150 *almogávares*, along with 130 knights of rank and 700 ordinary infantrymen; similar figures feature in the modest force that started the siege of Valencia (1238). In this case, and with total disregard to their limited strength, they launched with the support of other infantrymen a reckless action against the nearby village of Russafa. This raid, strongly reminiscent of the one carried out in Córdoba barely two years before, would have ended in disaster had the king not intervened. After the city fell they maintained their *modus operandi*, forming heterogeneous groups under the command of a nobleman, frequently indulging in depredations and making captives of already subjected "Moors of peace."[56]

This latest aspect is important. In the crown of Aragon the proliferation of groups of *almogávares* was increasingly connected with practices carried out in violation of the king's authority, especially with regard to the guarantees given to Muslim communities in the recently conquered regions. This kind of action escalated immediately after the entry of James I into Valencia and was replicated once more with the Muslims expelled from Murcia in 1266, despite the guarantees granted by the Aragonese king. The end of the campaigns and

55 *Repartimiento de Sevilla*, II: 100–102, 104–109, 122–126, 249–250, 273–280; *FFC* Ch. 44, 48; *Partidas* II.22.3, 4, 6.

56 *Llibre dels feits del rei en Jaume* [hereafter cited as *LF*], ed. Ferran Soldevila, Jordi Bruguera and Maria T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2008), Ch. 103, 187, 203, 225, 255, 257, 295, 306, 315, 333; Josep Torró, "Guerra, repartiment i colonització al regne de València (1248–1249)," in *Repartiments a la Corona d'Aragó* (*segles XII-XIII*), ed. Enric Guinot and Josep Torró (Valencia: PUV, 2007), 253–255.

the reduction of opportunities for booty across the frontier accentuated the recurrent confusion between *almogávares* and *malefactores*. After the arrival of the Marinid army and the Castilian defeat at Écija in 1275, bands of *almogávares* from the crown of Aragon and from part of the crown of Castile fell uncontrolledly upon the subjected Muslims still living in the kingdom of Valencia, who were officially under the protection of the king. These events resulted in the promulgation of several persecutory orders between 1275 and 1280. These had, however, to coexist with contradictory measures of grace due to the essential role played by these armed bands in putting out the widespread Muslim rebellion which they had worked so hard to inflame.[57]

In the Guadalquivir Valley and in other regions conquered by Castile where the Muslim communities had almost completely disappeared after the 1264–66 war, these groups turned to forms of banditry that were deemed less acceptable; i.e. aimed at Christians and their property. One of Alfonso X's *cantigas* mentions the gathering of certain *almogávares* "on foot, who were very good but also very big thieves" in the chapel in Jerez Castle soon after its conquest (1264), where they made the decision to seek redemption by "being good through doing the Moors evil" (*hacer mal a moros con muy buenos corazones*). Eventually, the term *almogávares* was reserved for those predatory bands acting on the last Muslim frontier – with the Nasrid emirate in Granada – while the groups involved in assaulting and murdering travellers and in stealing beehives and livestock in the sparsely populated regions around the former frontier, between the Montes de Toledo and Sierra Morena, were to be known thereafter as *golfines*. The earliest occurrence of this term dates to 1254; Alfonso X's (somewhat belated) chronicle stresses that the king was willing to pardon the "large companies of *golfines*" if they took part in an expedition against Granada. This appeal failed, and orders for their capture and execution were issued in 1281. However, the offer must have had some effect because Diego Pérez de Montenegro, one of the *almocadenes* who embarked that same year on the expedition against Algeciras, was nicknamed *el Golhín*. Clearly, the conversion of *golfines* into *almogávares* presented no technical difficulties. In fact, a good proportion of them soon after joined the companies of *almogávares* mustered by Peter III of Aragon. Significantly, the only extant description

57 Bernat Desclot, *Llibre del rei en Pere d'Aragó* [hereafter cited as Desclot], ed. Ferran Soldevila, Jordi Bruguera and Maria T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2008), Ch. 49, 65, 67; *LF* Ch. 295, 306; *Llibre de la Cort del Justícia de València* (*1280–1282*), ed. E. Guinot, M.A. Diéguez and C. Ferragut (Valencia: PUV, 2008), 78; Robert I. Burns, "Social Riots on the Christian-Moslem Frontier (Thirteenth-Century Valencia)," *American Historical Review* 66 (1961): 378–400.

of these evildoers is provided by the Catalan chronicler Desclot, who must have met them on this occasion. According to him, they were ruined men of *paratge* (i.e. high ancestry), "with no rents to live on, or having gambled and squandered all away" being thus forced to assault Christians and Muslims in the Muradal Pass (Sierra Morena). Although the Catalan term *paratge* formally designates a special group assimilated into the lowest level of the nobility, its use here to generically refer to a level below that of the noble knights may signify that it was also meant to embrace outcast urban knights, maybe even including true *hidalgos*. At any rate, their considerable numbers and the graphic representation of them found in one of the books of *cantigas* – where the miniature represents the *golfines* as a large group of infantrymen armed with lances and javelins – call into question Desclot's generalisation.[58]

During the brief interval between the beginning of the "second war of Granada" (1275) and that of Aragon's expansive policy in the Mediterranean (1282), the dimensions of this phenomenon, the growth of bands of freebooters, started to have a significant effect on their potential as a military force. The proliferation of these groups at the new Nasrid frontier is clearly shown by the list of miracles of Saint Domingo of Silos, composed by the monk Pedro Marín in the late 13th century. This text relates the escape from the Muslims of numerous prisoners who had been captured while taking part in raids against Granada. At least 26 of the cases narrated (of a total of 91) are directly connected with *cabalgadas* carried out between 1276 and 1285 by groups of "*compañeros*" – a dozen men, or a few tens of men at the most – led by *almocadenes*. Given the considerable bias of the sample we can assume that these *miráculos romançados* present but a pale resemblance of the true magnitude of this sort of action during this period.[59]

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58 *Cantigas de Santa María de Don Alfonso el Sabio* (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1889), II, 523–524 (Ch. 374); *Crónica de Alfonso X*, ed. Manuel González and María A. Carmona (Murcia: Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, 1999), 215; Pedro Marín, *Miráculos romançados*, ed. Karl-Heinz Anton (Burgos: Abadía de Silos, 1988): 135; Desclot Ch. 79; Carmen Mela and José M. Sánchez, "Para el estudio del bandidismo medieval. Golfines y seguridad en los montes," in *I Congreso de Historia de Castilla-La Mancha* (Toledo: Junta de Comunidades, 1988), 5:197–203; José M. Sánchez, "Hermandades y delincuencia rural entre el Tajo y Sierra Morena (siglos XIII–XV)," *Clío & Crimen* 3 (2006): 134–166. Illuminated *Cantiga* num. 102, Escorial codex.

59 Pedro Marín, *Miráculos*, 50–57, 61–65, 67–68, 79–80, 84–91, 93–101, 106–111, 120–123, 139–140, 142–144, 157–158, 179–180 ; Francisco García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al islam. Estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares* (*siglos XI–XIII*) (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), 127–135.

It was not at the frontier of Granada, however, but in the south of the crown of Aragon that these small contingents, hard to pin down and highly mobile, started to unite in much larger groups of several thousand men at a time. Eight thousand *almogávares* from Valencia, Catalonia and Aragon gathered in 1275 to sack the *huerta* of Alicante; and up to thirty thousand that operated between Valencia and Murcia – including Castilian *golfines* – had followed their *adalides* and joined Peter III's call to participate in his 1282 African expedition. Finally, only half of them were permitted to embark. Desclot's figures must not be dismissed. According to the campaign's expense records, during the war against the Muslim rebels in the kingdom of Valencia (1276–77) there were autonomous companies formed by groups of up to 2,000 infantrymen apiece; additionally, Desclot's and Muntaner's accounts indicate that at the beginning of the campaigns in Ifrīqiya and Sicily the *almogávares* were organised in groups of between 1,000 and 3,000 troops. This can be confirmed by the archival evidence cited in the modern editions of these chronicles. On the other hand, references to the activity of bands of *almogávares* at the Iberian frontiers (especially in the records corresponding to the crown of Aragon) also multiply in this period.[60]

These infantry forces described by Desclot and Muntaner fully demonstrated their prowess and efficiency in the long war following the Sicilian Vespers and in the subsequent expedition to the Byzantine Empire. In his 1305 and 1309 treatises on the recovery of the Holy Land, Ramon Llull presented the *almogávares* as *pedites bellatores*, foot combatants selected for their strength and valour, "very necessary men in any conquest" and a key factor in the military superiority of the Christians.[61] But this is well known; the reasons behind this efficiency have not, in contrast, been satisfactorily explained. Their equipment – in line with a carefully outlandish general attire – was characterised first by the total absence or, at best, extreme subtlety of body armour. It seems clear that mobility was one of their key assets not only in harrying operations but also in hand to hand combat against heavier troops, which they did not avoid. They fought with javelins, lances and knives, changing their

60 Desclot Ch. 67, 79, 84; ACA Cancillería, reg. 33, f. 123r–124r (1276); Ramon Muntaner, *Crònica* [hereafter cited as Muntaner], ed. Ferran Soldevila, Jordi Bruguera and Maria T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2011), caps. 62, 66, 93, 102; Elena Lourie, "Anatomy of Ambivalence: Muslims under the Crown of Aragon in the Late Thirteenth Century," in *Crusade and Colonisation. Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medieval Aragon* (Aldershot: Gower, 1990), 10–11, 19–20.

61 Ramon Llull, *Liber de Fine*, in *Raimundi Lulli. Opera Latina*, IX, ed. Alois Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), 278–279; *Liber de Acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. Eugène Kamar, *Studia Orientalia Christiana* 6 (1961): 107–108.

weapons according to the needs of the battle. Their key technique or, at any rate, the most specialised was javelin-throwing, which they could perform with unique force and accuracy.[62] This allowed them to attack heavy cavalry and to participate in naval combat, complementing from prow and stern the fire power of the crossbowmen stationed on the central platforms of the ships (*ballesters en taula*).[63] Their skills with the javelin set these units apart from other foot soldiers and became their mark of identity, as was the longbow to the English archers in the Hundred Years War. Other European infantry forces did not use this technique, and Muntaner openly scorns the clumsiness with which the French soldiers threw their javelins in naval battles.[64] Therefore, according to the Catalan chronicles this infallible *modus operandi* made the *almogávares* an unstoppable war machine in the forty years between the Vespers and the Sardinian campaign.

We cannot, however, forget that these successes were to a large degree due to the considerable dimensions of the units, very different from the small bands engaged in the conquest of Mallorca, Córdoba, Valencia, Seville and Murcia, where they always played a subsidiary role. The increase in their numbers was, on the other hand, surprisingly rapid, occurring in barely a decade, as I have pointed out before. Is it possible for so many men to become proficient in a certain combat technique in such a short period of time? In fact, there was a solid basis for this training, because the combination of lance and javelin was already common among Iberian urban militias from the 12th century.[65]

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62 Desclot Ch. 89, 102–103; Muntaner Ch. 107, 122, 134, 159, 191–192, 195, 203, 221, 275–276; Llull, *Liber de Fine*, 279.

63 Justly considered one of the causes of Roger de Lloria's uninterrupted series of naval victories gained in conditions of numerical inferiority: Lawrence V. Mott, *Sea Power in the Medieval Mediterranean. The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of the Sicilian Vespers* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 191–196. See the actions of the *almogávares* in naval combats in Desclot, Ch. 113, 127; and Muntaner, Ch. 83, 130, 152. In 1316 all seamen and combatants in the navy organised by James II had to use javelins (*darts*): ACA Cancillería, reg, 322, f. 18v–19r.

64 Dennis E. Showalter, "Caste, Skill and Training: The Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies from the Middle Ages to the Sixteenth Century," *The Journal of Military History* 57 (1993): 412–414; Muntaner, Ch. 130. In other parts of Europe the *pedites* carried defensive equipment and fought with long lances or pikes, long hooks, crossbows and longbows: John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of Crusades, 1000–1300* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 25–28, 66–69; Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1996), 194–195; Settia, *Comuni in guerra*, 193–195.

65 It seems likely that the use of javelins, also related to deer-hunting, had been borrowed from al-Andalus; in the social network of Christian towns its use would acquire hitherto unknown dimensions.

According to the charter of Cuenca – in a provision replicated in the *Partidas* – in order to have the right to a share in the booty an infantryman must carry lance and javelin (*lanceam et siculum*). This was not a trivial requirement: the anonymous *Poema de Fernán González*, written in 1250–52, portrays Castilian infantrymen as hard, light-footed men fighting in the vanguard with lances (*azconas*) and javelins (*dardos*) which they could throw with precision, opening breaches in the enemy lines for the cavalry to target. A non-literary text, the court proceedings corresponding to a hearing in Cocentaina concerning the disagreement between several infantrymen involved in the sack of the *huerta* of Alicante (1275), repeatedly describes the same combat position: "low lance and brandishing the javelin."[66]

The infantrymen involved in this incident were, no doubt, part of that large group – supposedly around eight thousand – of men whom Desclot already labelled as *almogávares* in his narration of the events occurring after the Battle of Écija. At this moment a significant number of militiamen, with some military experience after their participation in royal hosts and major *cabalgadas*, found it relatively easy to join the small bands of full-time *almogávares* involved in frontier raids – one or two day rides, covering a distance of between four and six leagues – and in providing other armed services.[67] With all certainty *adalides* and *almocadenes* played a crucial role in this process of integration. These chiefs commanded more or less dedicated militia units and true *almogávares* (i.e. specialised combatants) and could facilitate the transition from one category to the other. The new recruits may not have been as skilled as the old hands but were at least familiar with the key techniques of their new units. This swelling of the phenomenon probably caused some alarm in Peter III's court, showing the advantages of giving them employment abroad, especially with the 1282 African (and afterwards Sicilian) expedition.[68]

Just as with certain groups among the urban cavalry militias since the early 12th century, the emergence of the *almogávares* presented certain social sectors with the possibility of a full-time dedication to predatory war, particularly in this case with those that could not afford to fight on horseback. In the mid-13th century, at the end of the great Christian conquests, the urban cavalry's

66 *FC* 30.5; *FFC* Ch. 61; *Partidas* II.26.28; *Poema de Fernán González*, ed. H. Salvador (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1995), strophes 193, 308, 456, 462; *LCJC* I, 225–226. Some miniatures in the Escorial codex of the *Cantigas* represent infantrymen armed (only) with lance and javelin: nums. 22, 96, 102 and 175.

67 Desclot Ch. 79; Llull, *Liber de Acquistione*, 107.

68 Josep Torró, "Viure del botí. La frontera medieval com a parany historiogràfic," *Recerques* 43 (2001): 17–30.

interest in an increasingly difficult and squalid *ganancia* at the frontier declined; their focus shifted towards the reinforcement of privileges, the exploitation of urban taxation, and social promotion. Yet the emergence of the *almogávares* indicates that the risky option of frontier raids was still a viable option under the new circumstances.[69] At first sight the change suggests the reduction in size of the social sectors involved, but in fact it was more of a transformation of the social groups committed to looting. The close identification with respectable cavalrymen in control of urban councils – *boni* and *probi homines* – was in any case lost. This transformation soon resulted in a rapidly expanding and almost uncontrollable phenomenon, capable of destabilising the public order in the kingdoms.

The Catalan-Aragonese provenance of *almogávares* has been overstressed, to the extreme that the phenomenon is often considered exclusive to the Aragonese crown and, in particular, of Catalonia. The *almogavería* emerged pretty much simultaneously in all Iberian Kingdoms, persisting in all of them until the late 15th century. In Portugal, in fact, it lasted even longer with the proliferation of *almogávares* – referred to by that name – in the Portuguese Maghreb.[70] The large number of Catalan *almogávares* is, by contrast, truly in need of an explanation. Indeed, if autonomous associations of combatants had emerged in the framework of council militias which, as pointed out by Powers, projected urban structures and expressed their strength, little could be expected from Catalan towns in this regard.[71]

Catalonian urban institutions crystallised considerably later than their Western and even their Aragonese counterparts. The earliest, still unstable, forms of urban association under charters of franchise did not appear until the late 12th century; more developed forms of organisation and a jurisdiction based on written legislation had to wait until the 1220s. Lleida, conquered in 1149 and for a long time influenced by the nearby Aragon, was the city where the term *universitas* (Cat. *universitat*, "corporation"), used in Catalonia to refer to a community of neighbours, was adopted for the first time (1217) and where

69 Powers, *Society*, 88–89, 210.

70 Roger Sablonier, *Krieg und Kriegertum in der Crònica des Ramon Muntaner* (Bern-Frankfurt: Verlag Herbert Lang, 1971), 57–61 criticized the "patriotic" perspective in Ferran Soldevila, *Els almogàvers* (Barcelona: Barcino, 1952). Desclot, Ch. 79, claims that *almogávares* were Catalans, Aragonese and *Serranos* (no doubt, Castilians). According to Llull, *Liber de fine*, 279, they abounded *in Catalonia, Aragonia et Castella*; the *Liber de acquisitione*, 107, locates them *in Hispania, Catalonia et etiam Aragonia*. There are multiple 16th century references to Portuguese *almogávares* and their *almocadenes*: see Bernardo Rodrigues, *Anais de Arzila*, ed. David Lopes (Lisboa: Academia das Sciências, 1915–19).

71 Powers, *Society*, 93–111.

the first body of local laws (*Consuetudines Ilerdenses*) was enacted (1228). According to these "customs" local citizenship was conditional to participation in the *exercitum*.[72] However, the military units from Catalonian towns lacked the strict regulations ordering urban militias elsewhere in the Peninsula and were in no way comparable to the autonomous council armies raised in Castile, León and Aragon. They did not play a significant role in the royal host until the conquest of Valencia (1238). Certainly, the record of the distribution of land prizes (*repartiment*) after the conquest of Mallorca already reveals the collective participation of "men from towns" and Catalonian cities in the campaign (1229–30), but their corporate integration into the framework of the *universitas* did not crystallise until the conquest of Valencia.[73] As in France, military requirements of free men were limited to the obligation to participate in hosts and *cavalcatae* affecting all vassals – including clerics and noblemen –, and in the general duty to defend the prince's (i.e. the Count of Barcelona) land in case of danger, as set forth in the legal compilation of the *Usatges* (c. 1150). These militias, therefore, lacked developed organisational structures, including well defined units (*collaciones* and *posadas*) and specialised commanders (*adalides*).[74]

The Associative Agreement and Its Function

Despite all of this, and as pointed out by Antoni Virgili, there were groups carrying out autonomous *cabalgadas*, by land and by sea, on the Catalan Ebro frontier during the second half of the 12th and the early decades of the 13th century. These were the *cavalcadors*, a frequent sight in Tortosa, where they sold captives and robbed livestock; this practice was well regulated in the local laws, compiled in a late document (1272) based on common uses and customs

72 José M. Font, *Orígenes del régimen municipal de Cataluña* (Madrid: CSIC, 1946); *Costumbres de Lérida*, ed. Pilar Loscertales (Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1946), Ch. 93.

73 *Còdex català del llibre del repartiment de Mallorca*, ed. Ricard Soto (Palma: Govern Balear, 1984); *Llibre del repartiment del regne de València*, ed. María D. Cabanes and Ramón Ferrer (Zaragoza: Anubar, 1979–80), I.

74 Powers, *Society*, 37–38, 82–83; Donald J. Kagay, "Royal Power in an Urban Setting: James I and the Towns of the Crown of Aragon," *Mediaevistik* 8 (1995): 161–170; *Usatges de Barcelona*, ed. Joan Bastardas (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 1991), Ch. 30–31, 64. From 1258 the king and the church promoted the organisation of *rustici* armed with crossbows, swords and lances in the parishes around the Llobregat to repel hostile actions by other aristocrats; this was known as *sometent*, an irregular military expression of local solidarity: Flocel Sabaté, "El somatén en la Cataluña medieval," *Clío & Crimen* 3 (2006): 209–304.

which are indeed more characteristic to the period predating the conquest of Valencia.[75] The process by which the companies of freebooters regulated in Castile by the *Fuero del Emperador* and the *Partidas* branched out of the formally organised structure of council militias was completely lacking in Catalonia. However, the possibility of setting up an association in order to launch independent raids – besides the obligation to participate in those organised by the count – was recognised in the *Usatges* by the mid-12th century. The *Usatges* even declare the soundness of the associative covenant (*comunie et convenien-cie*) individually agreed between knights and men on foot for carrying out *cabalgadas* or hunting expeditions. This means that, from a formal perspective, urban organisation was not a necessary condition for the creation of societies of combatants. In fact, this same possibility is openly contemplated in the charters of Cuenca and Teruel which, apart from the chapters dedicated to the council militia, guaranteed the validity of *societates ad lucrandum* created, as with the Catalonian case, to regulate predatory actions (*expeditione*, *exercitu*, *cavalgata*) and hunting parties, including – in contrast with the *Usatges* – a commercial dimension (*negociacione*). It therefore seems clear that these societies were formed *extra villam*; that is, outside the boundaries of urban institutions, although they were also protected by them.[76]

While regulating the activities of the *societas* (Cat. *companyia*), later legislations in Tortosa (1272) and Valencia (1261) precisely avoided the laying down of their aims. It was declared that the duration of the associations would be set forth in the foundational agreement (this could be a matter of hours or years, or could be indefinite) and that a good understanding between all parts must prevail. Naturally, the participation of the partners (*socii*) in the profits would also be established in the foundational agreement, but it was bluntly asserted that not all forms of profit were legitimate, expressly excluding gain resulting from robbery, homicide, and other bad actions (*maleficiis*) which were in fact considered harmful to the legitimacy of the society at large (*turpis et feda societas*). In this same period Castilian councils issued similar prohibitions against *cofradías y ayuntamientos malos*.[77] This is an important introduction, as it shows the royal will to control this kind of association; indeed, a specific terminology, with a certain literary background, was soon adopted to refer to those

75 Antoni Virgili, "War and booty as incentives for emigration. Tortosa and al-Andalus (12th–13th centuries)," in this volume; *Costums de Tortosa*, ed. Jesús Massip (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 1996), 9.7.8.

76 *Usatges*, Ch. 66; *FC* 25.2; *FT* Ch. 237.

77 *Costums de Tortosa*, 4.20.1–6; *Fori Antiqui Valentiae*, ed. Manuel Dualde (Madrid: CSIC, 1967), LXX.1–3; XVIII.2, 5,11; Monsalvo, "Frontera pionera," 118.

associations aimed at non legitimate profiteering: *confraternitates*, *sacramentalia*, and *conspirationes* can be understood as synonyms of "bad enterprise" and were rigorously prohibited.[78] The prosecution of companies of infantrymen or *almogávares* involved in the 1275–76 attacks, just before the Muslim revolt in the kingdom of Valencia, and for which reason they were treated as vulgar evildoers, was based on these legal foundations.[79] It was important to stop these free associations of armed men, created outside the corporate framework of the urban militias, from violating in one way or another the authority of the king and the political order of the kingdom.

We do not have much evidence regarding the actual way in which these associations were formed. This is particularly the case in the western kingdoms, where literary texts are often our only source. The *Cantigas*, for example, allude to the agreement reached by 16 *almogávares* from Lisbon to launch an expedition into the Algarve (presumably before 1248). No doubt the pacts could be markedly informal and based on verbal oaths, but we must not forget that usually all partners had to submit their names to a registry in order to declare their responsibility and to record their claim to a part of the booty. For example, in 1277 a townsman from Cocentaina was not granted his modest share (15 *sueldos*) of the profits of a raid because the group leader claimed that he was not on the roll.[80]

The risks involved in the actions of these groups to the life and property of their members were too great not to commit agreements to writing. A notarial record from Vic, coeval with the conquest of Mallorca, contains entries referring to the constitution of two societies (*firmam societatem*) created to go *ad lucrandum* to the "land of the Saracens"; and to that of another two which were, somewhat more explicitly, to join the *exercitu Mayoriche*. The terms of these agreements are not substantially dissimilar to those found in the same book and concerning the setting up of commercial societies created for trading with Muslim countries: they determine the duration (several months; two years; indefinite), establish the proportional distribution of profits, and record the partners' commitment to mutual loyalty and assistance in the case of illness. It must be stressed that these agreements are nearly always between just

78 *Fori Antiqui Valentiae* XVIII.9. In Tortosa the government of the *universitat* adopted a similar decision in 1285 to stop associations of citizens from uniting against the aristocrat Ramon de Montcada: ACA, Cancillería, Pergs., Pere II, 453, 475–476, 478.

79 *LF* Ch. 554–555; *LCJC* I, 227; Ferran Soldevila, *Pere el Gran* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans: 1950–62), 1:405–407; Burns, "Social riots," 394–399.

80 *Cantigas*, II, 388–389 (Ch. 277): "et atal preito poseron ontre ssí que correr fossen o Algarue"; *LCJC* I, 306: "no s'escreví ab él."

two people, including two brothers, with one very interesting exception; in this, a group of ten men with different family names created in the usual terms a society *firmam et stabilem* with the purpose of participating in the military operations taking place on the island and profiting from them.[81] This sort of group would thus also form elsewhere in Catalonia under the stimulus of the conquest. This has left clear traces in the *repartiment* of Mallorca, where there are several entries referring to "men from towns." The leaders of at least seven such groups – three of which were connected with the coastal city of Tortosa – are also mentioned, along with their *socii* (Cat. *companyons*) whose number is only specified in two cases: five and twelve companions.[82]

This kind of *socii* group only appears sporadically in the earliest land distributions executed in Valencia, and in which the urban councils, by opposition, played such a crucial role. In contrast, societies of combatants had a very predominant position in the *repartiment* carried out in 1248–49, during the so-called "al-Azraq war." James I launched this campaign with the purpose of eliminating the latest enemy redoubts and proceeding with the general expulsion of Muslims. Due to the lack of enthusiasm shown by the lay aristocracy on this occasion the king decided not to call for a host, and thus left out not only the aristocracy, who were generally opposed to the enterprise, but also the urban militias. He believed that the lure of generous land prizes would be enough to attract sufficient forces, mustered *ad hoc*. The truth is that ninety groups of *socii* are mentioned in the record of this distribution, including an overall figure of 2,177 men, 72% of the total number of beneficiaries. The most common case is for these societies to be formed by ten men, and at any rate to oscillate between 5 and 20 members. This coincides with the groups of *almogávares* and infantrymen taking part in the *repartimiento* of Seville, formed by between 8 and 10 men. In the case of Valencia, however, some exceptionally large groups (of up to 200 members) can be found; these were very likely the result of the aggregation of smaller units. Similarly to Mallorca, each of these associations

81 *Manual primer de l'Arxiu de la Cúria Fumada de Vic* (*1230–1233*), ed. by Rafael Ginebra (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 1998), docs. 531, 866, 1190, 1203. I want to thank Antoni Mas (Universitat de les Illes Balears) for pointing out this source to me.

82 *Còdex català*, 53, 59–62, 64–68, 81–83. This can be checked with the published Latin version of the *Repartimientos de los reinos de Mallorca, Valencia y Cerdeña*, ed. Próspero de Bofarull (Barcelona: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón: 1856), 7–141. The data have been systematised by Guillem Rosselló, "Mallorca 1232: colectivos urbanos, órdenes militares y reparto del botín," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 19 (2006): 461–483. For the groups from Tortosa see Virgili, "War and booty," in this volume.

had at least one leader, whose task it was to distribute the land prizes granted to the group among its members, as clearly shown by the record.[83]

Towards the mid-13th century military societies thus proliferated greatly throughout the whole of the Iberian Peninsula, especially among men with little means who fought on foot. It seems clear that as a part of this process Catalonian combatants, both specialised (*almogávares*) and part-timers, assumed the experience of Castilian and – more directly – Aragonese militias despite not having participated in similar urban armies. The model followed has three key features. First, the size of the basic unit, around ten men, was aimed at ensuring manoeuvrability on the march and on the battlefield by the men's ability to join and separate at will, at the same time giving them the option of attacking or defending by themselves.[84] Second, command was bestowed on individuals of recognised merit such as *adalides* and *almocadenes*; the former are documented in the conquest of Valencia since at least 1237, and the latter some time later.[85] Finally, similar rules for booty management and distribution were observed, as shown by the dissemination of the *Fuero del Emperador* in Catalan-Aragonese territory.

The most relevant factor in this process is not, however, the quantitative aspect, but the qualitative leap between the society of the *cabalgada*, created with the sole purpose of grabbing movable property (livestock, captives), and the companies operating as a conquering force and as an instrument of colonisation, attracted by the prospect of land prizes in advantageous conditions. It is clear that this transformation could not have occurred without the availability of a critical mass of willing man power. The truth is that while the creation of autonomous societies of combatants was spurred by the great conquests, it did not cease once these had come to an end. Instead, the 1270s and 1280s saw a rapid increase of bands of freebooters. The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the blocking of traditional routes to social promotion, for example by increasingly restricting access to the urban elite, and the conditions prevailing in the colonisation of conquered territory. The limited amount of land distributed and the difficulty of access to the necessary equipment and labour, compared with the relative ease with which war gain was acquired (and the social prestige it conferred), were without doubt significant factors. It is, in any case, a very complex issue, the analysis of which is well beyond the scope of this paper. Naturally, the society of *cabalgada* did not disappear; the direct grasp of

83 *LF* Ch. 365; Torró, "Guerra, repartiment," 210–212, 246–252.

84 Powers, *Society*, 97; Mott, *Sea Power*, 163.

85 Torró, "Guerra, repartiment," 254–255.

booty always remained an option. The really important point here is that the aims of the association validated nearly every form of (legal) profit, including, of course, the retribution of services in the form of a land grant or any other form of payment.

As previously mentioned, by 1275 the phenomenon had reached a level that the Catalan-Aragonese crown was beginning to regard as dangerous. However, confronted by the general insurrection of Muslims in the kingdom of Valencia – to a degree caused by the uncontrolled action of these groups – the king did not hesitate to show support to many of these companies and even to facilitate the creation of new ones for their use as crack troops, with the promise of distributing the lands taken from defeated enemies as reward. Up to 44 letters were addressed to villages in Catalonia, Ribagorza and the Aragonese Pyrenees, to mention just a few examples, asking for armed infantrymen with the promise of land prizes as a reward. An *adalid* called Sancho La Serra and his two hundred men (who held no property of their own) were offered lands in the valley of Pego if they took part in "this war against the Saracens"; soon after, the *almocadén* Bernat Duran and his *pedites socios* (up to a hundred) received several hamlets in the vicinity of Calpe.[86]

While the military and the colonising operations could occasionally be efficiently combined, they had to be neatly delimited because of the clear disproportion between the amount of land available for distribution and the potential number of beneficiaries. In fact, during this war some societies of combatants seem to have worked for a daily wage. In 1276 the 2,000 infantrymen under Falconet and others were allocated 6 *diners* a day for their upkeep alone. The 40 infantrymen in Gil Martínez de Oblites' company, on the other hand, received 5 *sous* per day; ten times more.[87] The amount paid probably reflected the dangers of the service, the quality of the troops (whether they were part timers or *almogávares*), and also, perhaps, the prestige of their leader. It is essential to note that these military societies started at this stage to act as a paid or mercenary force; as such, they were to play a crucial role in the forthcoming Mediterranean campaigns.[88]

In addition to their quantitative growth, these companies were increasingly recognised as autonomous military units during this period. Similarly, the

86 ACA Cancillería, reg. 23, f. 52v (1276); reg. 22, f. 45r (1276); 39, f. 221v, 222v (1277); reg. 40, f. 10r (1277). Soldevila, *Pere el Gran*, II, 95, 100–101.

87 ACA Cancillería, reg. 33, f. 123r (1276); reg. 19, f. 16v (1276).

88 Also, Castilian *golfines* would serve as mercenaries for the different sides at war during the reign of Sancho IV (1284–1295): Mela and Sánchez, "Para el estudio," 200–201.

identification between units and their commanders, *adalides* or *almocadenes*, by whose name they were identified, became ever closer. A column of 1,190 infantrymen led *in frontaria sarracenorum* by the previously mentioned Falconet was made up of eighteen companies of between 14 and 200 men, each commanded by a named chief (two in the case of the largest companies).[89] The considerable difference in size shows that these units had not been created "artificially," as in modern armies, but were instead groups of men associated under the command of a leader whose charisma and prestige undoubtedly played a part in the group's ability to attract members and even smaller units. It must not be considered strange that the army of *almogávares* that embarked in Peter III's fleet some years later for the Ifrīqiya campaign and the war following the Sicilian Vespers showed an identical organisational pattern; they were *grosso modo* the same men. Desclot's and Muntaner's chronicles show that incorporation to the royal host did not affect the cohesion of these companies, which remained apart from the aristocratic armed retinues.[90] The companies were of between 20 and 50 men and mustered around a prestigious chief. The accounts of Roger de Lloria's fleet between 1288 and 1292, indicate that the *almogávares* on board the ships were organised in *societates* of between 6 and 27 men under the command of *almocadenes*.[91]

In short, it could be said that the organizational pattern regulating the forces on which the Aragonese crown's Mediterranean campaigns in the late 13th century relied was a continuation at a larger scale of practices of military associationism already in operation during the "Saracens war" in the kingdom of Valencia. At the head of one of the eighteen companies under Falconet in 1276 we find a character called Bernat de Rocafort. It is impossible to be absolutely certain, but it seems likely that this is the same chief of *almogávares* who gained control over several castles in Calabria (ennobled as *miles*) and was appointed commander of the Catalan Company on the death of Roger de Flor, in 1305. If this identification is correct, we are facing a long *cursus honorum* carried out over thirty years and modestly begun as a young and little-known *almocadén* followed by a small company of barely 25 men in the mountains of Valencia, and also a suggestive example of the continuity just mentioned.

89 ACA Cancillería, reg. 23, f. 49v (1276).

90 In 1290 James of Aragon, King of Sicily, congratulated two *adalides* and their respective *societates* of *almocadenes* and *almogávares* for their conquests in Calabria: *Codice diplomatico dei re Aragonesi di Sicilia* (*1282–1355*), ed. Giuseppe Lamantia (Palermo: Società Siciliana per la Storia Patria, 1918–56), I, docs. 206–207.

91 Desclot, Ch. 84, 101; Muntaner Ch. 70, 170; Mott, *Sea Power*, 161–163.

From Frontier to Empire

The proliferation of military societies, therefore, peaked in the last quarter of the 13th century. The critical situation caused by the uncontrolled multiplication of these groups prompted the reaction of the Hispanic monarchs, who combined repression with the taming of such forces for their own aims; this slowed down the process but did not stave it off completely. Thereafter, the experience accumulated in the constitution of partnerships for looting, conquest or mercenary employment reproduced itself in two different ways. One of them was spectacular but relatively short-lived: the Catalan Company. The other was less sensational but more constant and had, in the long term, more decisive effects: the raiding parties working along the frontier of Granada, the last redoubt of al-Andalus. It was here that the practices of military association were effectively preserved until the time was ripe to, as it were, transfer them from frontier to empire, to use Angus McKay's discerning expression.[92]

A confidential report addressed to James II in 1305 confirmed Muntaner's account of the problems that could have been caused by the permanent presence in Sicily, after the Peace of Caltebellotta (1302) had been signed, of "a multitude of *almogávares*" with no occupation and prone to "violence, looting and robbery." Thus, the report supported Roger de Flor's initiative to turn these men into a force at the service of the Byzantine Emperor. The King of Sicily, Frederick, would have liked to keep at least some of them, but this could not be done against their will, and would have contravened all the "traditions of the *almogávares* from Hispania" (*secundum quod est de ritu seu more armugavarorum Hispanie*). In conclusion, it is clear that the companies had maintained their structure and their autonomous nature during the long Sicilian conflict. They were in this way able to prolong their existence through the Catalan Grand Company (i.e. a company of companies), acting first as mercenaries for Andronicus II and then as freebooters on their way from Thrace to Thessaly. The conquest of the Frankish Duchy of Athens in 1311 gave them sovereignty over the territory and the chance to collect taxes regularly, reducing their need for raiding. This situation, however, did not drive the company to disband. The corporate spirit of the company prevailed even after handing the dominion

92 Angus MacKay, *Spain in the Middle Ages. From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500* (London: Macmillan, 1977). I have not taken piracy and corsair naval actions into consideration, even though these were of significance on the Mediterranean coast of the Iberian Peninsula from the last third of the 13th century. The considerable weight carried by the ship-owners in these enterprises makes it difficult to assess the real scope of partnership practices in this sort of operation.

of the duchy to the princes of Sicily, as was necessary to secure political recognition, and when their vicars tried to enforce their authority (although David Jacoby prefers to use the expression "co-dominion" to describe the new situation).[93]

We cannot therefore lose sight of the exceptional nature of the position achieved by this military society, the legal-political position of which was extremely ambiguous, as shown by the multiplicity of denominations used to refer to it. Enemies and rivals used short expressions – *Cathalani*, *Societas*, *Compagna* and *Colligationem* – often accompanied by derogatory terms, most particularly in Papal and Angevin documents (*nefandam*, *funesta*, *prava societas*).[94] In more formal contexts the company was referred to as *Societas*/*Compagna Cathalanorum*, *Societatis exercitus Catalanorum*, or *Magna Societate Catalanorum*.[95] These latter denominations deviated little from the expressions used by their protectors, especially the Sicilian crown, with two differences. First, the Sicilian chancellery replaced the demonym "Catalan" with "Frankish," less susceptible to offending the other identities also represented in the army, mostly Aragonese, although Catalan was still the main language in formal written communication. The second exception was the addition of the adjective "happy" to the name, for example in *Societas felicis exercitus Francorum*.[96] Both distinctions were inspired by the company's discourse of self-representation, with the qualification that the documents produced by the company's own chancellery neither referred to the institution as "society" nor as "company" but as *Universitas*.[97] This term was used in the Catalonian tradition to designate the legal dimension of a community of townsmen, and it was probably chosen in order to emphasise the corporate, lasting and honourable nature of the group.

The continuity of a body with these characteristics – *Universitas exercitus* – could not be sustained indefinitely without constant stress being laid on its military character. But the fact is that once the company was solidly in control

93 *Diplomatari de l'Orient Català* [hereafter cited as DOC], ed. Antoni Rubió (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1947), doc. 15; Muntaner, Ch. 199; Robert I. Burns, "The Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305–1311," *Speculum* 29 (1954): 751–771; David Jacoby, "La 'Compagnie Catalane' et l'État Catalan de Grèce. Quelques aspects de leur histoire," *Journal des Savants* 3 (1966): 78–103.

94 DOC, docs. 31, 33, 86, 93, 94, 102, 105–107, 119, 122–123, 129–131, 136, 162, 165, 167, 173–174, 176, etc.

95 DOC, docs. 43, 48, 120, 164, 177, 182, 188–189, etc.

96 DOC, docs. 83–84, 88, 95, 103, 109, 116, etc.

97 DOC, doc. 53 (1312?): *Universitas exercitum Francorum in Romania partibus existentibus*; docs. 70, 71 (1314): *Universitas exercitus foelicis Francorum…*

of Attica and Central Greece, the offensive drive began to wear off. In the peace treaty signed with Venice (1321) the company relinquished the right to possess galleys or any other kind of oar-propelled ship, effectively renouncing maritime expeditions, strategically essential in the Aegean theatre. In addition, the evidence suggests that by 1340 the infantry fighting techniques which had yielded so much success for the *almogávares* had already been abandoned. In fact, from 1310 the term *almogávar* itself (*compagnam almugavarorum*) is completely absent from the company's internal documents and almost totally so in external references.[98] The original military *universitas* tended to transfer its prerogatives to the few urban *universitates* created by "Frankish" citizens. It was these urban *universitates* – most particularly Athens – which ultimately negotiated the cession of sovereignty to the Aragonese crown in 1380.[99]

Naturally, the Catalan Company's intervention in Greece was no novelty regarding either the provision of mercenary services (provided by groups lacking any social or political link with their employers); or recourse to indiscriminate predatory practices whenever payment failed. This kind of contingent with a large proportion of infantrymen is documented from at least the second half of the 12th century in the wars waged by Henry II Plantagenet in south-western France, and their use was condemned by the Third Lateran Council in 1179. We do not know whether these combatants were fully dedicated to war, or how they were organised.[100] It seems however unlikely that these troops had as much experience as the members of the Catalan Company with its complex and deeply-rooted military tradition. It is, on the other hand, plausible that the Company strongly influenced other mercenary groups which proliferated in Italy and France from the 1330s onwards. These groups reproduced the Catalan Company's model: "great companies," "free companies" or companies "of fortune" formed from the merging of smaller companies, which retained their own chiefs but were under a unified command.[101]

98 *DOC*, docs. 109 (1319), 116 (1321), 189 (1346), 46 (1310).

99 David Jacoby, "L'état catalan en Grèce: société et institutions politiques," in *Els catalans a la Mediterrània oriental a l'Edat Mitjana*, ed. Maria T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2003), 90–92; *DOC*, doc. 391.

100 John D. Hosler, "Revisiting Mercenaries under Henry Fitz Empress, 1167–1188," in *Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France, (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 33–42; France, *Western Warfare*, 70–74.

101 Grillo, *Cavalieri*, 148–157; Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries. Volume 1: The Great Companies* (Oxford: Blackwell 2001), 2–6; Norman Housley, "The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy and the Crusades, 1356–1378," *Traditio* 38 (1982): 253–280. Among these companies "of fortune," the internal rules of the so-called Compagnia del Fiore are particularly well known. This was created in 1342 to serve the lord of Turin and was formed by Catalan and

Paradoxically, however, the form of large scale military association inaugurated by the Catalan Grand Company was not reproduced in the Iberian Peninsula itself. As is well known, the free companies taking part in the 1351–69 wars (caused by the succession conflict in Castile, which also had repercussions in the crown of Aragon) were for the most part French in origin. In contrast, the existence of small societies of combatants acting at the frontier with the emirate of Granada – from Cádiz to Murcia and the southern reaches of the crown of Aragon (Orihuela) – lived on throughout the 14th and 15th centuries. The scale of this phenomenon had significantly decreased from the formidable boost of the years 1270–80 and, at this stage, the dimension of these groups and of those operating from the other side of the frontier (*almogávares moros*) were pretty much symmetrical. Such "micro-groups," or "primary groups," in the words of Manuel Rojas, continued to reproduce 13th century practices, with short incursions carried out by a small number of men (between ten and twenty) who could either be professional *almogávares* or simple townsmen acting as such on occasion.[102] Also following traditional practice these bands often acted outside of the formal political framework, ignoring truces and auctioning captives along with the rest of their booty and outside the royal jurisdiction (for example, if they were Castilian, they would carry out the auction in the Kingdom of Valencia). Sometimes they fought with each other and even took Christian captives for sale in Granada, making themselves liable not only to moral sanctions as "children of perdition" but also to implacable earthly punishment.[103] This level of transgression suggests that its perpetrators had indisputably moved beyond the margins of the social order from which they came.

It is thus unsurprising that the ambiguity with which these groups were originally regarded by the political powers was still fully in place. This notwithstanding, frontier urban councils still used them profusely. First, the councils did not hesitate to support their low-intensity raiding activities as long as the booty was legally validated (*de buena guerra*) by public auction undertaken

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Aragonese troops (*sociorum de terris Cathalanis et Aragonis*). Their constitution and rules were carefully put down in writing: Gaudenzio Claretta, "Gli statuti della società militare subalpina del Fiore dell'anno 1342," *Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 16 (1880–81): 651–673.

102 Manuel Rojas, *La frontera entre los reinos de Sevilla y Granada en el siglo XV (1390–1481)* (Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1995), 247–260; *Hechos del condestable don Miguel Lucas de Iranzo*, ed. Juan de M. Carriazo (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1940), 278, 324–325.

103 Juan de M. Carriazo, *En la frontera de Granada* (Sevilla: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1971), 97–101; Maria T. Ferrer, *La frontera amb l'Islam en el segle XIV. Cristians i sarraïns al País Valencià* (Barcelona: CSIC, 1988), 429–430.

inside the towns and the part corresponding to the king or his beneficiary – between a fifth and a seventh – was duly handed over. Secondly, councils also paid these bands for security and intelligence services; retributions to motivate the defenders included bonuses for the heads of "Moors" killed during skirmishes.[104] The crown itself requested the cooperation of *almocadenes* and *almogávares* for sieges and other large-scale military operations. On these occasions their role was increasingly ancillary; they often played auxiliary roles particularly well suited to their specific skills, such as tracking.[105] At the same time, we must not forget that the frontier with Granada was the stage of two parallel wars: first, the permanent action of companies of *almogávares* operating – in the words of Henry IV's chronicler – without insignia, trumpets or tents, and the less constant activity of "powerful folk" (*gente poderosa*); that is, the high aristocracy in whose hands the Castilian crown had left the responsibility of looking after the frontier in the late 13th century.[106] These aristocrats would organise, especially in the 15th century, large expeditions, *cabalgadas* or *entradas*, into the territory of Granada, including not only their own armed retinues and ordinary paid men, but also groups of experienced *almogávares*. By this stage council militias had lost all initiative. Although at times they would eventually contribute with large numbers, they did so against their will, often contesting the figures they were ordered to submit. At the same time their military performance was far from satisfactory, despite organisational efforts and the enactment of rules imposing the maintenance of horses and equipment to townsmen above a certain rent (*cuantía*) and the frequent inspections (*alardes*).[107]

At any rate, *cabalgada* specialists were still able to act independently in bands or companies organised for raiding; these groups were certainly

104 Rojas, *La frontera*, 268–269, 376; Manuel González, "La frontera entre Andalucía y Granada: realidades bélicas, socio-económicas y culturales," in *La incorporación de Granada a la corona de Castilla*, ed. Miguel A. Ladero (Granada: Diputación Provincial, 1993), 116–118; Maria T. Ferrer, *Organització i defensa*, 259–263; Carriazo, *En la frontera de Granada*, 140–141, 213; *Hechos del condestable*, 442.

105 Juan Torres Fontes, "Los fronterizos murcianos en la Edad Media," *Murgetana* 100 (1999): 15; Ferrer Mallol, *Organització i defensa*, 264–284.

106 Alonso de Palencia, cited by González Jiménez, "La frontera," 113. This duality is clearly shown in one passage from the *Hechos del condestable*, 450–453, 460 (1470–71).

107 Carriazo, *En la frontera de Granada*, 75, speaks of "mediocre military value"; Rafael Sánchez, "Las milicias concejiles y su actuación exterior: Sevilla y la Guerra de Granada (1430–1439)," *En La España Medieval* 10 (1987): 393–418; Manuel González Jiménez, "Las milicias concejiles andaluzas (siglos XIII–XV)," in *La organización militar en los siglos XV y XVI* (Sevilla: Cátedra General Castaños, 1993), 231–237.

audacious but their actions were increasingly regarded as marginal. Although they were considered necessary, political authority – *concejos*, frontier nobility and the crown – never ceased in trying to domesticate them through different means. The rank accorded to the *adalides* stands as a clear example of the determination to tame these irregular forces. The decreasing military importance of councils, already apparent in the late 13th century, and the reduction in the number of autonomous companies created unfavourable conditions for the prestige of these professionals. There were still *adalides* but their formal recognition was increasingly dependent on their subordination to the authorities hiring their services. There was a restricted body of royal *adalides* (*del número*), while others were appointed by the *concejos*, for example in Murcia, Jerez, Priego and Sevilla; the most remarkable case, however, is that of the *adalides* at the service of the frontier nobility, most of whom seem to have been *tornadizos* (convert Muslim deserters).[108] The narratives composed to praise the deeds of personages such as *condestable* Miguel Lucas de Iranzo, governor of Jaén (1458–1471) and Rodrigo Ponce de León, Marquis of Cádiz (1462–1489), among others, are full of references to this *adalides*. In these two chronicles the *adalides* are shown in command of the *mesnadas* and forces mustered by the aristocrat, who is portrayed as the *adalid*'s lord. These field commanders are said to be amply experienced but not always effective or reliable. Many among them are labelled as renegades and men of fickle loyalties, including conversions to Islam. As shown by these chronicles the role of *adalides* is closer to that of guides or rangers, instead of the respected commanders of the past.[109] We do not know if, or how, they maintained the judicial powers that they had exercised in the 13th and 14th centuries. At any rate, the loss of autonomy and of corporate homogeneity must have accelerated the deterioration of their professional standing. This process must have affected the entire group of raiding specialists, and it is therefore not surprising that from the late 14th century the term *almogávar* was at times replaced by expressions such as "trackers" or "rangers" (*fieles del rastro*, *hombres del campo*).[110]

It must also be taken into account that during the second half of the 15th century the raids, which previously had been exclusively launched against

108 Rojas, *La frontera*, 236–244; Juan Torres Fontes, "El adalid en la frontera de Granada," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 15 (1985): 352–357, 362–365.

109 *Hechos del condestable*, 86–92, 107–109, 137–146, 188–189, 417–418, 443–447; 454, 458–460, 464–467; *Historia de los hechos del marqués de Cádiz*, ed. Juan L. Carriazo (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2003), 185, 195–200, 205, 215–224, 234, 258, 265, 290; Torres Fontes, "El adalid," 351, about an *adalid* from Lorca that "turned Moor."

110 Torres Fontes, "Los fronterizos," 13–16.

Granada, began targeting a different frontier: the western Maghreb coastline.[111] Unfortunately, the evidence (narrative or archival) available for this phenomenon is apparently not very abundant, and has therefore not been studied in depth. The better known, and most often quoted, piece of evidence is the so-called *Memorial de la guerra de allende*, written by an unnamed *adalid* around 1505 in order to offer King Ferdinand advice on the organisation of major military expeditions in the region.[112] According to this account, the groups of raiders divided areas of action on the basis of geographic proximity: men from the towns in the Gulf of Cádiz (Jerez, Puerto de Santa María, Cádiz, Sanlúcar, Duchy of Medina Sidonia) sacked the Atlantic coast between Larache and Wādī Šibka (*Berbería de Poniente*); while raiders from the Kingdom of Murcia (Cartagena and Lorca, in particular) focused on the Mediterranean coast between Béjaïa and Tétouan (*Berbería de Levante*). All of them, says the anonymous author, "have the custom of going to Africa and plundering the land," and therefore knew the coast well. The fruit of their depredations, mainly captives – of which hundreds were taken on each raid – was a considerable source of wealth. According to the public accounts, the profit gained by the city of Cádiz from African raids in 1485 doubled the amount collected in ordinary city rents.[113]

In contrast with the "micro-bands" operating in Granada the new maritime frontier required expeditions of a certain scale, with naval crews, horses for exploration and fast movement, and more numerous troops. For example, the expeditions organised by the townsmen of Jerez and other settlements in the Bay of Cádiz against the Atlantic coast of the Maghreb between 1461 and 1498 mobilised around 500 men.[114] The anonymous memorandum mentions up to 700 infantrymen and 50 mounted knights. Embarking and equipping these expeditions was a costly endeavour, which encouraged the participation of financing partners; naturally, after equipping ships and men these partners

111 Although used as a precedent, the incursion of the Castilian knight Pedro Niño in the coast of Tunisia and Oran (1404) was not organised as a company of *cabalgada*, but as a corsair operation: Maria T. Ferrer, "Els corsaris castellans i la campanya de Pero Niño al Mediterrani. Documents sobre 'El Victorial,'" *Anuario de estudios medievales* 5 (1968): 298–301.

112 Published by Marcos Jiménez, "La guerra del moro a fines del siglo XV," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 25 (1894): 171–181. Antonio Rumeu de Armas, *España en el África atlántica* (Madrid: CSIC, 1956), 153, dated the document wrongly to 1494.

113 Eduardo Aznar, "Corso y piratería en las relaciones entre Castilla y Marruecos en la baja Edad Media," *En la España Medieval* 20 (1997): 413–415. A significant proportion of the profits, the royal fifth, had to be handed over to the king, the city or the shipowners.

114 Aznar, "Corso y piratería," 416–417.

exercised strict control over the enterprises, sometimes even acting as captains. This was especially common in the raids launched from the Canaries. The booty, however, was still shared according to the traditional associative principles "fuero y uso de España" (three parts for the knight, two and a half for the seaman, two for harquebus-men, one and a half for the crossbowmen, and one for the infantrymen); these expeditions did not hire paid men with a fixed remuneration. The financial and military direction of these operations invariably fell to noblemen. For this reason, Canarian *cabalgadas* prior to the intervention of the crown (1477) have been labelled as *señoriales*. They were in any other respect coherent with the modus operandi of the *compañías de conquista* deployed for the capture of the minor islands in the archipelago. Incursions organised from the Peninsula were similar, although they were generally under the command of a member of the lower urban aristocracy, as suggested by the anonymous *adalid* in his reference to the company under Francisco Estopiñán, a citizen of Cádiz and member of a noble but only modestly wealthy family from Jerez. This same family also produced Pedro Estopiñán, who conquered Melilla (1497) while serving the Dukes of Medina Sidonia and Pedro Estopiñán Cabeza de Vaca, son of the former and co-explorer of the Río de la Plata along with his famous cousin Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca.[115]

Notably, in the organisation of expeditions against the coast of the Maghreb, urban knights seem to have regained some of their past importance. It seems that the raids launched against Larache and Azemmour were convened on the initiative of the knights from the city of Jerez.[116] The willingness of these men was such that the 1505 memorandum expresses the opinion that the royal expedition would not need to spend any money on hiring knights for a salary because the number of volunteers would fill all available places, as it happens "every time a *cabalgada* is announced." In the opinion of this anonymous author the reasons are obvious: the knights and *adalides* "who were the terror of the African coast" participated in these expeditions because they had "no rents." It seems that the overabundance of urban aristocrats, a costly legacy of the times of the frontier in Andalusian cities, could only be sustained by the arrival of external wealth through raiding. Naturally, due to their increasingly critical economic position the members of this impoverished group were not only willing to seek new places to raid, farther and farther away and therefore

115 Eduardo Aznar, "Exploración y colonización en la configuración de la Europa Atlántica," *Historia, instituciones, documentos* 35 (2008): 53–54; Aznar, "Corso y piratería," 415; Hipólito Sancho de Sopranis, *El comendador Pedro de Estopiñán, conquistador de Melilla* (Madrid: CSIC, 1953).

116 Rumeu de Armas, *España en el África*, 152–153.

more dangerous, but also to put themselves under the command of financing partners from wealthier families of their own class.

Indeed, in regions like Andalusia and Murcia the lower urban aristocracy had never truly abandoned the frontier, in the defence of which they had always played a determinant role, through institutions such as the *caballería de cuantía*, and through taking part in hosts and major operations launched by the king or on the king's orders. Now we witness the "return" of urban knights to autonomous companies and *cabalgadas*. In this context the role played by specialists – *adalides*, *almocadenes* and *almogávares* – in the raids continued with their progressive decline. In a letter with recommendations for the conquest of Oran, dated to 1509, Hernán Pérez del Pulgar makes a detailed examination of the abilities and skills of *adalides*, also suggesting the marginal nature of these characters and their scarcity. The *adalides* known to be active during the late 15th century were under the orders of noble houses or were Muslim converts; often they were both. Some reached the New World (the list of citizens of Panama includes an *adalid*) but the term soon disappeared. Obviously, the bands of conquistadores used experienced guides, but only rarely (the case of the so-called *baquianos* in Tierra Firme for instance) were these in command of the expeditions or acting as charismatic leaders. Regarding *almogávares* from rank and file the aforementioned letter indicates their usefulness (*buenos almogávares a pie y a caballo*) but only as auxiliary forces for exploration. In addition, it seems to imply that they were already hard to come by. According to the letter, if looked for in earnest they could be found, "although broken"; that is, undisciplined and bent to evil practices.[117]

The important idea, in any case, is that the *cabalgada* and the *compañía* were reproduced on the other side of the ocean. There, in fact, particularly favourable conditions ensued, resulting in the amplification of the phenomenon which soon became the main drive of the Spanish expansion in America. The changes were, as a matter of fact, smaller than is generally assumed, and were mostly due to the need to adapt well-rehearsed practices to the vast and unknown field of operations now unfolding. It is true that the term *cabalgada* disappeared. It was normally replaced by *entrada*, with which it coexisted for several decades in America. It must be pointed out, however, that this substitution had already started in some texts dating to the reign of Alfonso X in the 13th century and that by the second half of the 15th century the term *entrada* is shown increasing preference in the chronicles recording the actions in Granada. The change seems to be a logical one if the original connotations of the

117 Carriazo, *En la frontera*, 77, 82; Torres Fontes, "El adalid," 365–366; Góngora, *Los grupos*, 14, 35, 95; Mena, *El oro del Darién*, 223.

word *cabalgada* are taken into consideration, especially with regard to the fact that the formal aim was limited to movable booty. Much stress has been laid on this point, causing an overemphasis on the differences between medieval expeditions and the conquest of the New World, where enterprises tried, as far as it was possible, to explore every possibility for profit offered by the vastness of the newly "discovered" lands, including the capture of slaves, *rescates* (asymmetrical exchanges with the natives), conquest and colonisation. On the other hand, we must not forget that the medieval *cabalgada* had not renounced blindly the achievement of bigger targets when they made themselves available. The widespread charter of Cuenca recognised and provisioned for the possibility of stable occupations resulting from raiding expeditions.[118]

On the other hand, short-range expeditions carried out by just a few men did not cease at all, and in fact played a decisive role in areas such as Tierra Firme, where the colonists lacked the income offered by the rents paid elsewhere by sedentary and populous native groups. Reflecting the tone of 12th century texts – the century in which all this began – the chronicler Fernández de Oviedo sarcastically qualified the colonists that Bartolomé de Las Casas tried to settle there as peaceful farmers (in exchange for the unlikely promise of turning them into nobles as "golden spurs knights") rapidly drifting into assaulting the natives, as *mílites pardos*. In reality, no such exceptional circumstances were necessary. Towards 1524, after the conquest of the very rich and populous Mexico-Tenochtitlan, and once Cortés had gone, those *conquistadores* that were unhappy after the distribution of prizes would "get together, fifteen or twenty of them and go around the villages, taking women by force and robbing blankets and chickens, *as though they were in Moorish lands*." As though they were in Valencia in 1238, we might add. The *Brevísima relación* of Las Casas could be considered to some extent a compendium of actions carried out by that sort of band.[119]

Conclusion

It is clear that the forms of organisation adopted and the ends pursued by the *entradas* were in the New World more varied than in the Iberian frontier, although it is also true that this transformation had already started in the

118 *FC* 31.5.

119 Barceló, "Loquella Barbarica (V)," 92–98; Bernal Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España*, ed. Carmelo Sáenz de Santa María (Barcelona: Planeta, 1992), Ch. 162.

Peninsula in the mid-13th century, when the companies of combatants began to act as conquering force and as instruments of colonisation, not to mention their employment as mercenaries. Organisational flexibility would also be an unmistakeable feature of the companies acting during the 15th century in the Canaries and the Maghreb. The organisation of bands fully made of partners (regardless of the specific proportions contributed by each member) was also imported into the Indies but its importance dwindled before the growing presence of salaried men (who were paid fixed wages) or the participation of capitalist partners in the companies, such as rich captains, shipowners, merchants and moneylenders authorised to do so by a royal permit or *capitulación*.[120] It must be stressed, however, that the changes occurring in America did not substantially alter the two pillars on which the activity of autonomous companies had rested since the 12th century; first, the military association, on the basis of the proportional distribution of profit (regardless of the nature of said profit and of the exact conditions set forth in each agreement), as a profit-seeking and at the same time conquering endeavour; and second, the role played by urban communities as centre and base of these forms of military association.

Half a century ago Charles Verlinden suggested that the "modern" colonisation of America had been made possible by the reproduction of associative institutional models developed in Italy and the Iberian Peninsula in the previous centuries (first in the Mediterranean and latterly in the eastern Atlantic). He was referring to companies of a commercial and a colonial nature and to urban communities, closely connected with military associations and which, according to him, were based on similar principles. This author did not take the analysis further, although he must be given his due credit for drawing this essential link. Indeed, companies of freebooters could only form and operate in the environment offered by communities of inhabitants. Urban communities presented all the necessary conditions for the organisation of these groups: a social network, rich citizens willing to invest, a legal framework and a market where the booty could be made legal merchandise (through the payment of royal dues) and transformed into coin (by public auction). Everything was there. The correspondence between urban communities and autonomous military companies was not unidirectional, because the latter could also evolve into the former. It happened in Catalonian-Aragonese Greece and also, on a larger scale, in America. Verlinden's comparison of the internal agreements regulating the operation of the Catalan Company and the measures put into practice to control their Greek dominions with the methods implemented two

120 Mena, *El oro del Darién*, 221–222, 239–244.

centuries later by the *conquistadores* in Mexico and Peru is, in this regard, not gratuitous.[121]

To a degree, Verlinden anticipated, though perhaps with less precision, Robert Bartlett's thesis, according to which Medieval Latin Christendom had expanded by the reproduction or replication of elemental, codified institutional units.[122] One of the key examples set forth in Bartlett's theory referred to the legally autonomous community of townsmen, even if this author had not fully realised how virulent these dynamics of *cell replication* had become in the Iberian frontier.[123] The increasingly sophisticated methods put into practice for the distribution of profit (*ganancia*) in the Iberian Peninsula from the 12th century onwards constituted the technical basis for the allocation of the gains, including real estate, following the great conquests of the 13th century (*repartimientos*), the scale of which could not have been handled by the royal administration without the support of urban councils (*concejos*, *universitats*) and their experts. These actions resulted in the creation of new communities which simply replicated the formula by constituting councils and consequently militias and autonomous companies eager to bring the war across the new frontier.[124] In this regard, the imbalance between the distribution of real estate and rights of access to the native workforce (which were uneven and limited), and the potentially lucrative returns of predatory activities played a crucial role. As long as the second factor compensated the first, the dynamics proceeded unchanged.

Incidentally, this was not so in the opposite case. The capture of sedentary alien populations and the imposition of a tax system upon them deactivated

121 Reedited essay by Charles Verlinden, *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 3–32. In an allusion to the origins of the city of Coro (Venezuela) (*c*.1533) Góngora, *Los grupos*, 64–66, suggests that "the band of conquerors has taken a new shape as city council, and is duly represented in the *cabildo*." This author highlights what he calls "a growing lack of distinction between the city and the band of *conquistadores*," as shown by the custom of distributing the booty also among the citizens that remained whilst others were out on an expedition. This was, incidentally, also observed in the charter of Cuenca (*FC* 30.2).

122 I have supported this idea elsewhere: Josep Torró, "Colonizaciones y colonialismo medievales. La experiencia catalano-aragonesa y su contexto," in *De Tartesssos a Manila. Siete estudios coloniales y poscoloniales*, eds. Glòria Cano and Ana Delgado (Valencia: PUV, 2008), 91–93.

123 Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (London: Allen Lane, 1993), 111–132, 306–314.

124 Josep Torró, "Was the Christian conquest of al-Andalus irreversible?," *Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies* 4:1 (2012): 63–64.

the reproduction of the Catalan Company as a society of freebooters. In America the same mechanism ensued in zones with a consolidated Spanish presence, especially in *encomiendas* and *haciendas* – with *buenos indios* – granted to *conquistadores*. This did not stop the arrival of new groups of colonists attracted by the perspective of *ganancia*, "lazy people" in the words of Las Casas, who threatened to "exhaust" and "destroy the Spanish *haciendas* in a region or a province."[125] This was the same argument used two centuries earlier for the removal of the *almogávares* from Sicily, and similar measures were now taken, such as the organisation of expeditions to remote places like El Dorado (1560), an enterprise aimed at keeping poor or discontent troops away from Peru, where they could be a source of trouble. This famous episode is another reminder of how easily these autonomous companies could turn into marginal and unwanted bands of desperados. This had already happened at the frontier with Granada. Before reaching these point-of-no-return extremes, however, the mechanism had worked for long enough to be the vehicle for major territorial gains.

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CHAPTER 2

Council and Urban Militias in the Crown of Aragon during the 13th Century: From Conquering Militias to Monetary Exemptions

Enric Guinot

According to the King James I chronicle – *Llibre dels Feits* – in autumn 1232 the infantrymen attached to a militia force raised by the town of Teruel conquered the castle of Ares, in the Maestrat de Castelló. This fortress was located approximately 100 km to the south of the foremost Christian positions around Teruel, a region that some authors have referred to as a "march," a politically and militarily open, half populated territory, which in the period from 1150 to 1230 remained wedged between Aragon and southern Catalonia, and Sharq al-Andalus.[1] Barely six months later the council militias of Teruel, Daroca and Zaragoza participated in the siege and conquest of the *madīna* of Borriana, in la Plana de Castelló, and between 1237 and 1238 the largest concentration of urban militias of the 13th century in the east of the Iberian Peninsula gathered to take part in the siege of the city of Valencia (this included militias from Barcelona, Lleida, Tarragona, Tortosa, Montblanc, Montpellier, Jaca, Zaragoza, Daroca, Calatayud, Teruel and some few other minor towns).[2]

On the other hand, in 1263 Christian colonists recently installed in the new settlement of Alcoi, in the mountains to the south of Valencia, assaulted and sacked the nearby Muslim village or *alqueria* of Ibi, taking as much grain and as many items as they could load on their donkeys, according to a document

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1 Antonio Gargallo, *El Concejo de Teruel en la Edad Media, 1177–1327*, 3 vols. (Teruel: Instituto de Estudios Turolenses, 1996); Antonio Ubieto, *Orígenes del reino de Valencia* (Zaragoza: Anúbar, 1979) 2:37–60. List of abbreviations: ACA (Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Barcelona); AHN (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid); AMV (Archivo Municipal de Valencia); ARV (Archivo del Reino, Valencia); OM (Sección Órdenes Militares).

2 For this and other evidence contained in the royal chronicle we follow *Llibre dels feits del rei en Jaume* [hereafter cited as *LF*], ed. F. Soldevila, J. Bruguera and M.T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2008).

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attached to the minutes of the first court record of their local council, studied by J. Torró.[3] This shows that the conquests carried out by the Crown of Aragon throughout the 13th century into the lands of Sharq al-Andalus and into the Balearic Islands encouraged the emergence of new local militias, especially in the recently created kingdom of Valencia. These new militias joined the veteran border or urban militias from Aragon and Catalonia, considerably expanding their presence, entity, functions and aims.

In order to illustrate this variety of functions and modes of organisation we can refer to a document from the records of the royal chancellery of Aragon, dating to July 23, 1275 – one year before the death of King James I (1213–1276). The document lists the Valencian towns exempted from contributing men to the royal host in exchange for a certain amount of money. Specifically, the king proposed to liberate the city of Valencia from military obligations in exchange for 60,000 solidi, an amount ultimately reduced to 40,000, probably as a result of negotiations. A similar transaction was carried out with the twelve royal towns located in the northern half of the Valencian kingdom. The amounts were probably calculated on the basis of their population at that time.[4]

These documents show the evolution undergone by council militias in the Crown of Aragon during the 13th century. This evolution clearly discourages the approach to their study from a strictly structural point of view; the historical transformation undergone by the feudal kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula during that period must also be taken into account. In general terms we could divide the century into two main stages. The first one, corresponding to the first half of the 13th century, is determined by the expansive policies followed by the feudal society at the expense of Sharq al-Andalus. In our opinion this phase can be further divided into two sub-stages: the earliest one was clearly conditioned by 12th century practices, and was defined by the pillaging expeditions launched by highly autonomous frontier council militias against Muslim lands – fundamentally from the kingdom of Aragon. The second stage was determined by the predominant role acquired by the monarchy, specifically James I, in the military conquest of Sharq al-Andalus. Council and urban militias were mobilised and submitted to the king's military and political authority, and eventually rewarded with lands and houses in the newly conquered territories.

3 Josep Torró, *La formació d'un espai feudal: Alcoi de 1245 a 1305* (Valencia: Diputació de València, València, 1992), 129–130.

4 Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter cited as ACA], Cancillería, reg. 23, f. 8v–9r. These towns are: Morella, Peníscola, Onda, Borriana, Morvedre, Segorbe, Llíria, Alpuente, Cullera, Ademuz, Castielfabib and Alzira.

These were the mechanisms that, paradigmatically, came into operation in the city of Valencia, conquered in September 1238. The Christian forces included nobles, knights, churchmen, almogavars, infantrymen, and a very significant proportion of urban militias recruited in the main royal towns. Due to the absence of plunder, all these troops were rewarded with lands and houses, both in the urban centre and in its rural surroundings, the *Huerta* de Valencia. These *repartimientos* played a key role in the historical evolution of feudal society. As established by M. Barceló – see J. Torró for the Valencian case – the eventual implantation of an imported feudal society into a Mediterranean region such as Valencia was only made possible by the combination of feudal power structures with a colonising peasant society.[5] For urban and council militias, however, the conquests introduced the dilemma of what to do with their share of the spoils: whether to liquidate the new properties received – in a context of strong supply and therefore low prices – or to occupy them, which implied the transformation of their members into colonists.[6]

The second of our chronological stages roughly corresponds with the second half of the 13th century. This stage was determined by the permanent settlement of Christian colonists in the Balearic Islands and Valencia. This was followed by the creation of new armed militias which operated in their own territory against their Muslim neighbours. The militias from the north of the Crown of Aragon were left no clear role, because since the conquest of the kingdom of Murcia by the Crown of Castile, the Crown of Aragon was no longer in direct physical contact with Muslim territories. This does not mean that war was over; quite the opposite. Starting with the Sicilian Vespers in 1282, the monarchy of Peter III (1276–85) deeply entangled itself in Mediterranean conflicts also involving the Anjou, France and the Pope, the moment in which monetary exemptions to military mobilisations became common among local militias.

The Context of Urban and Council Militias in the Iberian Peninsula during the 13th Century

The study of medieval council militias in the Iberian Peninsula boasts a long historiographical tradition. This field was first cultivated during the 20th

5 Josep Torró, *El naixement d'una colònia. Dominació i resistència a la frontera valenciana (1236–1276)* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2006).

6 On the general issue of immigration in Valencia during the 13th century, see our thoughts in Enric Guinot, "Migració i colonització feudal al País Valencià al segle XIII," in *Els processos migratoris a les terres de parla catalana. De l'època medieval a l'actualitat*, (Barcelona: Centres d'Estudis de Parla Catalana, CCEPC, 2010), 31–52.

century and has recently been renovated with new insights from military and political history. This novel approach to political history combines the analysis of power structures – the classic "institutions" – with that of social relationships, following the model set forth by F. García Fitz for the Crown of Castile.[7]

A full historiographical overview of medieval military history, even if limited to council militias, is well beyond the scope of this article, but we must highlight two particularly relevant factors. Firstly, the number of available studies, recent or not so recent, for the Crown of Castile is much larger than those focused on the Crown of Aragon. This makes us wonder about the reason behind this lack of interest, particularly if we consider that according to this same historiography these militias played a crucial role in Spanish medieval society, organised around the so-called *Reconquista*. Secondly, we note the need to fully account for the different political models adopted in Aragon – developed in Catalonia and subsequently imposed in Valencia and Mallorca – and Castile. This distinction was significant regarding the real power of councils, which was of necessity different in southern Aragon and Castile, where society was legally divided between knights and peasants, and in Catalonia, where in the 12th century towns were still not organised in councils and where such social-legal divisions of the population were lacking.

These differences have already, albeit succinctly, been mentioned by J.F. Powers in his classic works on council militias in the Iberian kingdoms between the 11th and the 13th centuries.[8] While stressing that Aragonese and Castilian militias had a very similar genesis, during the 11th and 12th centuries, he also points out that in the Catalan counties traditions of military mobilisation were not organised around councils – which did not exist – but around military obligations with the count-king. This author also stresses the scarce mentions to the obligation to participate in royal war parties and *cabalgadas* recorded in Catalonian repopulation charters during the 11th and 12th centuries. According to María T. Ferrer, this is due to the methodology followed for military mobilisations, by public call, as established in the *Princeps namque* law, dating to the 12th century and compiled in the Catalonian legal text *par excellence*, the

7 See for example Francisco García Fitz, "La organización militar en Castilla y León: siglos XI al XIII," *Revista de historia militar* 45 (2001): 61–118; Francisco García Fitz, "La composición de los ejércitos medievales," in *La guerra en la Edad Media. XVII de Estudios Medievales, Nájera 2006*, ed. José I. de la Iglesia (Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2007), 85–146.

8 James F. Powers, *A society organized for war. The Iberian municipal militias in the central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, 68–90; James F. Powers, "Dos reyes guerreros y sus milicias municipales: El ciudadano-soldado en la ley y en la vida," in *Los mundos de Alfonso el Sabio y Jaime el Conquistador. Razón y fuerza en la Edad Media*, ed. Robert I. Burns (Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim, 1990), 123–158. As a precursor for these works, see Elena Lourie, "A Society organized for War," *Past and Present* 35 (1966): 54–76.

Usatges.[9] Indeed, during the 13th century the inhabitants of royal settlements in Catalonia were militarily mobilised directly by the crown, as evidenced by their presence in the conquest of Mallorca and Valencia. To date, however, we know nothing about their internal military structure, which in itself seems to suggest that no formal military regulations, such as those enforced in Castile and Aragon, existed.

Therefore, as already pointed out by Powers, from the beginning of the 13th century the Crown of Aragon and, more specifically, James I had to deal with two different traditions of military mobilisation, later reflected in the strategy followed during the conquests of Mallorca and Valencia. This took place against the wider background set by the process of reconstruction of the king's political power, in motion during the same period, which logically entered into conflict with traditional local privileges and the feudal lord-vassal relationships burdening the centralisation policies pursued by the crown. Finally, military mobilisation procedures were also determined by specific political conditions and aims. All these factors combined explain the problems faced by James I in the organisation of long campaigns for the conquest of the Balearic Islands and Valencia.

The Aragonese Council Militias on the Frontier with Sharq al-Andalus (Late 12th and Early 13th Centuries)

The southern half of the kingdom of Aragon saw a very significant development of autonomous councils during the 12th century. These councils soon organised their own militias, regulated according to their local laws and with a free hand regarding military expeditions into Muslim territory. As the new urban settlements to the south of the Ebro became more secure, new militias were formed, for example in Calatayud, Daroca, Alcañiz and Teruel, and other smaller settlements. A special case is that of the two military brotherhoods created in Belchite and Monreal del Campo, which organised themselves after the model of the military orders.[10]

9 María T. Ferrer, "La organización militar en Cataluña en la Edad Media," *Revista de historia militar* 45 (2001): 119–222, esp. 156–157. Although most works on military organisation in the Crown of Aragon focus on the Late Middle Ages, Ferrer's article also touches upon the 13th century.

10 Antonio Ubieto, "La creación de la cofradía militar de Belchite," in *Quince temas medievales publicados por el Profesor Don Antonio Ubieto* (Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza,

The militia of Teruel, created after the foundation of the city in 1171, was probably one of the longest serving frontier units confronting Sharq al-Andalus. The militia served continuously and with increasing activity against Valencian lands for nearly sixty years, often independently from the king's direction.[11] These expeditions, aimed at pillaging and at the occupation of border enclaves, included the assault on the castle of Bueynegro (Sierra de Espadán) in 1219, and on the castle of Begís in 1229, both mentioned in the so called *Efemérides Turolenses.* The second is also mentioned in a letter from the Almohad governor of Valencia, *sayyid* Abū Zayd, to the Caliph al-Ma'mūn.[12] The assault on the castle of Ares in 1232, mentioned at the beginning of the present essay and carried out by infantrymen from Teruel and other frontier settlements, follows the same pattern.[13]

Although the evidence is scarce, it is sufficient to support a comparison with military actions carried out in the Catalonian frontier with Sharq al-Andalus, established beyond the city of Tortosa (conquered by the Christians in 1148), during the same period. The record barely mentions some campaigns launched in the decade of 1190 by the Templars and the Hospitallers, resulting in the brief occupation of Muslim fortresses near the frontier.[14]

Council Militias and the Conquest of Valencia (1232–1280)

These events are different in character from the participation of these militias in the royal campaigns for the conquest of Sharq al-Andalus cities, during the first war of conquest of the new kingdom of Valencia between 1233 and 1245. These were not pillaging expeditions but operations aimed at permanent

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1991), 145–152; Elena Lourie, "The Confraternity of Belchite, the 'ribat,' and the Temple," *Viator* 13 (1982): 159–176.

11 Antonio Gargallo, *El Concejo de Teruel en la Edad Media, 1177–1327*, 3 vols. (Teruel: Instituto de Estudios Turolenses, 1996), II, 357–366.

12 Edited by Antonio Floriano, "Las efemérides turolenses." *Revista de historia Jerónimo Zurita* 2 (1951): 7–59. Biblioteca de la Academia de la Historia, *Manuscritos de Aben Amira*, fol. 151–159, quoted by Francisco Codera, "Los manuscritos árabes de de Aben Amira y Aben Bassam en la Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 14:3 (1889): 180.

13 *L F* Ch. 132.

14 For example, the Templars' brief occupation of the castle of Polpís in 1190: Archivo Histórico Nacional [hereafter cited as AHN] Órdenes Militares [hereafter cited as OM], Montesa, perg. 8–R; and the Hospitallers' seizure of Barcella in 1192 (probably including the frustrated foundation of Sant Mateu): AHN, OM, Montesa, perg. 11–R.

occupation of the territory, as shown clearly by the siege of Borriana in 1233 and especially that of the city of Valencia in 1237–38.

Evidence for the former is scant, but according to the royal chronicle the council militias from Daroca, Teruel, Tortosa and Lleida participated in the siege of this *madina* between May and July 1233. They were later joined by the Calatayud militia, whereas the Zaragoza militia arrived after the city had surrendered.[15] All inhabitants were immediately expelled, and though the king proceeded with the *repartimiento* of the city and its extensive rural territory soon after, the available documents make no reference to these militias benefitting from it. It is possible that this was due to the brevity of the siege, only two months long, which was included in the obligation to participate in the royal host and which therefore did not entice the king to grant additional rewards.[16]

No doubt the case of the city of Valencia is different and also the most significant regarding the participation of militias. This siege was attended by militias from large and small towns. Specifically, the participating militias included those from Barcelona, Tortosa, Tarragona, Lleida, Vilafranca del Penedès, Montblanc, Prades and Tremp on the Catalonian side, Montpellier from Occitania and Zaragoza, Daroca, Calatayud, Tarazona, Jaca and Teruel from Aragon. Almost all of them arrived in 1238, during the latest stage of the siege, and were rewarded with houses and agricultural lands in the city's surroundings, the Huerta. We have, however, almost no information regarding their military activity, their numbers or internal organisation, aside from some mentions in the royal chronicle. These refer to the arrival, probably in May or June, of new nobles and local councils to complete the circle around the city, sometimes in positions nearer to the city walls than the king's camp, which was located near the *alqueria* of Russafa. The Barcelona militia seems to have been the most advanced.[17]

In a similar vein, another piece of information from the chronicle refers to the arrival of three galleys full of men from Tarragona and Tortosa, accompanied by twenty one 'sails' to confront the Muslim fleet sent by the Tunisian king. The text refers to this arrival as the *caravana* from Tortosa, an unusual expression which could be related to a donation recorded in the so-called *Llibre*

15 *LF* Ch. 157. Ramón Ferrer, *Conquista y repoblación del reino de Valencia*. (Valencia: Del Senia al Segura, 1999).

16 Most of the terms of this *repartimiento* can be consulted in the documents compiled by Father Ramón de María, *El Repartiment de Burriana y Villarreal* (Castellón: Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura, 1935). The case of Vila-real, however, must be approached with caution because some of the documents cited actually correspond to Vila-real de Figueres, in Girona. Some modern authors have been subject to this confusion.

17 *LF* Ch. 260.

del Repartiment de la ciutat i regne de València,[18] dating to September 1, 1238, by virtue of which the king conceded several people (later settled in the neighbourhood of Tortosa) and "all seamen in the *caravan*" a neighbourhood beside the Porta (Gate) de la Xerea, as well as 200 *jovadas* of land (600 ha) in the area of Russafa.[19]

As previously indicated, their positions near the city during the latest stages of the siege, between May 1 and September 29, 1238, suggests that the key role of these militias was to close the circle around the city, taking advantage of their numbers, and also to form units of infantry and crossbowmen to support the cavalry. The evidence, however, does not provide details regarding their military role in the siege, and we can but make assumptions on the basis of similar cases which occurred elsewhere.

The available evidence about the siege and the *repartimiento* does not offer enough information regarding the recruitment and organisation models followed by council militias, although the presence of council officials is well attested. In some cases, it seems that these officials became the representatives of their councils for the reception of collective donations, for example in the case of Lleida.[20] It is also the case of the *justicias* of Calatayud and Tarazona, also present at the siege; the former, Domingo Maçó, received several houses

18 This is a group of three volumes written by the Chancellery of Aragon between 1237 and 1248 and recording several thousand donations of houses, lands and estates in the new kingdom of Valencia among the Christian settlers. For their nature and content see Enric Guinot, "El repartiment feudal de l'Horta de València al segle XIII: jerarquització social i reordenació del paisatge rural," in *Repartiments a la Corona d'Aragó: segles XII–XIII*, ed. Enric Guinot and Josep Torró (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2007), 111–196; Josep Torró, "Guerra, repartiment i colonització al regne de València (1248–1249)," in *Repartiments a la Corona d'Aragó: segles XII–XIII*, ed. Enric Guinot and Josep Torró (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2007), 201–276. Two modern editions of are available: *Llibre del Repartiment del Regne de València*. Edited by Antoni Ferrando, (Valencia: V. Garcia editors, 1978); and *Libre del repartiment del Regne de Valencia*, ed. María D. Cabanes and Ramón Ferrer (Zaragoza: Anubar, 1979–80), 3 vol. The quotations in the text refer to the numerical references of the former [hereafter cited as *LR*].

19 September 1, 1238, "*R. Conpain, G. Bertrandi, P. Renaldi, B. de Lovait, F. de Cambrils, B. Pezo, Michael d'Enbort et G. de Apiaria et B. Çacalza, I. de Mora et* (*omnibus*) *D hominibus marinarii qui nunc venerunt in ista caravana: totum illum barrium de uno capite ad aliud sicut via vadit recte de porta de Exarea usque ad portam de Bebalcarrac, et complementum in civitate et CC iovatas in residuo de Roçafa; et si non sufficeret, in termino Valentie. Kalendas septembris*" (*LR* 729).

20 September 12, 1238 "*Octaviano, R. Clavel et R.A. de Sanaugia et R. et S. de Castelnou et aliis probis hominibus ilerdensis qui moraverunt cum domino rege in exercitu: D iovatas in termino Valencie et D casas in civitate. Idus septembris*" (*LR* 792).

from the king on April 18, 1239, whilst the latter was awarded several properties in the district assigned to the Tarazona council, according to an inventory also carried out in April 1239.[21]

For all this the term used to refer to the members of the Calatayud militias (*cofrades*) and their number – a hundred – are in our opinion peculiar. It could, at first sight, be argued that this term only refers to a particular section of the militia. Yet it seems – based on the number of houses in the city and the plots of land around the nearby village (alqueria) of Montcada subject to this *repartimiento*, approximately a hundred and sixty respectively, as we shall see later in more detail – that this *cofradía* was in fact the whole militia sent by this Aragonese council.

Although this case seems to suggest the persistence of the well structured organisational model followed in previous decades, some details in the record indicate a greater flexibility once the militias had joined the siege. We are referring to the double donation in favour of the Barcelona militia on July 5 and 13, 1238, in the heat of the siege; in the first, the king offered one fifth of the city to those willing to settle and repopulate Valencia and in the second he addressed the *prohoms* who remained in the royal war party, perhaps indicating that some had decided to leave the siege and decline the first offer. We tentatively suggest that the king was trying to address the problem implied by the limited time that the militias were obliged to participate in the campaign (which would also introduce an element of military disorganisation) by offering real estate as a reward for their voluntary permanence.

The Presence of Northern Aragonese Militias in the New Kingdom of Valencia after the Fall of the City (1244–80)

We have evidence for the participation of these militias in the campaigns launched after the fall of the city of Valencia in 1238; campaigns against Xàtiva and Dénia in 1244 and the continuation of the war from the end of 1247. For example, in April 1248, within the context of the new war against the Muslims, around sixty members of the Daroca militia are to be found participating in the siege of the castle in Llutxent, Vall d'Albaida, for which lands and houses in the term of Segorbe were granted as a collective reward. Two years later, in

21 Abril 18, 1239. "*Dominicus Maconi, iusticia Calataiubii, domos de Muça Abencorayxo iuxta domum de Mahomat Abençehet. XV kalendas madii*" (*LR* 1166); "*Rex. Iusticie Tirasone, domos Alhag Allarabi,Marti Sancho*" (*LR* 3459); "*+C. Iusticie Tirasone, domos Tayb Abexamon, Zaug Albiari, Alahuarani et Mahomat Alarifi, Mahomat Anagar, Abdalla Abnalfarrar. \IIII domos et III cameras/*" (*LR* 3518).

1250, the same chronicle gives an account of another episode of the war. The council militias from Tortosa, Alcañiz and their surrounding areas penetrated through the Sierra de Espadán "to hurt" (*per a fer mal*), and were defeated by the peasant *aljamas* of the area.[22]

It seems, however, that no general mobilisation similar to that which occurred for the siege of Valencia took place. According to J. Torró's detailed analysis, from 1247 the most common form of mobilisation involved almogavars and parties of infantrymen led by a horseman, acting quite freely rather than under the control of an organised militia. In fact this is also suggested in the royal chronicle, where it is written that rather than calling *cridar host e cavalcada* – which was the formula by which calls took an official nature and therefore became compulsory – for this 1247–48 campaign the king made a public declaration of his intention to expel the Muslims and let it be known that voluntary attendance would suffice.[23]

With the continuation of the war against the Valencian Muslims in 1276 the king again called upon the main Aragonese and Catalan urban militias. In fact, as a consequence of the grave military situation this call also included militias from several minor settlements, as shown by a letter from the sick King James (the letter was dated to May 19, 1276; the king was to die two months later) by which the local militias from at least thirty towns and villages were commanded to join the royal war party with a force divided into two halves, one of infantrymen armed with spear and shield, and another of crossbowmen.[24] The extension of the war into 1277 prompted the new king, Peter III, to call upon the militias of Zaragoza and another hundred towns and villages from Aragon and Catalonia, a call which was made effective on January 14.[25] Cases such as the one presented by the important town of Perpignan, however, demonstrate that monetary redemptions were becoming increasingly common.[26] It would even be possible to question the effectiveness of these royal calls, because

22 Torró, "Guerra, repartiment," 212–224; *LF* Ch. 370.

23 Torró, "Guerra, repartiment," 248–260; *LF* Ch. 365.

24 ACA, Cancillería, reg. 23, f. 52v. Then settlements included in this call were: Vilamur, Caldes de Montbui, Manresa, Terrassa, Vilafranca, Piera, Berga, Igualada, Prades, Cervera, Tàrrega, Montblanc, Cabra, Forés, Vilagrassa, Agramunt, Cubells, Camarasa, Montgai, and the manorial estates of Bernat d'Anglesola, Albesa, Menargues, Almenar, Tamarit, Tremp, Montanyana, Almacelles, Benavarre, Fòntova, Graus, Viacamp, Falç, Estopinyà, Tena, Anso y Avardo, Hecho, Verdú, Salvatierra, Termas, Sos, Castelliscar, El Bayo and Ejea.

25 ACA, Cancillería, reg. 39, f. 144v–149r. Published by Ferran Soldevila, *Pere el Gran* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans), 2:83–84 (doc. 52).

26 A 1277 – but otherwise undated – note found among the chancellery documents records the use given to the 4,000 solidi paid by Perpignan in order to evade the obligation to join the king's host in the kingdom of Valencia: ACA, Cancillería, reg. 23, f. 70v.

despite the king's threats to impose fines the call to the Zaragoza militia to join the siege of Montesa had to be reissued on May 28.[27]

The *Repartimiento* of the City of Valencia among the Council Militias

Although our knowledge about their military organisation during the conquest of Valencia is very limited, their prominence as beneficiaries of land and houses in the *repartimiento* provides us with at least a partial insight into the nature of council militias. During and after the siege, in 1237 and 1238, the king proceeded to grant houses and estates – the latter included full *alquerias* (Muslim villages) and their corresponding lands, even full districts given *en bloc*, and mostly benefitted the feudal class, lay and ecclesiastical – as a reward and also as a show of kingly magnificence. The *repartimiento* was therefore based on the pyramidal social structure: seigneurial estates, *alquerias* and rural districts for the lay and ecclesiastical aristocracy, large agricultural estates for the intermediate class formed by knights and burghers, and small allotments to infantrymen and peasants.[28]

The first of the three volumes that make up the aforementioned *Llibre del Repartiment* also mentions, as an extract, grants to councils and militias, while the second volume gives a far more detailed account of the individual grants given to the components of these militias. This third volume is a detailed inventory carried out by royal officials in April 1239, six months after the surrender of the city, listing the occupants of each house and absentee owners. The inventory is organised neighbourhood by neighbourhood and street by street, and includes marginal annotations as to which militia or council the new owner was ascribed to, as well as whether the property was a direct donation by the king before the city's capitulation (they are indicated with a 'C,' for *cartas*) or after ('R,' for *rex*). The inventory also identifies those properties granted to the Church, the Templars or other specific groups, such as the butchers, the Jews or even a group of Muslims attached to the entourage of the former Almohad governor of Valencia, the *sayyid* Abū Zayd, at the time in alliance with James I.[29]

27 ACA, Cancillería, reg. 39, f. 194v. Published by Soldevila, *Pere el Gran*, 2:90 (doc. 67).

28 Antoni Furió, "Organització del territori i canvi social al País Valencià després de la conquesta cristiana," in *Territori i Societat a l'Edat Mitjana I*, ed. Jordi Bolòs and Joan J. Busqueta (Lleida: Universitat de Lleida, 1997), 131–166; Guinot, "El repartiment feudal," 143–161.

29 Guinot, "El repartiment feudal," 156–163.

Focusing now on collective grants, we must discriminate between armed groups led by a chief or *adalil*, which are to be considered almogavars even if the term is not used, and urban militias, which represented a given community and were compelled to answer the royal call. The latter received collective grants, the nature of which was probably determined by the moment of their arrival at the siege, before or after the city's surrender (and therefore dated to 1237 and 1238). The *Llibre del Repartiment* or other available documents do not include them all, however, since for example those corresponding to the Zaragoza, Tarazona, Prades and Montblanc are not recorded, while some of the others are but with ambiguous and confusing terms.

Thus, while the donations granted to the councils of Daroca, Teruel and Calatayud are directly mentioned, the council of Barcelona is referred to through the use of the terms *universitat* and *prohoms*, the latter also being used to allude to the council of Lleida. Similarly, the term used for the councils of Montpellier and Montblanc is *homines*.[30] We believe that the direct reference to the council only in the Aragonese cases is due to nothing more than different legal traditions, but it is in any case of note that donations to Tortosa, Tarragona, Tremp and Jaca are remarkably dissimilar. The records for the last two enumerate several names which are interpreted as members of the group, whereas the grant conceded to Lleida includes two separate collective grants, one to twenty five members of the group and another to the whole group of *prohoms*. Regarding Tarragona, the list appears mixed with that of Tortosa as shown by the April 1239 inventory. The records regarding Tortosa are even more fragmentary, since no mention of *universitat* or *prohoms* is made, but up to five different collective grants to groups arrived at the siege by sea or as a part of a *caravana* can be found. Furthermore, these records do not make explicit mention of any official magistrate, though it is significant that at least two, if not three, of the *prohoms* present in the *cortes* of Monzón – to which king James I called all estates of the crown prior to the campaign against Valencia – are mentioned in this *Llibre del Repartiment*.[31]

30 *Homines de Montepesulano, totum barrium sive callem de Rahabat Alcadi, in civitate Valencie, de uno capite ad aliud, ad opus domorum. Et* [*L iovatas*] *alquerias de Benituçen et de rahal Abinsanxo et alqueriam Raitol et alqueriam d'Alqueyxia et alquerias ambobus de Almaçafs. Idus Iunii* (LR 357).

31 Specifically, Guillem Moragues and Bernat Gisbert, and probably Ramon Despuig, as a man with this name was granted a house in the neighbourhood of Tortosa. Names and other data regarding the *cortes* of Monzón (1236) in *Documentos de Jaime I de Aragón*, ed. Ambrosio Huici and María D. Cabanes, *Documentos de Jaime I* (Valencia: Anubar, 1976–82), 1, doc. 238.

On the other hand, the royal promises given to these militias show some degree of inconclusiveness, and the evidence records the introduction of a number of changes in some of them. For example, in June 22, 1238, the king granted the council of Teruel with the castle and town of Jérica, which included large estates adjacent to the territory of Teruel. Some few days later this grant was revoked and substituted with another involving houses in Valencia and land properties of the surrounding Huerta, in the area of Mislata beside the River Turia. The Barcelona militia presents a similar case, because while in June 5, 1238, they were promised one fifth of the city and one sixth of the lands in the city's territory, these were just eight days later exchanged for the lands attached to ten *alquerias*, also introducing the proviso of adding some lands around the town of Sagunt-Morvedre should the donation of the *alquerias* prove insufficient. Perhaps the most prominent case is that regarding the militia or military *cofradía* from Calatayud, which saw their grant changed up to three times in only three years, as we shall see later.

It is clear that the process involved a transitional stage, because originally all these donations were merely promises which did not become effective until the city had fallen. After the surrender, in September 28, 1238, a new stage was entered in which all promised properties were to be occupied by the new owners. The details of this process are not known, and we must therefore operate in the realm of deduction. For this we must differentiate between houses within the city wall, which was organised into neighbourhoods, and the doubtless more complicated process of allotting rural lands around the capital, which the king's officials and surveyors organised by pre-existing *alquerias* and other rural divisions. The measurement of the lands promised by the king in the Huerta caused a conflict between the monarch and certain members of the aristocracy, adding to popular unrest caused by the fact that the lower classes could not measure the lands themselves. Finally this was resolved with the king recuperating this attribution and with the reduction of the referential unit of land, the *jovada*, to six *cahizadas*, *e serà anomenada jovada e no ho serà*.[32]

On the other hand, the process seems to have been faster and less problematic regarding houses in the city, because the number of properties granted suggests that the crown had many to distribute at will, probably as much as half the city, quite apart from the already compromised areas. This distribution must have taken place over a few days in October 1238, and was doubtlessly proportional to the number of members of each militia present at the time of the surrender of the city. This is reflected in the inventory carried out by royal officials in April 1239, recorded in the third volume of the *Llibre del Repartiment*.

32 *LF* Ch. 289.

This document shows that the houses given to each militia formed compact neighbourhoods. The expression *partita de* followed by the name of one of these areas is common in selling contracts issued in later years, indicating the impact of the *repartimiento* on the topographical characterisation of the city after the conquest. It seems clear that negotiations must have ensued between the representatives of each militia – officials from the council the militia was attached to – and royal officials, since a good deal of each area remained in the king's hands. This could be associated with the so-called *quinto real*, though in truth it seems to have exceeded this proportion (1/5) by a large amount, approaching half the properties in the city. This would result in streets in which houses conceded to militiamen alternated with those occupied by members of the ruling aristocracy, merchants, members of the royal house, and other infantrymen and almogavars who had also taken part in the siege.

The Decision of Militia Members: Return or Settlement

As noted at the beginning of the present work, the members of council and urban militias who had benefitted from real estate grants were presented in Valencia with a serious dilemma. They could either try to gain a profit with a sale or an agricultural lease in favour of a colonist or they could settle themselves and work the land.[33] The third volume of the *Llibre del Repartiment*, inventory recorded in April 1239, offers us a starting clue about this issue.

The first issue to be addressed is that this inventory, among other things, already distinguishes between the houses conceded in the *repartimiento* and those that remained occupied six months later. The figures are highly significant. Approximately 40% of the houses granted were closed, though not necessarily abandoned outright, and their owners absent from the city. Some other specific cases should also be noted which, while not particularly common, were nevertheless significant, for example the presence of the wife but not the husband. The aim of the royal officials was to corroborate that the houses were being inhabited, and some interviewees even claimed to come and go between Valencia and their towns of origin.

A second significant issue is the frequent change in house owners, which is reflected in the records by crossing out the previous owner's name and the consignation of the name of the new one. In some cases this is accompanied with the expression *vendidit*, which suggests the swift sale of the property. This

33 On the general issue of the migration to Valencia in the 13th century, see Enric Guinot, "Migració i colonització," 31–52.

may indicate that the decision as to whether to stay or go could in many cases have been made relatively soon after the *repartimiento*, and the transferral of property probably remained within the militia; the expression *vendidit* also suggests the rapid emergence of a real estate market. Similarly, we must mention the presence of a number of *difuntos*, that is, beneficiaries that had died in the course of these six months for unknown reasons such as illness, war actions, etc. The latter is attested and confirmed with the use of the term *captivus* next to the term of the beneficiary, which usually coincides with unoccupied properties.

A high degree of mobility thus seems to be a clear feature of the months following the conquest. This is shown by the best documented case, the Aragonese council of Calatayud, the militia of which was organised around a military *cofradía* of a hundred members. As with most other militias their arrival at the siege must have occurred during the spring of 1238, since by April 18 the *justicia* Domingo Maçó had been awarded with several houses.[34] The collective grant had, however, to wait until June 20, when the king conceded the council the town of Llíria and a hundred houses in the city of Valencia.[35] At any rate, this latter grant seems to have been revoked and substituted with granting certain properties near the town of Morvedre, at the Vall de Segó. As late as November 12, 1240, the king had changed the terms once again, by granting to the council the lands around the tower and *alqueria* of Montcada instead.[36]

Regarding the mechanisms for distribution of the new properties among militia members, it seems reasonable to assume that the heads of these militias played an important role, probably with the participation of council officials if not active members of the militia. The available evidence, however, is insufficient to offer further certainties. It seems on the other hand clear that allotments of land were distributed equitably, as reflected by the terms used to refer to them in later sale contracts, *heredades*, *quiñones*, and, predominantly, *partes* or *porciones*. Expressions equivalent to "the part of the *cofrades*," "my part of the Calatayud lot," and "piece" were also used. It is also reasonable to think that the leaders of the party received larger portions, perhaps two lots

34 April 18, 1238. "*Dominicus Maçoni, iusticia Calataiubii, domos de Muça Abencorayxo iuxta domum de Mahomat Abençehet. XV kalendas Madii*" (*LR* 1166).

35 June 20, 1238. "*Concilio Calataiubensis, Liriam totam ab integro et C domos et casas in Valencia. XII kalendas Iulii*" (*LR* 410).

36 The reference is *LR* 2259, but the full version of the document is preserved in the original records of the Templars, later transferred to Montesa: AHN, OM, Montesa, pergs.73–R to 76–R, published by Vicente García Edo, "Los escribanos de la Cancillería Real," *Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura* 64-2 (1988): 290; Enric Guinot, *Cartes de poblament medievals valencianes* (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1991), 150–151.

together rather than other more complex arrangement involving different divisions.[37]

The allotments received by each of these Aragonese subjects were located in the area irrigated by the *acequia* of Montcada. Later sale documents do not specify their dimensions and only four or five of them provide physical details, referring to the main canal, or roads to nearby villages. It seems likely that the lots were half a *jovada* – 1.5 ha – if we take into consideration that the king's survey ordered in 1271 measured this *huerta* in approximately 43.5 *jovades*, excluding some properties on the high ground where the *acequia* starts.

As recently ascertained, the initial distribution was not followed by the settlement of most of the beneficiaries, but by a hasty process of property sale. Over the first few years after the conquest the new owners decided against settling as colonists, opting instead for exchanging their new properties for cash. Among the records from the Order of the Temple, later the Order of Montesa, currently preserved in Madrid, are around fifty referring to these sale contracts dated between December 8, 1240 – less than a month after the royal grant of Montcada – and February 13, 1246. Merely three months later James I and the Templars signed the exchange of Russafa for Montcada, which thus came under the jurisdiction of the order and entered a new stage of colonisation with the issuing of a charter or *carta puebla*.[38]

These documents are therefore evidence for the evolution of landed property and the real estate market in Montcada while the district remained under royal jurisdiction. The contracts refer to landed properties, built or otherwise, and to the so-called *suertes*, shares in the canal's watermill. In most instances, these properties were sold by the original beneficiaries from Calatayud, but in two cases the seller was the initial purchaser, re-selling the property approximately a year later. In a few instances the seller was the son or brother of the original beneficiary, reflecting the usual everyday contingencies (deaths, inheritances, etc.) that the ownership of these lands was subject to. It is also possible to find landowners with two or even three lots, but in most cases they possessed only one. Finally, it is of note that the comparison between the list of beneficiaries of houses in the neighbourhood of Calatayud in

37 Enric Guinot, "El desplegament feudal sobre el País Valencià. Repartiment i colonització a l'Horta de València: Montcada (1239–1246)," in *El feudalisme comptat i debatut. Formació i expansió del feudalisme català*, ed. Miquel Barceló et al., (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003), 361–388.

38 Enric Guinot and Ferran Esquilache, *Moncada i l'orde del Temple en el segle XIII. Una comunitat rural de l'Horta de València en temps de Jaume I* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 2010).

Valencia – drafted in April 1239 – and that of land allotments in Montcada only show twelve full coincidences. In some cases, however, this seems to be a result of spelling mistakes or the fact that those in the Montcada list may actually be the relatives of those listed in the *Llibre del Repartiment*.

Regarding purchasers, two groups can be clearly discerned. First, neighbours from Calatayud, mostly individuals not included in the initial distribution, who in some cases acquired more than one allotment. Who were these people and why did they buy these lands? The evidence does not give the reasons behind these transactions, but we can suggest two possibilities which are not mutually exclusive: most plots seem to have been transferred in order to liquidate debts, inheritances, etc. Only in a few cases did the new owners exhibit the desire to accumulate landed wealth, for example, a Clemente de Villalba or a Joan de Latorre, the only name put down as officially resident in Valencia. A second group of purchasers must be highlighted. They are easy to identify due to their Catalan names: Arnau de Calaf, Guillem Molner, Pere de Sitjar, Arnau Ferrer de Vilafranca del Penedès and Guillem de Cambrils. In some cases these newcomers bought more than one lot of land. It seems clear that, along with the colonists from Calatayud, these new settlers were responsible for the subsequent agricultural exploitation of the district of Montcada. These could either be newly arrived colonists or urban dwellers from Valencia taking advantage of the ready supply of land caused by the conquest to acquire agricultural property. It seems reasonable to think that most grants awarded to urban militias after the conquest followed a similar path.[39]

The New Militias from the Colonising *Pueblas* in the South of the Crown of Aragon and Their Military Role in the Last Third of the 13th Century

As we have seen, until the mid 13th century the most active council militias came from Aragon and Catalonia. This is shown by their double role in their carrying out of pillaging expeditions across the frontiers in the first third of the century and their participation in the major invasion campaigns led by the monarch in the second. The so-called repopulation and settlement of Christian colonists in Mallorca and the Valencian kingdom brought about the creation of new communities, which in some cases were mere peasant villages but which in others involved socially complex fortified towns.[40]

39 Guinot and Esquilache, *Moncada i l'orde del Temple*, 43–45.

40 Enric Guinot, "La génesis de las comunidades campesinas cristianas en Valencia y Andalucía tras la conquista del siglo XIII," in *Monasterios, espacio y sociedad en la españa*

Most work on the Castilian militias has focused on the frontier towns and villages in the Guadalquivir valley and Murcia, with works by M. González, F. García Fitz, among others.[41] According to them these militias emerged following the concession of extensive and well rehearsed town *fueros* by Ferdinand III and Alfonso X, which included strictly regimented military obligations. These *fueros* followed the models set forth in the cities of Cuenca and Córdoba. According to the already cited J.F. Powers this extension of the legal, military and social model reflected the continued prevalence of a social division between knights and infantrymen (*peones*) throughout the 13th century, despite the dissimilarities shown by the different *fueros* regarding the level of royal authority and local autonomy.[42]

In the case of the Crown of Aragon, however, and always according to Powers, the model of council militia set forth by the *fuero* of Teruel was of no practical use in Valencia or Mallorca. The local military structure was consequently no longer built on the basis of the social distinction between knights and infantrymen, which was in most cases substituted with the legal tools developed for the extensive local *fueros* given during the settlement of Valencia.[43] The reasons for this lie partially with the strong presence of Catalan settlers but also with the new political model introduced by James I. This involved an increase in royal power, the limited application of the council model set forth in Zaragoza and the generalisation of the Valencian model instead, based on the reinstatement of Roman law – directly inspired by the Justinian Code – and a territorial, and thus not locally inspired, organisation of the realm.

The absence of council *fueros* inspired by the Aragonese model is therefore explained in the generalisation of the alternative legal and political model offered by the *cartas pueblas*. These documents, as well as addressing the mobilisation of local militias, were used by the monarch or the lords (lay and ecclesiastical) to establish the legal status of the new colonists, their access to

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cristiana medieval (*Nájera, 2009*), ed. José I. de la Iglesia (Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2010), 323–351.

41 Manuel González, "Las milicias concejiles andaluzas (siglos XIII–XV)," in *La organización militar en los siglos XV y XVI : Actas de las II Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar* (Sevilla: Cátedra "General Castaños", 1993), 227–241; Francisco García Fitz, "Las obligaciones militares: un aspecto de las relaciones entre monarquía y concejos en la Andalucía del siglo XIII," in *Las ciudades andaluzas* (*Siglos XIII–XVI*) (*Actas VI Coloquio Internacional de Historia Medieval de Andalucía*) (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1991), 31–40; Bonifacio Palacios, "Las milicias de Extremadura y la conquista de Andalucía," in *Andalucía entre Oriente y Occidente* (*1236–1492*) (*Actas V Coloquio Internacional de Historia Medieval de Andalucía*) (Córdoba: Diputación de Córdoba, 1988), 79–94.

42 Powers, *Society*, 68–90.

43 Powers, "Dos reyes," 145–155.

land and the regulation of their rights and duties, including rents and other taxes.[44] The earliest references to the obligation to participate in war parties or *cabalgada* are therefore reflected in these documents. For example, in August 1241 Guillem Ramón de Viella – in representation of James I – gave one such authorisation for the repopulation of the castle and town of Vilafamés, indicating that the new settlers *teneamini facere hostem et cavalcatam, cum expensa vestra propria spacio triginta dierum per totum regnum Valencie*.[45] Regarding the city of Valencia, a royal privilege granted in November 1246 specifies that every nobleman, knight or priest who buys lands from any other settler must contribute along with the rest of his neighbours, by paying the royal and local taxes and by participating in royal war parties and *cabalgadas*, although no further details regarding what this precisely implies are given.[46]

Regarding seigneurial villages, it is relevant that, within the framework of the *repartimientos* in the south of the Crown of Aragon, most donations of villages to the lay or the ecclesiastical nobilities transferred the rights of war parties and *cabalgada,* and thus the responsibility of armed mobilisation, to the new lords. This is shown for example by the villages of Andilla, in 1237, and Buñol, in early 1238, two of the earliest seigneurial estates, created even before the campaign was complete.[47] A number of such seigneurial charters including the military obligations of the settlers were to be issued thereafter.

This pattern seems to indicate clear differences between the Castilian and Aragonese model of council militia prevalent during the 12th and the first half of the 13th centuries. In this case, military service appears to be channelled through feudal and royal prerogatives. We must, however, remember examples – such as the one cited at the beginning of this work about the 1263 assault on the Muslim village of Ibi by the nearby Christian militia of Alcoi, a town established in 1256 – of relatively autonomous action and organisation of what we could better define as settlers' militias.

For this reason, we have no doubt about a certain degree of independent military mobilisation fuelled and organised by the settlers themselves in the new kingdom of Valencia during the 13th century. Although the evidence suggests that in most cases military action was taken on the king's initiative,

44 Guinot, *Cartes de poblament*, 15–44.

45 AHN, OM, Montesa, libro 542c, f. 37v–38r.

46 AMV, perg. 12. For the city militia see Rafael Narbona, "La milicia ciudadana de la Valencia medieval," *Crimen & Clio* 3 (2006): 305–332, although the work focuses on the 14th and 15th centuries.

47 ARV, Real Cancillería, n. 495, fol. 70v; and AHN, OM, Montesa, perg. 61–R, respectively.

the intermittent state of war with the Valencian Muslims until the decade of 1280 justifies some level of autonomous military organisation. The crown-led campaigns were either internal, launched against Mudéjar groups (these were increasingly rare) and rebellious noblemen, or external, against the two neighbouring kingdoms: Castile and France. The latter became particularly common from the reign of Peter III and thereafter.

For example, in December 13, 1275, an elderly James I urgently recalled the royal villages of Valencia to muster at the southern town of Xàtiva eight days after the celebration of the Circumcision of Our Lord (and therefore on January 8).[48] This proves that by 1276 the militias from the 25 royal towns in the kingdom of Valencia were already organised and structured. Presumably, their date of origin must be much closer to the creation or repopulation date of these towns. A similar example, in this case regarding northern Catalonia, is offered by the new king Peter III's July 1278 call for the residents of Vic, both infantry and cavalry, to join the king's forces – wherever these were, as the call specified – in four days' time to fight the king's enemies.[49]

The Beginning of Monetary Exemptions

During this time, however, the records from the chancellery of Aragon bear evidence of a progressive change in tactics, with the crown increasingly requesting monetary exemptions rather than actual mobilisation. In addition to the 1275 Valencian example cited at the beginning of this article, almost twenty further exemptions have been ascertained, all of them conceded by Peter III between April and May 1280 to Valencia and other royal towns. In all cases the amount paid, calculated in proportion to the town's population, was of the order of several thousand solidi. The reason behind this exaction was the forthcoming royal campaign against the Catalonian castle of Balaguer, where a sector of the nobility that had rebelled against the king had sought refuge. It seems likely, given the distance to be covered – the participation in

48 These towns were Xàtiva, Gandia, Cocentaina, Alcoi, Xixona, Ontinyent, Albaida, Llutxent, Bocairent, Palma and Ròtova, Castalla, Dénia, Corbera, Alzira, Cullera, Llíria, Morvedre, Segorbe, Borriana, Onda, Morella, Peníscola, Alpont, Ademuz y Castielfabib. Additionally, 50 and 100 solidi fines were respectively imposed on yeomen and cavalrymen who, despite having the obligation to attend, did not: ACA, Cancillería, reg. 23, f. 42v, 43r.

49 ACA, Cancillería, reg. 40, f. 132r.

the campaign would have involved marching into a different kingdom – and the concentrated nature of the campaign, that both the king and the towns benefitted from the exemption.

Over the following years these instances appear recurrently in the records of the royal chancellery (the local archives from the 13th century are almost completely lost). A more in-depth study is needed in order to ascertain the real impact of the practice in all the kingdoms embraced by the crown, under what circumstances it was preferred, and the attitude of the town dwellers confronted with the need to raise the stipulated amounts. For example, for the reign of Peter III several court cases involving the negative response issued by the local councils of royal towns, noblemen, knights and the Templars to contribute to these exemptions according to their real estate, have been attested. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, even in the late 13th and throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, it was not at all rare for both new and old militias to meet their military obligations rather than paying exemptions.

Conclusions

The prominent role played by urban and council militias from Aragonese and Catalonian towns under the king's jurisdiction in the expansion of the crown at the expense of Sharq al-Andalus over the central decades of the 13th century – coeval with the conquests of Castile in the Guadalquivir, also with a considerable participation of council militias – seems therefore beyond doubt. Their actions in the kingdom of Valencia spanned approximately thirty years, an entire generation, and were instrumental in its conquest and even more so in its military control, facilitated by the settlement of some militiamen as colonists in the newly conquered lands.

In any case, this sort of general approach to the issue of urban or council militias, especially considering the markedly "institutional" nature of their study to date, particularly prominent in the case of Castile, may not be helping towards a full understanding of the social diversity that they represented. Indeed, their methods of mobilisation, aims and results progressively transformed throughout the 13th century to adapt to their historical context. The examples presented in the present article suggest a threefold chronological division: an initial stage, roughly spanning the first third of the 13th century, the main feature of which is the continuity with common practices of the second half of the 12th century, focused on the periodical pillaging of Andalusi territory in *cabalgadas*, and in which the parties acted autonomously from

the crown. The second stage involved the participation of these militias in the campaigns launched against Sharq al-Andalus, approximately between 1233 and 1250, always under the obligation to join the war parties and *cabalgadas* organised by, and therefore subject to, the crown. This obviously implied a loss of autonomy but also, at least in the case of the city of Valencia, the important novelty of tangible rewards in the shape of houses and land which offered the participants the opportunity to settle as colonists in the newly conquered lands. Finally, the third stage would involve the emergence of new local militias in the towns created in Valencia since 1240, once again the result of the policy of implantation of the feudal model in the new territories, and with it the traditional political institutions of the Christian kingdoms. During the first few years these institutions invested a good deal of energy in the control of the Mudéjar population, and in some cases their plunder, as shown by the 1276–78 war. The progressive Mediterranean expansion of the crown, including the annexation of Sicily and the wars against France and the Pope gave an increasingly international edge to military mobilisations, resulting in an equally increasing recourse to monetary exemptions.

It seems obvious that the evolution experienced by these militias has been obscured by the institutional nature of the studies carried out to date. In our opinion the social logic of these militias underwent a considerable transformation in consonance with the progressive reinforcement of the monarchy over the second half of the 13th century. Whereas the Aragonese and Catalan militias practiced a predatory policy over what were often distant Andalusi peasant communities, on their own initiative or under the direction of the crown but always in a context of open frontier, the colonists' militias in the new kingdom of Valencia combined pillage as a source of resources with a defensive role towards their own lands and towns. The key factor in this difference, in our opinion, comes into play when the crown, in order to impose its political and military control over the occupied territories, proceeded to *repartimientos* aimed at repopulating said territories with combatants. In short, pillage is no longer the target but occupation, offering militiamen the possibility to settle in the recently conquered lands.

In little over half a century, between 1230 and 1280, militias from royal town councils transformed deeply. From being collective forms of organisation with a significant role in the communities' social organisation, especially in the case of the Aragonese frontier towns shaped after the Castilian council model, they became defensive military bodies with a much more passive role, which often opted for avoiding mobilisation in exchange for monetary exemptions, most remarkably from 1300 onwards.

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CHAPTER 3

War and Booty as Incentives for Emigration: Tortosa and al-Andalus (12th–13th Centuries)

Antoni Virgili

The territorial conquests gained by the Catalan-Aragonese kings at the expense of al-Andalus during the 12th and 13th centuries were consolidated through a complex process of colonisation with the participation of hundreds of families which had left their places of origin in order to occupy the newly conquered lands. This colonisation was in fact essential to finish a process the military operations had only begun. Without colonisation there is no conquest, and we may even say that colonisation *is* conquest.[1] The written sources clearly show the complexity of this process, because of its magnitude in demographic terms and because of its chronological and geographical scope. The documents present us with a record of some of the people involved, but it is impossible to say with certainty what proportion of the total is in fact reflected in the sources. The volume of population involved, at any rate, invalidates arguments in favour of a slow and tentative process affected by fear of the "Muslim danger." On the other hand, this colonisation process responded to the unavoidable need to

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1 On the process of conquest and colonisation in feudal Europe, see Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (London: Allen Lane, 1993). On the conquests carried out by Catalan-Aragonese kings, see Josep Torró, *El naixement d'una colònia. Dominació i resistència a la frontera valenciana* (*1238–1276*) (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2006); Antoni Virgili, Ad detrimentum Yspanie. *La conquesta de Turtusa i la formació de la societat feudal* (*1148–1200*) (Valencia: Universitat de València, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2001) and Ricard Soto, "La colonització feudal de Mallorca, Eivissa i Menorca," in *Els processos migratoris a les terres de parla catalana. De l'època medieval a l'actualitat* (Valls: Publicacions de la Coordinadora de Centres d'Estudis de Parla Catalana, 6, 2009), 53–72, among others.

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replace the population groups expelled by the war.[2] The destruction of the pre-existing Andalusi society, carried out through means which remain partially unknown but which is clearly revealed by the practice of the *repartimiento* followed by the conquerors, forced the new authorities to implement colonisation policies immediately after the military campaigns. Colonisation was not a massive and spontaneous movement caused by overpopulation in the source regions, but a process organised by specialists and which resulted in the creation of an agrarian landscape adapted to the needs of the feudal order imposed by the conquerors in the new colonial regions.[3]

This process of migrating societies and Christian colonists, involving simultaneous destruction and construction, also answered a need to substitute the indigenous population subject under the conquerors to a process of extinction, which occurred at different paces and at different rates of intensity.[4] During the first half of the 12th century, Aragonese and Catalan conquests focused on the cities in the Ebro valley. Alfonso I of Aragon took Tudela and Zaragoza in 1118 and Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona did likewise with Tortosa and Lleida in 1148 and 1149. Alfonso II the Chaste conquered Lower Aragon (Teruel, 1170), and in the following century James I conquered Mallorca (1229) and Valencia (1233–1245). Before the conquests of Huesca and Balaguer, between the late 11th and early 12th centuries, the feudal advances had not demanded complex military offensives, because they were carried out in sparsely populated regions with little power to oppose armed resistance; the conquerors distributed the lands thus taken and imposed new procedures regarding agricultural production and labour conditions along with a new settlement pattern.

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2 Josep Torró, "Colonizaciones y colonialismo medievales. La experiencia catalano-aragonesa y su contexto," in *De Tartessos a Manila. Siete estudios coloniales y poscoloniales*, ed. G. Cano and A. Delgado (Valencia: Publicacions Universitat de València, 2008), 91–118.

3 The conquerors imposed new ways of managing landscape and production which followed the logic of feudal rent-systems. See, among others, Helena Kirchner, "Colonització de *lo regne de Mallorques qui és dins la mar*. La subversió feudal dels espais agraris andalusins a Mallorca," in *Histoire et archeologie des terres catalanes au Moyen Âge*, ed. P. Sénac (Perpignan: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan, 1995), 279–316; also the works by Helena Kirchner and Josep Torró in *El Feudalisme comptat i debatut,* ed. M. Barceló, G. Feliu, A. Furió, M. Miquel and J. Sobrequés (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003), and *Por una arqueología agraria. Perspectivas de investigación sobre espacios de cultivo en las sociedades medievales hispánicas* (BAR International Series 2062), ed. Helena Kirchner (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2010).

4 Torró, "Colonizaciones y colonialismo medievales," 95–100.

The cities and villages in the Ebro valley presented an altogether different scenario: these were densely populated areas, and there were no precedents as to the management of large contingents of conquered populations, so the conquerors had to improvise impromptu solutions according to the varying circumstances. The formalisation of capitulation pacts, often agreed after obdurate resistance and hard and long sieges – sometimes of six months or more – may be set against this background. Two major factors intervened in the signing of these pacts: the capacity of the defenders to resist and the difficulties experienced by the besiegers in maintaining the siege.[5] An agreed surrender seemed the only way out of the enormous cost in lives, resources and effort which a siege imposes on both sides, and offered a successful outcome, at least in the short-term: the taking of the city for the aggressor and the saving of lives for the defenders. By virtue of these pacts, the defeated were given the option to remain in the occupied territory. The pact also included provision for rules and conditions for those choosing to stay, which kept them at the same time apart from the Christian colonial population and under the control of the feudal lords.

The capitulation pacts of Tudela and Tortosa are preserved, and the latter also mentions the existence of an equivalent document for Zaragoza, now lost.[6] We do not know for certain whether such an instrument was also applied in Lleida, but the similar conditions imposed on the Andalusi groups left in place after the conquest seems to point in that direction.[7] A statute issued by Ramon Berenguer IV, probably around 1153, following the conquest of the fortress of Miravet, and addressed to the Mudéjar groups in the Ebro valley, is also preserved.[8]

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5 Josep Torró, *El naixement d'una colònia*, 25–46; Francisco García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam. Estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares* (*siglos XI–XIII*) (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2001), 240.

6 *Raimundus Berengarii … tales firmamentos quales astirmavit rex Adefonsus, quid sit requies, ad mauros de Çaragoca…:* Ignasi J. Baiges, Gaspar Feliu and Josep M. Salrach (eds), *Els Pergamins de l'Arxiu Comtal de Barcelona de Ramon Berenguer II a Ramon Berenguer IV* (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 2010), III, doc. 876.

7 José M. Font "La reconquista de Lérida y su proyección en el orden jurídico," *Ilerda* VIII (1949): 5–31; Josefina Mutgé, *L'aljama sarraïna de Lleida a l'Edat Mitjana. Una aproximació a la seva història* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992), 1–2; Xavier Eritja, "Reflexions sobre la comunitat andalusina de Lleida després de la conquesta (2a meitat s. XII)," in *Les cartes de Població cristiana i de Seguretat de jueus i sarraïns de Tortosa* (*1148/1149*) (Barcelona: Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, 2000), 299–307.

8 José M. Font, "La carta de seguridad de Ramon Berenguer IV a las morerías de Ascó y Ribera del Ebro (siglo XII)," in *Homenaje a D. José M. Lacarra de Miguel* (Zaragoza: Anubar, 1977), 1:261–283.

This practice of ending sieges by pact has caused the emergence of a historiographic trend according to which these instruments of capitulation facilitated the permanence of large contingents of Muslim population in the conquered regions. There is, however, no way to make a quantitative assessment of this. In fact, all the evidence seems to point in the opposite direction: on the one hand, the need to call for Christian colonists seems to indicate a considerable reduction in numbers; on the other, the residual Muslim population was settled in specific locations at the conqueror's convenience, leaving some areas, mostly peripheral, abandoned, as shown by settlement distribution in the Ebro valley.[9] The total submission and segregation of the residual conquered population was however not deemed sufficient and calls for colonists were soon forthcoming. Between Lleida and Tortosa, in the Segre and Ebro valleys, despite recurrent complaints over the breach of pacts, there is no evidence to support the occurrence of Muslim revolts, perhaps because their numbers were much smaller in comparison with the number of Christian colonists than, for instance, in the southern regions of the kingdom of Valencia a century later.[10]

The documents generated by the conquest bear witness to its well oiled machinery: the agreements reached during the recruitment of the host created the basis for the eventual *repartimiento*, whereas the *capitulaciones* regulated the living conditions of the defeated for a short period after their conquest. *Repartimientos* and charters (*cartas pueblas* or *de población*) were, simultaneously, a reflection of the extinction of the indigenous groups – as far as their properties were distributed – and the foundations of colonisation, by laying down the terms for the settlement of colonists.

The dynamics behind this process of colonisation still remain to a large extent unexplored. It is beyond doubt that identifying the people behind

9 Julián M. Ortega, "La agricultura de los vencedores y la agricultura de los vencidos: la investigación de las transformaciones feudales en los paisajes agrarios en el Valle del Ebro (siglos XII–XIII)," in *Por una arqueología agraria. Perspectivas de investigación sobre espacios de cultivo en las sociedades medievales hispánicas* (BAR International Series 2062), ed. Helena Kirchner (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2010): 123–145; Antoni Virgili, "Gent nova. La colonització feudal de la Catalunya Nova (segles XII–XIII)," *Butlletí de la Societat Catalana d'Estudis Històrics* XXI (2010): 77–102.

10 Font, "La carta de seguridad"; Maria T. Ferrer, "The muslim aljama of Tortosa in the late middle ages: notes on its organisation." *Scripta Mediterranea* 19–20 (1998–99): 143–164. On Valencian uprisings see Josep Torró, "Guerra, repartiment i colonització al regne de València (1248–1249)," in *Repartiments medievals a la Corona d'Aragó (segles XII–XIII)*, ed. Enric Guinot i Josep Torró (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2007), 201–276.

historical processes is an essential ingredient for better understanding their motivations.[11] We must assume that the incentives and expectations offered by the target regions reflected the limitations and the lack of opportunities in the source regions. In this regard, food shortages may have been a significant contributing factor in the increased supply of military recruits and colonists.[12]

Incentives would vary widely, depending on individual circumstances. While the various aristocratic echelons, the ecclesiastical institutions and the urban oligarchies aspired to create or enlarge their estates and to obtain commercial privileges in order to increase their power and their revenue, peasant families sought land.[13] There is, however, a powerful stimulus, of which the sources make no direct mention and in which risk and profit combined in equal measure: war. This war may take the shape of military operations carried out within the strategy and the framework of the conquest, but it may also materialise in the expeditions launched by autonomous armed companies from the colonies established in the wake of the conquest. These bands penetrated into enemy territory to obtain loot, and also formed militias and mercenary companies with which to join the royal hosts during campaigns, for example with the *almogávares*.[14]

In frontier regions, these expeditions soon became a way of life, like piracy: the target regions were close and the profit expectations good, and the incursions required neither major organisation nor sophisticated means, so they could be easily improvised.[15] As the conquest of nearby regions pushed the frontier further away, launching these *cabalgadas* became increasingly difficult. Additionally, during this period the crown was in the process of consolidating its powers, which obviously did not go in favour of the autonomy

11 Jonathan Riley-Smith, "The Motives of the Earliest Crusaders and the Settlement of Latin Palestine, 1095–1100." *The English Historical Review* 98, 389 (oct. 1983): 721–736.

12 Philip Slavin, "Crusaders in Crisis: Towards the Re-assessment of the Origins and Nature of the People's Crusade of 1095–1096," *Imago Temporis Medium Aevum* 4 (2010): 175–199.

13 Immaculada Ollich, "Vigatans a la conquesta de Mallorca i València: referències extretes dels testaments de Vic del segle XIII," in *Jaime I y su época*. X Congreso de la Corona de Aragón (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1980), 2: 131–148.

14 James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War. The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 162–187; Ramon Martí, "Els Almogàvers no van caure d'una figuera," *L'Avenç* 150 (1991): 22–25; Josep Torró, "Viure del botí. La frontera medieval com a parany historiogràfic," *Recerques* 43 (2001): 5–32.

15 García Fitz, *Castilla y León*, 76–89; Robert I. Burns, "Piracy: Islamic-Christian interface in conquered Valencia," *Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 109–125.

of armed bands.[16] Either way war was good business; not only for willing colonists, but also for knights, warriors, and peasants who had been unable to secure their position in the new colonies, war against al-Andalus continued to offer a "second chance."[17]

The present paper will examine how war, and the profits it involved, could be a factor in the attraction of colonists to recently conquered territories. The focus will be on the region around Tortosa, between the second half of the 12th (date of the city's conquest) and the mid 13th centuries (conquest of Valencia). The city, close to the mouth of the Ebro, was an important node of communications, with the confluence of land routes and the river thoroughfare which connected the Ebro valley with maritime routes.

Tortosa was taken by the troops under Ramon Berenguer IV (Count of Barcelona and prince of Aragon), the Genoese Republic and the military orders, after a long siege that eventually came to an end on the last day of 1148, with the surrender of the fortress. The city and the territory around it became a test site for the creation of the new feudal society, including the efficient substitution of indigenous groups – escaped, expelled, deported or captive – with colonists from the northern Christian regions. Regarding the territory around Tortosa and in accordance with the limits set forth by the charter in 1149, corresponding to the current regions of the Lower Ebro and the Montsià, the process was carried out with extreme thoroughness and breadth: to the south and the west of the Ebro there is not a single reference to remaining Andalusi population; to the north, in the city they are limited to a single neighbourhood outside the city walls, and a similar trend can be detected in the countryside, with only a small number of families in Xerta, Aldover and Tivenys, and a few more in Benifallet.[18] The population drop that this involved was compensated with the arrival of hundreds of colonists in an irregular flow throughout the second half of the 12th century and later. Most colonists were Catalan, but a good number of Occitans, Genoese, Aragonese, Flemish and Normans has also been identified.[19] It is impossible to determine at what pace the Christian population grew, because records only refer to those individuals in connection with the

16 Pascal Buresi, "Els 'senyors cristians de la frontera' a la Península Ibèrica (segona meitat del segle XII)," *Recerques* 43 (2001): 33–46.

17 Virgili, Ad detrimentum Yspanie: 165–167.

18 José M. Font, *Cartas de población y franquicias de Cataluña* [hereafter cited as CPFC] (Barcelona and Madrid: CSIC, 1969), I, doc. 75.

19 Antoni Virgili, "Conqueridors i colons a la frontera: Tortosa, 1148–1212," *Recerques* 43 (2001): 47–76; "*Angli cum multis aliis alienigenis*: crusade settlers in Tortosa (second half of the twelfth century," *Journal of Medieval History* 35 (2009): 297–312; and "Els aragonesos en la conquesta del Baix Ebre (1148–1212)," *Recerques* 62 (2011): 37–68.

religious institutions which kept such records (the Cathedral, the Cistercian monasteries and the military orders).

The aforementioned *carta puebla* (or *de fueros*) summarises the key incentives for the attraction of colonists: houses, lands, commercial privileges and tax exemptions, to mention just a few of the most common. To these we should add another – not made explicit but doubtless significant – derived from the colonial nature of the region and its position in the front line: war.

After the conquest of Tortosa and Lleida in the mid 12th century and until the taking of Teruel (1170) Christian operations merely consolidated a few interior positions (Terra Alta, Matarraña and Lower Aragon). Near the coast, the limit was set at the river Ulldecona (currently called Sénia, and which still sets the administrative limit between the regions of Catalonia and Valencia). For over eighty years, until the conquests of Borriana (1233) and Valencia (1238), the region was the front line against al-Andalus, a frontier thick with expeditions, incursions and *razzias*, aimed at looting and the apprehension of booty (livestock, people, money, precious metal).

Similarly, several of the formal conquest campaigns subsequently launched towards the south and the east had in the region their starting point, their logistic centre and an important recruiting area. The sources confirm the region's pioneering character: James I declares so openly when refusing to abandon his camp in Puig as the basis of the operations for the siege of Valencia, because that would endanger the lands between Tortosa and Borriana; he also believed that the conquest of Almenara would drive the country from Teruel to Tortosa to surrender; and in the negotiations between James I and Zayyān of Valencia, the latter offered the former all the castles between the Guadalaviar (Turia) river and Tortosa, and between Tortosa and Teruel, in exchange for not taking Valencia, which proposal was rejected by the king. The main target was, no doubt, the city. In order to justify this strategy, James I said that once the hen is caught the chicks should be an easy enough job. When Zayyān asked the king about his obsession with taking Valencia by storm and the personal enmity shown against himself, the king replied that his intention was to retaliate for an attack carried out against Tortosa, Amposta and Ulldecona, with damages to the population and to livestock, while he was campaigning in Mallorca, and for the unilateral reduction of the tributes from 100,000 to 50,000 *besants*.[20]

20 These episodes are recorded in James I's Chronicle or *Llibre dels feits del rei en Jaume* [hereafter cited as *LF*], ed. Ferran Soldevila, Jordi Bruguera and Maria T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2008), Ch. 237, 242, 243 and 275. The most likely date for this incursion into the Ebro valley is 1230; Pierre Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence et la reconquête* (*XI–XIII siècles*), 2 vols. (Damas: 1990–91), I: 147–148, also recounts this episode.

Tortosa also became one of the most common billets for James I – and one in which he stayed for particularly long periods – in his frequent comings and goings throughout the Valencian campaigns: between 1220 and 1274 he is recorded to have visited over fifteen times.[21] The role played by the city and its hinterland, however, was not of a passive nature. It was in fact highly active, although a thorough examination of this involvement is yet to come. The sources show the full range of actions in this regard: incursions, *aceifas* and participation in the royal hosts campaigning in Mallorca and Valencia, apart from the role as naval base and centre of logistics for fighting material and all the wide scope of supplies needed for an army engaged in a long campaign, including armed knights, militia units, foot companies and specialised contingents such as crossbowmen. We shall not linger on the position of these armed units in the colonisation process, but only on their military contribution, given in exchange for real estate. This was thereafter either used as the basis of new settlements or sold for cash.

This activity, intense and diverse as it was, could not be improvised; it was the result of long experience, accumulated for decades to be fully unleashed during the intense campaigning period. The charter given by Ramon Berenguer IV in 1149 stresses the need for at least part of the population to bear arms.[22] These normative texts, more importantly, were largely put into practice. One of the entries of Tortosa's *Llibre de Costums* (laws), compiled around 1270, contemplated the existence of armed companies, and regulates their creation, composition and organisation, as well as which procedures to follow in the distribution of booty and land.[23] Written rules typically recorded and regulated real and everyday practice. The activities of these companies may have been varied, but they certainly included war, as shown by the campaigns in Mallorca and Valencia.

The written sources consulted have been, chiefly, James I's *Llibre dels Feits* and Bernat Desclot's chronicles; the *repartimientos* of Mallorca and Valencia, thanks to which some participants from Tortosa have been identified as recipients of plots of land in the city and country estates after their part in the

21 Joaquim Miret, *Itinerari de Jaume I el conqueridor* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1918).

22 *Si quis etiam minando aut irascendo contra alium cultellum vel ensem vel lanceam traxerit LX solidos Curie donet aut manum dexteram perdat* (CPFC 75). In his 1196 will, Trepel·lo, a vassal under Ramon de Montcada, left a cranequin: Antoni Virgili, *Diplomatari de la Catedral de Tortosa* [hereafter cited as DCT], 2 vols. (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 1997–2001), II: doc. 542.

23 *Costums de Tortosa*, ed. Jesús Massip (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 1996), 4.20.1–6.

campaign; and finally the documents exchanged between the army and its bases.[24] A high number of the beneficiaries were descendents of conquerors or colonists, solidly established in the Lower Ebro from the second half of the 12th century.

From Raids to Conquest

The location of Tortosa and its hinterland at the frontline was explicitly highlighted in a coeval document. A royal sentence, issued on December 31 1198, on the tithes and other duties due to the episcopal see, mentioned that the inhabitants of the region enjoyed a special regime for their proximity to the frontier (*frontera*), and therefore their livelihood was gained amidst great toils and dangers for their persons and goods.[25] This geographical position promoted predatory activities in search of loot. Although for the second half of the 12th and the initial decades of the 13th centuries the sources are sketchy and explicit mentions are lacking, a thorough examination of the evidence leaves little doubt that these actions were frequent. For example, there are "peace treaties" (peace and truce), demands of tribute, references to naval expeditions, raids,

24 Bernat Desclot, *Llibre del rei en Pere d'Aragó* [hereafter cited as Desclot], ed. F. Soldevila, J. Bruguera and M.T. Ferrer (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2008); *Còdex Català del Llibre del Repartiment* [hereafter cited as LRM], ed. Ricard Soto (Palma: Govern Balear, 1984); *Libre del repartiment del Regne de Valencia* [hereafter cited as LRV], ed. María D. Cabanes and Ramón Ferrer (Valencia – Zaragoza: Anubar, 1979–80), 3 vol. The published records prior to 1212 come from the ecclesiastical properties of Tortosa cathedral, the Order of the Temple and the Cistercian monasteries of Poblet and Santes Creus: DCT; Laureà Pagarolas, *La comanda del Temple de Tortosa: primer període (1148–1213)* [hereafter cited as CTT] (Tortosa: Cooperativa Gráfica Dertosense, 1984); Agustí Altisent, *Diplomatari de Santa Maria de Poblet. Volum I. Anys 960–1177* (Barcelona: Abadia de Poblet, 1993); Joan Pons, *Cartulari de Poblet. Edició del Manuscrit de Tarragona* [hereafter cited as CP] (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1938); Joan Papell, *Diplomatari del Monestir de Santa Maria de Santes Creus (975–1225)* [hereafter cited as DSC], 2 vols. (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 2005). The wealth of published material for the 12th century contrasts sharply with the limited evidence available for the 13th century. Only the records from the Templars have been published: Laureà Pagarolas, *Els Templers de les Terres de l'Ebre. De Jaume I fins a l'abolició de l'Orde (1213–1312)* [hereafter cited as TTE] (Tarragona: Diputació de Tarragona, 1999). The archives in Tortosa cathedral from 1213 onwards still remain to be explored.

25 *Est autem sciendum quod premissam indulgentiam et gratiam in decimis et primicias facimus specialiter hominibus Dertuse contra ius scriptum et consuetudines eclesiasticas propterea quia sunt in frontaria et quia cum maximo labore et periculo rerum et corporum in Tortose et in terminis eius percipunt fructus et emolumenta* (DCT, II: doc. 577).

and constant mention of captives in a variety of contexts. It seems clear that all this prepared the ground for the future major campaigns by James I.

The count's donations to Santa Maria de Tortosa included the tithe of the *quintas* (fifths) obtained during the raids; in 1195, the king Alfonso the Chaste ceded the Order of Hospitallers and their master Fortuny Cabeza the fifth due to him of the profits from raids. Even in 1210, the bishop of Tortosa referred to the right to a share of the booty gained by the bands operating from Lledó, in the Matarranya region, one of the most exposed areas.[26] The breach of truces intensified this situation, as shown by Guillem Ramon de Montcada, who demanded of the count Ramon Berenguer his share in the revenues due to the resumption of hostilities.[27] The raids and armed expeditions launched from Teruel and Tortosa between the mid 12th century and 1230 caused the depopulation and abandonment of a large number of villages to the south of the river Ulldecona, down to the district of Borriana, the inhabitants of which were forced to take refuge in mountain strongholds.[28] There are no references to conquest campaigns against this region until James I's frustrated attempt against Peníscola in 1225 and Blasco de Alagón's occupation of Morella in the Ports Hills around 1232.

The evidence for specific expeditions and raids, however, is scarce. It is at any rate sufficient to show that they were frequent enough to offer effective training for those involved in the formation of the urban military companies engaged in the conquest of Mallorca and Valencia from 1229 onwards. Ademar de Puig (*Podio*) was an Occitan knight involved in the conquest of Tortosa, for which he was rewarded by the count through the *repartimiento*. Thanks to a document dated in 1154 we know that Ademar died in "Hispania," after pawning all his possessions and leaving his wife Saurina and his young children in

26 *Omnes decimas … de omnibus quintis meis que ad me pertinent vel pertinebunt de cavalcatis* (DCT, I: doc. 28); *Cartulaire Général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jerusalem*, ed. Jean Delaville (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1894–1906), I: doc. 960: *illam quintam quod ego habeo … et consuevimus habere et recipere de illis qui de terra mea intrant ad devastandum Ispaniam et terram sarracenorum; retineo in vobis cavalcadas super sarracenis et pacem et guerram sarracenorum* (DCT, II: doc. 740).

27 *Liber Feudorum Maior. Cartulario que se conserva en el Archivo de la Corona de Aragón* [hereafter cited LFM], ed. Francisco Miquel (Barcelona: CSIC, 1945), I, doc: 464. *Iterum conquestus est quod comes sibi* (to Guillem Ramon) *dare partem nolebat de ea pecunia quam ab hominibus Dertose habuit, quia pacem ac treguam fregerant sarracenis*.

28 Enric Guinot, "Canvis i transformacions en l'organització del poblament al País Valencià arran de la conquesta feudal del segle XIII. Una aproximació," in *Territori i societat a l'Edat Mitjana. Història, Arqueologia, Documentació*, II, ed. Jordi Bolòs and Joan J. Busqueta (Lleida: Universitat de Lleida, 1998), 153–174.

the most abject poverty (*multa miseria et gravisima paupertate*), for which reason the count gave them permission to sell their property to pay off their debts.[29] In 1180, Bernat de Zara wrote his will before starting on a trip to al-Andalus (*pergo in Hispaniam*). He returned soon after, because he appears in the records buying some land in the following year. In 1210 he wrote another will in which his property was left to his son Ramon, who was being held captive *in Hispania*.[30]

The record also shows, although once more in a sketchy fashion, the existence of ships which, despite the lack of explicit mentions to it, may have been involved in corsair actions and coastal raids. We know of several sea expeditions, such as the ones led by Ramon Mercer (*pergens in galea*) between 1177 and 1178 and Pere, son of the late Pere Ortolà, and Bernat Droet (*amico meo, in suo galiot*) in 1184. Ramon de Castelló, who owned slaves, also dictated his will before starting on a trip involving some danger (*cupiens pergere in quoddam viaticum et propter timorem mortem*).[31] In 1178, Ramon de Montcada was waiting for the return of a galley from Hispania to repay 200 *maravedíes* owed to Joan de Puig; according to this testimony, piracy and trade were not mutually exclusive.[32] Ramon de Taià expressed his intention never to alter his will unless a case of extreme necessity presented itself, such as hunger or captivity; similarly, Sibil·la allocated five *mazmudinas* for the ransom of Joan, his captive brother, and Ramon Blanxart, knight, gifted his hauberk in his will in the eventuality of his son being captured.[33] Some of these expeditions fell upon Mallorca. In April 1149, Bertran de Castellet, present during the siege of Tortosa, wrote a will were he expressed his desire to leave for the island: *volo ingredi Maioricis*.[34] In 1176, Peregrina and her children sold a garden to repay a loan, committing themselves to secure the signature of Guillem de Cahors, husband and father, *quando venerit de Maioricas ubi nunc est*; similarly, the inclusion of

29 DCT, I: docs. 14, 45, 202.

30 DCT, I: docs. 312, 328; II: doc. 729.

31 DCT, I: docs. 283, 362; II: doc. 574.

32 Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter cited as ACA], Órdenes Religiosas y Militares [hereafter cited as ORM], Gran Priorat, Tortosa, codex 115, doc. 165, f. 55v: *Ad adventum istius galee nostre in qua Hominisdei nunc in Hispana pergit, de omnes directos, videlicet, quod ego habeo in supradictam galeam, hoc est in armamento, in notxeria, in aribatge, et in quinta, et in alios meos directos mihi pertinentes*.

33 DCT, II: docs. 522, 612 and 632.

34 Thomas N. Bisson, *Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the early Count-Kings (1151–1213)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), II, doc. 144. For his participation in the siege of Tortosa the count gave Bertran de Castellet the *almunia* del Antic, located near the mouth of the Ebro (DCT, I: doc. 36).

the toponym Mallorca in the names of two people in the 12th century (Martí and Pere de *Maioricis*) cannot refer to the origin but to the out of the ordinary fact that both individuals had been to the island.[35]

There is a clear relationship between setting off on one of these expeditions and the economic difficulties for those doing so, and also with the possession of captives which was relatively common. Indeed, mention of *captivi sarraceni* is frequent, especially in wills where captives were left as any other piece of property.[36] Although it is possible that they had been made captive during the campaign that ended with the taking of Tortosa, we cannot discard the idea that some had been apprehended during later expeditions beyond the limits set in the city charter and therefore into al-Andalus. Tortosa was the seat of an office of *almostelafía*, in charge of managing the ransom and exchange of captives, a royal institution leased to a consortium of burgers from Barcelona in exchange for their financial support during the siege.[37]

Raids were, on the other hand, not completely incompatible with the negotiation of truces. In fact, Ramon Berenguer IV and Alfonso II the Chaste practiced a "carrot and stick" policy, alternating military expeditions with "pacts" involving the payment of *parias* (tribute). Ramon Berenguer IV received them from Valencia and Murcia since at least 1136; and the years 1144, 1145, 1150 and 1156 are also mentioned in this regard in the record.[38] In 1151, the count offered the new episcopal see in Tortosa 100 gold *maravedíes* a year to draw from the *parias* for as long as these were paid.[39] It is likely that around 1157 the payments

35 DCT, I: docs. 279, 356; II: docs. 550 and 551.

36 The charters from Tortosa include several legal dispositions regarding captives. On helping the escaped: Baiges, Feliu and Salrach (eds), *Els Pergamins*, III, doc. 876; rewarding captures: CPFC, I: doc. 75; escapes and manumission (*alforria*): Massip, *Costums* 1.10.1 and 2.3.1–2; agreements between military orders about eventual escapes: TTE, II: doc. 58; and auctions: Bisson, *Fiscal Accounts*, II, doc. 144. On the ownership and exchange of captives in Tortosa see Virgili, *Ad detrimentum Yspanie*, 123–126.

37 The rights over the *almostelafia* and the distribution of the profits it made were among Guillem Ramon de Montcada's complaints to Ramon Berenguer IV (LFM, doc. 464). On the lease of the *almostelafia* see Maria T. Ferrer, "Els redemptors de captius: mostolafs, eixees o alfaquecs (segles XII–XIII)," *Medievalia* 9 (1990): 85–106.

38 Próspero de Bofarull, *Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón* (Barcelona: J.E. Monfort, 1849), IV: doc. 20. Anna M. Balaguer, *Del mancús a la dobla. Or i pàries d'Hispània*. (Barcelona: Societat Catalana d'Estudis Numismàtics, 1993), docs: 90, 91, 95, 97.

39 *Centum morabetinos annuatim de paria sarracenorum quamdiu ego et succesores mei habuerimus illam* (DCT, I: doc. 28).

were interrupted, because in this year Ramon Berenguer IV launched an expedition which reached Lorca, coinciding with a letter issued by Pope Adrian IV in 1158 in which precise instructions are given not to disrupt the count's actions against the "Saracens, for breaking the peace and the truce."[40]

Everything seems to indicate that this act of extortion worked, and payments were resumed at least from 1167, when the king appears in the record committing himself to pay a debt once the *parias* have been received; in 1168, Ibn Mardanīsh (the Wolf king of the Christian chronicles) had to pay 25,000 *maravedíes* in two years; soon after, Alfonso II obtained 1,000 *maravedíes* per year on account of a "treaty" with Ibn Mardanīsh and his successors (*quandocumque ego faciam pacem de Hispania cum rege Lupo vel cum successoribus suis*), confirmed in 1170 with a payment of 40,000 *maravedíes* in five years; in the meantime, the Aragonese king guaranteed the repayment of a debt to the Order of Hospitallers (*de ipsa paria quam de Hispania accipio*).[41]

After Ibn Mardanīsh's death several military expeditions promoted by the Aragonese king were unleashed upon Valencia and Lorca, according to several documents dated to between 1172 and 1179.[42] Later, further raids fell upon Lorca, Valencia, Xàtiva, Morvedre and Requena, and later still upon Peníscola and Polpís. Between 1206 and 1210 the attacks on the Andalusi fortified defensive line (Ademuz, Castielfabib and Sertella) reached a new pitch under Peter II the Catholic, who enjoyed the financial support of the Templars. The Muslims responded to this aggressive attitude with a naval attack against the Catalonian coastline in 1211, while a host was being prepared to attack across the border.[43]

The gains from one or another form of aggression may explain the frequent use of Andalusi coins (Almoravid *maravedíes* and Almohad *mazmudinas*) by the members of the colonial oligarchies in their transactions, such as sale and purchase of real estate, formalisation of mortgages and testamentary dispositions.[44] These activities indicate that these armed companies and knight bands (*milites*) were highly mobile and operated with great autonomy, and were also ready to join the royal hosts in campaign, as shown during James I's campaigns in Mallorca and Valencia.

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40 Balaguer, *Del mancús*, doc. 98; Bofarull, *Colección*, IV: doc. 129.

41 Balaguer, *Del mancús*, docs. 102–106; Miguel Gual, *Precedentes de la reconquista valenciana* (Valencia: Diputación Provincial, 1952), docs. 22, 24, 25; CTT, docs. 205 and 207.

42 Balaguer, *Del mancús*, docs. 107, 109, 110.

43 Pierre Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence,* I: 134–136; CTT, doc. 134.

44 Antoni Virgili, "Moneda i peces de moneda en els inicis de la Tortosa feudal (1148–1213)," *Gaceta Numismática* 137 (2000): 29–50.

The Conquest of Mallorca

The parliament celebrated in Barcelona in 1228 decided in favour of the conquest of Mallorca, and the cities of Tortosa and Tarragona adhered to Barcelona's commitment to offer the expedition "people, ships and other craft," according to the royal chronicle. The archbishop of Tarragona and Guillem and Ramon de Montcada also took individual commitments; the latter, lord of Tortosa, promised to fully equip and mount 25 knights, and also to prepare footmen with crossbows and lances, seamen and other staff, good on both land and sea, promising not to return until the conquest was complete.[45]

The chronicles offer few details about the participation of companies from Tortosa in the conquest of Mallorca. Guillem and Ramon de Montcada, members of the high aristocracy, were killed in the battle of Portopí, which took place before the siege of *madīna* Mayūrqa. During the assault of the city two members of the Tortosan contingent saw the "king of the Saracens" and informed James I of his whereabouts in exchange for a thousand pounds, after the king haggled them down from their initial request of two thousand; one of them acted as an interpreter.[46]

The *repartimiento* of the king's share of Mallorca (*medietas regis*), in which a number of Tortosan people were given real estate as a reward for their contribution, reflects their participation in the campaign more effectively. Three of the relevant entries refer to lots of land to be distributed among the members of as many companies. Pere Novelles and his *companyons* received 36 *jovades* in seven different *rahals* in the district of Sineu.[47] The names Novell, Novella and Novelles are recorded in Tortosa since the second half of the 12th century.[48] Guerau de Castelló and his *companyons* received 18 *jovades* in four *rahals*, also in Sineu. The family Castelló, probably originally from the county of Empúries (Castelló d'Empúries, Girona) has had a strong presence in the Lower Ebro since directly after the conquest. Ramon de Castelló, *maior*, and his homonymous son, *iunior*, acquired particular prominence in the region, especially from 1156 onwards: they possessed lands in Benifallet, Aldover and

45 LF Ch. 47–55; Desclot Ch. 26.

46 LF Ch. 66, 87; Desclot Ch. 47.

47 LRM, 64–65. The size of *jovades* in Mallorca has generated some controversy. We agree with H. Kirchner, *La construcció de l'espai pagès a Mayurqa: les valls de Bunyola, Orient, Coanegra i Alaró* (Palma de Mallorca: Universitat de les Illes Balears, 1997): 169–174, on an extension of around 3 has. against the most common opinion, which raises this extension to 11.5 has. In Valencia, the *jovada* has an area of 2.99 has.

48 DCT, I: doc. 266, 330, 331; II: doc. 594.

Vilaroja, appear in the record as important members of the *curia*, and lent money. During the 13th century, Bernat, Miquel and Ramon de Castelló are mentioned in several documents related to Tortosa.[49] Finally, Bernat Poculul (from Tortosa, according to the *Llibre de les Quarterades*), and his twelve *companyons* were given 34 *jovades* in three *rahals*, again in Sineu. The presence of the Poculul family in the Lower Ebro has been confirmed from the last quarter of the 12th century. Nina, Poculul's wife, wrote in 1177 a will in favour of her children Bernat (possibly the same that was given the lands in Mallorca), Arnau, Vives and Soberana; the record shows that Bernat owned lands in Andust, and signed as witness in several notary documents.[50]

In conclusion, at least three companies led by Tortosa men participated in the Mallorcan campaign. Only for that under Bernat Poculul do we know the number of members, twelve, who received 34 *jovades*, or nearly three *jovades* each. The other two companies, the number of members of which is unknown, received 36 and 18 *jovades* respectively. If we take the ratio of 3 *jovades* per head as the standard, we should conclude that Pere Novelles's party would have 12 members and Guerau de Castelló's 6. The cession of land to armed parties could be the base of new colonial settlements, as was for example the case with the south of the Kingdom of Valencia in the mid 13th century.[51]

Regarding individuals, the best rewarded among the Tortosan knights was Ramon de Conies (or Coniles) who was awarded by the king with 24 *jovades* in two villages (*alqueries*) in Montueri, and other lands in Manacor, which had initially been given to Nuno Sanç, Count of Roussillon. We do not know the specific circumstances around this cession of land to the Conies, but it seems beyond doubt that they settled there, according to documents listing their possessions and dating to the second half of the 13th century. Conies is the name of a district in Manacor, led by Bernat de Conies between 1272 and 1290, and Ramon de Conies between 1307 and 1309.[52] It seems that the family originally

49 LRM, 66; Altisent, *Diplomatari*, doc. 410; ACA ORM, Gran Priorat, Tortosa, perg. 71; CTT, doc. 117; DCT, I: docs. 334, 339, 350, 384, 386; DCT, I: doc. 341; ACA ORM, Gran Priorat, Tortosa, codex 115, doc. 252; DCT, II: docs. 547, 574; TTE, II: docs. 90, 129, 130 and 155.

50 LRM, 59, 105; DCT, I: docs. 269, 345, 355, 384, 396; II: docs. 571, 598; CTT: doc. 80.

51 Torró, "Guerra, repartiment," 240–269.

52 I owe this information about the Conies of Manacor to Dr. Eugènia Sitjes, to whom I am indebted. In 1295, a mention to the Conies's *honor* also appears in the record: Arxiu Reial de Mallorca Escrivania de Cartes Reials (ECR) 354, f. 79v and 127r. Other, later documents in the same archive, mention the village (*alqueria*) of Conilles: Lletres Comunes (LC) 30, f. 41v. (1365); ECR 670, f. 260r (1407); LC 136, f. 113v. (433); and the *rafal* of Conilles in ECR 677, f. 155v. (1462); ECR 347, f. 264r; ECR 345, f. 282r; ECR 347, f. 158v; ECR 356, f. 240v; ECR 356, f. 271v; and ECR 357, f. 187r.

came from Barcelona, and that a branch settled in Tortosa around the late 12th century. Ramon appears in 24 documents dated between 1198 and 1212. He possessed several urban properties, including houses, empty plots, and workshops; he served Bishop Gombau and signed as witness in many official documents, for example the chart establishing the limits between the bishoprics of Tarragona and Tortosa. The king Peter II the Catholic, father of James I, wished to reward these services: he offered him his patronage and liberated him from transit dues in the royal possessions.[53]

Bernat Toz was also awarded six *jovades* in a *rahal* in Sineu, and Ramon Toz 12 *jovades* in the village of Novelix de Petra. A document, dated 1184 and referring to Arenes (Tortosa) also mentions a Berenguer Tos.[54] On his part, R. Gilabert obtained six *jovades* in the village of Castubenyon. Under the name Gilabert, this individual appears in many documents referring to Tortosa: he had lands, was member of the *curia* and, giving proof of his prestige, was called to bear witness in many transactions involving the monasteries of Poblet and Santes Creus and the military orders.[55] R. d'Aragó, from Tortosa, was also awarded five *jovades* in a *rahal* in Petra, while A. de na Dominga was initially awarded 8 *jovades* and A. Bernardo 11 *jovades* in the villages of Sineu and Petra respectively; in Montueri, Joan de Someres was awarded five *jovades*, and Astruc and his three brothers eight.[56] The *repartimiento* of Mallorca mentions a galley from Tortosa, awarded with 90 *cavalleries* (knight's fees), but no names are given. Similarly, the "men from Tortosa under the king" received a hamlet of two *jovades* in the city of Mallorca (the *rahal* Algarbí Mina Maya), 30 *jovades* in Petra, 13 in Montueri and two workshops in the city.[57] Finally, members of three additional families with strong presence in the Lower Ebro in the second half of the 12th century – although the *Llibre del Repartiment* does not made explicit that they came from Tortosa – also received real estate in the island of Mallorca: F. de Granada, 5 *jovades* in Inca; R. de Centelles, 10 *jovades* in Inca; and B. and G. dez Pug (the Despuig), 8 *jovades* in Pollença and 5 in Artà.[58]

In conclusion, the Tortosan singular members of the expedition received a total of 170 *jovades*, 94 of which were in the district of Sineu, 17 in Petra and 57 in Montuiri, to which collective donations must be added. Most beneficiaries

53 DCT, I: doc. 115; II: docs. 592, 641, 648, 650, 661, 663, 664, 694, 710, 712, 718, 733, 734, 740, 753, 767.

54 LRM, 61 and 67; DCT, I: doc. 359.

55 LRM, 78; DSC, I: doc. 171; CP, docs. 180, 196, 197; CTT, doc. 23; DSC, II: doc. 336, etc.

56 LRM, 68, 80, 64, 82–83, 86,

57 LRM, 44, 164, 176 and 194.

58 LRM, 48, 49, 55, 74.

belonged to families which had been well established in Tortosa and the Lower Ebro since the second half of the 12th century. Their ancestors had arrived to the city following war, and now war opened for them the gates of the island of Mallorca.

The Conquest of Valencia

Tortosa's contribution to the conquest of the future kingdom of Valencia was, according to the sources, even more significant than that with regard to the conquest of Mallorca. The city and harbour of Tortosa became an important centre for operations. The 1225 frustrated assault on the citadel of Peníscola, described by Bernat Desclot as a "castle near Tortosa, on the border between the Saracens and the Christians of Tortosa and Aragon," was prepared there; this episode was skipped in the royal chronicle. Additionally, during one of his stays in Tortosa, King James issued the order to tax the villages in Aragón and Catalonia in order to fund the campaigns, while calling his vassals to join the host mustered outside Valencia. Peníscola was finally surrendered in 1233, and the king personally escorted the defeated to Tortosa, where they had to collect some items (clothing, livestock and victuals), as established in the capitulation agreement, to return immediately thereafter. Soon after, the fortresses of Xivert, Cervera and Polpís followed suit.[59]

As logistic centres, Tortosa and Tarragona supplied the troops detached in the siege of Borriana with the delivery of two galleys led by Pere Martell and Bernat de Santa Eugènia. Similarly, the host encamped in the Puig de Valencia had to be supplied with 300 *cahíces* of grain and 50 pigs which the monarch had accrued in Tortosa – worth 1500 solidi – to correct the negligence of Bernat Guillem de Entença. Afterwards, forecasting a long campaign, James I went to Tortosa to direct the logistic operations necessary to gather enough supplies to maintain the host for two months. Siege engines and other items of war equipment were also built in Tortosa, for example the trebuchet later used in the final assault upon Valencia. Similarly, a naval squadron built between Tarragona and Tortosa repelled a Tunisian fleet which had arrived to succour Valencia.[60]

The *Llibre dels Feits* records several episodes of the campaigns against Valencia and Murcia in which combatants from Tortosa played a prominent part. The host besieging Borriana included the party of Ponç de Torrella, bishop of Tortosa, and the militias of Teruel and Daroca, promptly joined by those

59 Desclot Ch. 13; *LF* Ch. 230, 184 and 185.

60 LF Ch. 164, 214, 215, 261, 265.

from Calatayud, Lleida and Tortosa. Later, in order to secure the capitulation of Almenara, James I promised clothes and livestock, and left Pere Ramon de Tortosa, a member of the host who owned a textile workshop in Borriana, in charge of securing the items. Some of the mentioned actions ended badly for the attackers: the royal chronicle tells us about the defeat suffered near the Eslida hills by the militias of Tortosa and some other towns in the Lower Ebro and the nearby Aragonese towns, when an Andalusi troop killed around 400 or 500 men.[61]

Tortosa was especially prominent with regard to specialised militia, specifically crossbowmen, according to the royal chronicle and the *repartimientos*. During the siege of Biar (1244) the king summoned Guillem de Montcada, who had joined the host with 60 crossbowmen from Tortosa; who were, according to the sources, high quality troops. Similarly, a troop of 120 crossbowmen participated in the assault of the city of Murcia. They were later used to force the local population to abandon the mosque.[62]

These sporadic mentions must be complemented with the information offered by the *Llibres de Repartiment*, in which the value of logistic, financial and military services rendered to the royal host are in a way represented; each entry in which real estate is allocated gives a measure of the beneficiary's contribution. In Valencia, as shown by the *Llibres del Repartiment*, the crews of three Tortosan ships – from Palafrugell, Pedritxol and Cap de Ferro, with 23, 24 and 26 men respectively – were collectively rewarded with the village of Castelló, near Valencia; Arnau Capdeferro is also mentioned in the *repartimiento* of Peníscola (1249–1251).[63] On the other hand, both documents mention Pedritxol, from Tortosa (this name appears in the censuses of 1193 and 1211).[64] The singularity of the name makes it highly plausible that this neighbour of Tortosa and the ship-owner involved in the campaign of Valencia and the subsequent *repartimiento* are indeed the same person. Cap de Ferro, Petritxol and Berenguer Palafrugell belonged to a party of 30 who were collectively rewarded with two houses and 30 *jovades* in Russafa. A decade later, as the conquest progressed towards the south, a company of 40 crossbowmen were given a wealth of lands near the castle of Alfàndec, and another of 10, some lands in Corbera.[65]

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61 LF Ch. 157, 245, 246, 247, 370.

62 LF Ch. 358, 443 and 449. According to the editor, these crossbowmen could have been, at least in part, Andalusi in origin. This statement is not supported by any evidence.

63 LRV, I: 174, 175 and 176 (1238); Torró, "Guerra, repartiment," 263. On the *caravana* from Tortosa, see, in this volume, Enric Guinot, "Council and urban Militias in the Crown of Aragon during the 13th Century: from conquering Militias to monetary exemptions."

64 CTT, doc. 103; TTE, II: doc. 216.

65 LRV, I: 161 (1238); II: 248, 1080 (1248), and 1353 (1249).

The *Llibres del Repartiment* of Valencia record the settlement of around 130 individuals from Tortosa. Of these, 35 did so as individuals, each settler receiving a house, a garden and another piece of agricultural land; 15 entries do not specify the surface given. Regarding the rest, six received two *jovades*; two, three *jovades*; five, four *jovades*; four, six *jovades*; two, eight *jovades*, and another two, an unspecified area. There was also the settlement of four small groups of two or three people, and finally the aforementioned, larger companies. Most of the land thus allocated was in the districts of Russafa, Alboraia, Campanar and Alcudia. Regarding urban property, 142 houses were allocated to Tortosan neighbours in the city of Valencia. They were all in the same area, thenceforth known as "partita Dertuse," which had a total of 247 houses.[66]

A significant portion of those who were given houses in the city, lands, or both in the *repartimiento* of Valencia, have been tracked back to their region of origin, either directly – in 13th century documents – or through their, generally well established, families – in documents dating to the second half of the 12th century. Among these, one of the most significant is Robaldo Voltorasco, appointed perpetual Bailiff in Morvedre, probably as a reward to his contribution to the conquest and as a reflection of the social prestige so acquired. We also know of a Robaldo Voltorasco, the father or grandfather of the Bailiff in Morvedre, Genoese in origin and owner of houses and lands in Tortosa and its hinterland. Also Genoese were Gamundio, Bonvassall de Moron and Ambrosio, who frequently signed as witnesses for the transactions of the latter Voltorasco.[67] It seems very likely that these properties had been allocated to Robaldo Voltorasco as a reward for his participation in the siege of Tortosa, as a member of the Genoese militia, probably very soon after the conquest.

Among these relevant individuals we must also include members of aristocratic families, such as the Puig, or Despuig, who are present in Tortosa since the siege of the city.[68] Ramon Despuig, one of the representatives of Tortosa in the parliament celebrated in Monzón (October 1236) to give the final *placet* to the campaign against Valencia, received several houses in the city and

66 LRV, III: 867–966. See Guinot, "Council and urban," in this volume.

67 DCT, I: doc. 68; ACA ORM, Gran Priorat, codex 115, doc. 109, f. 34r; DCT, I: doc. 231.

68 Ramon Berenguer IV included Ademar de Puig (or de Podio) in the *repartimiento* of Tortosa in 1149 (DCT, I: doc. 14). Joan de Puig – in fact, the extended chronology (1154–1209) suggests two persons with the same name – is mentioned as owning lands in Fazalfori, Anglesola, Bítem, Tivenys, Arenes and Vinallop (DCT, I: docs. 84, 367, 413, 484; II: docs. 603, 752) and as belonging to the *Curia*. Ramon, son of Joan, who appears as the executor of a will in 1219 and who is known to have died by 1264 (TTE, II: docs. 16,109) may have been the same one who is said to have participated in the *repartimiento* of Valencia.

10 *jovades* in the village of Benimocren.[69] A Guillem Ademar, probably connected to the Puig, sold several houses in Tortosa before 1237, and was awarded with some houses and a garden in Valencia, including four *jovades* of land.[70] The Bell·lloc, from the homonymous castle in the region of the Vallès, nearby Barcelona, and members of Ramon Berenguer IV's court, lorded over Aldea, near Tortosa. Julià de Bell·lloc was rewarded with some houses in Valencia and two *jovades* of land in Campanar.[71] Tomás Garidell, from Tortosa, who in 1238 received houses and a piece of land in Rascanya (Valencia), also belonged to an aristocratic family settled in the Lower Ebro since the conquest.[72] The origin of the family is unclear, but could be a branch of the Claramunt (in central Catalonia). They lorded over the castle of Garidells and its hinterland, near Tarragona, from which they probably drew their name. The important conquests carried out by Ramon Berenguer IV permitted some members of the family to settle in the Lower Ebro, where they would found the village of Garidell, to the southeast of Tortosa.[73] I should also mention Berenguer de Crosius (Grosius, Gros), *miles Dertusensis*, who obtained houses in Valencia, and a garden and 3 *jovades* of land in Beniferri.[74] The common denominator of these families is

69 Enric Guinot, "El repartiment feudal de l'horta de València al segle XIII: jerarquització social i reordenació del paisatge rural," in *Repartiments medievals a la Corona d'Aragó* (*segles XII–XIII*), ed. Enric Guinot and Josep Torró (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2007), 149; LRV, I: 526 (1238).

70 TTE, II: doc. 46; LRV, I: 95 (1237).

71 Ramon Berenguer IV gave Bernat de Bell·lloc the *almunia* of Aldea (DCT: 11); Guillem, probably his heir, ceded the tower of Asmet, in Aldea, to Arnau de Rocacorba (DCT: 148, 244). The entry in Valencia, LRV: I, 58 (1237).

72 LRV: I, 125 (1238)

73 This is currently an uninhabited location in the municipality of l'Ampolla (Baix Ebre. Tarragona). It probably emerged from the tower owned by Arnau Garidell and his brother, according to a document from the monastery of Santes Creus (DSC, I: doc. 171). The Garidells are divided into several branches, and the family is profusely documented due to their prominent social position (DCT, I: docs. 175, 208, 251, 261, etc.; DSC, I: docs. 171, 176); they were also members of the *curia* (DCT, I: docs. 103, 159, 185, 186, 213, 363, 456, 486; II, docs. 560, 577; CP, docs. 180, 190, 196, 197; CTT, docs. 101, 107) and mingled with members of the major families (DCT, I: docs. 28, 30, 58, 70, 73, 75, etc.). The position of the family was consolidated in the 13th century (TTE, II: docs. 85, 107); meanwhile, Tomàs, probably the same one in the *repartimiento* of Valencia, signed the appointment of Tortosa's qadi in 1216, and affirmed the rights of the monastery of Sant Cugat over the lagoons and pools under the monastery's jurisdiction near Amposta: TTE, II: doc. 4; José Rius Serra, *Cartulario de Sant Cugat del Vallès* (Barcelona-Madrid: CSIC, 1946): doc. 1384.

74 LRV, I: 896 (1238). Of the family Gros we have little evidence. Egidio, or Gil, Grosius had owned lands in Burjasénia, between Aldea and Amposta, through the Templars (TTE, II:

their approach to the conquest as a *modus vivendi*. They were in Tortosa because they had taken part in its conquest, and Ramon Berenguer IV rewarded them with the lands which they needed to consolidate their lines: thereafter, these families entered into relationship with the ecclesiastical hierarchies, accumulated extensive properties, lent money and entered the political and jurisdictional local institutions (the *curia*, public magistracies, etc.) becoming, in short, part of the regional oligarchy.

The role played by Ponç de Torrella, bishop of Tortosa between 1213 and 1254, deserves special mention. A friend of James I, he frequently accompanied and assisted the king in the Valencian campaigns. The main aim of the bishop was to extend the territory of the see "up to the old limits" specified in the document issued for the consecration of the cathedral in November 1178. To the south, these limits embraced Almenara, Uixó, Nules, Onda, Alcalatén and Culla. The conquest of Valencia, therefore, enlarged the see of Tortosa towards the south and increased the associated sources of episcopal revenue, mainly tithe and *primicia*. Additionally, he constituted several territorial and jurisdictional manors in the villages of Khadrel (Fadrell), Sufera, Miravet (which evolved into the settlements of Cabanes, Bell·lloc and Torreblanca), Coves (de Vinromà), Rafalvazir, and in the castle and village of Almassora, including the *alqueria* of Benimocar.[75]

There is a second category of families involved in the conquest of Valencia, records relating to which exist for the last two or three decades of the 12th century in the Lower Ebro. Among the most prominent, we can count the Moragues (related to the Avirer), Gibert, Dalmau, Carbonell, Balaguer, Bou, Mora, Gavassa, Calderer, Pujol, Fraga and Alfocea. They also became significant landowners, although not with as many properties as the first group of families. Their most significant feature is their undertaking of offices and positions which made them close associates with, or members of, urban elites.[76]

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doc. 43). By the late 12th century, the owners of Burjasénia were already known as Egidio (DCT, I: doc. 442).

75 DCT, I: 301; Guinot, "El repartiment feudal," 105.

76 For example, the Moragues and the Gibert were members of the *sindicatura* and the *curia*. The presence of Guillem Moragues in Tortosa is well documented (DCT, II: docs. 546, 559, 676, 686, 743, 750, 767, etc.), and also that of Bernat Gibert (TTE, II: docs. 12, 45, 46). Also, Ramon Calderer was procurator and representative of Tortosa's citizens in the second half of the 13th century (TTE, II: docs. 115, 125, 184). Pere de Balaguer occupied the offices of Bailiff (*batle*) and *veguer* (TTE, II: docs. 7, 8, 9, 22, 37, 45, 46.). Others were clerks and notaries (examples in DCT, I: docs. 286, 363; II: docs. 553, 571, 632, 767; TTE, II: docs. 1, 2, 4, 5, 13, 16, 22, 24).

Of the Bou, Gavassa and Pujol (Podiolo) we have less evidence, but we know for certain that they were in Tortosa in the second half of the 12th century, as landowners or otherwise occupied.[77] J. and B. de Alfocea and R. de Fraga, from Tortosa, would be the descendants of Aragonese colonists, as shown by their family names, present in the Lower Ebro before 1200.[78] All of them received properties in Valencia: houses, gardens and other properties of various sizes.[79]

So far we have referred to people who, with all certainty since their activities in their region of origin have been safely attested, came from Tortosa or its hinterland and received properties in the *repartimiento* de Valencia. It has not always been possible to fully identify all of them, because the documents only record their initials or because the record is otherwise incomplete, making the drawing of relationships with regions of origin impossible. Finally, many entries refer to individuals whose origins are not mentioned, but whose names are nevertheless frequent in the Lower Ebro. Families such as Manresa (Minorisa), Morlans, Centelles, Caors, Tolsà (or Tolosà), Savassona, Altafulla, Jordà, Sentmenat, Tona, etc., are, despite their occasional similarity to toponyms connected to other regions, abundantly present in the Lower Ebro in the second half of the 12th and throughout the 13th century. Many were part of, or were closely connected to, the colonial oligarchy of the region. Future research may be able to determine their origin more precisely.

Conclusions

The region of Tortosa, conquered towards the mid 12th century, was for decades a frontier zone. Throughout this period there was an accelerated process of substituting the indigenous population with a new colonial society constructed with immigrants from the northern feudal regions. At the same time, the region became a springboard for the future conquests of James I. The creation of urban militias and their incorporation into the royal hosts was the result of a learning process, the origins of which may be sought in the previous two or three generations: among the conquerors and the members of armed bands which launched raids and other expeditions in search of captives, livestock and other booty. In one way or another, therefore, war became a lucrative

77 On the presence of the Bou, DCT, I: docs. 276, 306, 422, 458, 484; II: docs. 528, 558; and TTE, II: docs. 13, 25, 45. Of the Gavassa, DCT, II: docs. 631, 729, 763; TTE, II: docs. 14, 35. The Pujol had houses in the city and lands, sold land and acted as witnesses in several transactions: DCT, I: docs. 316, 321, 322, 333, 347, 361, 363, 435; II: doc. 645.

78 Virgili, "Els aragonesos."

79 LRV, I and DCT, I, *passim*; Guinot, "El repartiment feudal," 149.

activity for the new colonial society. The ideal location of this was, no doubt, the frontier, and war thus stood as one of the incentives for emigration.

Tortosa is a good example of this process. The record shows laconic but no less eloquent evidence of raids and other expeditions launched upon Andalusi settlements beyond the river Sénia, a situation which lasted for eight decades. When James I decided to conquer Mallorca and Valencia, Tortosa and its hinterland became a centre of major importance, as a logistic and supply node, but mostly for the human contribution made to the royal host.

The creation of important, highly specialised, armed companies, such as the groups of crossbowmen, was not coincidental. Their muster in Tortosa made sense, because Tortosa was the frontier. When we say that the companies came from Tortosa, we do not necessarily mean that all men were necessarily from the city, but that it was there where they gathered; that is why some of the most important towns nearby, such as Amposta and Ulldecona, are not as explicitly mentioned in this regard.

Among the conquering troops were members of the different levels of the aristocracy (lords, knights), such as the bishop, and the Bell·lloc, Garidell, Conies and Gros families; representatives of the local oligarchies; and members of the political and jurisdictional institutions and the urban council, such as the Balaguer, Moragues, Gibert, Carbonell among others. Finally, other individuals are more difficult to pin down, because they participated as members of armed companies or bands.

At any rate, however, these persons never acted as representatives of the city, and even members of the urban council or the *curia* acted individually, as shown by the entries in the *Llibres de Repartiment*. Equally, the beneficiaries in the *repartimiento* belonged to families established in Tortosa and its hinterland from the second half of the 12th century, and were therefore the descendants of the conquerors or of the earliest colonists. Those families that prospered – all the families analysed in this paper belong to that category – increased in size and branched out. For them, conquest and war was a way of life, as it had been for their predecessors.

War may help to explain the dynamics of colonisation and the ability to attract colonists to the frontier; colonists settled faster and earlier in the frontier than in rearguard regions. Conquerors and colonists used war with more or less success as a way to become rich and climb socially; it always remained as an alternative for those who had been incapable of holding on to the assets gained in previous conquests, having to sell them to quell their debts. The abundant pledges and sale documents – in most cases the purchase is being effected by the main lords of the land – are clear evidence of this process. This illuminates an economic perspective on conquest: war with al-Andalus offered a good balance between risk and profit.

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CHAPTER 4

Medieval Factors in the Conquest of America: Organisation and War Practices in the Incursions into Darién

Carmen Mena García

Building the Utopia

The medieval roots of the Spanish expansion overseas are well known.[1] It could hardly be otherwise. Immediately after closing the *Reconquista* with the conquest of the Muslim kingdom of Granada in 1492, another frontier opened, almost scenically, beyond the huge Atlantic, where Castilian men and institutions could be projected anew, and old uses could be perpetuated and preserved in the new scenario. Francisco Solano pointed out that "this coincidence was understood – then and later – as the logical (and preternatural) reward for eight hundred years of sustained efforts. Granada closed a multisecular process which had kept generations occupied in the pursuit of a triple objective: acquiring land, spreading Christianity, and gaining social and economic promotion." For this reason – in Solano's opinion – it must not be understood merely as the culmination of a successful campaign, but as a prize gained after centuries of toil. In conclusion, again according to Solano, the *Reconquista* – regardless of how we interpret it – "was a crusade, a holy war the expansionist, proselytist and militarist spirit of which were transferred to the Indies on their discovery."[2] Other authors use very similar arguments. The Mexican historian Silvio Zavala understands the conquering process as "the last religious adventure, the closing of the cycle of medieval crusades." However, this messianic and proselytistic nature of the Spanish expansion overseas has been recently questioned by several authors, such as Manuel

* This article provides an extract of our book *El oro del Darién. Entradas y cabalgadas en la conquista de la Tierra Firme* (*1509–1526*) (Sevilla and Madrid: Junta de Andalucía and CSIC) with some new thoughts and comments.

1 See, among others, Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, *La Edad Media española y la empresa de América* (Madrid: Edición Cultura Hispánica del Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1983), and Antonio Tovar, *Lo medieval en la conquista y otros ensayos americanos* (Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1970).

2 Francisco de Solano and others, *Proceso histórico al conquistador* (Seville: Alianza Editorial, 1988), 30–31.

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Lucena Salmoral and Esteban Mira, who think that "painting the conquest as a crusade is anachronistic, because the conquerors were no crusader knights, there were no holy lands to regain and the expansion of the faith was never the main target." In short, in their opinion the military conquest of America cannot in any way be read as "the last medieval crusade; at the most, it was one chapter in the holy war against the infidels."[3] This holy war was to take place on American soil and would not be waged against the Muslims, the natural enemies of the Spanish Christian kingdoms, but against American pagans, the Christianisation of which was always attempted "in bulk" and nearly always through violent methods. The survival of the warrior myth of St James, created in the context of the *Reconquista* – in his most common iconography, St. James appears riding a white horse and brandishing his sword overt the slain bodies of his Muslim enemies – is in itself very revealing. The saint, on his transfer to America, automatically became the protector of the conquering parties and changed his name from *Santiago matamoros* (St. James the Moor Slayer) to *Santiago mataindios* (St. James the Indian Slayer), thus becoming the patron of those in charge of extending the Christian faith over the newly discovered lands.[4]

At the beginning of the modern period European civilisation suffered a process of spatial dislocation. For centuries everything had evolved around Jerusalem, the symbolic centre of Christendom, and such a focal point was not only beyond the borders of Europe but also under the control of a rival civilisation: Islam.[5] With the discovery of the new lands Europeans had to face a novel, in this case mostly ideological, dilemma: how to fit a mysterious and extraordinary civilisation in their Old World intellectual frameworks. The main problem was lack of understanding. Although it may seem paradoxical, the "uncertain impact" of the discovery in European society did not crystallise in conflict, due to the weight of Christian and Classical traditions. Medieval cultural traditions made Europeans more tolerant with the extraordinary, and the idea of the lands and peoples of America were thus digested with less difficulty. Despite the enormous intellectual challenge posed by this need for mental readjustment, Europe's reaction may not have been as slow as may

3 Esteban Mira, *Conquista y destrucción de las Indias (1492–1573)* (Seville: Muñoz Moya Editores, 2009), 81–88.

4 For the evolution of the figure of St. James in Spain and Spanish territories in the medieval and modern periods, see, among others, Roberto J. López, "La pervivencia de un mito bélico en la España Moderna: la imagen de Santiago caballero," in *Religión y conflictos bélicos en Iberoamérica*, ed. David González (Seville: Universidad Internacional de Andalucía and Fundación Caja Rural del Sur, 2008), 42–76.

5 Tzvetan Todorov, *La conquista de América. El problema del otro* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 1998), 118.

be believed at first sight. In this regard, Elliott points out that Europe, on the threshold of the modern age "was quicker at responding to the presence of the New World than medieval Europe had been in its response to Islam."[6]

The road was at any rate long and full of obstacles. The first step was to break through fantastic medieval world views in order to grasp the reality of America. The collective imaginary of the medieval West was based on a mysterious cosmos full of monsters, fabulous creatures and legendary paradises (Prester John, the Seven Cities of Gold, the Well of Eternal Youth, *el Dorado*, etc.), which all of a sudden seemed to have materialised in the new continent. It has been said that Europeans projected in America their unrealised dreams, Christianity's unfulfilled longings, such as the Lost Paradise, and the classics' Golden Age. The Indians were in this regard seen as innocent creatures who walked around naked and uncontaminated, the fullest expression of the "noble savage." In particular, some clerics – followers of Joaquín del Fiore's millenarianist theories – saw the discovery of America as an opportunity for the restoration of the primitive church of the twelve apostles among the Indians. For the first time, apocalyptic traditions of the end of the world harmoniously associated with a new and untarnished world which, by offering the opportunity to extend Christianity, also had redeeming powers: a new and better civilisation, a privileged laboratory wherein to reinvent the world. That was Europe's utopic project.

The medieval imaginary which accompanied the conquerors overseas was rebuilt in the Indies in the construction of the idea of the other through the imposition of our own image. In order to be able to assume a reality they did not really understand – that of the Amerindian civilisations – the conquerors were forced to go back to their own history, drawing comparisons from the Greco-Roman paradigm or from the wide repertoire offered by closer examples, such as the Muslims.[7] When the friar Las Casas denounced the unfortunate treatment to which the Indians were subject at the hands of the Spanish authorities in La Española, for which they were to be impeached, he supported the process because "they had been living like Moors without a king."[8] The letters sent by Hernán Cortés from Mexico or the chronicle written by the soldier Bernal Díaz show clearly how instinctively the conquerors equalled the Aztecs with the Moors. The temples of the Tenochca, where the Indian "sacristans"

6 J.H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New: 1492–1650* (*1492–1650*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 17 and ff.

7 Todorov, *La conquista de América*, 117–118.

8 Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, ed. Juan Pérez de Tudela (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 1957), 2:376.

carried out their rituals, were called "mosques," Tlaxcala was favourably compared with Granada and the military tactics reproduced those used in the *Reconquista* because, as pointed out by John Elliott, "Cortés strategy aimed at creating internal dissensions among the Indians and against Moctezuma, in an ultimately successful effort to gain native allies."[9] This form of interaction occurred in the Antilles, in Tierra Firme (the Mainland), in Mexico, in Peru, and in the most remote corners of the continent.

Hueste Indiana and Medieval Bands

On their arrival to the New World, the Spanish brought a series of long-established military practices and forms of organisation. In a relatively short period of time, however, contact with the new American realities and the influence of the Renaissance were to update the medieval models left by the *Reconquista*, reinterpreting them for the development of typically American hybrid systems. One of the most prominent institutions in the conquest of the Indies was the *hueste indiana*, which has for a long time been considered the successor of medieval models. In fact, some even see these groups as the direct heirs to the medieval council militias which featured so prominently in the success of the *Reconquista*. In fact, although the word *hueste* was used in medieval documents to refer to any armed group, in a more limited meaning it referred specifically to "an army mustered for a major operation, offensive or defensive, and with the participation of council, royal and manorial troops".

Depending on the composition of these *huestes*, leadership would fall on the king, on an aristocrat, or on the councils."[10] In the Spanish Middle Ages – as Silvio Zavala reminds us – armies were not national, but formed by groups under the leadership of nobles or councils which, without losing their local character, participated in internal and external wars, particularly against the Moors. These independent parties, sustained and commanded by their own leaders and not to be mistaken for the king's armies, were present in the conquest of Valencia by the Cid, the Baleares, the Canaries, and Andalusia." Their transformation into a professional army and the emergence of a deeper sense of

9 J.H. Elliott et al., *Hernán Cortés y México* (Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 2000), 20.

10 Carmela Pescador, "La caballería popular en León y Castilla," *Cuadernos de Historia de España* 33–40 (1961–64): [2]:123. On the organisation of royal hosts, especially for the war in Granada, see Miguel A. Ladero, "Formación y funcionamiento de las huestes reales en Castilla durante el siglo XV," in *La organización militar en los siglos XV y XVI. Actas de las II Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar* (Málaga: Cátedra General Castaños, 1993), 161–172.

national representation took place between the late 15th and the early 16th centuries, with the creation of the Spanish *tercios* by the crown in the context of external wars in Italy and Flanders. In Zavala's opinion, however, "the conquest of America was not carried out by the state's army, but by privately paid and led parties, remarkably similar to the medieval *mesnadas*."[11] Zavala goes on to argue that the Castilian *mesnada* played such a prominent role in the Indies either because the most progressive instruments and the limited resources available to the Catholic Monarchs were invested in the European campaigns – instead of in the initially unpromising new lands – or because the conquerors, often from rural, backward councils, stuck to old medieval traditions, bypassing the needs of the modern state and ignoring directives from the court.

Other authors, such as Manuel Ballesteros, are however not so convinced about these similarities, though in general they admit one coincidence between both archetypes – the medieval and the American – which is the ultimate aim of imposing new populations.[12] It is well known that council militias were often involved in populating – or repopulating, if preferred – agents of the frontier lands between the Christian and the Muslim states, founding new cities in strategic points throughout the Spanish territory. Many of the individuals engaged in conquest and colonisation did so in order to escape feudal bonds. The territory taken from the Muslims was considered a land for new liberties, after centuries under the lord's heavy yoke; hence such expressive place names as Villafranca, Villareal, Ciudad Real, etc. In the same way, the new American lands were seen as a gateway, as a sort of paradise where life without ties seemed possible. The targets thus became conquering and settling. Indeed, the conquerors peppered with cities the new lands (whether previously uninhabited or taken from the indigenous groups), in a process of urbanisation which today remains a source of wonder.

The friar Las Casas nursed the utopic project of colonising the lands of the Indians with peasants recruited in Spain, and during his campaign of enlistment he made a stop at the seigneurial village of Berlanga (Soria). There, a good number of men joined along with their families, telling the friar in secret the real reasons for this: "Sir, none of us desires to go to the Indies for want of anything here, because all of us have one hundred thousand *maravedís* to our names, or more (which at the time, was rather a lot), but because *we want to leave our sons in a free land, under the king*." On another occasion, Las Casas arrived at a little village called Rello, with barely thirty houses, property

11 Silvio Zavala, *Las instituciones jurídicas de la conquista de América* (México: Porrúa, 1971), 106.

12 Manuel Ballesteros, "La hueste indiana," *Cuadernos Historia 16* 172 (1985): 15–16.

of the Count of Coruña. There he was joined by twenty nine people, including two brothers of around seventy, and seventeen children. The friar was rather surprised at their age: "You, father" – asked Las Casas of the eldest – "why do you want to go to the Indies being so old and tired?" And he replied: "Why sir, to die as I get there and *leave my children in a free and blessed land*."[13] Despite the secrecy with which this project was being undertaken, news about the campaign reached the ears of the *condestable* of Castile, who in great anger forbid any peasants to emigrate to the Indies, and issued an order indicating that whoever bought lands from these would-be *émigrés* would lose them. In the opinion of Bartolomé de las Casas, "these measures were not far from those of a tyrant."

It is at least clear that, along with their considerable similarities, medieval *mesnadas* and hosts of *conquistadors* had two significant differences regarding the recruitment of the men and the relationship between the leader and the ranks. Recruitment was done along military lines in both cases, with a drum playing and under a raised flag, but while in the Middle Ages – as admitted by Zavala – enlistment was considered an obligation, in the American case the men joined as volunteers. Similarly, in the American case there was no vassal/lord relationship between the leader and his troops; quite the opposite, according to the chronicles their relationship was more like a society – *la compaña* – or, at the most, a hierarchical relationship between a superior and a subordinate. In the words of Vargas Machuca in his treatise on Indian militias: "our *caudillo*, before raising the flag and playing the drum, will ponder the friends with whom better to achieve his business, and will be wary of them until he knows what's in their hearts and until they have shown their commitment to the quest."[14]

Some years ago Demetrio Ramos suggested that the model followed by the so called *hueste indiana* host was *el fecho de mar,* the medieval sea traditions, although with the incorporation of some specifically American uses; the Chilean Mario Góngora, on the other hand, sets their origin in the medieval *cabalgadas*, especially those unleashed upon the Barbary coast and the Canaries, despite these expeditions pursuing, as we shall see, very different objectives.[15]

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13 Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, 2:427.

14 Bernardo Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y descripción de las Indias*, ed. Mariano Cuesta and Fernando López-Ríos (Valladolid: Seminario Iberoamericano de Descubrimientos y Cartografía, 2003), 87.

15 Demetrio Ramos, *Audacia, negocio y política en los viajes españoles de descubrimiento y rescate* (Valladolid: Casa Museo Colón, Seminario Americanista de la Universidad de Valladolid, 1981); Mario Góngora, *Los grupos de conquistadores en Tierra Firme* (*1509–1530*).

Góngora also rejects any analogy between the American enterprise and the peninsular frontier wars, because "both the environment and the enemies involved were too different." He continues: "More than a parallel, what we find here is a genetic relationship; in the Peninsula's frontier, and most specifically in Andalusia, a kind of war and a kind of society existed which were natural for the generation immediately preceding the men who took part in the Indian emigration."[16] Other scholars sustain that the war against the Muslims in the Peninsula, most particularly the Granada campaign, is the model from which the Indian hosts drew.[17]

To a degree, they are all right. Medieval war traditions were transferred to America following its discovery, but the new circumstances soon imposed substantial changes. It may be said that new branches grew from the same trunk. First, it must be clarified that the *Conquistador* troops were not mustered around a lord or a council. It is true that after the achievement of some of their targets the warriors often became settlers, founding cities and towns which, following the Spanish model, were subject to the military obligations of all settlements under the king's jurisdiction, having the duty to defend the territory with their weapons and horses. This commitment did not affect everyone to the same level, because it was interpreted according to social status (knight or footman) and preferred fighting technique.[18]

Similarly, and logically considering the general continuity of the process, American councils reproduced well known medieval urban practices: in case of imminent danger the neighbours would be summoned "with ringing bells" to assist in the defence.[19] This notwithstanding, the organisation of the *hueste indiana* was very different from anything that had been done theretofore. These were markedly egalitarian bands of adventurers, voluntarily mustered around a *caudillo* bent on carrying out a personal enterprise, without any orders from above. This sort of organisation was already known in the coastal expeditions referred to by Mario Góngora. It must be stressed, however, that the aim of these expeditions was merely the capture of booty and slaves, and

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Fisonomía histórico-social de un tipo de conquista (Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, 1962). For the Canarian precedents of the conquest of America see Silvio Zavala, *Las conquistas de Canarias y América* (Las Palmas: Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, 1991).

16 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 95.

17 Zavala, *Instituciones jurídicas*, 95.

18 Ladero, "Formación y funcionamiento," 246–247.

19 See the case of Santa María de La Antigua del Darién: Carmen Mena, *El oro del Darién. Entradas y cabalgadas en la conquista de Tierra Firme* (*1509–1526*) (Seville and Madrid: Junta de Andalucía and CSIC, 2011), 310–313.

never the conquest of land, even less with the ultimate aim of colonising it.[20] The main difference is that in America, although the war tactics adopted were similar, the objective was always the complete domination of the territory and the creation of settlement nuclei.

America was not conquered by a true army, but by the actions of groups of brave and ambitious men engaged in private, almost commercial enterprises which nevertheless had the supervision and the sanction of the state. This is why it is nowadays conceived as a public task under concession to *caudillos*-entrepreneurs. This is, at any rate, how it was understood at the time. For example, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo bitterly complained that "the crown rarely contribute to these discoveries with money, only with paper and good words." Vargas Machuca expressed a similar feeling towards the end of the century: "in the militias in the Indies the prince does not spend anything, because it is the *caudillo* that finds the people, pays and equips them."[21]

It may thus be thought that the term "soldier," frequently used by historians to refer to the *Conquistadors*, is inappropriate, as they not only received no wages but were sometimes forced to spend their own money. Certainly, they had to provide for their own weapons and equipment. The *caudillo* or military chief of the mission for one was expected to invest heavily, sometimes beyond his means. The chance of acquiring succulent war booty, of obtaining riches and honours was an overwhelmingly tempting stimulus, a siren's chant that few could ignore. In fact, the case of the ruined captain thrown into the most abject of poverties when Fortune was not forthcoming is far from being a rare one. Pedro de Heredia, *Conquistador* of Cartagena, was denounced by his wife, *doña* Constanza Franca, for squandering all her possessions in the organisation of one such party, leaving her completely ruined. The governor himself was to admit, years later, that some of the men in his party had incurred debts of over 2,000 golden *pesos* to buy horses and gear and thus join his expedition.[22] Diego de Nicuesa, briefly governor of Veragua, abandoned Seville in 1509, swamped by the demands of his creditors; he never paid his debts, as he was to die in mid ocean.[23] It is easy to find similar cases.

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20 Demetrio Ramos, "La Conquista," in *Historia de Iberoamérica*, ed. Manuel Lucena (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 1990) 2:109–198.

21 Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y descripción*, 65.

22 María del C. Gómez, *Pedro de Heredia y Cartagena de Indias* (Seville: CSIC, 1985), 30, 131.

23 Further details can be found in Carmen Mena, "Preparativos del viaje de Diego de Nicuesa para poblar la Tierra Firme. Sevilla y los mercaderes del comercio atlántico (1509)," *Revista de Indias*, LXXII-256 (2012): 617–650.

It has been said that the door to profit-oriented enterprises and the investment of private capital was opened because the crown lacked the funds or the will to engage in such a colossal task. It is true that the African and European policy carried out by the Catholic Monarchs and later imperial commitments were a heavy burden on the public finances which also diverted the crown's attention from overseas. The private nature of the enterprise is alluded to so often that it has become one more among the myths of the conquest. But it is equally true that the state neither neglected the American issues nor abandoned them in the hands of the conquering parties. Similarly, it did not avoid all expenses incurred in the American expeditions. Much to the contrary, the state often intervened directly, adopting the role of financial partner or directly assuming the full costs of an expedition.[24] Indeed, the crown aimed at organising its overseas possessions on a permanent basis while encouraging new discoveries by promoting costly expeditions. This resulted in commissions to Columbus (second and fourth trip), Nicolás de Ovando (1502) or Pedrarias Dávila (1514), to name but a few, and included full-sized royal hosts, paid and equipped by the crown, in the classic Castilian medieval fashion. Once in the Indies, their wages were complemented with the distribution of the war booty and other rewards, such as lands, Indians, tax exemptions and other prizes aimed at ensuring the colonisation of the territory.

For all this, our analysis would be partial and our perspective on the conquest distorted if we neglected the existence of military units of clear medieval inspiration, such as the royal hosts, formed by real "soldiers," paid for by the king and under the authority of regular officers, with their artillery, lancers and even musicians. These troops, so different from the usual archetype, were therefore funded by the king and under the direct supervision of royal officials, following the centuries-old practices of medieval hosts.[25]

More than a Handful of Heroes

The discovery of America was viewed from the outset as an exceptional event. People at the time were well aware that these events had an enormous

24 For more information on this issue see Carmen Mena "Lo privado y lo público en la exploración y conquista del Nuevo Mundo (hasta Felipe II)," in *De la unión de las Coronas al Imperio de Carlos V*, ed. Ernest Belenger (Barcelona: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), 2:399–441.

25 For a detailed study of the *Hueste Real* sent to Darién under the orders of Pedrarias Dávila Dávila, see Mena, *El oro del Darién,* Chapter 3.

significance for the history of the world. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of events, men from all across Europe declared their awe with bold words. Around 1539, the Italian Lazzaro Buonamico said – in the earliest printed commentary on the issue known to date – that nothing had ennobled humanity more "than the invention of the printing press and the discovery of the new world; two things which I always thought could be compared, not only to Antiquity, but also to immortality."[26] "The greatest event since the creation of the world (excluding the incarnation and death of He who created it), is the discovery of the Indies," said López de Gómara in 1522, in the dedication of his *Historia General de las Indias* to Charles V.[27]

One unpredicted factor contributed to increasing the perceived dimension of the task. The conquest was carried out by a very small number of men, forced to confront thousands of Indians at a time. The men involved did not hesitate to complain about this inequality in numbers. The *Conquistador* Francisco de Jerez, asked in his chronicle of the expedition against Peru, written in 1534: "When among the ancients was there such an adventure, with so few people against so many?"[28] Towards the end of the century, the captain and prominent military writer Bernardo de Vargas Machuca warned the *caudillos* that "often you will find yourself fighting one to one hundred." The question was soon raised, and kept appearing recurrently in the writings of those interested in the conquest: "How could such powerful empires be so swiftly defeated by a few hundred Spaniards?" Because they were extraordinary men. And thus another myth is born: the heroes on whose shoulders the whole of the conquest rested. This exercise of reductionism, with the mythification of certain military leaders such as Balboa, Pizarro and Hernán Cortés, has had a firm grasp over traditional historiography, as stressed by M. Restall in his excellent work. The idea is also unfair, as it ignores all of those who, under the orders of the corresponding *caudillo*, did most of the work. The myth of the larger-than-life heroes of the conquest takes us presently to another one: the superiority of the Spaniards, which down to our days is used to explain the defeat of the Indian nations. Those in favour of this idea, turned into a myth by virtue of repetition, forget that Spanish hosts rarely acted alone, operating instead in close cooperation with not inconsiderable allied Indian troops. As I point out

26 Quoted by Mathew Restall, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2. This section quotes several of his thoughts.

27 Francisco López de Gómara, *Historia General de las Indias y vida de Hernán Cortés* (Caracas: Fundación Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1979), 7–8. (T.N.: The translation of this and the previous quotation have been extracted from Restall, *Seven Myths*).

28 Quoted by Restall, *Seven Myths,* 3.

elsewhere, "the Spaniards managed to succeed in the enterprises not only through the action of small bands of *Conquistadors*, but also of thousands of Indians which they had attached as allies to their expedition."[29] The defeat of the Aztecs at the hands of Hernán Cortés can only be explained by the support provided by certain Indian nations – especially the Tlaxcala – who paved his way into the heart of the empire in the Valley of Mexico. Similarly, Pizarro saw his advance into Peru made easier by the aid of the legitimate faction against Atahualpa, also benefiting from the support offered by tribes such as the *Cañaris* and the *Huancas*, opposed to the Inca. The *Conquistadors* enjoyed some such form of local support, indispensable for their incursions in enemy territory and for intelligence purposes, in almost every corner of the continent. The Indians, for fear of the Spaniards or for profit, made a decisive contribution to the final victory of the invaders.

The human landscape of the conquest was, as a consequence, highly varied: a handful of Europeans and thousands of mercenary Indians, many of whom were to be rewarded by the crown and ennobled according to Spanish uses. This mix also had African components, slaves who formed an exotic and a valuable addition to the conquering troops. In general these slaves arrived as domestic servants and were later used as porters, carpenters and builders. Some of them, however, especially the bravest and strongest, were armed and put alongside the Spaniards in their actions against the Indians; occasionally, they even substituted their masters to earn their part of the booty. Thus, without risking anything beyond the cost of the slave, some *Conquistadors*, most particularly royal officials, sent them to fight the Indians while they awaited the outcome in the comfort of the colonial base. Naturally this practice, which only benefited a privileged group, supported by the governors, was not easily digested by the rest of the groups and increasingly distorted the fragile equilibrium of the host. This is reflected in the growing number of complaints to the crown. During the impeachment carried out against Pedrarias Dávila, governor of Panama, at the end of his term in office, one of the witnesses declared that the officials of the treasury sent their black slaves with war parties, "and they did not have a place in them, because they were not war-like people, and the captains have to give them a share, which is for the treasurer or the official, but if the matter rested with the captains, they would not give these shares or even half-shares, and not even let them join the party."[30]

29 Mena, *El oro del Darién*, 332.

30 Quoted by Armando Fortune, "El esclavo negro en el desenvolvimiento económico," in *Obras Selectas* (Panamá: Editorial Mariano Arosemena del Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1993), 101.

Not all *Conquistadors* were sturdy, brave, war-like men. The documents occasionally use the nearly always derogatory expression "mozos soldaderos," to allude to youngsters, almost children, who were a burden for the expeditions and put their comrades at risk. Similarly there were those who, for being "not old enough, skinny, ill or clumsy" were a hindrance to the group, and sometimes even had to carried by its stronger members. To prevent the captains from rejecting them, as they were often wont to do, these men would approach royal officials, judges and other distinguished members of their colonies for their patronage, in what soon became common practice. Thus, denounces a document of the time, "they promise them half their profits to intercede for them with the captains." Over time, this situation generalised to such an extent that a royal order dated to 1525 and addressed to the authorities in Panama condemned it and ordered "that the people taking part in expeditions are only to be those who know how to fight."[31]

From the earliest examples the *hueste indiana* shows a number of singular characters, including some of clear medieval filiation, who would play secondary but essential roles for the performance of the group and the success of the enterprise. For example, the so-called *lenguas* or interpreters were naturally highly esteemed. These were almost always Indians, used initially to facilitate communication with the invaded nation and thus extract the secret of their wealth, and thereafter to ensure that vassalage ties were laid according to the wishes of the *Conquistadors*. They were a considerable source of income for their masters because, like all essential instruments for the party, they received a share in the profits, as with horses and dogs.

Also, the bands entering Indian territory needed the guidance of men capable of finding their way in the middle of a nowhere ridden with enemies and obstacles. The *adalides* were rangers, men who knew about life at the frontier, the ruses and hiding places of the Indians, the paths, the shortcuts, and the safe havens. This *rara avis* was also highly valued, because it significantly increased the expedition's chances of success. Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo described the virtues of the captain of the Darién, Bartolomé de Ocón, and included among them his being a great *adalid* "with much knowledge of the field." These men were called *adalides* because of their similarity with their counterparts in the medieval Iberia, although it seems that in the Indies the

31 "Real Cédula a las autoridades de Castila del Oro," Toledo, May 19 1525: Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla [hereafter cited as AGI] Panamá, 233, II; published by Pablo Álvarez Rubiano, *Pedrarias Dávila. Contribución al estudio de la figura del "Gran Justador," gobernador de Castilla del Oro y Nicaragua* (Madrid: CSIC and Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, 1944), appendix III.

character was somewhat diluted and lost a good part of his original attributes. It is certain that in the Spanish *Reconquista* the *adalid* was not a secondary character, but a crucial one. His job was to lead and guide the host, taking care of the technical side of the military command and taking double shares of the booty: "*Adalides* are the same as leaders, because they must know all there is to know to guide a host to war". Additionally, they acted as judges, and their authority extended to all party members, also being in charge of distributing the booty and of compensating the members for any loss or injury suffered.[32]

Finally, we must not forget the roles of *cuadrillero*, *botinero* and *repartidor de cabalgadas*, of special significance in the *hueste indiana*, since they were in charge of keeping the captives under control and of distributing them at the end, following the medieval tradition.

Cabalgadas, *entradas* and *guazavaras* into Tierra Firme[33]

In their advance upon Indian lands – from the Antilles to Tierra Firme and from the south of the current USA to Patagonia – the Iberians encountered a wide variety of landscapes. They also found an enormous diversity of cultures, including both populous and sophisticated nations – especially in Mesoamerica and the Andes – and societies organised in smaller units, such as bands or tribes; both sedentary and, in the peripheral regions, nomadic groups. The peculiar features of these societies generated very different responses: In Bethell's words "Different regions posed different problems and demanded different responses, and every expedition or attempt at colonization possessed its own peculiarities."[34] It is beyond doubt that the conquest of different regions was achieved through very different methods. However, although there was no standard procedure some models of organisation gained widespread popularity.

32 *Las Siete Partidas del Rey don Alfonso el Sabio* [hereafter cited as *Partidas*], ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1807), II:II.22.1–4; *Fuero sobre el fecho de las Cabalgadas*, ed. *Memorial Histórico Español* 2 (1851), Chs. 5, 6; María Martínez, "La cabalgada: un medio de vida en la frontera murciano-granadina (siglo XIII)," *Miscelánea Medieval Murciana* 13 (1986): 55–56; Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, *Guerra de Granada*, lib. II, quoted by Antonio Palomeque, "Contribución al estudio del ejército en los Estados de la Reconquista," *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español*, 15 (1994): 264.

33 This issue is extensively examined in Mena, *El oro del Darién*, 307–348.

34 Leslie Bethell ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America, I. Colonial Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 176.

Until approximately 1519 La Española was the centre of operations, the platform from which expeditions projected into the Antilles and later into Tierra Firme. It was also here that the first fiascos occurred. In barely two decades the *Conquistadors* occupying the island exhausted the gold from the rivers and annihilated the indigenous population. The Portuguese and Genoese commercial factory model adopted by Columbus failed irrevocably, and a new project for stable colonisation with men willing to settle gained prominence despite the difficulties.[35] During this period of experimentation, both confusing and violent, the *modus operandi* of explorers and *Conquistadors* already clearly shows three key influences: first, the Portuguese-Genoese commercial factory model, which joined exploration and barter with the Indians; second, the experience accumulated by the Spaniards in the occupation of the Atlantic Barbary and the Canaries, initiated in 1402 by Jean de Bethancourt and followed by Fernández de Lugo, where the public and the private concerns combined to perfection, as was to occur again in America; and, third, the practices developed by the Castilian-Leonese Crown during the *Reconquista*.[36] Ultimately, the latter two models prevailed, repeatedly driving the Spanish expansion in America.

Medieval Precedents and Military Archetypes

During the centuries over which the Christians conquered al-Andalus, Castilian-Leonese monarchs adopted a complex strategy for the use of all political and military resources available; from diplomatic agreements, avoiding direct confrontation, to the systematic destruction of enemy territory and the practice of attrition strategies to subdue the foe into submission. In this context, as shown by medieval military historiography, "devastating incursions, attrition strategies, expeditions and raids of different size and shape became a strategic alternative to large campaigns," thus overcoming the limitations imposed by financial shortcomings and the lack of a permanent, properly organised army. These incursions into enemy land sometimes had no other purpose than to obtain supplies for a garrison, a besieging force, or a marching host. In other cases the incursions were launched to punish the enemy, and they often became a

35 For an excellent analysis of these early years see Juan Pérez de Tudela, *Las armadas de Indias y los orígenes de la política de colonización* (Madrid: Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, 1956).

36 Carmen Bernand and Serge Gruzinski, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo. Del Descubrimiento a la Conquista. La experiencia europea, 1492–1550* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996), 223.

modus vivendi for whole groups, particularly near the frontier and in the Atlantic space around the Canaries and Barbary. In the latter case, they were merely aimed at capturing booty (slaves, livestock, and riches) and were on almost every occasion carried out without reference to the king's authority.[37] The large number of urban charters, local jurisdictions and other privileges conceded to frontier cities in Castile and Leon throughout the Middle Ages shows the importance of this military practice and how it progressively created a whole frontier archetype: the *cabalgador*.

The military expeditions which medieval men knew as *cabalgadas* were already defined in the *Partidas*, where the following statement is made: "There are many kinds of war … for men to do evil to their foe … some of them are called *cabalgadas*; that is when a group of disenfranchised people join to go and overrun some place and hit the enemy; or when they detach themselves from the host for the same reason … and this name of *cabalgada* is because they have to ride fast." This same text recognises the existence of two modalities of *cabalgadas*: open and covert. The former was generally carried out by substantial groups detached from a larger host which entered enemy territory periodically and briefly to wreak havoc and capture booty and prisoners. In the latter, the groups were smaller and were lightly equipped to ensure manoeuvrability, falling upon the enemy in the dead of night, causing damage and sacking the territory. *Cabalgadores* were indeed interested in passing undetected "riding hard … and moving more during the night than during the day."[38] Obviously, the name of this sort of expedition indicates the use of horses, although footmen were by no means excluded. The *Fuero de las Cabalgadas* and other 15th century documents already indicate this, by labelling every participant in the *cabalgada* as a *cabalgador*, regardless of whether he was a horseman or a footman.[39]

The medieval *cabalgadas* organised by council militias included men of all ages and social conditions – knights and peons – under the authority of a chief, *adalid*, *almocadén* or *alcaide*, or of a man well versed in the life of the frontier, the tactics and tricks of the Muslims and the terrain; paths, corners,

37 The quotation comes from the sharp analysis in Francisco García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam. Estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares* (*siglos XI–XIII*) (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), 54–70.

38 *Partidas* II.23.38. Quoted in Palomeque, "Contribución al estudio," 222.

39 The *Fuero de las Cabalgadas* or *Fuero del Emperador* is a compilation of instructions written in the late 13th or early 14th century, and originally attributed to Charlemagne. Martínez, "La cabalgada," 51–62. See the discussion by Josep Torró, "Partners-in-arms. Medieval military associations: from the Iberian *cabalgada* to the American *entrada*," in this volume.

ravines, and any other possible place of concealment. All of them – young and old – were prompted by a desire for adventure and riches, without forgetting the chances of social betterment, improving their honour and fame in front of others. "The tension of the life at the frontier, the dangers, the hardships and the surprises bring many possibilities for the man of action and elevate individual values, resulting in the elimination of the weak and the inactive."[40]

As noted earlier, these expeditions were targeted at hitting the enemy and at sacking; that is, they were *profit* motivated. They often took the shape of "fully organised military expeditions, and the profits were shared with reference to the contribution of each participant: capital invested (gear), ability, risks incurred," up to the point that they became a sort of "frontier" industry.[41] Over time, the *cabalgadas* and their looting of enemy territory became one of the basic foundations of the socio-economic structure in the frontier during the conquest of al-Andalus.

Ultimately, despite being neither inspired by hunger for new territory nor directly encouraged by the Christian monarchs, these predatory expeditions had an effect in prompting royal plans to unleash conquest-focused campaigns upon Muslim territory. In fact, as pointed out by García Fitz, the attrition strategy carried out through the devastating incursions regularly organised by the council militias destabilised the Andalusi economic structure, slashing at its resources and morally and materially softening the enemy prior to major campaigns. In the following quotation, Geoffrey Parker refers to warfare in the modern period, but it is perfectly applicable to war in medieval Spain: "Most of the wars fought in Europe before the French Revolution were not brought to an end by a strategy of extermination, but [...] through a strategy of attrition, by the patient accumulation of minor victories and the slow erosion of the enemy's economic base."[42]

As we have seen, the wars in the Peninsula and the conquest of the Atlantic space of Barbary and the Canaries helped to develop the archetype of a frontier warrior, constantly engaged in predatory *cabalgadas*; this model was exported to America by the Portuguese and the Spanish. These wars were

40 Juan de M. Carriazo, "La vida en la frontera de Granada," in *Andalucía Medieval. Actas del 1 Congreso de Historia de Andalucía* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, 1978), 2:289–290.

41 Charles E. Dufourcq and Jean Gautier-Dalche, *Historia Económica y Social de la España Cristiana en la Edad Media* (Barcelona: El Albir, 1983), 97–101.

42 García Fitz, *Castilla y León,* 75 and 67–73; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 43.

waged against different peoples with different cultures who, therefore, were not granted equal legal status. For example, the pagan nature of the enemy became the official argument of the Spanish in justification of the annexation of conquered territory. The expansion certainly followed medieval notions, in the sense that the independence of the infidels was subordinated to the spiritual ends of the Christian monarchs. Coherently, this expansion was unquestionably sanctioned and legitimised by the Catholic Church.

Warriors, Ship-owners and Merchants

Several years ago, the Chilean scholar Mario Góngora proved the importance of predatory *cabalgadas* in the early phases of the American continental expansion, and highlighted the importance of the territory of, first, the Darién, and later of Panama. According to his prologue:

> The crucial fact in Santo Domingo is the transformation of the factory into a colony in just a few years. Slaving bands commenced operations around 1509–1510, and were an important but secondary phenomenon. The cases of Puerto Rico and Cuba are identical. In contrast with the islands, in the western end of Tierra Firme, in Darién, populated towards the end of 1509, incursions soon acquired an enormous importance for life in the city. Starting in 1509 or 1510 there were expeditions – in search of gold and slaves – being organised every year, until the final incursion of Pizarro, which set off in the early days of 1531. After the capture of the Inca treasure, Panama became a port of transit for Peru, and its function changed.[43]

The same author also stressed the conjugation of incipiently capitalistic commercial interests and the expansionist objectives of the bands of warriors on the ground, especially during the period of transition between the Antillean phase and the conquest of the great nations of Tierra Firme. With the financial support of ship-owners and merchants, who offered the necessary capital for the enterprise, some bands of warriors operated almost as employees of the mercantile society, even though in almost every case they still had to procure their own equipment. Slowly, the expeditions abandoned the original model, the maritime-commercial company, to embrace the model offered by

43 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 11.

the Spanish Reconquista, the *compaña* or group of armed men, although some minor elements of the earlier modality still survived.[44]

Members of the *compaña* did not receive any wages, but were rewarded with a proportion of the expedition's profits, thus perpetuating the medieval tradition of the distribution of fair shares of the booty, although the capitalist partners, the *caudillo* and the royal officials not only commanded the group but also received a greater share of the profits. It is clear that the financial needs of the conquest favoured the multiplication of associative formulas, aimed at pooling all available efforts and resources to ensure the success of the enterprise. In Lockhart's words "maximum democratization and decommercialization occurred almost automatically where no capital was available."[45] In this regard, the high point of solidary-oriented expeditions coincided with the occupation of the Darién and the Caribbean coast of the Isthmus, between 1509 and 1513, during the time of Enciso and Balboa. The earliest conquering incursions did not penetrate very deeply, and barely needed anything beyond food, weapons, horses, canoes – either stolen from the Indians or, at least, acquired from them – and a few ships if necessary. It was only later that more ambitious and longer ranging expeditions were organised, requiring larger capital and more ships, horses and men. The complexity of these expeditions forced a return to the contractual model conformed by *caudillos*, money lenders and investors, although they never fully adhered to the mercantile parameters of a commercial company.

During the difficult years of the Darién the men shared everything, not only the booty; they went hungry, thirsty and had to go through all manner of hardships, including illness and death. These extreme conditions made them draw closer and feel more like equals. Not even the authority of a *caudillo*, admired by his men, like Balboa, debilitated the internal solidarity of the group. In extreme situations they even went as far as to depose their chiefs. In Góngora's words, "these actions, typical in relatively egalitarian groups, mustered and sustained on the hope of gain, could not be replicated in more complex conditions."[46]

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44 James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *América Latina en la Edad Moderna* (Madrid: Akal, 1992), 81.

45 James Lockhart, *Los de Cajamarca: Un estudio social y biográfico de los primeros conquistadores del Perú* (Lima: Editorial Milla Batres, 1987), 1: 80. (T.N.: The translation of this quotation has been extracted from: James Lockhart, *The Men of Cajamarca*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972).

46 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 58.

Darién in the Time of Balboa

Santa María de la Antigua del Darién, founded in 1510 between Panama and Colombia, was the earliest European city in the American continent and for years it remained the westernmost frontier of the European world. It was the capital of the tiny kingdom established by Vasco Núñez de Balboa – who was to gain celebrity for the discovery of the Pacific – and the laboratory of many practices and institutions which were later to become the norm throughout the continent.

While based at this frontier settlement the troops spent much of their time in launching predatory *cabalgadas* in search for food, gold, and Indian slaves. They were aware of the risks incurred in these, "because" – in Balboa's own words – "everyday one must face death a thousand times," and "the Indians gave us such a licking that before we could do anything all thirty of us were injured, many with four or five injuries; I got a head injury, so bad that I was close to death … and Luis Carrillo, they got him across the chest, and killed him."[47] Indeed, these expeditions often ended in a large number of casualties for both sides; some of the expeditions never came back from the lands of the Indians, who defended themselves bravely against the invasion. The Indians, naturally, referred to their battles differently. *Guazabara* is an indigenous word which means "fight against the enemy," and was recorded in Spanish documents from a very early date. One of the first to use it was the chronicler Anglería, who recorded one of the episodes of the conquest of Tierra Firme. He pointed out that when the Indians from the Pearl Islands were about to engage in combat with the host of Captain Gaspar de Morales, "as a war cry they started screaming '*Guazzáguara*,' while brandishing their javelins."[48] It was also used by chroniclers such as Oviedo, Las Casas and Andagoya, and it ended up as a common word in the documents issued by the *Conquistadors*: "and for this reason we remained alert all night, knowing for sure that by dawn there would be *guazabara*, and we comforted each other beyond measure."[49]

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47 Vasco Núñez de Balboa to the king, Santa María de la Antigua, october 16 1515. Published by José T. Medina, *El descubrimiento del Océano Pacífico: Vasco Núñez de Balboa, Hernando de Magallanes y sus compañeros* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1913–14), 2:139–145.

48 Pedro Mártir de Anglería, *Décadas del Nuevo Mundo*, ed. Manuel Alba (Madrid: Polifemo, 1989), 237.

49 "Relación hecha por Gaspar de Espinosa, Alcalde Mayor de Castilla del Oro, dada a Pedrarias Dávila, lugarteniente general de aquellas provincias, de todo lo que le sucedió en la entrada que hizo en ellas de orden de Pedrarias," Panamá, 1516: AGI, Patronato, 26, R.8, in Carol F. Jopling ed., *Indios y negros en Panamá en los siglos XVI y XVII: Selecciones de los*

The records left by the chroniclers of Darién contain numerous references to these sorties or *guazabaras*, named differently depending on which side was launching them, but similar with regard to the free exercise of cruelty. Swords, crossbows, arquebusses, horses and bloodthirsty dogs were hurled against a mass of stone, arrow or javelin-throwing Indians, or armed with atlatls or macanas, and surprised by the ferocity of the attack and the unknown. It was a frontier life, similar to that which had the Muslims as enemies in the Peninsula, just as the expeditions were also the same.

The spirit of the *Reconquista* and many of its practices, such as the taking of war booty and the right to capture slaves, were present in Darién as they would be in other later cases. Little by little, a new and terrifying concept took hold of Tierra Firme: *ranchear* or *saltear*, which was the launch of a violent assault under cover of night "Because (the Spaniards) could not stay put and their place in the Indies was to assault, rob and capture those who kept still to their houses, and this they called *ranchear*."[50]

These expeditions had a variable duration – from just a few weeks to two years – depending on the distance to be covered and the targets pursued. The members of the band ate whatever they found in their path; mostly maize and meat. According to the calculations of the royal treasurer, Alonso de la Puente, they came back with booty of 4 or 5 *pesos* and 3 or 4 slaves each. An order dated to December 4th 1514 authorised the inhabitants of Darién to sell Indian slaves in the Islands to fund their expeditions. Balboa often complained about the destructive policies set forth by newcomers and asked, in vain, that the export of Indians should be forbidden. The new governor, Pedrarias Dávila, argued in favour of this commerce with the pretext that "it would bring some a measure of respite." The motivation behind these expeditions was, therefore, bare profit. In the words of the soldier Andagoya: "In all these actions, the Spaniards never tried to settle peace or to populate: all they wanted was to come back to Darién loaded with gold and Indians and then go away."[51] The booty in gold and slaves paid for the import of Spanish products, such as livestock, clothing or tools, as well as all that was necessary to keep the colony running; investment in agriculture or mining was deemed secondary.

Additionally, the fact that the captains had to fund their own expeditions made them more eager for quick gain, and they sought easily saleable goods,

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documentos del Archivo General de Indias (South Woodstock, Vt.: Plumsock Mesoamerican Studies and Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica, 1994), 42–58.

50 Las Casas, *Historia de las* Indias, 2:278.

51 Pascual de Andagoya, *Relación y documentos*, ed. Adrián Blázquez (Madrid: Historia 16, 1986), 87.

such as gold, slaves, and pearls. It was, as Góngora pointed out, a continually changing population, "with brief and precarious ties, such as become bands of men joined in the search for gold and slaves. The relationships never fully crystallised, as they may have done had the conquest lasted for years or generations."[52] This violent process soon entered a situation of semi-anarchy, promoted by the authorities' nepotism and ambition; in Andagoya's words: "because their captains were their friends, some who had done much evil were never punished."[53] For Pedrarias and his officials these outrages were not a matter of concern. Everyone was equally interested in the success of the expeditions, and the methods used were but a minor issue. They would wait placidly in their comfortable dwellings in Santa María for a grateful captain to put some riches into their hands. The records indicate that the *Conquistadors'* climate was embittered because of personal conflicts, generalised unrest, aggravations and denunciations. In each case, the appeasement of these feelings would to a large degree depend on the authority and abilities of the chief. According to Góngora, the so-called individualism of *caudillos* was nothing more than "the political instinct of a band leader," similar to the one prevailing in the Iberian Peninsula in the 12th century in the context of the formation of raiding parties.[54]

The Booty and the Captain's Jewel

Medieval regulations saw booty as compensation for the investment and risks incurred during an expedition. The *Partidas* defined it as "something which all men naturally want, especially men of arms. Some because of the cost, and some because of the toil."[55] This must not surprise us. The *cabalgada* was a society organised for profit, and those in it risked their lives. On the other hand, each warrior had to give some of his booty to the king "in recognition of his supremacy." To a large degree, during the Middle Ages these dues were used to fund the costs of campaigning, which in some way gave the booty the nature of a public fund.[56] From very early, it had been established that the crown must keep one fifth (*el quinto regio*) of the product of any incursion, while the rest

52 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 66–67.

53 Andagoya, *Relación y documentos*, 87.

54 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 67.

55 Quoted in García Fitz, *Castilla y León*, 74.

56 Palomeque, "Contribución al estudio," 263; García Fitz, *Castilla y León*, 74.

was distributed among the members of the host depending on their status, footman or knight, and the arms carried.[57] The importance that horses had for medieval warfare is clearly reflected in the fact that horsemen (*caballería*) were due twice as much as footmen (*peonía*). It was also common to use borrowed equipment or horses, when the owner did not personally join the host.[58]

The *quinto* was an old institution drawn from Islamic predatory law, later assumed by the Christian kingdoms.[59] In the Middle Ages it was considered a due to the monarch, a frontier tax to the towns in contact with Islam.[60] It certainly had a long tradition in Spain, and survived well into the modern period, settling as a system for the distribution of rights and dues. At first, it only applied over war booty but it would later extend to cover "fortunes," "sea-based wealth," etc. Eventually, it would acquire legal status with regard to the crown's due in the profit generated by colonising expeditions in America.[61]

This due did not, however, necessarily remain a rigid proportion. From the earliest explorations the crown secured a proportion of the profits which oscillated between one quarter and one tenth of liquid profits. Eventually this proportion became fixed at one fifth. This notwithstanding, on certain occasions the monarchs could decide to attend to the pleas of the settlers and grant reductions in the tax, in order to compensate for the expenses incurred by new colonists and facilitate their settlement. For example, in 1524 the crown replied favourably to the entreaties of the governor of Panama, Martín Estete, and reduced the tax to one eighth rather than one fifth "because the settlers have gone through terrible dangers, and hardships and hunger and other calamities … and are very worn out because they are but newly arrived."[62] It was not the first time, and it would not be the last, that such grace was granted. In some cases the tax was fully condoned, especially when the on-going colonising enterprise had promising prospectives for the crown, or was even given in concession

57 The *Partidas* detailed the correspondence between the gear of each participant and the rations they were due. See Carmela Pescador, "Caballería popular" [II], 179.

58 Pescador, "Caballería popular" [II], 120–121 and 196.

59 Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, *En torno a los orígenes del feudalismo* (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1942) 3:168.

60 Manuel Acién, "El quinto de las cabalgadas, un impuesto fronterizo," in *Andalucía Medieval. Actas del I Congreso de Historia de Andalucía* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros 1978), 2:39–52.

61 *Recopilación de las leyes de los reynos de las Indias* (Madrid: Julián de Paredes, 1681), III: libro VIII, titulo X.

62 "Real Cédula a las autoridades de Castilla del Oro," Vitoria, February 20 1524: AGI, Panamá, 233, tomo I; published in Álvarez Rubiano, *Pedrarias Dávila*, appendix 98, p. 547.

to someone as a reward.[63] The discovery of "the other sea" and the search of a land route absorbed the exploratory impulses of the Spaniards for a while. Therefore, when the settlers in the new city of Panama (1519) started building a fleet to "go and search for the western route," one of the crown's most nurtured projects, the king encouraged them in the following terms:

> We gracefully grant … that the fifth that is our own of the first trip of the said four ships along the coast, once they have settled in the new city and the fair distribution of the gains has been made, will not be demanded, provided they give me the most remarkable *jewel* that they find.[64]

This *jewel*, also known as "the captain's due," reserved for the king from the booty obtained in discovery expeditions, remains today an enigma. In America, the governors received it in representation of the crown, and it is plausible that the practice was recorded in some Spanish law, but so far the search has not borne fruit.[65] The practice is well documented in the Indies at least for the three first decades of the 16th century in Darién and Panama, and later in the conquest of Cartagena by Pedro de Heredia.

Before the *bachiller* Martín Fernández de Enciso, lieutenant of Alonso de Ojeda, was expelled from Darién by Balboa and his men, Balboa demanded that from the last booty taken of the Indians, after the royal fifth had been

63 "Real Cédula a Pedrarias Dávila" to ensure that the royal treasurer in Tierra Firme and the Casa de la Contratación release all the gold and things pertaining to Charles de Puper, lord of Xao, of the part of the *quinto real* drawn from the expeditions launched by the *adelantado* Vasco Núñez de Balboa, Burgos, March 18 1524; published by Medina, *El descubrimiento*, 2:85, 91.

64 "Real Cédula a las autoridades de Castilla del Oro," Burgos, September 6 1521: AGI, Panama, 233, tomo I; published in Álvarez Rubiano, *Pedrarias Dávila*, appendix 85, 533–534.

65 Regarding the possible medieval origin of the "jewel," as a due reserved for the head of the *cabalgada*, neither I nor Mario Góngora (*Los grupos de conquistadores*, 43, note 6) have found any similar practice in the sources consulted. However, some local laws included a provision to ensure that judges, mayors and *adalides* received a specific part of the booty. Since these officials were also responsible for its distribution it does not seem unlikely that they were the first to receive their share and it is also plausible that they had preference in choosing whichever part of the booty they desired. It could be thought that over time this tradition became institutionalised and turned into the right to choose a "jewel." Carmela Pescador reminds us that in the Middle Ages, along with the proportional distribution of profits "special prizes were given – referred to in the *Partidas* as *galardón* – to reward those knights who had taken a prominent part in the campaign, for example granting them direct possession over a certain item or compensating their deeds with a certain amount of money:" Pescador, "Caballería popular" [II], 183.

taken, "three parts must be made, and two given to the bachiller, one for the ships and another for the gear, and from the remaining third, the *captain's due*, a jewel and four swine, as settled in the *capitulación* signed with Ojeda."[66] In fact, this was not true: in said *capitulación* (1508) no mention was made of this privilege. But the normative existed and the instructions given to Pedrarias (1513) recognised the dues "of the captain in chief" in the booty obtained in the course of expeditions by land. Furthermore, the *caudillos*-governors defended this privilege during their exploration of the Isthmus:

> Of the remaining 261 *pesos* and 3 *tomines* Pedrarias took *as the captain's jewel* a gold helmet (*capacete*) of 188 *pesos* of twenty one carats … Apart from this there were four 19 carat gold bracelets weighting 30 *pesos* and 2 *tomines*, three of which were given to the governor Pedro de los Ríos *as jewel*.[67]

The governor of Cartagena and the war parties who used the city as a base were equally interested in keeping the practice of the "jewel" well alive. A detailed study of the troop led by Pedro de Heredia indicates that the expedition launched towards Cenú and Abreva in 1534, with which the conquest of Cartagena began, gathered booty for 50,000 *pesos*, almost all of which had been obtained through *huaquería*.[68] From this, a jewel worth 3,000 *pesos* was set apart for Heredia.[69] Other expeditions launched in this region present similar examples.

The Church also benefitted from the expeditions with a part of the booty given by the *Conquistadors* as alms in thanksgiving for their safe return. This was the continuation of an old medieval tradition; for example, Seville's cathedral received a part of the booty obtained in the *cabalgadas* unleashed upon the Kingdom of Granada. This must surprise nobody, because the warlords cherished their role as vanguard of the Christian faith and were willing to commit pious contributions in exchange for divine protection in their battles

66 "Real Cédula a Pedrarias Dávila," decreeing that once he arrives at the village of Santa María de la Antigua, Vasco Núñez must take all symbols of authority and determine the guilt of the *bachiller* Enciso in the taking of the gold, and send him in chains to the court, Valladolid, July 28 1513; published by Medina, *El descubrimiento*, 2:44–46.

67 See Carmen Mena, *Pedrarias Dávila o la Ira de Dios. Una historia olvidada* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1992), 211–228.

68 This term refers to the Spaniards' exploitation practices. The Conquistadors, thirsty for riches, did not hesitate to open the tombs of the Indians and steal the grave offerings within.

69 Gómez, *Pedro de Heredia,* 46.

against Islam. These individual crusades were exported beyond the Atlantic to the fights against the pagan Indians. There are plentiful examples in every campaign launched during the conquest of al-Andalus and later in America. In this regard, Hilda Grassotti pointed out that "when caught in a tight spot, the council militias ambushed by Almoravid forces tried to muster divine help by promising the Mother of God one tithe of the booty if victory was granted them. This was the case in the victory gained by the militias from Toledo, Ávila and Segovia against the Muslim army sent from Córdoba and Seville."[70] A similar case is presented in America, for example in the conquest of the village of Cemaco, when the men under Martín Fernández de Enciso sought the protection of Nuestra Señora de la Antigua by offering to send some men to Seville's cathedral with gold gifts for the virgin. The parallel could not be clearer.

According to Las Casas' account, before the Spaniards engaged in battle against the Indians in Cemaco, they fell to their knees and prayed for victory. In the friar's words, at this point "they put themselves into the hands of God and promised Nuestra Señora de la Antigua, which in Seville has a strong following, that if God granted them victory the first church that they built would be dedicated to her; and moreover, that they would send a pilgrim to Seville with some gold and silver jewels for her as a gift," and "he made them swear that none would run away to save their lives."[71]

In general, local laws in medieval Castile did not include specific provisions for the Church's due, although there were some exceptions. In the so-called *Fuero de Molina* it was stated that the part "the host wished to give God" could be deducted from the Royal fifth. This followed the dispositions set forth in the *Partidas*, where it said that "whatever goes to God does not have to go the King." Among these we are especially interested in the famous *Fuero de las Cabalgadas*. This text ordained that "whenever more than fifty cabalgadores were engaged, one knight's part had to go to God and another to Mary and the Saints".[72]

Also in America, *caudillos* liked to show their Christian charity by giving up part of their booty to contribute to ecclesiastical expenses. This is the case of governor Pedrarias who in 1515 showed a generous and unusual profile, granting part of the booty gained by the expedition led by Bartolomé Hurtado to the construction of the cathedral and hospital of Santa María de la Antigua del Darién. Pedrarias set the example and his lieutenants followed him on their

70 Hilda Grassotti, *Miscelánea de estudios sobre instituciones castellano-leonesas* (Bilbao: Nájera, 1978: 160–161).

71 Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, 2:154; Anglería, *Décadas,* 104.

72 *Fuero de las Cabalgadas*, Ch. 28; Palomeque, "Contribución al estudio," 277.

return from their *cabalgadas*. At the end of 1517, *licenciado* and mayor Gaspar de Espinosa, after coming back from the successful expedition to Mar del Sur, gave the Bishop of Darién an indigenous 19 carat gold breastplate worth 17 *pesos*. Of course, the bishop hastened to pay the royal fifth, thanks to which a record for this whole episode has survived.[73] The equally successful expedition to Mar del Sur, led by Balboa and his *compaña,* offered over 28 gold *pesos* "for the church in Darién and the souls in purgatory," personally handed over by the dean Juan Pérez de Zalduendo. In short, examples are easy to find.

This tradition, however, ended up acquiring the category of norm, and the originally voluntary donation became a formal due. The testimony given by Father Hernando de Luque during the impeachment process undergone by the authorities of Tierra Firme in 1527 shows this clearly: "He said that those that went on expeditions, on coming back, visited the church with what they had gained; there they were met by the governor and officials and the people, and in front of all presented the Indians that they had brought for them. This happened with the expeditions of Becerra, Ávila, Morales, Serrano, Badajoz, Tello de Guzmán and all the others from that time". After the distribution had been made, "they used to give the Bishop his due and nothing more, after a royal order saying that it was not necessary to give more."[74]

These medieval traditions regarding the distribution of booty were not always strictly adhered to in America; in fact, they were very often applied by the *Conquistadors* in a discretional fashion reflective of their love of profit, which caused countless law suits – from which the Church did not shy away – to be decided upon by the authorities. This was frequently the case in Tierra Firme. During the earliest activity in Darién the distribution was ridden with irregularities, which Balboa quickly pointed out with his usual subtlety; his style was to praise his own actions by criticising those of others. In a letter written by his own hand, dated to January 1513, he accused governors Ojeda and Nicuesa for not acting justly with his men in the distribution of booty "for which cause they were all so angry that even having the gold there to be grabbed they did not, knowing that there was too little of it." Naturally, Balboa did not mention that he had been the victim of a plot – which nearly cost him his life – caused by an irregular distribution of his own, "because he did not distribute the Indians and the ten thousand *castellanos* which they captured according to the merits of each man." It is clear that he only escaped thanks to

73 This indicates that the disposition in the *Partidas* II.26.8 ("whatever goes to God does not have to go to the king") was not observed in the Indies, at least in Darién.

74 AGI, Justicia, 359: "Declaración del ex mayordomo del Hospital del Darién, padre Hernando de Luque"; quoted by Góngora, *Los grupos*, 43.

his ability to garner support from the relevant people. Las Casas, who records this incident in detail, informs us that Balboa escaped from Santa María with the excuse of going out hunting,

> expecting his most faithful followers – in other words, those who got big shares – to join him and craft a plan. Knowing the power of money, he distributed said ten thousand *castellanos* among them, giving small men more than their share and the most important among them less, so those who were in on the plot were disappointed.[75]

The attitude of the different *caudillos* was an important parameter to measure their ability to head expeditions. Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, who knew and did business with Balboa, does not seem to share las Casas' analysis. His description of Balboa mentions his fairness in the distribution: "And in truth, Vasco Núñez was brave and better than others for many things. He was also cunning and cautious, and ambitious, *but was fair when distributing booty*."[76]

During the preparations for the great expedition commissioned to Pedrarias in 1513 the crown showed some concern in regulating the distribution of the booty.[77] Responding to a petition made by Balboa, the fourth was reduced to the fifth, and the incentives for the colonists also included that the captain was to take a double share.[78] Regarding the booty obtained during the sea voyage, distribution had to comply with to the "Laws of Oléron," a French code with roots in very old common law rules, in force since the 13th century. This law established that the king was not only to take one fifth – as was the custom among *compañas* – but another two as ship-owner (one for the ships and another for the supplies). The sea crews were considered part of the host, and therefore had the right to their fair share. For this reason, the king explicitly stated that "the booty taken at sea must also be shared with the seamen." This made the crews full members of the expedition, stimulating their work by considerably increasing their wages.[79]

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75 Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, 2:283.

76 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, *Historia General y Natural de las Indias*, ed. Juan Pérez de Tudela (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959), 3:286.

77 "Instrucciones dadas a Pedrarias Dávila," Valladolid, August 4 1513: AGI, Panamá, 233, I; in Mena, *Pedrarias Dávila*, appendix 4.

78 "…that all that was gained in entries and ransoms, once the king's fifth has been taken, the rest was to be distributed among the participants, taking the captain a double share:" Manuel Serrano, "Preliminares del Gobierno de Pedrarias Dávila en Castilla del Oro," in *Los orígenes de la dominación española en Indias* (Madrid: Bailly Baillière, 1918), 271.

79 Carmen Mena, *Sevilla y las flotas de Indias. La gran armada de Castilla del Oro* (*1513–1514*), (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), 201.

As pointed out by Góngora, the royal dispositions dictated in 1513 "did not fully solve all the legal conflicts that could arise from a society based on conquest and booty." The famous memorandum issued by *procurador* Rodrigo de Colmenares, in which the demands from the members of the host are explicitly stated, seems to point in this direction. In Colmenares' opinion, since the expeditions ran through many dangers and sometimes penetrated as far as ninety leagues, it was fair to reduce the fifth to one eighth. Similarly, Colmenares reproduced the demand by which settlers requested the effective application of the dispositions of the *Partidas* regarding booty distribution, which suggests that this was not at that time the case. Once the king's part had been set apart – says Colmenares – the remainder could be distributed by the captain and his men "whichever way they wish according to the decision of an appointed official, who can give each what they deserve, one part, or one and a half or three quarters, and the Captain two parts, or two and a half, if he deserves it, all according to the laws of *la Partida*." As already pointed out by Mario Góngora, the crown gave way in the reduction of the fifth to the eighth, but not until 1526, after the term of Pedrarias and by then referring to the settlers in Panama, since the settlement of Santa María had been dismantled.[80]

Pascual de Andagoya, a soldier in these expeditions and therefore a direct witness, offers the best testimony in this regard. He sheds some light upon the distribution of booty among the hosts in Darién:

> The captains and men went in that direction, because it was the most salubrious and thickly populated land … they brought great bands of captives and as much gold as they could carry. And the following practice was carried out for three years: the Indians and the gold, all put together and melted, were distributed among men and officers, each their share, and the officials and Bishops in the government, including the governor.

Indeed, by 1515 a new system, which particularly favoured the governor and other high officials, had been set up in Darién. The system gave them a share in the booty even if they had not participated in the expedition. The governor was due two parts, and the mayor and tax officials one, equal to the largest share and including gold, pearls, slaves or any other good. In addition, these officials increased their private profit by equipping and sending some trusted subordinate with the expedition, who would afterwards give them a half or a quarter of their own share. Sometimes these included something of value for the expedition, for example black slaves, Indian interpreters – particularly valuable during early contact with the Indians – or even their horses or dogs,

80 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 40–41.

"which got shares the same way that people did."[81] The royal officials, especially the treasurer Alonso de la Puente and the *contador* Diego Márquez, had enough authority to interfere with these expeditions, since from the beginning both Pedrarias and the bishop – who played an active part in the government of the colony – had delegated to them the role of authorising the expeditions, enabling them to take bribes for this.[82]

Although, according to Álvaro de Guijo, this practice soon became common among the settlers in Darién, these officials could extract more than anyone because of their position.[83] We have Alonso de la Puente's own version, given during his impeachment process. According to this cunning official, he received a part of the booty despite not having participated in any of the expeditions because "I deserved it" for staying behind and defending Santa María.[84] It would appear that the treasurer was looking for any excuse to get away, but he knew very well what he was doing. Certain medieval local laws, such as that of Teruel, determined that the men the council left in charge of the city's defence while the host was away on campaign were due one share of the booty, even if they had stayed behind.[85] Already in the reports issued against Balboa some years earlier, the *procurador* of Darién Juan de Caicedo accused the captain of rewarding those who stayed behind as garrison, following these medieval Spanish regulations. There are more allusions to this tradition. The *procurador* Rodrigo de Colmenares applied the crown for some privileges to be conceded to the settlers in Darién, including the right to reward the councillors with part of the booty obtained by exploring parties: "equally, we beg Your Majesty to give the councillors who must remain in the town to rule it half a part of the profits of expeditions, with the mayor getting one and a half, the latter half for

81 These practices have been tracked back to the Middle Ages. The *Fuero de las Cabalgadas* (13th century) contemplated the possibility of a knight loaning his horse to an expedition in exchange for a pre-arranged share of the booty: "Whoever gives his horse on loan, the horse must be considered a part for the *adalid*, and be given a share" (Ch. 102).

82 It must also be said that the *contador* Diego Márquez declared that he took the job "under pressure," since he was aware that it "was not pertaining to my position:" AGI, Justicia, 359.

83 One of the most conspicuous examples after the foundation of Panama was the clerk Antón Cuadrado, subordinate to the mayor Gaspar de Espinosa, who was often accused of getting half the booty from expeditions, including slaves, "only for writing." Other documents say that he took two shares "one for himself and another for his job:" AGI, Justicia, 359, N.2, R.4 and R.6.

84 "Descargos del tesorero Alonso de la Puente:" AGI, Justicia, 359.

85 We must remember that these rights were only applicable from the booty left after the preferential shares had been distributed. Palomeque, "Contribución al estudio," 271.

being also a councillor."[86] We do not know whether this practice was accepted; if so, as Góngora has already pointed out, it must have discouraged real *Conquistadors* from undertaking new enterprises.[87]

It seems clear that officials from the treasury acted with total impunity, and used every trick in the book to get rich quickly without taking any risks, since they never actually participated in the expeditions. The situation eventually hit rock bottom, and instead of slaves or animals, shares in the booty were being exchanged for backpacks and weapons. Others even got their share for a promise, without having to actually contribute anything at all.[88] Obviously, everyone in Darién was against this abusive and illegal practice, and many *compañeros* refused to participate in further expeditions. The unrest soared among the settlers; ambitious and hungry people. Some explorers became accomplices of this situation and were rewarded for it, while others left never to return.

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86 "Memorial de Rodrigo de Colmenares como procurador enviado a Castilla por el gobernador y vecinos de Tierra Firme en solicitud de ciertas mercedes," undated (1516?), published by Medina, *El descubrimiento*, 2:149–152.

87 Góngora, *Los grupos*, 40, reports that this same practice was later implemented in Santa Marta and Cartagena.

88 "Residencia del licenciado Salmerón:" AGI, Justicia, 359, N.2 R.1 and 2: "In the twenty fourth question, it was said that a ransom paid to *micer* Francisco in the northern sea was in one third to *licenciado* Molina, *without doing anything for it* as heard by Diego Díaz Zatico who left the country because he had not been given what he was due."

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CHAPTER 5

On the Use of Terror, Cruelty and Violence in the Spanish Conquest of the Americas: Some Thoughts

Antonio Espino-López

On Terror, Cruelty and Extreme Violence in History

Nobody makes propaganda about their own atrocities, whatever the reasons for which they are committed; political, military or both.[1] Karl von Clausewitz's definition of war – "[It] is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will" – can obviously be applied to the conquest of the Americas. But there are many ways to wage war. For Clausewitz "war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds," and for this reason, as pointed out by Sean McGlynn with regards to the Middle Ages, "Acts of savagery and mass executions would further military objectives."[2] According to McGlynn, the chaos and horror of war caused actions that can only be qualified as horrifyingly savage to be perpetrated, but always under "the military imperative." Referring to the First Crusade and more specifically to the storm of Jerusalem in 1099, McGlynn points out a number of circumstances to explain the savagery with which the Christians applied themselves to the Muslim population in the Holy City:

> Ever present had been fear of a strange and alien enemy; disease which weakness made even more deadly and which claimed as many lives

* T.N. All quotations taken from original sources, unless otherwise referenced, have presently been translated for the publication of this article.

1 An example of this can be found in the moving diary by Victor Klemperer. In his entry for 18th February 1943 he notes how a shudder of horror runs over him when, alone in his rooms, he remembers some words spoken to the customers of a shop, good Aryan women, that very morning in a moment of euphoria; when reassessed in a calmer state, his own remembered words compel him to exclaim, "Atrocity stories! Enough for concentration camp and attempted escape," that is, for execution. Victor Klemperer, *To the Bitter End. The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1942–1945* (London: Phoenix, 2000), 246.

2 Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Radford: Wilder Publications, VA, 2008), 27 and 29; also quoted in Raymon Aron, *Peace and War: a Theory of International Relations* (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2003).

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> as combat; excruciating hunger which led some to resort to cannibalism; and, constantly referred to by the chroniclers, the agonizing thirst […]. Jerusalem offered the chance to avenge these deprivations and torments…[3]

We believe that this can largely, if not fully, be applied to the conquest of the Americas. It would seem that the systematic use of terror, cruelty and extreme violence for the achievement of political and military aims of conquest and submission, although not unknown in Greece – Alexander's destruction of Thebes and Tyre are strong and by no means exceptional examples – was largely a Roman development.[4] Sulla's siege and partial destruction of Athens in 87–86 B.C. sent the message that no one could escape due punishment. "The lesson was very clear, and proves once more Sulla's ability to use fear as a tool for coercion," as pointed out by Borja Antela.[5] In the words of Simone Weil:

> Les Romains ont conquis le monde […] par l'emploi médité, calculé, méthodique de la plus impitoyable cruauté […] sans être jamais sensibles ni au péril, ni à la pitié, ni à aucun respect humain […] ou de les endormir par l'espérance, avant de les asservir avec les armes.[6]

3 Sean McGlynn, *By Sword and Fire. Cruelty and Atrocities in Medieval Warfare* (London: Phoenix: 2008), 158, 245.

4 The destruction of Thebes in 336 B.C. can be interpreted as a harsh but necessary measure for the maintenance of a quiet rearguard on the eve of a large operation such as the assault on the Persian Empire. The truth is that after the Theban episode Aetolians, Arcadians and Athenians, among others, reconsidered their critical position towards Alexander. See Antonio Espino, *Guerra y cultura en la Época Moderna* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2001), 160. According to John Keegan, in Thebes Alexander learnt that "…frightfulness pays." Later he adds "atrocity [the massacre of Thebes' inhabitants] had won him the subservience of the Greeks with a peremptoriness that no amount of diplomacy or military menace could have achieved." Regarding the siege of Tyre, eight thousand Tyrians died and the thirty thousand survivors were sold into slavery. John Keegan concludes his profile of the Macedonian general saying that "his dreadful legacy was to ennoble savagery in the name of glory and to live a model of command that far too many men of ambition sought to act out in the centuries to come," among which we include Hernán Cortés. John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (London: Pimlico, 2004), 91.

5 Borja Antela, "Sila no vino a aprender Historia Antigua: El asedio de Atenas en 87/86 a. C.," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 111 (2009): 475–492. I thank the author for providing me with a copy of his work.

6 Simone Weil, *Écrits historiques et politiques* (París: Gallimard, 1960), 24; also quoted in Aron, *Peace and War*.

According to Enrique García, there are examples in which the inhabitants, and their properties, of cities which had offered their unconditional surrender (*deditio*) were treated by the Romans with the same ferocious repression applied to fortified cities taken by storm (*oppugnatio*). In this second scenario the most frequent practice – also followed in medieval and modern times – was to enter by sword and fire, "intentionally annihilating not only the active defenders but any person or animal that the Romans happened to find in their path." Polybius claimed that this tactic aimed to strike terror.[7] Thus,

> the need to maintain peace in the territory against the frequent revolts is reflected not only in the selective application of the death penalty, but also in the use of other traumatic measures, for example amputation of the hands [...] in our opinion this measure has a practical justification in the permanent incapacitation of large human groups for war.[8]

The amputation of the hands, also used disciplinarily in the Roman army, was to feature frequently alongside total massacres in the conquest of the Americas.[9] According to William V. Harris, perhaps "the regular harshness of Roman war-methods sprang from an unusually pronounced willingness to use violence against alien people." During the siege of Numantia, for example,

7 According to Francisco Marco, also quoting this text by Polybius (X, 15; translation from Perseus Digital Library), "The Romans thought that military strategy would not work – at least not to the full – unless the Barbarians were frightened. The only way they could be forced to keep their promises was by inflicting upon them the terror of the powerful Roman war machinery; in short, the Roman peace could only be ensured by aggression." See his work "Intimidación y terror en la época de las guerras celtibéricas," in *Terror et pavor. Violenza, Intimidazione, Clandestinità del mondo antico, Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Cividale del Friuli 22–24 settembre 2005*, ed. Gianpaolo Urso, 197–213 (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2006), 198.

8 Enrique García, "'Tempus poenae.' Represalias contra poblaciones sometidas durante la expansión romana en Hispania," in *Formas y usos de la violencia en el mundo romano*, ed. Gonzalo Bravo and Raúl González , 23–28 (Madrid: Signifer Libros, 2007).

9 The amputation of the right hand was a known practice among the Indo-European and Iberian populations of Hispania before the Roman conquest. Regarding this see Francisco Marco, "Intimidación y terror," 201–202. According to the same author, "it was common for the Romans to kill all inhabitants of cities taken by storm, before entering the second stage in the capture of the city, the sack (*direptio*), in which the soldiers enjoyed a free hand to kill, plunder and rape. The massacre would probably only affect, at least in the main, men of military age, because killing young boys and girls would have been detrimental for the following stage, in which rape played such a prominent role. This, the slaughter of all adult males, is what the sources tell for the cases of Leontini in 231, Cauca in 151, Corinth in 146 and Capsa in 107." From "Intimidación y terror," 198–199.

Scipio Aemilianus ordered that four hundred young men from Lutia, an ally of Numantia, have their hands cut off.[10] To summarise, and following Francisco Marco, "Amputation of the hands, enslavement of the defeated and indiscriminate slaughter were the main measures taken by the Roman authorities to retaliate against indigenous resistance, along with the sack and destruction of the cities."[11]

Exactly the same was to happen in the conquest of the Americas. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the conquest was given a "classical dimension" by comparison with the wars of Rome. Hernán Cortés, who according to Bernal Díaz del Castillo liked to recall the heroic feats of the Romans, established a parallel between the siege of Mexico-Tenochtitlan with that of Jerusalem. Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo also indulged in this comparison pointing out that in the siege of Mexico "No fewer Indians died than did Jews when the Emperor Tito Vespasian conquered and destroyed Jerusalem."[12] For the priest José de Acosta, the Spanish cruelty in the Americas surpassed that of Greeks and Romans – "Never did Greek or Barbarian invasions indulge in such cruelty. These facts are known, and they have not been exaggerated by historians."[13]

To a certain degree and with only a few exceptions the analysis of the Spanish conquest of the Americas has overlooked the deeper features of

10 William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 51. Spanish translation quoted in Miguel Salinas, "Violencia contra los enemigos: los casos de Cartago y Numancia," in *Formas y usos de la violencia en el mundo romano*, 31–32. Also interesting is John Thornton's work, "Terrore, terrorismo e imperialismo. Violenza e intimidazione nell'età della conquista romana," in *Terror et pavor*, pp. 157–196, where it is considered that "La tesi secondo cui la distruzione di Cartagine, Corinto e Numancia avrebbe perseguito l'obiettivo di diffondere una paura tale da condizionare il comportamento politico degli altri popoli soggetti all'*imperium Romanum* sembra consentire di iscrivere questi atti nella categoria del terrorismo," and also that "terroristiche tutte quelle azioni violente che perseguano finalità politiche attraverso la diffusione della paura," pp. 159–160.

11 Marco, "Intimidación y terror," 201.

12 Carlos J. Hernando, *Las Indias en la Monarquía Católica. Imágenes e ideas* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1996), 51–55.

13 José de Acosta, *De procuranda indorum salute,* quoted in Claudia López Lomelí, "La polémica de la justicia en la conquista de América," doctoral thesis, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 2002, 66. Indeed Acosta complained about the ill-treatment of the Indians caused by the disinformation or lack of knowledge of those in contact with them, "considering them unworthy of any sort of respect." Thus the lamentable result: "We entered [the Americas] by the sword, and neither hear nor understand them, we do not believe that the Indians' affairs deserve repute but treat them like game hunted in the hills and brought to us for our service and whim." José de Acosta, *Natural and Moral History of the Indies* (Duke: Duke University Press, 2000), 329–330.

the excesses of war – and of their practices.[14] These excesses were, as we know, also being committed in Europe at the time.[15] It has been argued that "'Atrocity does not pay' that the selective use of brutality [...] brought short-term success but long term failure," but the truth is that in the Americas atrocities did pay, perhaps because brutality was administered less selectively than indiscriminately.[16] Joanna Bourke points out that "atrocious behaviour was a feature of combat in the two world wars, as well as in Vietnam." Furthermore, and according to this author, a true fighting attitude at first "*did* require men to act in brutal, bloody ways. During battle, men typically lost their ability to feel shocked or disturbed," but later the most common reaction was to in some way come to terms with the slaughter, which "became commonplace." In fact, and again according to J. Bourke, "The association of pleasure with killing and cruelty may be shocking, but it is familiar" for many of the combatants. Soldiers frequently manifest contradictory emotions, deploring having caused the death of another human being on some occasions and happily committing acts of extreme violence on others. The problem is that most historians have tended to consider the pleasure caused by slaughter as "sick" or "abnormal," in contrast to trauma, appraised as "normal."[17] This is a very interesting approach that we ought to apply, within the bounds permitted by our limited sources, to the Spanish conquest of the Americas.

Bartolomé de Las Casas and Others: Witnesses of Cruelty

One of the main consequences of the anti-Spanish "Black Legend" and its ramifications, of enormous historiographical impact, was the neglect to which competent historians condemned the military angles of the

14 For example, Carlos S. Assadourian, "'La gran vejación y destrucción de la tierra.' Las guerras de sucesión y de conquista en el derrumbe de la población indígena del Perú," in *Transiciones hacia el sistema colonial andino* (Lima: El Colegio de Mexico and Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1994), 19–62.

15 For example see John R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 179–208; and Matthew S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988).

16 Geoffrey Parker, *Success is Never Final: Empire, War and Faith in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 144. G. Parker refers to the wars in Flanders and the operations of O. Cromwell in Ireland, also mentioning the Balkans War in the 1990s.

17 Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing* (London: Granta Books, 2000), 175, 355, 359–366.

Spanish conquest.[18] Modern military history has paid little attention to non-European wars and to those fought between the peoples beyond the sea and European powers prior to the 19th century.[19] At the same time, specialists in American history have taken little advantage of the ample theoretical renovation that military history has undergone in recent years.

Thus, for several decades the American History scene has been dominated by precepts such as those set forth by Rómulo D. Carbia who, without denying excesses and "inexcusable crimes" during the Spanish domination of the Americas, claims that these practices were not "evidence of a system, but symptoms of the human quality behind the deeds." Moreover, "Cruelty, excess, perversity and crime were not the norm, but exceptions in the huge task of transferring Old World civilisation into America."[20] This last remark reflects Carbia's wish to confront the well known postulates of Bartolomé de las Casas, the ultimate aim of the Argentinean historian. In his famous *The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account* (Seville, 1552), Las Casas denounced the Spanish occupation of the Americas as characterised by systematic use of extreme violence.[21] It is in our opinion the easiest thing to use counter-propaganda in

18 Julián Juderías, *La leyenda negra. Estudios acerca del concepto de España en el extranjero* (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1997); Miguel Molina, *La leyenda negra* (Madrid: Nerea, 1991); Ricardo García, *La leyenda negra. Historia y opinión* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992); William S. Maltby, *La leyenda negra en Inglaterra. Desarrollo del sentimiento antihispánico, 1559–1669* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982). Esteban Mira refers to what he dubs "a sacred account of the conquest," obviously apologetic in nature and in operation from the 16th to the 21st centuries. See his work *Conquista y destrucción de las Indias (1492–1573)* (Tomares: Muñoz Moya Editores, 2009), 19–23.

19 Geoffrey Parker dedicates one chapter of his well known *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 115–145, to the military revolution outside Europe. Jeremy Black did likewise in *European Warfare, 1494–1660* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 61–64, focusing in its expansion in the New World, and most prominently in *War and the World. Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450–2000* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 30–59.

20 Rómulo D. Carbia, *Historia de la leyenda negra hispano-americana* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2004), 62. A very different perspective is offered by Georg Friederici, *El carácter del descubrimiento y de la conquista de América*, (Stuttgart: 1925; Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1973), 387 and ff. Citations refer to the FCE edition. For a different, and much more stimulating, approach see Miquel Izard, *El rechazo a la civilización. Sobre quienes no se tragaron que las Indias fueron esa maravilla* (Barcelona: Península, 2000).

21 In Las Casas's words: "The common ways mainly employed by the Spaniards who call themselves Christian and who have gone there to extirpate those pitiful nations and wipe them off the earth is by unjustly waging cruel and bloody wars. Then when they have slain

order to attack the propagandist – especially if not a very cunning one – with his own weapons, and thus the denunciations by Las Casas have been assailed, with negative effects on their credibility.[22] We do not wish to enter the debate which has already proven to be rather fruitful, but we must at least acknowledge that the reading of the basic work by the Dominican father, the *History of the Indies*, offers a perfectly articulate explanation of the technique commonly used by the Spaniards for the control of a conquered territory.[23] We could term this as a diabolical trinity: the first stage was to seize the caciques, because once these were dead "it was easy to subjugate the others." Another variety of this was to take some local Indians hostage – especially if they were socially important – in order to torture them and learn "their secret scheming, and the disposition of their people and troops." Secondly,

> The Spaniards (...) in the wars they fought against the Indians were always strangely cruel, so the Indians would perpetually be in a state of

all those who fought for their lives or to escape the torture they would have to endure, that is to say, when they have slain all the native rulers and young men (since the Spaniards usually spare only the women and children, who are subjected to the hardest and bitterest servitude ever suffered by man or beast), they enslave any survivor. With these infernal methods of tyranny they debase and weaken countless numbers of those pitiful Indian Nations." *The Devastation of the Indies: a brief account* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 31.

22 The "legitimacy of the colonisation of America" is an altogether different question for Las Casas, according to Eduardo Subirats in *El Continente Vacío. La conquista del Nuevo Mundo y la concepción moderna* (Madrid: Anaya and Mario Muchnik, 1994), 125 and ff. For Subirats, Las Casas suggested the introduction of the indigenous peoples to a condition of natural vassalage, not through the violence practiced in the early stages of conquest but through a peaceful conversion deriving from freedom, albeit a freedom submitted to the Spanish discourse. Besides, "true legitimacy had to be spiritual," p. 142 and ff; p. 174.

23 On the debate: Lewis Hanke, *La lucha española por la justicia en la conquista de América* (Buenos Aires: 1949; Madrid: 1987). Similarly, the controversy reflected in the 1971 issues of the *Hispanic American Historical Review* (HAHR) between Hanke and Benjamin Keen is reproduced in Molina, *La leyenda negra*, p. 152 and ff; Marcel Bataillon and André Saint-Lu, *El padre Las Casas y la defensa de los Indios* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1974); Juan Friede, *Bartolomé de las Casas: precursor del anticolonialismo* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1974); and Marianne Mahn-Lot, *Bartolomé de las Casas et le droit des indiens* (Paris: Payot, 1982). Georg Friederici already reflected this reality: "The Spaniards unleashed terrible and ferocious vengeance for the smallest number of casualties," in recurrent retaliations that "perfectly and casually responded to a preconceived plan." Friederici, *El carácter del descubrimiento*, 396. More recently Matthew Restall has referred to the "theatrical" intimidation techniques in *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 23–25.

> bitterness and hardship, in such a subjugated life that they would even forget that they are men; many times the prisoners had their hands cut off at the wrist, and having them put inside a purse, the Spaniards said to them: "Go and take these letters to your masters."[24]

Finally, Las Casas points to the frequent massacres aimed at the domination of the many by the few.[25] He refers to the operations of Nicolás de Ovando in Hispaniola as follows:

> He decided to do something often done by the Spanish in these islands and in all the Indies; whenever they are in a thickly populated land, because they are always but few in numbers in comparison, in order to instill fear in their hearts [...] they indulge in a large and cruel slaughter.[26]

The truth is that, as we shall see, Father Las Casas was giving a faithful account.[27] How could it not be true when the monarchy used the same arguments to put an end to the career of Hernán Cortés? Indeed, the accusations set forth against him during his *juicio de residencia* (1526–1529) included "cruelties and arbitrariness during the war."[28] Regarding the conqueror of Peru, Alonso de Alvarado, the following was included in the process carried out against him in 1545: "Captain Alonso de Alvarado and his Spanish companions went to wage war upon the Indians and the caciques in said provinces, by sword and fire, as is commonly done against Indians."[29] The last sentence is significant.

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24 The Chilean historian José Bengoa controversially claims that in the cutting of the hands is some "influence of Arabic punishments as established in the Quran" and "their impact on the most common practices" can be appreciated. See his work *Conquista y barbarie. Ensayo crítico acerca de la conquista de Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Sur, 1992), 42.

25 According to F. Marco Simón, "Disuasion through terror was a psychological resource traditionally used by the Romans, though obviously not only by them. The Republic, with just a small army to attend the State's expansionist needs, took advantage of the psychological value of fear as a strategy." See his work "Intimidación y terror," 199.

26 Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, *Historia de las Indias* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981), 2:232–3, 237, 259, 522–539.

27 The truth behind Las Casas' account has been used very effectively by Massimo Livi-Bacci in *Los estragos de la conquista. Quebranto y declive de los indios de América* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), 45–49, 92–97, 121–136. On the other hand, as pointed out by Mira Caballos "a mere glance at the documents in the Archivo General de Indias is sufficient to appreciate the truth behind most atrocities described by the Dominican." See Mira Caballos, *Conquista y destrucción*, 33.

28 José Luis Martínez, *Hernán Cortés* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992), 560.

29 Assadourian, "'La gran vejación,'" 30.

A witness of all these events in Peru, Cristóbal de Molina (called "el Almagrista") did not hesitate to add:

> Spaniards respected the reputation of any man who was cruel, who was a good rider and who slew many Indians [...] I have told what my eyes saw for my sins, to make whoever reads this understand that this conquest and discovery was carried out with as many plentiful cruelties as is normal in these lands, and understand that this destruction has become normal when conquering Indian kingdoms...[30]

The acceptance and endorsement of the report by the Consejo de Indias should be, at any rate, proof enough of its soundness. This is the case with the events of 1537 in Andahuaylas (Peru), when Francisco de Chaves, sent by the conqueror Pizarro to the area to punish the death of two Spaniards, not finding any adult Indians:

> For they had fled to the hills, took all boys and girls from three to nine years of age, amounting to six hundred, and killed them, and instead of having them say the name of Christ forced them to say that of Chaves, all of which the captain Fer[nand]o de Aliaga, who told him not to do it, saw and that in remembrance of such cruelties a school should be built where up to a hundred Indian children could be taught and fed until they were of working age.[31]

A fourth factor should not be forgotten. In *Conquista y destrucción de las Indias* Esteban Mira makes a heart-breaking account of the excesses committed by most conquistadors upon Indian women, implying their use as war booty and their abuse for the destruction of the enemy's morale.[32] Cristóbal de Molina explained in his chronicle of the Spanish advance in Peru that the Indians soon realised that the safest option was to serve the conquistadors "because of the slaughters they had inflicted," but what about the women?:

> The Indian women that served the Spaniards thought that they were better off than the rest. Although previously amongst these Indians women

30 Cristóbal de Molina, *Relación de muchas cosas acaescidas en el Perú* (Madrid: Atlas, 1968), 85.

31 Sumario de consultas del Consejo de Indias, Archivo General de Indias, Indiferente, 737, no. 66.

32 Mira, *Conquista y destrucción*, 231 and ff.

> involved in public acts of impropriety and filth were to be despised, from this moment it became normal for them to become bad public women, losing their tradition to take a husband, because no handsome woman was safe with her husband, and it was a miracle it they escaped from the Spaniards or their servants.[33]

Shame and grief. Furthermore, as pointed out by Francisco de Solano, "any regrets for excesses committed during the war could be spiritually remedied through payment of papal bulls: in 1505 these were certified for the Antilles and in 1528 for New Spain." Bernal Díaz del Castillo explains it as follows: Hernán Cortés sent Juan de Herrada to Rome with rich gifts for the negotiation of the issue with Pope Clement VII, who "sent us bulls to absolve us of all our sins, and other grants to hospitals and churches, endorsed with his forgiveness; *thus he gave his approval to the actions of Cortés in New Spain*."[34] It is clear, at any rate, that regret acknowledges a bad deed.

Moreover, other clerics, and not necessarily those friendly to Las Casas, such as Toribio de Benavente (Motolinía), also gave their own accounts of Spanish actions which were fundamentally in accordance with that of the Dominican:

> But large was the greed of the Spanish in their toils to destroy and depopulate this land, to eradicate the sacrifices and wars and homicides that had been committed in the time of their infidelity. Because some had the fantasy and diabolical opinion that by conquering by the sword and fire the Indians would become better servants, subject to constant terror and submission, and thus they laid waste all villages they encountered.[35]

Apart from the clerics few authors expressed any criticism for the Spanish attitude, including the conqueror Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, who in his *The Indian Militia and Description of the Indies* acknowledged that many Indian revolts, costing the life of many soldiers, the depopulation of whole areas and the pointless lengthening of no few wars, had mainly been caused by the greed

33 Molina, *Relación de muchas cosas*, 62.

34 Francisco de Solano, "El conquistador hispano: señas de identidad," in *Proceso histórico al conquistador*, ed. Francisco de Solano (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988), 35; Bernal Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera de la conquista de Nueva España* (Madrid: Atlas, 1947), 2:284. I emphasise that phrase in italics.

35 Toribio de Benavente, *Historia de los Indios de Nueva España* (Madrid: Castalia, 1985) quoted by Miquel Barceló, "Un pròleg," prologue to the Catalan translation of Bartolomé de las Casas, *Brevíssima relació de la destrucció de les Índies* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2008), 31.

of the Spaniards.[36] Similarly, Pedro Cieza de León also thought that the greed with which the Spanish conducted themselves was behind the destruction of Indian society, in this case in Peru:

> It is indeed a pity that those Incas, despite being gentiles and idol-worshipers, were so good at organising such large lands. And us, being Christians, to have laid waste so many kingdoms; because wherever Christians conquered and discovered, the land was put to the fire.

Proceeding with his account, Cieza pointed out that

> past wars, in all their cruelty, consumed these poor Indians [...] Some noteworthy Spaniards told me that the biggest evil to these Indians started with Pizarro and Almagro disagreeing over which lands were to correspond to each of them, which ended ill.[37]

Cieza made his opinion extend to the whole of the American continent: some governors and captains caused

> the Indians much evil, and the Indians, in order to defend themselves, armed themselves and killed many Christians, including some captains. For this these Indians were burned or subjected to other hard deaths.[38]

Similarly, according to Fernández de Oviedo in his *History*: "Such things have happened in the Indies because of the greed for gold that I cannot remember them without my heart breaking with pity and horror." Or, regarding the waning of indigenous populations:

> It is tiresome, very, for me to write and for others to read, and there would neither be enough paper nor enough time to explain what the captains did to slay and rob the Indians and destroy their lands, if everything had to be told in detail; but I say that in these lands where Castilla del Oro lies, where there were two million Indians, or too many to be counted, it

36 Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y descripción de las Indias*, ed. Mariano Cuesta and Fernando López-Ríos (Valladolid: Seminario Iberoamericano de Descubrimientos y Cartografía, 2003), 72–73.

37 Cited in Assadourian, "'La gran vejación,'" 26 and ff.

38 Pedro Cieza de León, *La Crónica del Perú*, in *Pedro Cieza de León. Obras completas*, 1, ed, Carmelo Sáenz de Santamaría (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1984), 7.

> is necessary to tell how so many people could be wiped out in so short a time.[39]

In another example, the scholar Tomás López Medel, *visitador* in Yucatán and Chiapas, where he supervised the application of the Leyes Nuevas in 1542, claimed that five or six million Indians had "died in the desolation of wars and conquests, and after other illtreatments and cruel murders," mostly because of the "insatiable greed which our people showed in their dealing with the miserable Indians."[40]

Therefore, and starting from the fact that the Americas were not conquered by a royal army but by organised volunteer bands mustered and funded by military privateers, albeit acting in the name of the crown, we will try to prove that extreme violence was more extensive than generally acknowledged, with only a small number of exceptions.[41]

Confronting highly diverse and abundant populations instead of organised armies, in a hostile geographical setting, the Spanish bands – the so called *hueste indiana* – resorted to military practices that though not at all unknown in Europe became in our opinion a common and systematic strategy for the invasion and occupation of the Americas. On the other hand, our perspective brushes aside another possibility: according to Carmen Bernand and Serge Gruzinski, "The constant tension deriving from immersion into an unknown, hostile and unpredictable environment" could explain "the explosions of

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39 Quoted in Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, "Héroes y villanos del Nuevo Mundo en la *Historia General y Natural de las Indias* de Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 61:2 (2004): 614–615.

40 Luciano Pereña, *Genocidio en América* (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992), 101. About the Spanish "gold rush," from a literary perspective, see Winston A. Reynolds, *Hernán Cortés en la literatura del Siglo de Oro* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1978), 233 and ff.

41 As pointed out by Silvio Zavala, these privateers "aimed at quick, and even abusive, enrichment in order to meet their expenses and gain a profit; many censors recommended the crown not to authorise such expeditions." Silvio Zavala, *Las conquistas de Canarias y América* (Las Palmas: Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, 1991), 87. Mira expresses identical opinions on the use of violence in *Conquista y destrucción*, 222 and ff. Friederici, *El carácter del descubrimiento*, 397 and ff, 451 and ff. Some, however, talk about the "exaggerated accounts" of the acts of barbarism committed in this case by the Mapuche Indians, when the same relevant sources could be argued to accuse the Spanish of similar acts. By thus attacking the stereotypical treatment given to the Mapuches, described as cruel and barbaric, in the wars in Chile, the depravity and bellicosity shown by the Spaniards is indirectly and unduly downgraded: Ricardo Alonso, "Los fuertes fronterizos chilenos. Resistencia e interacción en la frontera de Chile en los siglos XVI y XVII," *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, series IV, *Historia Moderna*, vol. 18/19 (2005–6): 223–246.

barbarism and 'preventive' slaughters which marked the routes followed by the troops."[42] The fact is that if this were true the slaughter of part of the Mexica aristocracy ordered by Pedro de Alvarado on 23 May 1520 in Mexico-Tenochtitlan would have been caused by fear, due to the small number of troops with which he was trying to protect the *tatloani* Moctezuma.

We believe that explaining a specific action through fear or the tension of the moment is incompatible with allusions to preventive actions which, moreover, seemed to be applied as a matter of course. We suggest that this was a calculated action based on previous experience of preventive military operations in the Americas. From our perspective Pedro de Alvarado's actions, quite independently from the tension which he must have suffered throughout the episode, respond to a previous event: the massacre of a number of the inhabitants of the city of Cholula some months earlier, before Hernán Cortés' entrance into Mexico-Tenochtitlan (8 November 1519). The earlier massacre, for its part, stemmed from an entire tradition of war tactics in America whose immediate roots lay in the conquest of Granada and the Canaries and, more generally, in the forms of violence of medieval societies.[43]

On the other hand, Bernand and Gruzinski provide us with the key to understanding some military tactics and their systematic application in the different territories under attack: "The position of the conqueror cannot but look astonishingly fragile: a single defeat would finish the Spaniards off."[44] This would explain the extreme resort to violence.

In my work *La conquista de América* I have offered reasonably precise data on the effects of the Spanish operations in the Antilles, Panama, New Spain, Florida, New Granada, Venezuela, Rio de la Plata, Peru and Chile from the beginning of the conquest to the death of Philip II, and also on the consequences of the great native offensive by the Mapuches in Chile, known as the Indian Flanders.[45]

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42 Carmen Bernand and Serge Gruzinski, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo. Del Descubrimiento a la Conquista. La experiencia europea, 1492–1550* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996), 260.

43 For this, see Robert Muchembled, *A History of Violence. From the End of the Middle Ages to the Present* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 45 and ff. As pointed out by Muchembled, for long periods, where living conditions arise and the application of the law becomes difficult, "true cultures of violence" arise, p. 13.

44 Bernand and Gruzinski, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo,* 259–260, 271.

45 Antonio Espino, *La conquista de América. Una revisión crítica* (Barcelona: RBA, 2013). The main source has been a collection of chronicles from the Americas. See also Subirats, *El Continente Vacío,* 83–91, and Francisco Esteve, *Historiografía Indiana* (Madrid: Gredos, 1992). In his assessment of the sources Luciano Pereña works towards the idea

We would like to add that there must be both an inflicting and a suffering culture. As pointed out by Brian Bosworth in an interesting work comparing the military deeds – can we call them carnages? – of Alexander and Hernán Cortés, the Spanish chronicles and also the ancient sources make little reference to slaughters and terrible injuries inflicted on defeated enemies, because in such case "The battles would lose their heroic aura, and the conquistadors would appear more like abattoir workers." In the case of the Macedonian general, accounts by the defeated are few, if not altogether lacking. According to Bosworth, by reading only the accounts of Alexander's supporters "one becomes immune to the casualty figures. Alexander's men may have killed countless thousands, but one gets the impression that nobody was really hurt…."[46]

The chronicler of the conquest and the civil wars in Peru, Pedro Cieza de León, confessed that his writings intentionally skipped many horrible deeds committed by the Spanish in the Americas, because going into details would be "never ending story, because Indians were slaughtered as if they were useless beasts […] But the reader knows what there is to know, and I don't want to talk about it…"[47] The last sentence could be the basis for further avenues of enquiry.

On the other hand, the Spanish violence in the Americas – in a similar vein to Alexander in his Asian campaigns – sought very clear targets, the satisfaction of which justified all actions. "The social benefit the community derives from its violent actions prevents the development of any ethical reflections," in Esther Sánchez's words, although in the Spanish case in the Americas this reflection did ensue, albeit on a very minor scale.[48] As pointed by Raymond Aron, for several millennia,

> the quantity of wealth which the conquerors could seize by arms was enormous compared to the quantity which they created by their labor.

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that available sources are not trustworthy and their accounts are thus open to doubt. He concludes as follows: "The myth of the sources already deformed historical truth during the time of the early conquest, giving birth to the black legend": Luciano Pereña, *La idea de justicia en la conquista de América* (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992), 80. See also comments on Pereña in Mira, *Conquista y destrucción*, 75.

46 Brian Bosworth, "A Tale of Two Empires: Hernán Cortés and Alexander the Great," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. Albert B. Bosworth and Elizabeth J. Baynham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38.

47 Quoted in Assadourian, "'La gran vejación,'" 29.

48 Esther Sánchez, "La violencia, el imaginario colectivo antiguo y las *gentes* africanas de Coripo," in *Formas y usos de la violencia en el mundo romano*, ed. Gonzalo Bravo and Raúl González (Madrid: Signifer Libros, 2007), 96. For the ethical and moral reflections during the conquest of the Americas see Hanke, *La lucha por la justicia.*

> Slaves, precious metals, tributes or taxes levied on the foreign populations, the profits of victory were obvious and rewarding.

And the case of the Spanish conquest of the Americas is a paradigmatic example.[49] Our main purpose in tackling these issues is not the exculpation of any European power by comparison with what others did in their expansion beyond the seas. For example, Philip W. Powell in his work *Tree of Hate*, expresses the opinion that the 16th century English would have done the same as the Spanish if it had been in their power. We might also cite Irving A. Leonard, who in his well known work *Books of the Brave* (Berkeley, 1992) claimed that the English had actually behaved in exactly the same cruel and merciless way in their Irish campaigns and their North American colonies in the 17th century. For example, he highlights the case of Thomas Dale in Virginia, who did not hesitate to hang, burn, roast, shoot and lay on the rack, not the Indians, but those of his own men who had tried to escape to indigenous territory to avoid the hard toil in the colony. The obvious question is: if he did that to his own men, what would he not do to the Indians?[50]

It seems to us that expressing a position in some ways favourable to the Spanish conquest and colonisation of America in comparison with the actions of other countries – England, France, the Dutch Republic, Portugal, the recurrent example of the Germans in the conquest of Venezuela[51] – was for a time considered indicative of modernity, if not of a progressive historiographical position and righteousness.[52] This phenomenon reflects the wish to leave behind the clumsy excesses of the black legend but does so without contributing, in our opinion, to a better understanding of military behaviour in the Americas. Needless to say, we do not agree with conservative perspectives, such as those expressed by Francisco Morales, who did not hesitate to suggest that,

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49 Raymon Aron, *Peace and War*, 257.

50 Philip W. Powell, *Tree of Hate. Propaganda and Prejudices Affecting United States Relations with the Hispanic World* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008); Irving A. Leonard, *Books of the Brave. Being an Account of Books and of Men in the Spanish Conquest and Settlement of the Sixteenth-Century New World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 9–10.

51 See the much more balanced and well documented opinion of Juan Friede, *Los Welser en la conquista de Venezuela* (Caracas-Madrid: Edime, 1961).

52 "It must be said that these brutal and unchristian ideas and attitudes were not, by any means, something specific or exclusive to the Spanish early conquest of America, the ignominious flag of a specific country; on the contrary, these ideas were embedded in the philosophy not only of Spain but of the whole of Europe." Friederici, *El carácter del descubrimiento,* 300.

> America had to be conquered in the way it was. The conquistadors were not a gang of merciless murderers; they were human beings reacting against the environment and deeply conditioned by their time, the circumstances, the enemy and their own historical horizon.[53]

This is indeed the case, although it must be stressed that they applied themselves with the cruelty typical of their age in order to win a war that was in no way won beforehand.[54]

Muslims and American Indians

Francisco López de Gomara claimed that "as soon as the conquest of the Moors finished, they began that of the Indians, because Spaniards were constantly at war with the infidels."[55] According to Georg Friederici, the conquest of the Canaries – which he sees as a link between the wars in Granada and America – featured all the excesses later to be reproduced in the Americas: "hanging and staking and impaling the victims, the cutting of hands and feet, forcing the mutilated man to run afterwards, drowning prisoners and enslaving indigenous populations." For this German author,

> The internal wars between the Spanish, the crusades against the Moors and the invasion of the Canaries, were clearly wars waged for the spoils,

53 Francisco Morales, *Los conquistadores de América* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1974), 79.

54 See Josefina Oliva, *La resistencia indígena ante la conquista* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1974). On Indian cruelties, see Harry H. Turney-High, *Primitive War. Its Practice and Concepts* (Columbia, South Carolina: 1971), quoted in John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 89 and ff. Also useful are Joan Santacana, "El redescubrimiento de la guerra en la Prehistoria," *Íber* 51 (2007): 20–34; and Jean Guilaine and Jean Zammit, *El camino de la guerra: la violencia en la Prehistoria* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2002). Similarly suggestive is the work edited by R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, *War in the Tribal Zone. Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare* (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research, 1992). Finally, a lucid perspective on barbarism is offered in Francisco Fernández, *La barbarie. De ellos y de los nuestros* (Barcelona: Paidós, 1995), esp. 33–124.

Additionally, we must not forget that on many occasions the introduction of cruel practices and torture among the Indians was a direct consequence of the European arrival. Friederici, *El carácter del descubrimiento*, 250–251; Wilbur R. Jacobs, *El expolio del indio norteamericano* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1973), 97 and ff.

55 Quoted in Jacques Lafaye, *Los conquistadores* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1987), 57.

> and the school in which the conquistadors of America learned their trade.[56]

Although Mario Góngora rightly points out the contrasts between the border wars in the Iberian Peninsula and the wars fought in America, in the sense that both enemy and environment were very different, he also recognises that the first generation that fought the American wars was the direct descendant of an earlier one very much determined by certain ways of waging war and by their specific social configuration. Góngora specifies that the defining feature of these combatants in Barbary (Northern Africa), the Canaries or, soon afterwards, America, was not so much their hunger for plunder, something consubstantial to war in Europe until the 18th century, but for the capture of slaves.

On the other hand, while in the wars against the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula enslavement and ransoms worked both ways, this was not the case with the indigenous peoples in the Canaries and the Americas. Therefore, the expeditions launched in the Peninsular wars and even more clearly in the African and American ones, were an institution defined by war between peoples with very different cultures who did not recognise one another as inhabitants of the same legal order. Besides, in the American case expeditions and *razzias* into a given territory lasted for as long as it took to introduce institutions such as the *encomienda*, frequently manned by the enslaved aborigines brought from other regions.[57]

Beatriz Alonso points out that after the fall of Granada and the conquest of Melilla in 1497 the Spanish presence in Barbary was restricted to a limited occupation of "coastal sites located in areas of strategic importance to the enemy." This was a consequence of the ways in which

> the conquest of the kingdom of Granada had been carried out. *Razzias*, raids, expeditions and temporary agreements with the enemy had determined the way Muslim territory in the Peninsula was taken. The war for Granada was based on raids across enemy territory, incursions in which

56 Friederici, *El carácter del descubrimiento*, 388–389 and 462–463. See also Mercedes García-Arenal, "Moriscos e indios. Para un estudio comparado de métodos de conquista y evangelización," *Chronica Nova* 20 (1992): 153–175.

57 On the border war in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages and its connection with America, see the clarifying ideas of Mario Góngora, *Los grupos de conquistadores en Tierra Firme (1509–1530). Fisonomía histórico-social de un tipo de conquista* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1962), 91 and ff.

> abundant plunder was gained forcing the enemy to offer conditions for surrender.[58]

According to Anthony Pagden the conquest of America can be more easily related to the wars fought by the Spanish monarchy in Italy than to those waged against the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula, at least regarding its economic, political and military angles (we believe this to be arguable). On the ideological side, however, "the struggle against Islam offered a descriptive language which allowed the generally shabby ventures in America to be vested with a seemingly schatological significance." In Pagden's opinion, the Spanish conquest literature played its role by "to enhance this sense of continuity, by celebrating the actions of the most celebrated of the conquistadores in the language of the Spanish border ballads."[59] This observation loses some strength when the author insists that the Spanish providentialism in the Americas, represented by the apparitions of Santiago "Matamoros" (the Moor-slayer) transfigured into "Mataindios" (the Indian-slayer) in the thick of battle, among others, was recorded by the quill of Bernal Díaz del Castillo, who is labelled as a "disingenuous old soldier." A careful examination of the texts written by Díaz del Castillo will make clear that he was among the few sceptics regarding such a miracle.[60] It would be Francisco López de Gómara who not only certified the presence of the Apostle in New Spain, but also of his horse, which "killed as many [Indians] with his mouth and hooves as the knight [Santiago] with his sword." As pointed out by Javier Domínguez, the presence of the Apostle in the first serious encounters in America can be understood as

> the reiteration of a persistent process towards the self-affirmation of the Spanish identity in the New World. This nostalgia for the medieval identity is projected onto America and supported by a religious construct which, through the proliferation of 'Santiagist' symbols, becomes so prominent in the first conquest chronicles, trying to force the new spaces of the American continent into the Christian medieval cosmogony.

For the Spanish clergy, especially those involved with American issues, this was a "a way to legitimise the conquest of the New World, a continuation of the

58 See the clarifying work by Beatriz Alonso, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África: cruzada, política y arte de la guerra* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2006), 226.

59 In contrast Beatriz Pastor sees in Hernán Cortés the creator, instead of the follower, of a model. Beatriz Pastor, *El segundo descubrimiento. La conquista de América narrada por sus coetáneos (1492–1589)* (Barcelona: Edhasa, 2008), 156 and ff.

60 Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France (c.1500–c.1800)* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 74.

Crusade against Islam."[61] According to Francisco de Solano, the conquistadors in the Americas displayed the same religious ideology which had supported the medieval struggle against Islam, though now hurled against pagan peoples. For this reason Solano concludes that "the military operation becomes an evangelic mission, and the conqueror a religious agent. Conquest turns into crusade and crusader turns into conqueror."[62] Some testimonies, however, suggested that the kind of war waged against the Muslims should not be reproduced in America. For example, Fray Jerónimo de Mendieta accused Nicolás de Ovando of entering Hispaniola in 1502 "as if he was taking Oran from the Moors."[63] Or Father Las Casas himself who, in his *Memorial of Remedies* (1542) suggested that the term conquest, as applied to the Indies was

> a tyrannical, Moorish, abusive, inappropriate and hellish word. Because in the Indies there should be no conquest of African Moors, or Turks or heretics like those in our lands persecuting the Christians and trying to destroy our faith.[64]

Quoting Manuel Lucena among others, Esteban Mira understands the conquest not as a crusade, but as a holy war, because expansion of the faith was not a part of its main target, which was greed. In Pedro Cieza de León's words, "we left Spain for these lands only in order to get gold." Mira concludes "The conquistadors managed to transfer the holy war of the *Reconquista* to the Conquest, while implicitly maintaining the potential for economic gain."[65]

It is at any rate possible to see the conquest of the Americas as an extension of the conquest of the Muslim kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula at least from the economic angle, although the conquistadors generally did not obtain the sort of privileges granted to the Castilian nobility after their occupation of the southern Iberian Peninsula. It is very significant, however, that Hernán Cortés compared Tenochtitlan with Granada, of all Spanish cities: "In the minds of the conquistadors the annexation of the New World clearly stood as a continuation of the wars of the *Reconquista*."[66] But this does not mean that both

61 Javier Domínguez, *De apóstol matamoros a Yllapa mataindios. Dogmas e ideologías medievales en el (des)cubrimiento de América* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2008), 82 and 88–89.

62 Solano, "El conquistador hispano," 31.

63 Quoted in Pereña, *La idea de justicia*, 22.

64 Quoted in Bataillon and Saint-Lu, *El padre Las Casas*, 220.

65 Cieza de León cited in Mira, *Conquista y destrucció*n, 89 and 91–93.

66 José de la Puente, *Encomienda y encomenderos en el Perú* (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1992), 233–234.

wars were comparably hard; at least for Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán war in the Americas was much worse:

> I find and can say that this is the cruellest and hardest war there can be in the world, because when war is waged between Christians, if one surrenders he'll find himself among his own kind. And if it is between Christians and Moors, some pity can follow if there is a ransom, so those that surrender can find some relief. But here, amongst Indians from any of these lands, they fear neither God nor the world, and there is no chance you'll be allowed surrender, because they have gold and silver aplenty and do not value them. They don't let you utter a word, regardless of whether you treat them good or ill, or whether you are their enemy or foe, they will kill you as cruelly as they can.[67]

The fact is that, according to Manuel González, ever since the establishment of the frontier with the kingdom of Granada following the Spanish conquests in the 13th and 14th centuries, "violence became an endemic problem deeply affecting life in nearby communities." The border existed in a permanent state of what we would call today low intensity warfare, with frequent

> incursions, raids, assaults, kidnaps, murders, crop burnings, and other atrocities committed by Almogavars fighting on both sides, leaving among Christians and Muslims a continuous rosary of grievances which nourished an uncontrollable hatred.[68]

Clearly, operations in the Americas were not carried out by an army such as the one that conquered the Nasrid kingdom of Granada, after decades of fighting. The figures suggested by Ladero are overwhelming:

> between 6,000 and 10,000 cavalry, and between 10,000 and 16,000 infantry in the early campaigns; 11,000 and 25,000 in 1485; 12,000 and 40,000 in 1486, maximum figures that, with little variation, also applied to the 1487, 1480 and 1491 campaigns.

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67 Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán, *Libro de la vida y costumbres de Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán,* ed. Hayward Keniston (Madrid: Atlas, 1960), 151.

68 Manuel González, "La frontera entre Andalucía y Granada: realidades bélicas, socio-económicas y culturales," in *La incorporación de Granada a la corona de Castilla*, ed. Miguel A. Ladero (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1993), 111 and ff. On the war in Granada see Miguel A. Ladero, *Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada* (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1993), 37–112.

For the siege of Málaga (1487) two hundred cannon were used, which were to be present in all campaigns conducted thereafter. To this must be added an enormous logistics apparatus.[69] Although the chronicles of the conquest of Granada tend to be moderate in their description of the campaign, on some occasions the accounts of encounters, skirmishes or, simply, the war cries of the Muslims during combat, are reminiscent of later events in the conquest of America.[70] There is one element in which the differences are clear: in Granada the Christians fought a less numerous enemy, who hardly ever allowed himself to be drawn into field battle. In America the *hueste indiana* had to confront great masses of enemy warriors far superior in numbers, aside from the presence of their Indian allies. For this reason the practice of terror may be considered a military imperative, and their systematic application was connected with the need to prevail over an enemy overwhelmingly superior in numbers; it is also possible that the American context and the experience accumulated over campaign after campaign encouraged the chroniclers to give more unfettered accounts of events. Another possibility is that during the war in Granada, despite the callous combats on record, less cruel methods that did not include mutilating, burning or setting dogs on the enemy were preferred. A better explanation, however, is offered by Miquel Barceló in his prologue to the *Brief Account* by Las Casas, suggesting that the reader should not be so much surprised by the acts of cruelty narrated in the text, but by the fact that the Spanish thought themselves to be unquestionable in the right to use others, the Indians, to the full of their ability. During the conquest of al-Andalus from the 12th century onwards they had accumulated a formidable experience. In M. Barceló's words:

> These conquests took place under the theological and ecclesiastical umbrella provided by the idea that the Muslims had usurped the dominion and the land – in that order- of the Church. These were, therefore, no innocent populations, as the Indians were to be, surprinsingly, considered later (...) The destruction of the Muslims was the result of a long and difficult process that did not come to an end until the abrupt expulsion of 1609. The destruction of the Indians, for its part, was always accidental, the result of unrestrained exploitation; so unrestrained that the only

69 Miguel A. Ladero, *La España de los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1999), 183.

70 According to Fernando del Pulgar, "And the Moors, with a loud cry and plentiful valour attacked the count and the *alcayde*, because it is their way of fighting to assault the Christians with great force thinking to instil them with fear and put them to flight." Fernando del Pulgar, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, ed. Juan de M. Carriazo (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1943), 2:71.

limits to this exploitation were set by the Indians' physical extinction, which came a surprise, given how generous the available source had appeared to be at first.[71]

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PART 2

The Agrarian Organisation of the New Colonial Societies

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CHAPTER 6

Feudal Conquest and Colonisation: An Archaeological Insight into the Transformation of Andalusi Irrigated Spaces in the Balearic Islands

Helena Kirchner

Introduction

Some time ago I showed that the methodology of "hydraulic archaeology," which was developed for the reconstruction of Andalusi irrigation agriculture in the Balearic Islands, necessarily involved the detailed examination of the written record left by the process of feudal colonisation which replaced it.[1] Although the primary research aim was to analyse Andalusi irrigation systems

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1 Helena Kirchner, "Colonització de *lo regne de Mallorques qui és dins la mar.* La subversió feudal dels espais agraris andalusins a Mallorca," in *Histoire et archéologie des terres catalanes au Moyen Âge*, ed. Philippe Sénac (Perpignan: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan, 1995), 279–316. Kirchner, *La construcció de l'espai pagès a Mayūrqa: les valls de Bunyola, Orient, Coanegra i Alaró* (Palma de Mallorca: Universitat de Les Illes Balears, 1997). Kirchner, "Arqueologia colonial: espais andalusins i pobladors catalans, 1229–1300," in *El feudalisme comptat i debatut. Formació i expansió del feudalisme català*, ed. Miquel Barceló et al. (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003), 201–236. For the methodology of hydraulic archaeology see Helena Kirchner and Carmen Navarro, "Objetivos, método y práctica de la arqueología hidráulica," *Archeologia Medievale* 20 (1993): 121–150. For the general principles of Andalusi hydraulics, and for the conceptual and terminological framework, see Miquel Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados en al-Andalus: Un enunciado de principios generales," in *I Coloquio de Historia y Medio Físico. El agua en zonas áridas. Arqueología e historia* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1989), 1:XV–XLV, and Barceló, "De la congruencia y la homogeneidad de los espacios hidráulicos en Al-Andalus," in *El agua en la agricultura de al-Andalus*, ed. Antonio Malpica (Granada: El Legado Andalusí, 1995), 25–39. For an up-to-date perspective on the aims of hydraulic archaeology see Kirchner, "Archeologia degli spazi irrigati medievali e le loro forme di gestione sociale," in *L'acqua nei secoli altomedievali*. Atti delle LV Settimane. *L'acqua nei seccoli altomedievali* (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2008) 1, 471–503.

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and their management, it seemed obvious that a clear understanding of the formal and managerial transformations suffered after the conquest had to be gained. In consequence, while the study of medieval documents was essential for the reconstruction of hydraulic systems in the Andalusi period, a firm knowledge of these systems was also crucial for a full comprehension of the changes triggered by the Catalan conquest.[2] The following question had already been put forth by M. Barceló: How did the feudal colonists transform Andalusi agricultural systems to fit their own productive logic?[3]

My doctoral thesis, which was published in 1997[4] and supervised by Miquel Barceló, was one of his earliest endeavors to set up a research school focused on Andalusi society and, ultimately, on its destruction. Specifically, my research revolved around agricultural areas, and this paper tries to answer Barceló's question. This question has not only been essential for research in the Balearic Islands, but has also loomed, albeit with uneven intensity and results, in Aragón, Catalonia, Valencia and Andalucía. The common denominator in all of these cases is the considerable impact produced by the feudal conquerors in relation to the management of hydraulic systems built during the preceding Andalusi period. The analysis, which was carried out through the methodology of "hydraulic archaeology," also included the examination of irrigation systems constructed in areas where the Islamic presence was brief, for instance, Carolingian Catalonia.

Current research is not therefore aimed at comparing different hydraulic traditions as such (the Andalusi, the feudal systems in those areas where the Muslims did not settle, and the feudal areas following the conquest of Andalusi territory), but at establishing the criteria for the construction of feudal irrigation systems and at determining the chronology of development of feudal hydraulic policies. A detailed approximation of the Balearic case reveals the limitations posed upon these hydraulic projects by local conditions, which are the peculiarities of the colonisation process and the environmental resources at the disposal of the peasant communities, and more specifically, the often modest volume of water available.

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2 For the conceptualisation of "feudal colonialism" see Josep Torró, J. 2008. "Colonizaciones y colonialismo medievales. La experiencia catalano-aragonesa y su contexto," in *De Tartessos a Manila. Siete estudios coloniales y post-coloniales*, ed. Glòria Cano and Ana Delgado (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2008), 91–118.

3 Miquel Barceló, "La arqueología extensiva y el estudio de la creación del espacio rural," in *Arqueología medieval. En las afueras del medievalismo*, ed. Miquel Barceló et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 1988), 239–240. Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados," XXI–XXII.

4 Kirchner, *La construcció*.

In areas where the feudal conquest occurred at an early date, such as the region of Penedès, south of Barcelona, which was conquered and colonised by the Count of Barcelona in the late 10th and 11th centuries, the participating secular lords and the monastery of Sant Cugat acquired new dominion on a landscape that had already consolidated agricultural infrastructures (farmland, vegetable gardens, watermills, houses, etc.). Apparently, the new lords did not significantly transform the pre-existing agricultural structure.[5]

This model – the appropriation of peasant-constructed agricultural infrastructures and their subsequent conversion into sources of feudal incomes – was also followed by monastic centres created in the wake of later conquests. This is, for example, the case with the monasteries of Santes Creus and Poblet (Tarragona), which were founded in the 12th century. These institutions did not promote the construction of new hydraulic infrastructures and limited their actions to occasional repairs. The objective of these monasteries was to profit from the existing watermills and from the associated irrigation systems, not to create new ones.[6]

The evidence referring to the conquest and colonisation of the lower Ebro valley, around the city of Tortosa, is particularly abundant. According to the written record in the archives of the cathedral of Tortosa, this colonisation process involved the extension of vine cultivation to lands irrigated by waterwheels and to a drained riverside area southwards of Tortosa, all of which were under cultivation in Andalusi times.[7] Settlement charters written after the 1148 conquest set upon tenants the condition of planting vines (*ad plantadam vineam*). It is, however, difficult to make quantitative estimates of the actual increase in cultivated surface shown by this record.[8] Three watermills were built after the conquest by Alfons, king of Aragon and count of Barcelona, and

5 Carolina Batet, *Castells termenats i estratègies d'expansió comtal. La Marca de Barcelona als segles x–xi* (Sant Sadurní d'Anoia: Institut d'Estudis Penedesencs, 1996).

6 Carolina Batet, *L'aigua conquerida. Hidraulisme feudal en terres de conquesta* (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València and Publicacions de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2006). Antoni Virgili, "La infraestructura hidràulica de la Conca del Gaià a mitjan segle xii segons el 'Llibre Blanch' de Santes Creus," *Universitat Tarraconensis* 8 (1985–86): 215–226.

7 Antoni Virgili, Ad detrimentum Yspanie. *La conquesta de Ṭurṭūša i la formació de la societat feudal* (*1148–1200*) (València: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Universitat de València, 2001).

8 Antoni Virgili, "Espacios drenados andalusíes y la imposición de las pautas agrarias feudales en el prado de Tortosa (segunda mitad del siglo xii)," in *Por una arqueología agraria: perspectivas de investigación sobre espacios de cultivo en las sociedades medievales hispánicas*, ed. Helena Kirchner, (Oxford: Archeopress, BAR International Series 2062, 2010), 147–156. Helena

the bishop of Tortosa. Their remains are still known as "the count's watermills" (Molins del Comte).

In contrast, the conquest of Valencia and Aragón was followed by the expansion of irrigation systems, the construction of new watermills, the allocation of new land plots, irrigated or otherwise, and the draining of fields. In Valencia, for instance, the expansion of hydraulic systems in the wake of the conquest involved the irrigation of lands that had been previously left uncultivated in the interstices between Andalusi networks. This transformed an agricultural landscape based on small and discontinuous systems – although all had been supplied by a single main canal – into a new, compact model of *huerta*.[9] Furthermore, several new hydraulic systems were newly

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Kirchner, Antoni Virgili and Ferran Antolín, "Un espacio de cultivo urbano en al-Andalus: Madīna Ṭurṭūša (Tortosa) antes de 1148," *Historia Agraria* 62 (2014): 11–45.

9 For a selection of recent publications see Josep Torró, "Arqueologia de la conquesta. Registre material, substitució de poblacions i transformació de l'espai rural valencià (segles XIII–XIV)," in *El feudalisme comptat i debatut. Formació i expansió del feudalisme català*, ed. M. Barceló et al. (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003), 153–200. Torró, "Terrasses irrigades a les muntanyes valencianes. Les transformacions de la colonització cristiana," *Afers* 51 (2005): 301–356. Torró, "Field and canal-building after the Conquest: modifications to the cultivated ecosystem in the kingdom of Valencia, ca. 1250–ca. 1350," in *A World of Economics and History: Essays in Honor of Prof. Andrew M. Watson*, ed. Brian A. Catlos (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2009), 77–108. Torró, "La conquista del reino de Valencia. Un proceso de colonización medieval desde la arqueología del territorio," in *La conquista de al-Andalus en el siglo XIII*, ed. J. Eiroa (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2012), 9–40. Torró, "Tierras ganadas. Aterrazamiento de pendientes y desecación de marjales en la colonización cristiana del territorio valenciano," in *Por una arqueología agraria. Perspectivas de investigación sobre espacios de cultivo en las sociedades medievales hispánicas*, ed. Helena Kirchner (Oxford: BAR International Series 2062, Archaeopress, 2010), 157–172. Enric Guinot, "L'horta de València a la baixa Edat Mitjana. De sistema hidràulic andalusí a feudal," *Afers* 51 (2005): 271–300. Guinot, "La construcció d'un paisatge medieval irrigat: l'horta de la ciutat de València," in *Natura i desenvolupament. El medi ambient a l'Edat* Mitjana, ed. Flocel Sabaté (Lleida: Pagès Editors, 2007), 191–220. Guinot and Sergi Selma, "La construcción del paisaje en una huerta feudal: la Séquia Major de Vila-Real (siglos XIII–XV)," in *Hidràulica agraria y sociedad feudal. Prácticas, técnicas, espacios*, ed. Josep Torró and Enric Guinot (València: Universitat de València, 2012), 103–145. Guinot and Ferran Esquilache, "La reorganización del paisaje agrario en la huerta de Valencia después de la conquista cristiana. El sistema hidráulico y el parcelario de Montcada y Benifaraig en el siglo XIII," *Debates de Arqueología Medieval* 2 (2012): 229–276. Esquilache, *Història de l'horta d'Aldaia. Construcció i evolució d'un paisatge social* (Aldaia: Ajuntament d'Aldaia, 2007). Esquilache, "L'evolució del paisatge agrari andalusí i feudal de les grans hortes fluvials. Les sèquies de Quart i del Comuner d'Aldaia a l'horta de València," *Recerques* 62 (2011): 5–36. *Huerta* is the Spanish word to refer to large irrigated agricultural areas, generally in the vicinity of a city.

constructed. Equally, in Aragón the commercial growth undergone by cities from 1250 onwards prompted the expansion and construction of irrigation systems.[10]

These works were not only built in areas of military expansion but also in the origin areas of the conquerors. In the region of Catalunya Vella, however, the construction of irrigation systems by secular or ecclesiastical lords was exceptional before the end of the 12th century.[11] The reuse of old Roman canals has been suggested as a possible origin of the canals in Girona and Barcelona, but in the case of Barcelona, recent archaeological work has shown that the Roman Montcada aqueduct had been blocked up by the erection of the city wall dating to the Late Empire or by other construction work carried out in the 7th century.[12] The medieval canal – Rec Comtal (count's canal) – and the Roman aqueduct did indeed share the same water source, but the course followed was slightly different.[13] There is some written evidence for the existence of a *regario* in the 10th century, indicating the creation of a hydraulic system before

10 Carlos Laliena, "Los regadíos medievales en Huesca. Agua y desarrollo social, siglos XII–XV," in *Agua y progreso social. Siete estudios sobre el regadío en Huesca, siglos XII–XX*, ed. Carlos Laliena (Huesca: 1994), 19–44. Laliena, "Agua y progreso social en Aragón," in *Agua pasada. Regadíos en el Archivo Histórico Provincial de Zaragoza. Exposición*, ed. Julián Ortega (Zaragoza, 2008): 53–84. Laliena and Ortega, "Formas feudales de especulación agraria: villas, viñas, acequias en el sur de Aragón (ca. 1170–1240)," in *Hidráulica agraria y sociedad feudal. Prácticas, técnicas, espacios*, ed. Josep Torró and Enric Guinot (València: Universitat de València, Valencia, 2012), 79–102.

11 "Catalunya Vella" is the name given to the region of Catalonia, which fell under the authority of the Carolingian counts in the 9th century and which, therefore, was only slightly integrated in the Andalusi political order before that moment.

12 Josep Canal, et al., "Història urbana de Girona. El Monar Reial del Mercadal a Girona," *Annals de l'Institut d'Estudis Gironins* 35 (1995): 55–67. Ramon Martí, "Les primeres transformacions de la ciutat medieval de Girona," *Catalunya Romànica* (Barcelona: Enciclopèdia Catalana, 1991), 5, 53–57. Pere Ortí, "L'explotació d'una renda reial: els molins del Rec Comtal de Barcelona fins al segle XIII," in *Estudios sobre renta, fiscalidad y finanzas en la Cataluña bajomedieval*, ed. Manuel Sánchez Martínez (Barcelona: 1993), 243–275. Carme Miró, "El abastecimiento de agua a la colonia *Iulia Augusta Faventia Paterna Barcino*," in *Aquam perducendam curavit. Captación, uso y administración del agua en las ciudades de la Bética y el Occidente romano*, ed. Lázaro Lagóstena et al. (Cádiz: Seminario de Agustín de Horozco de Estudios, 2011), 147–163.

13 Carme Miró and Héctor A. Orengo, 2011. "Following Roman waterways from a Computer screen. GIS based approaches to the analysis of Barcino's aqueducts," in *Go Your Own Least Cost Path. Spatial Technology and Archaeological Interpretation*, ed. Philip Verhagen et al. (Oxford: BAR International Series 2284, Archeopress, 2011), 47–53.

the earliest mention to the Rec Comtal, dating to 1075.[14] This pre-existing hydraulic system may have been built during the reign of Ramon Berenguer I, and was different from the Roman aqueduct, both in terms of course and purpose.[15]

In the case of Girona, watermills and canals can be attested in the course that was later followed by the count's canal as far back as the 9th century, but no explicit mention can be found until the early 11th century (1015).[16] In Sabadell, near Barcelona, the *huerta – orta maiore* – is mentioned for the first time in 1240, but it was not an *ex novo* construction but rather the result of the work undertaken on alluvial lands besides the river Ripoll for the creation of irrigated fields in the meanders and the erection of watermills. From the late 10th and throughout the 11th centuries, a succession of legal suits resulted in the dispossession of peasant-owned lands and watermills in favour of secular and ecclesiastical lords, replicating similar earlier phenomena in the lands flanking the Barcelona and Girona canals.[17]

In none of these cases can be clearly documented an initiative from the count or other feudal lords towards the planning and construction of irrigation systems. In the monastery of Sant Cugat, for example, no new irrigation systems or watermills were built in the immediate surroundings of the monastery. Instead, throughout the 10th century the monastery acquired lands and rights over the small irrigated areas and watermills – which had been previously constructed by the local peasant communities – in the valley bottoms of Ripoll, Riera de Rubí and Riera de Sant Cugat by means of donations, purchases and exchanges. The process culminated in the late 10th century with the total dispossession of the peasants (Fig. 6.1).[18]

14 Joan Busqueta, *Una vila del territori de Barcelona: Sant Andreu de Palomar als segles XIII–XIV* (Barcelona: Fundació Salvador Vives i Casajuana, 1991), 162–163; Ortí, "L'explotació d'una renda reial," 244.

15 Pierre Bonnassie, however, claims that the construction of the canals and most watermills was carried out under Ramon Berenguer I's orders, on the basis that the earliest mentions of these structures are dated to his reign. Pierre Bonnassie, *La Catalogne du milieu du Xe à la fin du Xie siècle. Croissance et mutations d'une société*. 2 Vols. (Toulouse: Publications de l'Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 1975–76), 1, 466.

16 Martí, "Les primeres transformacions," 5, 54.

17 Mercè Argemí and Josep M. Masagué, "L'aprofitament hidràulic al riu Ripoll: molins i hortes, un patrimoni que desapareix," *Arraona* 27 (2003): 58–78.

18 Helena Kirchner, "Hidráulica campesina anterior a la generalización del dominio feudal. Casos en Cataluña," in *Hidráulica agraria y sociedad feudal. Prácticas, técnicas, espacios*, ed. Josep Torró and Enric Guinot (València: Universitat de València, 2012), 21–50.



FIGURE 6.1 *Sketch of a typical irrigated area with watermill, built in a valley bottom*
HELENA KIRCHNER

It is only from the late 12th and the early 13th centuries that major hydraulic infrastructures were promoted by the crown and by urban institutions. The irrigation system built in Puigcerdà – a 9km long canal that primarily supplied royal flour and fulling mills, and the urban *huerta* secondarily – is a good example of these royal projects. The Puigcerdà canal was intended as a source of revenue generated by the mills and water concessions for irrigation. This project, however, was carried out in a well-established, valley-bottom agricultural landscape with peasant-built irrigation systems and watermills, which were appropriated by a monastery and a bishopric during the 10th century. Since the valley had no room for further watermills or irrigation networks, the only alternative was to go beyond with the construction of a 9 km-long canal reaching the newly founded town of Puigcerdà (Fig. 6.2).[19]

At a later date, in the 15th century, the canal of Manresa, which was 20 km long, contributed to the creation of an urban *huerta* next to the city walls.[20] Also

19 Helena Kirchner, Jaume Oliver and Susanna Vela, *Aigua prohibida. Arqueologia hidràulica del feudalisme a la Cerdanya. El Canal Reial de Puigcerdà* (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002).

20 Jordi Piñero, "La sèquia de Manresa: un canal d'irrigació construït en el segle XIV per iniciativa del consell de la ciutat," in, *La ciutat medieval y l'arqueologia*, ed. Flocel Sabaté and Jesús Brufal, (Pagès Editors, Lleida, 2014), 407–432.



FIGURE 6.2 *Plan of medieval hydraulic systems in Puigcerdà, Catalonia (Spain)*
HELENA KIRCHNER, JAUME OLIVER AND SUSANNA VELA, *AIGUA PROHIBIDA*

in the 15th century, the construction of a new canal met the irrigation needs of the new *huerta* in Sabadell, the so-called *huerta Novella*.[21] All these *huertas* and the supply canals were created outside valley bottoms. It can be claimed that the ability of feudal society to promote major hydraulic infrastructures and

21 Argemí and Masagué, "L'aprofitament hidràulic al riu Ripoll."

large-scale land allocation processes was consolidated by the second quarter of the 13th century.

These large-scale projects, which were promoted by the crown, the urban institutions and, sometimes, as described by S. Caucanas for the Rosselló area, other feudal lords, were the result of late initiatives.[22]

Furthermore, the spaces that these projects occupied were very different from those where earlier agricultural phases had laid their irrigations systems, and which were mostly to be found in valley bottoms. By the time the feudal lords and, somewhat later, the urban corporations had started promoting hydraulic works, in the late 12th century, these environments were already densely occupied. The only way to undertake the construction of new infrastructures was to develop new water-catchment areas and then carry the water elsewhere, outside the valley bottoms, to a *huerta* or a city. This process often involved the construction of long main canals.[23] In this regard, the hydraulic works carried out by the new feudal masters in recently conquered areas in Valencia and Aragon seemed to respond to similar criteria. In all cases, the ultimate objective of these programmes was to raise rent or fiscal revenue. Hydraulic systems were managed through the lease of land plots, irrigation rights and watermills, which were also a source of revenue for the managing lords.

The Impact of the Feudal Conquest on Agricultural Landscapes: The Case of the Balearic Islands

The written record concerning the feudal conquest of each the Balearic Islands (effected in 1229 in Mallorca, in 1235 in Ibiza and in 1287 in Menorca) is very uneven. In the case of Mallorca the evidence is much more abundant and varied. The main documentary *corpus* includes the text that records James I's distribution of the island among the feudal lords who took part in the campaign, a list of the *alquerias* and *rahales* in the lands allocated to the lord Nuno Sanç, and hundreds of notarial documents, which were chronologically systematized in codices.[24] Regarding Ibiza, we have the island's equivalent from

22 Sylvie Caucanas, *Moulins et irrigation en Roussillon du IXe au XVe siècle* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1995).

23 Kirchner, "Hidráulica campesina."

24 This document is known as the *Repartiment*, meaning "allocation." Several versions of this document are preserved, in Catalan, in Latin and, in a fragmentary state, in Arabic. Jaime Busquets, "El códice latinoarábigo del Repartimiento de Mallorca (parte latina)," *Butlletí*

the *Repartiment* – the *Memoriale Divisionis*, which includes a list of *alquerias*, *rahales* and watermills in the island, alongside several record books dating to between the 13th and 15th centuries.[25] In the case of Menorca, no *repartiment* has been preserved and only a succinct collection of notarial documents is available.[26]

This documentary evidence describes a rural landscape dominated by Feudal lords and occupied by new settlers. Also, it reveals that the basic unit of Andalusi settlement was the *alqueria*. P. Guichard considered the *alqueria* as a peasant settlement often identified with a clan or tribal name.[27] The term is often used by archaeologists to refer to a rural village. In my opinion, this definition of *alqueria* is too narrow, since it only contemplates the residential area of the peasant settlement. The archaeological surveys in the islands have showed that *alquerias* included a territorial dimension claimed by the kin group which included one or more residential areas, one or more farming areas

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la Societat Arqueològica Luliana 31 (1953): 305–307; Ricard Soto, *Còdex català del llibre del Repartiment de Mallorca* (Palma de Mallorca: Govern Balear, 1984). Most particularly the records of the *Escrivania de Cartes Reials* (ECR) (Arxiu del Regne de Mallorca, ARM). *Alqueria*: Word used in Arabic and feudal documents to design agricultural villages or hamlets (from the Arabic, *qarya*). *Rahal*: In Andalusi Arabic *r.ḥ.l* conveys a sense of departing, of moving out. Federico Corriente, *A Dictionary of Andalusi Arabic* (Leiden, New York and Köln: Brill, 1997, 204). When used as a noun the word means "ranch," and eventually "village" as well. The word, therefore, clearly refers to an outpost, a derivation of a settlement. The mentioned list is known as the *Remenbrança*, meaning "remembrance" or "memorial." Antoni Mut and Guillem Rosselló, *La "Remenbrança" de Nunyo Sanç. Una relació de les seves propietats a la ruralia de Mallorca* (Palma de Mallorca: 1993).

25 The document *Memoriale Divisonis* summarises the distribution of the island among the conquerors. Joan Marí, *I. La conquista catalana de 1235* (Ibiza: Fundación José M. Quadrado-Institut d'Estudis Eivissencs, 1976). On the record books, in Latin, *caput brevis*: the *Capibrevium Reverendissimi Domini Archiepiscopi Terracone* (*1433*) (*AHPE*, V–62) (*CRDAT*) and the *Capbreu del Capítol de Tarragona* (*1394*) (*AHPE*, 2030–1) (*CCT*), preserved in the Arxiu Històric de la Pabordia d'Eivissa (AHPE), remain unpublished. See Francesc X. Torres, *El capbreu de l'arquebisbe Ènnec de Valterra* (*1396–1398*). *Introducció. Estudi. Transcripció* (Ibiza: Consell Insular d'Eivissa i Formentera, 2003), and Torres, *Dos capbreus del segle XIII. Capbreu Antich de Eviça i capbreu del* Llibre Verd *de Tarragona* (Ibiza: Arxiu Històric de la Pabordia d'Eivissa, 2008).

26 Ramon Rosselló, *Aportació a la història medieval de Menorca. Segle XIII* (Menorca: Consell Insular de Menorca, 1980). Rosselló, *Aportació a la història medieval de Menorca. Segle XIV* (*Reis de Mallorques i Pere el Cerimoniós*) (Menorca: Consell Insular de Menorca, 1985). Elena Lourie, "La colonización cristiana de Menorca durante el reinado de Alfonso III 'el liberal,' rey de Aragón," *Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia* 53–4 (1980–81): 135–186.

27 Pierre Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence et la Reconquête* (*XIe–XIIIe siècles*) 2 vols. (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1991–1992).

and pasturelands. Also, different peasant groups could share irrigated areas or territories. On the other hand, *rahals* seem to be complementary working areas of the *alquerias*, and rarely were owned by a sole individual.[28]

The wealth of information contained within these documents can also be used to identify and outline the agricultural areas active at the time of conquest. It is good-quality evidence, giving plentiful indication of land plots, the number and location of watermills, the course followed by canals, the location of settlements, and Andalusi toponymy. All of these are crucial factors in the reconstruction of the migration to, and subsequent colonisation of, the islands by Andalusi groups. Similarly, the documents also provide much clarity with regard to the legal aspects of the feudal colonisation.[29] Finally, the combining of this information with the data collected through archaeological survey

28 Helena Kirchner, "Original design, tribal management and modifications in Medieval hydraulic systems in the Balearic Islands (Spain)." *World Archaeology: The Archaeology of Water* 41.1 (2009): 148–165. According to P. Guichard, *rahal* referred to a farm belonging to individuals, usually located in rural areas close to towns. Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence*, 374–387.

29 This issue has generated an abundant bibliography, but the attention paid by historiography to each of the islands is very uneven. Some relevant contributions are: Jaume Portella, "La colonització feudal de Mallorca. Els primers establiments de l'alqueria de Deià," *Estudi General. La formació i expansió del feudalisme català* 5–6 (1985–86): 331–343. Portella, "Baronies y cavalleries de Mallorca en els segles XIII i XIV. In feudum ad consuetudinem Barchinone," *Afers* 18 (1994): 427–441; Ricard Soto, "Repartiment i repartiments: l'ordenació d'un espai de colonització feudal a la Mallorca dels segle XIII," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales. De al-Andalus a la sociedad feudal: los repartimientos bajomedievales*, Annex 25 (1990): 1–51. Soto, *L'ordenació de l'espai i les relacions socials a Mallorca en el segle XIII (1229–1301)* (PhD thesis. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Bellaterra, 1991); Soto, "La *porció* de Nunó Sanç. Repartiment i repoblació de les terres del sud-est de Mallorca," *Afers* 18 (1994): 347–366; Soto, "Conquesta, repartiment i colonització de Mallorca durant el segle XIII. Un estat de la qüestió," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 26/2 (1996): 605–646; Soto, "De soldats de fortuna a pagesos: els primers colonitzadors de Mallorca," in *El feudalisme comptat i debatut. Formació i expansió del feudalisme català*, ed. Miquel Barceló et al. (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003), 315–348; Gabriel Jover and Ricard Soto, "Els dominis feudals a la Mallorca baixmedieval (segles XIII–XVI)," *Revista d'Història Medieval* 8 (1997): 217–274; Jover and Soto, "Colonización feudal y organización del territorio. Mallorca 1230–1350," *Revista de Historia Económica* 20/3 (2002): 439–477; Ángel M. Rodríguez, "Conquesta i feudalització: el cas de Pollença, Mallorca (1298–1304), *Estudi General.*" *La formació i expansió del feudalisme català* 5–6 (1985–86): 371–418; Rodríguez, "Dos moments en la colonització feudal del nord-oest de Mallorca (Pollença, 1298/1304–1319/1325)," *Afers*: 18 (1994): 367–404. Rodríguez, *El territori de Pollença sota l'ordre del Temple (1298–1304)* (Pollença: Ajuntament de Pollença, 2000); Joan Marí, *Illes Pitiüses*, I; Lourie, "La colonización cristiana de Menorca."

facilitates the analysis of the transformation suffered by these agricultural landscapes after the conquest, including modifications in land distribution, the substitution of crops, and the introduction of new policies in the management of irrigation systems. The morphological transformation of the landscape was, at any rate, uncommon; if anything, it involved the construction of new watermills alongside pre-existing canals. The extension, and distribution, of irrigated fields remained for the most part unaltered, and the course of canals only suffered minor changes. Elsewhere, I referred to this process as a "subversion" of the agricultural system, in reference to the changes undergone by the criteria for the allocation of water rights – the priority became the operation of watermills -and to the new crop preferences.[30] In conclusion, the cases under examination showed that the changes introduced during the 13th century were of very limited significance, in sharp contrast to the situation in Valencia and in some hydraulic systems in Aragón.[31]

Several case studies concerning the Balearic Islands have demonstrated that Catalan colonists and the new managers did not introduce changes into the cultivated areas, the course of canals or the extension of irrigated surfaces immediately after taking over from the previous settlers.[32] In the valley of Coanegra (Tramuntana range, Mallorca) up to three new watermills were built between the late 13th and the initial decade of the 14th century (Fig. 6.3).[33] In the gorge of Algendar (Menorca) the course of one canal was slightly modified

30 Kirchner, "Colonització de *lo regne de Mallorques*."

31 See references above, note 11.

32 Kirchner, *La construcció*. Kirchner, "La reconstrucció del disseny original dels espais irrigats andalusins i de les modificacions posteriors. Exemples d'Ibiza," in *Estudiar i gestionar el paisatge històric medieval. Territori i societat a l'Edat Mitjana. Història, arqueologia, documentació* IV, ed. Jordi Bolòs (Lleida: 2007), 11–38. Mercè Argemí, "El sistema de molinos andalusí del *guz'* de Yartân (Mayūrqa)," in *Agricultura y regadío en al-Andalus. II Coloquio de historia y medio físico,* ed. Lorenzo Cara and Antonio Malpica (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1995), 259–271. Argemí, *A les vores dels torrents. Una prospecció dels assentaments pagesos andalusins de Pollença*, Anuari, núm. 6 (Pollença: Ajuntament de Pollença, 1999). Mercè Argemí, et al., "Un sistema hidràulic compartit per diversos assentaments," in *El curs de les aigües. Treballs sobre els pagesos de Yabîsa* (*290–633H/902–1235dC*), ed. M. Barceló (Ibiza: Consell Insular d'Eivissa i Formentera, 1997), 37–51. Miquel Barceló and Fèlix Retamero, eds., *Els barrancs tancats. L'ordre pagès al sud de Menorca en època andalusina* (*segles X–XIII*) (Maó: Institut Menorquí d'Estudis, 2005). Eugènia Sitjes, "Espacios Agrarios y redes de asentamientos andalusíes en Manacor (Mallorca)," in *Por una arqueología agraria: perspectivas de investigación sobre espacios de cultivo en las sociedades medievales hispánicas*, ed. Kirchner (Oxford: BAR International Series, Archeopress, 2010), 61–78.

33 Kirchner, *La construcció*, 133.

to create room for a new watermill.[34] The construction of new watermills and the preservation of the pre-existing ones was, however, not always possible. In Buscastell, Santa Eulària and Balansat (Ibiza), the number of watermills did not change in the wake of the conquest; in Alaró (Mallorca) no new watermills were added to the 10 recorded immediately after the Christian arrival; and finally, in Bunyola (Mallorca), four of the seven watermills recorded after the conquest had already been abandoned by the 1240s, never to be reactivated.[35]

Exceptionally, the concession of water rights in the *huerta* of Madīna Mayūrqa (presently Palma) suggest an extension of the irrigated surface, which is difficult to quantify at this stage in the absence of detailed fieldwork. The documentation produced by the concession of water rights after the conquest, and the legal suits pointing to the misuse of the canals supplying the city of Mallorca and the adjoining *huerta*, show that the way this system was being managed by the crown heavily compromised its efficiency.[36] The pressure put upon the hydraulic systems through the construction of watermills was, on the other hand, not so significant, and was at any rate very different from case to case. Sometimes the number of watermills even descended, as in the aforementioned example of Bunyola. These instances are consistent with the difficulties found in securing stable colonists, since many of the recently settled families abandoned their new lands throughout the 13th century.[37] In all cases, however, the new lords were mostly interested in these watermills as sources of revenue. In the valleys of the Tramuntana range, for example, the location of watermills was the key factor in the distribution of land. Frequently, watermills were allocated in the same way as the nearby plots of land.[38]

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34 Retamero, "La colonització andalusina dels barrancs de Menorca"; "Les mesures de la supervivència," in *Els barrancs tancats,* 51–235.

35 On Ibiza: Argemí et al. "Un sistema hidràulic compartit;" Kirchner, "La reconstrucció del disseny original." On Mallorca: Kirchner, *La construcció*, 176–177 and 289–291.

36 Reis Fontanals, *Un plànol de la Sèquia de la Vila del segle XIV* (*Ciutat de Mallorca*) (Palma de Mallorca: Ajuntament de Palma,1984). Fontanals, *L'aigua a Ciutat de Mallorca* (Palma de Mallorca: Lleonard Muntaner, 2004).

37 Soto, "La *porció* de Nunó Sanç;" Soto, "Conquesta, repartiment i colonització;" Kirchner, "Arqueologia colonial."

38 Kirchner, *La construcció*, 132–136. First-hand and second-hand beneficiaries – those who were handed lands directly by the king and by first-hand beneficiaries, respectively – were not the actual peasant colonists. These normally settled under the lordship of second-hand beneficiaries in exchange for a rent (Soto, "Repartiment i repartiments"). Second-hand beneficiaries, therefore, based their income on land leases and on the direct management or the lease of watermills. In the valley of Coanegra, in 1271, one Guillem Mestre took over the rights over the watermills granted to Bernat de Santa Eugènia – the first-hand beneficiary – in exchange for 100 *morabetinos* per year, which suggests that second-hand beneficiaries raised revenue from the colonists and the watermills through



FIGURE 6.3 *Original layout of the hydraulic system of Coanegra. Watermills numbered as 1,5 and 8 were built after the 1229 conquest.* Helena Kirchner, *La Construcció de l'espai pagès*

Overall, 14th and 15th century record books from Ibiza do not show major reformations across the island or in the drained area near the city.[39] The earliest changes of note to be carried out in irrigated spaces took place in the 17th century in Buscatell (Sant Antoni de Portmany), with the construction

the operation of middlemen. Finally, millers paid rents to up to three progressive levels of lordship.

39 Kirchner, "La reconstrucció del disseny original."



of a water reservoir for the linen industry, and in the system of Es Ierns (Santa Eulària des Riu), where a new dam was built to raise the main canals.[40] Major changes to hydraulic systems are dated to the late 18th century, when most of the irrigation networks were expanded.[41] At this time, the crown commissioned Gaietà Soler with the presentation of a report, a record book and a development plan with the aim of increasing tax revenue. The plan was

40 Argemí and others, "Un sistema hidràulic compartit."

41 Kirchner, "La reconstrucció del disseny original."

partially executed and, although the process has not been studied in detail, some of its effects on the largest hydraulic systems are obvious.[42]

In Menorca, the drop in population numbers following the conquest was so severe that most irrigation systems, which were concentrated in the gorges to the south of the island, were abandoned, with the exception of Algendar (Ferreries) and Maó, where concessions for the construction of watermills are documented. Their construction must predate the late 16th century, when they are first mentioned in the written record. To a large degree, Andalusi peasants relied on rotary querns turned by hand to grind their grain.[43]

The Spread of Cash Crops

Another consequence of feudal colonisation was the spread of the cultivation of cash crops in rural areas. In the Andalusi period, there seems to have been a larger variety of plants under cultivation, though there were some areas specialised in the cultivation of commercial crops. The Andalusi geographer Al-Zuhrī points out that Ibiza specialised in vines, almonds and figs, which were exported to Mallorca; in the case of Mallorca, he mentions the rarity of figs, cotton and linen, and stresses the abundance of vegetables; finally, Menorca seems to have been rich in vines. The olive tree, according to this author, was not abundant, so olive oil had to be imported from the Peninsula.[44] In Ibiza, vines were particularly predominant in the *huerta* associated with the *Madīna*, which had been created by draining an area of coastal wetlands at the foot of the hill where the city stood.[45] The *Liber Maiolichinus* – which narrates

42 *Mojonamiento de Ibiza*, año 1791 (AHPE, C–13–2); *Real capbrevación de Ibiza y Formentera* (1791–97) (ARM, RP 319, 6, 2–160); Gaietà Soler, *Extracto del siguiente plan instructivo de agricultura, industria y policia de la campaña en las islas de Ibiza y Formentera*, 1789 (Arxiu Històric d'Eivissa – AHE); *Expediente de egecución del Plan político y económico aprobado por S.M. en Real Orden de 15 de setiembre de 1789* (AHE).

43 Retamero, "La colonització andalusina dels barrancs," 65–67, 78. J. Sánchez, "Estudi de les pedres de molins manuals i de les zones d'extracció de Menorca," in *Els barrancs tancats,* 236–267.

44 Al-Zuhrī, *Kitab al-jughrafiya,* ed. Mahammad Hadj-Sadok*, Bulletin d'Études Orientales* XXI (1968): 128–130. Miquel Barceló, *Sobre Mayūrqa* (Palma de Mallorca: Museu de Mallorca, 1984), 35–51.

45 Miquel Barceló, Ricardo González and Helena Kirchner, "La construction d'un espace agraire drainé au *ḥawz* de la *Madīna* de Yābisa (Ibiza, Baléares)," in *La dynamique des paysages protohistoriques, antiques, médiévaux et modernes. XVIIe Rencontres Internationales d'Archéologie et d'Histoire d'Antibes*, ed. Joëlle Burnouf, Jean-Paul Bravard and Gérard Chouquer, (Antibes: Sophia Antipolis, 1997), 113–125.

the pillaging raid sent by the Catalans and the Pisans in 1114 – mentions the extreme fertility of the vines and barley fields.[46] The documents dating to immediately after the feudal conquest of Ibiza also highlight the island's vines. According to Al-Zuhrī, olive trees were not present on the Balearic islands in the 11th century, but mentions are made of the existence of consolidated olive groves in the valley of Bunyola, near Palma, after the Christian takeover.[47]

In general, the written record which follows the conquest is not very informative. Notarial documents rarely refer to the plant species under cultivation in the plots of land which they mention; when they do, vague descriptions, such as "different kind of trees," "figs," "cereal" and "vines," are the norm. Sometimes, when vines are noted, some sort of trained vine can be assumed. There are also references to irrigated gardens "with vines," "with different types of trees" or "with olive trees." Mentions of fig trees, carob trees and almond trees, often cultivated together, are also frequent. An excepcional document concerning the *alqueria* of Ortolug in Mallorca lists a number of fruit trees and other plant species: mulberry trees, broad beens, peas, onions, garlic, cabbages, asparagus, plum trees, pomegranate trees, pumpkins, cucumbers, apricot trees, apple trees, peach trees, orange trees, lemon trees and citron trees.[48] This list, and the references to different kinds of crops in the same plot show that the new Catalan settlers found that mixed-crop farming was predominant. Barley and durum wheat are the most prominent cereals in the record.

There are also some sporadic mentions of oriental crops, such as dates, for example in a document referring to the cargo of a ship leaving Mallorca for Genoa in 1242.[49] The recording of payments done with pepper, hemp and linen is also common. No written record for the cultivation of cotton or sugar cane

46 Carlo Calisse, ed., *Liber Maiolichinus de gestis pisanorum illustribus*, in *Fonti per la storia d'Italia* (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1904), 43.

47 Barceló, *Sobre Mayūrqa*, 41–42. Soto, *L'ordenació de l'espai i les relacions socials*.

48 ARM, *Actes del Pariatge* (P–1). The document is an inventory of the produce of a small *alqueria* located north of Mallorca: Ortolug de Puigpunyent. (Kirchner and Soto, "Les tècniques agràries," 104). Some of these plants have an oriental origin, and were introduced in the islands by Andalusi peasants from the 10th century onwards: mulberry trees, pomegranate trees, orange trees, lemon trees and citron trees. Cotton, sugar cane and dates may also be included in this list. Andrew M. Watson, *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World: the Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques 700–1100* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

49 ARM, ECR 342 f. 121v. Helena Kirchner and Ricard Soto, "Les tècniques agràries andalusines i les transformacions posteriors a la conquesta catalana a les Illes Balears," in *Història de la ciència a les Illes Balears. Volum 1: L'Edat Mitjana*, ed. Anthony Bonner and Francesc Bujosa (Palma de Mallorca: Consell de Mallorca, 2006), 142.

has been found to date, but they are nevertheless known to have been exported from Mallorca in the mid-13th century.[50]

The recurrent emergence of vines, olive trees, wheat and barley in the documents referring to the mountainous zone north of the island indicate that these were particularly popular crops among the new Christian lords. Vegetable gardens and fruit trees are recorded only in connection with areas adjoining watermills or as complementary crops in areas which were primarily used to grow cereal. Although the archaeological confirmation for this is lacking, it seems that, after the Catalan conquest, the tendency was to give preference to the cultivation of vines and cereal, limiting vegetables and fruit trees to small gardens for domestic use.

In the case of Mallorca, notarial documents, which become particularly regular from 1242 onwards, show that vines were systematically introduced in irrigated areas. Based on the abundant permits granted for the planting of vines and the growing presence of the crop in the written record throughout the 13th century, along with the equally increasing tax revenue in relation to the olive trees around Bunyola, R. Soto suggested that feudal colonists played a prominent role in the "diffusion" of these crops.[51] The identification of plots of land through the examination of toponyms and property boundaries, which are copiously mentioned in the written record, confirmed the expansion of vines in irrigated areas in the valleys of Tramuntana range. The analysis of the plots and their boundaries showed that vines were often located between the canal and the torrent which served as the system's lower boundary or in plots adjoining watermills or vegetable gardens. These spatial references thereby clarify that vines were not planted in expressly broken-up dry lands outside the hydraulic network.[52] It therefore remains unclear up to what point new vine plantations involved breaking up extra areas for cultivation and from what date. Our flimsy evidence seems to suggest the breaking up of garrigues outside the limits of irrigation systems; the phenomenon is, however, difficult to locate and to measure with any precision with the information available to date.[53] Similarly, the dissemination of olive trees and cereal crops, which

50 A document, currently in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris 1797 ms. Français 25545 fol 19, dating to the mid-13th century, mentions these products among the cargos shipped by Flemish merchants (Kirchner and Soto, "Les tècniques agràries," 104).

51 Soto, *L'ordenació de l'espai i les relacions socials*; Jover and Soto, "Colonización feudal y organización;" Kirchner and Soto, "Les tècniques agràries," 139–142.

52 Kirchner, "Colonització de *lo regne de Mallorques*"; Kirchner, *La construcció*.

53 In Coanegra (Mallorca), Guillem de Berga, descendant of one of the second-hand beneficiaries, started introducing vines and fig trees in the 1270s. These were located alongside the path that left the valley to enter the valley of Alaró, to the east. This must have been a small but compact area outside the irrigation system. The rest of the area is described as a wide expanse of garrigue and woods which reached the valley of Alaró: this area was

seems to be beyond doubt on the basis of the written record, is still lacking archaeological confirmation and quantification.

In the cases of Menorca and Ibiza our data is less abundant. In the former, the new colonists kept exploiting the Andalusi dry plots in the north of the island, and sowed cereal, thus increasing the relative importance of stock keeping, but they abandoned most of the hydraulic systems to the south of the island.[54] The so-called "*moixerif's* gardens," agricultural areas in valley bottoms, which were morphologically equivalent to Andalusi systems, were populated by vines, fig trees and fruit trees of different descriptions, according to a document dating to three years after the conquest (1290).[55] Similarly, vines and fig trees were kept in some urban plots in the Madīna Manūrqa (Ciutadella). According to F. Retamero, this scant evidence suggests a preference for cash crops, and for those fields on which they were already being cultivated, among the new lords.[56]

In Ibiza, the written evidence indicates that the new feudal colonists kept most irrigation systems in use, especially in drained zones such as Pla de Vila, just below the city, and the areas surrounding the mouth of the Buscastell torrent, as well as the wetlands of Les Salines. These areas, particularly the former, must have been where most of the vines mentioned by Al-Zuhrī – the source of the raisins exported from the island – were kept. Record books from the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries confirm that vine cultivation not merely remained stable, but probably increased.[57]

In conclusion, the feudal conquerors were especially interested in crops that could be sold at market or turned into rents (vines, olives, figs and cereal), and it is therefore logical that those lands which had already specialised in producing them always attracted the interest of the new lords.[58]

The New Regimes of Water Distribution

A new selection of plant crops was one of the consequences of the conquest, and was also coherent with the new regimes which were now put into place for the distribution of water rights. The feudal distribution system prioritised

called l'Arboçar, in reference to a type of wild bush, *arbutus unedo*, known in Catalan as *l'arbocer*. Kirchner, *La construcció*, 82–83 and 113–116.

54 Helena Kirchner and Félix Retamero, "Cap a una arqueologia de la colonització. La subversió feudal de l'espai rural a les illes," *L'Avenç* 290 (2004): 40–45.

55 *Al-mušrif*, official in charge of collecting tax.

56 Félix Retamero, "Les plantes i els camps del moixerif de Minûrqa," *Publicacions d'Es Born* 15–16 (2006): 85.

57 Barceló, González and Kirchner, "La construction d'un espace agraire drainé."

58 Retamero, "Les plantes i els camps del moixerif," 85–86.

using water as a power source for milling over irrigation. The evidence for this change of policy is abundant in the valleys of Tramuntana range. In Alaró and Coanegra, for instance, regulations were issued giving mills the right to use water every day of the week except one – Saturday or Sunday – when irrigation had precedence.[59] This norm was incompatible with the cultivation of some highly-water-demanding vegetables and fruit trees, some of which are listed above. The introduction of vines, wheat and barley, all of which demand little water to grow (sometimes rainwater suffices) in the irrigated areas, and the limitation of vegetable gardens to small domestic plots around the watermills, were, on the other hand, perfectly compatible with the new water-distribution policies.

In consequence, under this new regime irrigation was dependent on milling needs, in contrast with Andalusi policies. Andalusi systems were based on blocks of land plots sometimes with a water mill, all of which was associated with an *alqueria*. The feudal management system was effectively left in the hands of the millers.[60] This transformation did not necessarily involve a change in the number or location of watermills. The concentration of watermills in some Andalusi hydraulic systems responded, primarily, to the availability of a substantial water flow. Their number had no connection with the volume of cereal sown or to be ground, but responded to a strategy to give multiple options for milling. All watermills above the point where the water turn was could function simultaneously, because mills do not consume water. The closer the mill was to the bottom end of the system, however, the less often it was put into operation, because it would bar irrigation at higher elevations. In Andalusi society, where cereal grinding was considered complementary to irrigation, the construction of several watermills multiplied the opportunities for milling, and thus minimised the possibility of conflicts arising between the operation of mills and the irrigation of fields. For the new feudal lords, a large number of mills increased the opportunities for collecting revenue. The partial abandonment of irrigation after the feudal conquest was therefore aimed at permitting the simultaneous and stable operation of the mills (Fig. 6.4).[61]

The settlement of the new colonists, which were allocated a block of plots of land in association with a watermill, was similarly coherent with the new

59 Ramon Rosselló Vaquer, *Història d'Alaró. Segles XIII–XIV* (Palma de Mallorca: 1979); Kirchner, "La construcció," 135–136, 322–323.

60 Kirchner, "Colonització de *lo regne de Mallorques*;" Kirchner, *La construcció*.

61 Helena Kirchner, "Watermills in the Balearic Islands during the Muslim period," in *VIIIth Ruralia International Conference: Processing, Storage, Distribution of Food. Food in the Medieval Rural Environment* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 45–55.



FIGURE 6.4 *Diagram based in Coanegra's system (Majorca) showing the areas which can be irrigated when one or some of the watermills are in motion.*

regime for the distribution of water rights. Under this system, an Andalusi irrigation network, shared in Andalusi times between several *alquerias*, was handed over to a few families of colonists and managed, in the best case scenario, by the beneficiaries of the watermills: this was the case with Coanegra (Fig. 6.3) and Alaró (Mallorca), Buscastell and Balansat (Ibiza) and others in the gorges to the south of Menorca.

The occupation of hydraulic systems in the wake of the conquest was, therefore, carried out through the allocation of blocks of plots, often coincided with the lands previously associated with a specific *alqueria* in the Andalusi period, and also including the watermill if one existed. The beneficiaries of these allocations, who sometimes received a considerable number of plots of land, handed these over to the "second-hand beneficiaries" who, in their turn, distributed the lands, and sometimes also the watermill, among the colonist families, upon whom the burden of paying rent rested. Occasionally, more than one level of concession intervened between the "first-hand beneficiary" and the actual colonist; we have already referred to Guillem Mestre, the beneficiary of the rents paid by all mills in the valley of Coanegra. In the occupation of the system of Buscastell, in Ibiza, the system followed for land distribution revolved around the allocation of watermills and the immediately adjoining lands.[62]

Dry Land Agriculture

In the opinion of G. Jover and R. Soto, the analysis of the written record suggests an increase in the cultivated surface through the development of dry land agriculture (cereals, vines and olive trees).[63] Although this seems to be where the process ultimately led, its chronology remains problematic. The process may have begun sometime in the 14th century, but not even a rough approximation as to the extent of land so broken up, or its location, can be achieved. Implicitly, the approach followed by these authors implies the operation of a natural tendency towards growth that cannot be easily explained.

In those cases in which archaeological and spatial studies have been attempted, for instance in Tramuntana range and Felanitx, the evidence seems to indicate that no major expansion of dry crops was done until the late 13th century.[64] During the Andalusi period, plots of land worked for the exploitation of dry crops tended to be adjacent to the irrigated perimeters which occupied the bottom of valleys, where the most humid and the best-quality soils accumulate. Dry land agriculture was also practised on deep-soiled plains, where marshes developed more easily, thus facilitating these agricultural practices in the surrounding area. A good example of the former can be found in the valleys of the Tramuntana range. The creation of the hydraulic system involved the

62 Argemí et alii, "Un sistema hidràulic compartit."

63 Jover and Soto, "Colonización feudal y organización."

64 Kirchner, *La construcció*. Kirchner, "Arqueologia colonial."

deforestation of the whole valley bottom, because one of the key operations was the channelling of torrents through the construction of dry-stone walls, which also helped to contain the soil. The course of the main canal could provide for the irrigation of one of the sides of the torrent (Bunyola, Alaró) or both of them alternatively (Coanegra), leaving the opposite side free for the cultivation of tree crops that demanded little water (Fig. 6.3 and 6.5).

In addition, research carried out in the valley of Bunyola has crosschecked the mentions of *jovadas* present in the written record with land plausibly used for dry agriculture, and has found significant correlations.[65] The areas adjoining the irrigation system in the bottom of the valley have a total area of 90 ha; according to the *Remenbrança*, on the other hand, the agricultural area of Bunyola comprised 34 *jovadas*. If an equivalence of 2 to 3 *jovadas* per hectare is accepted, the correlation is shown to be considerably precise.[66] Although it is impossible to ascertain which of these plots were active at the time of the conquest, we can at least be sure that they were considered worth recording by the officials in charge of listing active agricultural lands in Nuno Sanç's lot. In the case of Coanegra, no overall reference to *jovadas* is available to us, but we can establish that no more than 14 hectares were deforested outside the hydraulic network located in the valley bottom.[67]

Felanitx, on the other hand, offers an example of the other kind of land exploited in a dry agricultural regime. This *alqueria* was included in the operation set forth in Jaume II's *Ordinacions*, which was published in 1300 and aimed at organizing the settlement of colonists in the ancient *alquerias* of a larger size, now called *vilas*.[68] This was not the first attempt to settle colonists in these places – we have abundant testimonies on the arrival of new settlers since at least the 1240s – but an endeavour to boost the colonisation process and thereby to increase the king's rents by offering urban plots on which houses could

65 The mentions of *jovades* in Mut and Rosselló, *La "Remenbrança" de Nunyo Sanç;* on Bunyola, Kirchner, *La construcció*, 182–187.

66 Kirchner, *La construcció*, 183. This surface unit refers to the amount of land that can be ploughed by a pair of oxen in a single day. Claudi Alsina, Gaspar Feliu and Lluís Marquet, *Pesos, mides i mesures dels Països Catalans* (Barcelona: Obra Cultural de la Caixa de Pensions, 1990), 167. For the equivalence with hectares in Mallorca see Kirchner, *La construcció*, 169–172.

67 Kirchner, *La construcció*, 136–138.

68 Kirchner, "Arqueologia colonial;" Guillem Morro, "Les ordinacions de Jaume II," in *I Jornades d'estudis locals de Felanitx. Actes Commemoratius 700 aniversari Fundació de La Vila de Felanitx* (Felanitx, Mallorca: 2000), 108–132; Joan Muntaner and Joan Vich, *Documenta Regni Majoricarum* (*Miscelanea*) (Palma de Mallorca: 1945). An "ordinació" is a royal order with precise instructions for execution.



FIGURE 6.5 *Hydraulic system of Bunyola (Mallorca, Balearic Islands) and dry farming areas*
KIRCHNER, *LA CONSTRUCCIÓ DE L'ESPAI PAGÈS*

be built and agricultural land around the *vila*.[69] Some of the colonists may be connected by name with the 13th-century settlers, so it seems that the operation was also aimed at rationalising the previous colonisation process. A total of 185 *quarteradas* (131.35ha) were allocated, in plots adjacent to the Andalusi irrigation system.[70] The likely area for the location of this *quarteradas* has a surface of around 140 ha, which is coherent with the written record. Even in the present day, the size of some of the plots corresponds to a *quarterada*, a fraction or a multiple. The area is a sunken, flood-prone, extension of land, located alongside the lower course of a torrent which does not run into another watercourse or the sea. The soils are therefore humid and suitable for growing cereal.

In consequence, the *Ordinacions* involved the reorganisation of the allotment in a zone which was already active in the immediate aftermath of the feudal conquest and also, at least partially, in the Andalusi period. 13th-century documents do indeed suggest that the areas located within the meanders of the torrent were already being exploited before the conquest. These comprise an extension of 38.1 ha, which is in agreement with the estimation of 14 *jovadas* recorded in Nuno Sanç's *Remenbrança* concerning Felanitx (Fig. 6.6).[71] The distribution of the year 1300, it follows, expanded the area dedicated to growing cereal by approximately 100 ha.

In Ibiza, the areas dedicated to dry land agriculture are concentrated in the three available floodplains: Pla de Vila, where the marshland was partially drained in Andalusi times, Pla de Ses Salines, which is surrounded by a dense ring of *alquerias*, and the plain of Portmany, near the mouth of the torrent of Buscastell, which was equally encircled by Andalusi rural settlements.[72] The utilisation of these areas as pastureland – *pratum*, in the written record and in place names – and for other agricultural uses, most particularly the cultivation of vines, is also significant. New draining works aimed at the expansion of the cultivated surface are not attested until the 17th century.[73]

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69 Antoni Mas claims that these regulations had no major impact on the property structure. Their aim was to regulate agricultural and farming activities and increase the king's rents. Antoni Mas, "Les ordinacions, una reforma agrària," in *Jaume II i les ordinacions de l'any 1300* (Mallorca: Consell de Cultura, 2002), 149–162.

70 La *quarterada* corresponds, in Mallorca, to 0,71 ha. Francisco Sevillano, 1974: "Pesas y medidas en Mallorca desde el siglo XIII al siglo XIX," *Mayurqa* 12 (1974): 67–77.

71 Mut and Rosselló, *La "Remenbrança" de Nunyo Sanç*.

72 Barceló, González and Kirchner, "La construction d'un espace agraire drainé."

73 Barceló, González and Kirchner, "La construction;" Kirchner, "El mapa de los asentamientos rurales andalusíes de la isla de Ibiza," in *Asentamientos rurales y territorio en el mundo mediterráneo en época medieval*, ed. Carmen Trillo (Granada: Athos-Pergamos, 2002), 120–186.



FIGURE 6.6 *Plan of the farming area of Felanitx (Mallorca): irrigated, dry areas, and marshes*
KIRCHNER, "ARQUEOLOGIA COLONIAL: ESPAIS ANDALUSINS"

In Menorca, dry land agriculture areas have also been identified, near the irrigation systems built in the valley bottoms to the south of the island, in non-irrigated areas to the north and in plots associated with Madīna Manūrqa.[74]

74 Retamero, "La colonització andalusina dels barrancs"; Félix Retamero and Bernat Moll, "Los espacios agrícolas de Madīna Manūrqa (Ciutadella de Menorca). Siglos X–XIII," in

F. Retamero has recently pointed out that dry land agriculture was part of the Andalusi peasant strategy to diversify crops. Dry land agricultural practices, wherever identified, usually appear on the margins of irrigated spaces and, then, integrated into a compact peasant work calendar. Alternatively, they could be managed separately and connected with inter-regional exchange patterns.[75] The new colonists' preferred choice was the second one, and in Menorca, they maintained the cereal fields to the north of the island, far away from the irrigated areas of the south, and to develop a commercially-oriented cattle industry.[76]

Abandonment of Residential Areas and Settlement Concentration after the Conquest

One of the most visible consequences of the feudal conquest was the general abandonment of Andalusi residence areas, as is clearly shown by the results of archaeological survey.[77] Thereafter, feudal colonists tended to concentrate in the larger Andalusi towns, referred to as *vilas* in the written record.[78] Sometimes, Andalusi *alquerias* comprised more than one populated nucleus and more than one agricultural land area. In some cases, several of these smaller settlements shared the same irrigation network. The territory associated with each of these *alquerias*, does not always appear well defined in the written record, and frequently a number of clan groups did in fact share the same territory. The feudal distribution and colonisation process reorganised these

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Por una arqueología agraria: perpectivas de investigación sobre espacios de cultivo en las sociedades medievales hispánicas, ed. Helena Kirchner (Oxford: BAR International Series, Archeopress, 2010), 95–106.

75 Félix Retamero, "Pautes per a l'estudi dels conreus de secà a al-Andalus," in *IV Curs Internacional d'Arqueologia Medieval. Els espais de secà*. Universitat de Lleida (Lleida: 2010), 31–49.

76 Retamero, "La colonització andalusina dels barrancs." Kirchner and Retamero, "Cap a una arqueologia de la colonització."

77 Mercè Argemí, "Segmentación de grupos bereberes y árabes a través de la distribución de asentamientos andalusíes en Yartân (Mayūrqa)," *Arqueología del paisaje. Arqueología Espacial* 19–20 (1998): 373–386; Argemí, *A les vores dels torrents*; Miquel Barceló and Helena Kirchner, *Terra de Falanis. Quan Felanitx no ho era. Assentaments andalusins i organització de l'espai al sud-est de Mallorca* (Palma de Mallorca: Universitat de les Illes Balears, 1995); Kirchner, *La construcció*; Kirchner, "El mapa de los asentamientos;" Retamero, "La colonització andalusina dels barrancs;" Sitjes, "Espacios Agrarios y redes de asentamientos andalusíes."

78 Jover and Soto, "Colonización feudal y organización."

territories into territorial units (*terminum*), with continuity in the agricultural areas but not in the settlement pattern. In the case of Mallorca, feudal *vilas* coincided with the largest and more centrally located *alquerias*, where churches were built and houses reoccupied. Sometimes these attempts did not come to fruition.

There are evidences of the difficulties in ensuring a stable colonists settlement in substitution of the Andalusi population. The first colonisation process did not consolidate until about 15 years after the conquest, because the names recorded in the serial notarial protocols (beginning in 1240) are in many cases different from those listed in the *Repartiment*.[79] The aforementioned 1300 *Ordinacions* also show these problems associated with achieving a stable settlement, even in a case such as Felanitx (Mallorca), where the *alqueria* had been reoccupied immediately after the conquest.

Conclusions

The detailed examination of Andalusi agricultural spaces is essential if we are to understand the strategies followed by the feudal colonists in the 12th and 13th centuries; conversely, the reconstruction of the agricultural regime predating the conquest can only be approached with the assistance of the written record which followed the conquest. Although the conqueror's new production criteria introduced changes into the management policies, these did not necessarily break the continuity of irrigation systems. Three major changes can be detected: the creation of new spaces or the expansion of the existing ones, which occasionally included the construction of new watermills; the partial substitution or redistribution of plant species; and the implementation of new policies in the allocation of water rights.

Additionally, this process was closely linked with the foundation of new settlements (*pueblas nuevas* or *vilas*) and the reorganisation of existing ones. The colonisation of the agricultural spaces cannot be understood in isolation from the policies set forth for the expulsion or shifting of the Andalusi population and their substitution with Christian colonists, whose settlement was strictly monitored by the feudal elite, which was the main beneficiary of the conquest.[80]

79 Soto, "Repartiment i repartiments."

80 Josep Torró, *El naixement d'una colònia. Dominació i resistència a la frontera valenciana (1238–1276)*, 2nd edition (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2006); Torró, "Colonizaciones y colonialismo medievales."

Finally, the criteria followed and the technical solutions adopted for the expansion of irrigated areas, the erection of new watermills, and the construction of new irrigation networks, were rooted into the techniques already in operation in feudal Catalonia at least since the 12th century. These endeavours were preceded by the appropriation of the peasant-constructed systems and infrastructures carried out by the feudal lords from the 10th century or even earlier. From the 12th century, the construction of new major waterworks began on the initiative of the king and of other members of the aristocracy. These works, including the creation of long water courses, watermills and brand-new *huertas*, were of considerable dimensions.

In both cases – feudal Catalonia and the conquered regions – the scale of the works undertaken is explained by the need to carry the water outside the valley bottoms in which irrigation systems were previously constrained. The creation of new irrigation networks could not be implemented by dismantling the pre-existing ones because these were already in the hands of the feudal elite, including institutions as much as individuals. Such large-scale operations demanded significant water flows, often drawn from rivers, and the chance to establish the adequate gradient to supply the newly broken-up irrigated lands. In conclusion, both in feudal Catalonia and in the regions taken from al-Andalus through conquest, these works were dependent on the availability of a sufficient water flow, an adequate gradient and the construction of a plotted new agricultural area.

This sort of construction was however not replicated in the Balearic Islands after the 13th-century conquest. There, the insertion of new watermills into pre-existing irrigation systems, the spread of cash crops, the introduction of new policies of water allocation and the settlement of new colonists, along with the expulsion of the previous Andalusi population, can be attested, but not the construction of new irrigation systems or the expansion of the lands which were already in cultivation during the Andalusi period. The reason for this is clear: there were no water sources rich or regular enough to be capable of supplying areas beyond the valley bottoms, which would have demanded the construction of long water courses reaching new plotted areas. The use of *qanât*(s) – underground galleries used for water catchment – natural springs, animal-powered wheels – at the margins of marshlands – and dams, which channelled irregular water courses, had allowed Andalusi peasant groups to create small irrigated spaces in the valley bottoms and in some terraced slopes despite the limitations of the available water resources, but could not accommodate new canals aimed at supplying additional plotted areas. The earliest attempts to expand the irrigated areas did not occur until the 17th and, mostly, the 18th centuries, and only in those cases in which the water available was

particularly abundant. This involved stretching the length of existing canals (Tramuntana range), building new dams below the original systems to use the excess flow (Balansat, Ibiza) and, more exceptionally, replacing the original network of canals with the construction of new ones (Es Ierns, Ibiza).[81] In consequence, beyond the demographic and administrative difficulties attached to the colonisation process, the ecological impact of the construction of Andalusi irrigation systems, closely intertwined with the settlement pattern, heavily conditioned the subsequent feudal colonisation process.

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81 Kirchner, "La construcció;" Kirchner, "La reconstrucció del disseny original."

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CHAPTER 7

The Agrarian Model of Valencian Moriscos

Manuel Ardit Lucas†

Introduction

The current state of our knowledge deems it somewhat risky to assert the existence of an agrarian model for Valencian Moriscos, as the evidence points to several different models which nonetheless shared certain features in almost every case. There seems to have been a primacy of irrigation and little regard for dryland farming, with agriculture focusing mainly on the production of vegetables and cereal. The property structure was organised around small estates and a proliferation of micro-plots. The model followed by the Moriscos resulted from transformations to the Andalusi systems introduced by feudal lords after the Christian conquest. The differences observed, on the other hand, are probably responses to adaptations necessitated by the specific environment and the depth of change implemented by the conquerors. Some features are difficult to grasp because of the nature of the sources, Christian in all cases, which probably obscure or misinterpret some of the characteristics of Morisco agriculture, most particularly regarding the property structure. For example, a number of properties of unfeasibly small size have been documented for Valencian Morisco communities; it is likely that the sources have overlooked the existence of other collective agricultural resources or practices.

16th and 17th century publicists insistently characterise Morisco agriculture as being predominantly occupied in the production of vegetables and mostly organised around small properties. The anti-Morisco ideas defended by these authors should raise a call for caution, since their information may be raked with deeply rooted prejudice. This is the case of Jaime Bleda, one of the most ardent defenders of expulsion who is, along with the Aragonese Pedro Aznar Cardona, our richest source on Morisco agriculture. Jaime Bleda, Dominican friar, held for some time the rectory over the Morisco parishes of Corbera, a territory under the king's jurisdiction, Alcocer and Gavarda, under the barony of Alberic, and Aielo de Malferit, under the Marquis of the same

* T.N. All quotations taken from original sources, unless otherwise referenced, have presently been translated for the publication of this article.

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name.[1] Despite the aforementioned prejudices, this work also offers plenty of useful evidence.

In the eighth and last book of his work, Bleda offers, we might say, plentiful information. He knew that if the Moriscos had not been expelled yet it was because their staying was in the interests of the feudal lords, as "everybody knew that having Moors gave you gold, and the more Moors, the more gold."[2] The expulsion was a severe blow for the lords' economy, but according to Bleda this was unavoidable because: "the filthy or rotten members that cannot be softly cured with medicines and ointments must be painfully cut for the sake of the body, because in order for the cure to be effective some healthy flesh has to go as well."[3] In actual fact the negative effects of the expulsion were not as dramatic as had been expected. According to this work, in the year of its publication, 1618, in many places such as the lands belonging to the Marquis of Elche, the Count of Elda, and the Barons duque del Infantado and Llombai

> and many other places in the kingdom (…) the population [did not] miss the Moriscos, and neither [did] the wheat and other important crops; and this is proven by the fact that the tithes and privileges collected by the church will be at first barely less, and will eventually become much more, than in the time of the Moors […], although some lords who own poor and non irrigated lands will take longer to put the lands back in the state the Moriscos had them, this will take a smaller number of Christians.[4]

The latter stereotype was very popular at the time. For example Valencia's inquisitor, Ximénez de Reinoso, was in 1582 of the opinion that "in normal conditions it takes as much to keep a Christian household as it takes to keep two Morisco families."[5] This sort of account is very common. Another significant text, in this case published after the expulsion, is that of a commissioner of the Duque of Gandía, in late 1609, in which he said that "the Morisco was happy with two *hanegadas* of land, and thought himself a wealthy man […] and the

1 For the biography of the Dominican see Bernard Vincent's and Rafael Benítez's preliminary study (pp. 9–47, esp. p. 13) in Jaime Bleda, *Corónica de los moros de España*, Biblioteca Valenciana, València: Ajuntament de València, Universitat de València, 2001, facsimile of the first edition published in Valencia in 1618 by the printer Felipe Mey.

2 Bleda, *Corónica*, 886.

3 Bleda, *Corónica*, 1030.

4 Bleda, *Corónica*, 1030.

5 Text reproduced by Pascual Boronat, *Los moriscos españoles y su expulsión. Estudio histórico-crítico* (Valencia: Francisco Vives Mora, 1901), 1, 596–597.

new tenants are given fifteen and still complain."[6] Although based on reality as we shall presently see, this sort of assessment was also aimed at minimising the effects of the expulsion and to spread the idea that the recovery would be easier than had been forecast. Around 135,000 Moriscos were expelled in 1609 (though contemporary estimates were much higher), and it was thought that about half this number should have sufficed to fill the void with the implementation of more efficient systems. But this was only partially true. In line with the rest of his discourse Jaime Bleda offered a very negative image of Morisco agriculture:

> Because they were bad farmers for dryland agriculture, and they left them uncultivated. They did not try to plant trees or vines, solely occupied with their irrigated gardens, which they divided into small allotments, and they lost heart if they had to work a wide and big field. They did not stay at work all day like Christians, but only three or four hours. They were lazy and sluggish because they didn't drink or eat properly. If a field needed to be ploughed six or seven times, they made do with three or four, and not even at the right time. I am sure, as I already said in my *Defence of the Faith*, that the wheat and other important crops will not miss the Moriscos, and that if the new Christian tenants in the lands of the lords had the tools and the beasts necessary for farming, the wheat harvest would already be one third richer than it was in their time, and I use the example of the lands of the baron duque del Infantado, where a sea of wheat has been harvested these recent years.[7]

This account is not only biased and opportunistic, but also reflects a lack of understanding of the Andalusi agricultural models from the perspective of a Christian feudal position. From this perspective, "important crops" were those obtained by dryland intensive farming practices, fundamentally cereal and vines, and not by irrigation horticulture.

The Aragonese Pero Aznar Cardona expressed a similar opinion regarding Morisco agricultural practices; according to him the Moriscos

> …ate vile stuff (even in that they have been punished by the heavens), they made flours of legumes such as lentils, *panizo*, broad beans, millet and they made bread. Those who could afford it would have this bread

6 Text reproduced by James Casey, "Què deu el País Valencià als canvis en el poblament rural del segle XVII?," *Revista de Catalunya* 5 (February 1987): 84–100, quotation on pp. 85–86.

7 Bleda, *Corónica*, 1030–1031.

> with raisins, figs, honey, *arrope*, milk and fruit, such as melons, even if they were still green and no bigger than a fist, cucumbers, peaches and others, no matter how badly seasoned they were, and that is all they ate, not leaving one stem in their gardens alone; and because all they ate was fruit and vegetable and legumes, sometimes stored to rotting point, and bread and water, because they did neither drink wine, nor buy meat nor game, killed by dogs or laces or gunshot or net, unless it had been killed by them according to Mohammed's rite, and because of all this they were cheap to feed and to dress, and they could pay high rents to their lords.[8]

A little further on, Aznar also made the following account of Morisco agriculture, in which one again recalls Bleda's arguments:

> there are many good farming lands that they had and left almost uncultivated of important crops, and used but for fig trees, plums, cherries, peaches and raisins, and greens like melons and cucumbers, leaving the vines and olives abandoned, and they also left the harder fields forgotten without using them to raise animals, horses, cows, goats, pigs and other profitable things that are the republics' wealth.[9]

As with Bleda, the Aragonese thought that "important" farming should occupy itself with cereal, vines, olives and stock breeding. In the following pages we will try to discern up to what point these accounts are based on prejudices and how much they stand as a reflection of reality.

Morisco Agriculture in the Lands of the Marquisate of Llombai (Valencia)

The Marquisate of Llombai (prior to 1530 Barony of Llombai) included the villages of Llombai, Catadau and Alfarb, to which Alèdua must be added since, despite being an independent barony, it was to all administrative effects included in the Marquisate. The population of Llombai was mixed, with a majority of Morisco elements. The remaining villages had a fully Morisco population. Some descriptions of the agricultural production of the area in the 14th and 15th centuries are known, but they are very vague.

8 Pedro Aznar, *Expulsión justificada de los moriscos españoles y suma de las excelencias christianas de nuestro rey don Felipe III, deste nombre* (Huesca: Pedro Cabarte, 1612), 2, fol. 34.

9 Aznar: *Expulsión justificada*, 2, fol. 65.

An agreement dated to 1381 mentions some of the cereals, vegetables, fodder and legumes cultivated by the Moriscos and another document of the same year also mentions vines and olive oil.[10] The farming regime seems to have combined vegetable farming with the production of cereals (*forment*, *ordi*, *dacsa*, *panís*) and animal fodder. It seems likely that most of this production was based on irrigation, because as we shall see later dryland agriculture was poorly developed.

Forment and *ordi* refer to wheat and barley respectively, whereas *dacsa* and *panís* are sorghum and millet. As we shall see later, these were the predominant cereals. Sometimes they were harvested before ripening, to use as animal fodder: the expressions *erba de panís* and *erba de adacça roja* make reference to this. It seems plausible that the cultivation of cereals had expanded since the 13th century, soon after the Christian conquest, as a means to pay the new lords their rents. The locally produced oil must have been destined for local consumption and the harvest from the vines for the production of wine and raisins. Other descriptions from the 15th century add little information to that already examined, but a document from late in the century is more explicit.[11] It says that "many kinds of cereals and rice" (*forments*, *dacçes*, *paniços*, *civades*, *arroços*) were cultivated in the basin (*foia*) of Llombai, and also that "many kinds of oil, wine and other fruits" were produced.

Regarding the property of the lord, Guillem Ramon de Centelles, it says that he owned "many vines and many fields with olive trees, mulberry trees, fig trees and other types of fields".[12] Rice must have been of little importance because it eventually disappeared, along with sesame and white mulberry. Confirming this, a partial relation of rents from 1492 which registers production leases records a very small amount of white mulberry.[13]

Rent records from the 16th century provide much richer evidence. These records, however, only register those products considered for rent satisfaction, not including perishable produce which would be mostly consumed by the peasant households themselves. The main cereals in cultivation were sorghum, millet and, to a lesser degree, wheat; spelt, rye, barley and rice were of minor significance. These documents include sharecropping terms, including *tercio diezmo*, *alcaidía*, and *fatra*, that is, all dues proportional and fixed. The figures are expressed in Table 7.1.

10 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Nobleza (AHN, N), Osuna, fil. 72, 8 and fil. 95, 17.

11 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 722, 6 (9) and fil. 695, 2 (12).

12 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 585, 3.

13 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 1028, 80.

TABLE 7.1 *Dues in kind in the Marquisate of Llombai (1530–1594)*[a]

Year	Wheat	Sorghum	Millet	Maize	Olive oil	White Mulberry
1530	335.3	209.9	476.1	–	–	12.5
1532	342.9	143.1	207.8	–	–	13.7
1533	249.5	207.2	327.8	–	–	22.7
1534	381.7	156.8	180.6	–	–	22.7
1538	250.1	110.2	129.9	–	–	22.7
1539	360.4	274.3	181.7	–	240.0	22.7
1540	428.0	443.8	188.6	–	–	36.2
1541	407.2	324.2	132.4	–	446.5	36.2
1559	663.8	307.3	245.0	–	238.0	203.0
1588	947.7	262.6	293.9	0.2	160.0	600.0
1589	962.2	537.9	234.1	0.2	1,650.0	600.0
1590	1,539.9	520.0	233.7	55.2	–	600.0
1591	1,306.2	772.1	328.5	114.3	1,130.0	600.0
1592	1,146.2	618.5	102.8	75.7	–	
1593	1,323.0	773.5	201.8	77.4	1,250.0	600.0
1594	1,080.7	464.7	77.4	70.8	–	600.0

a Monetary value of dues *tercio diezmo*, *alcaidía* and *fatra* is expressed in Valencian pounds. The dues for Llombai for the year 1538 are missing. Sorghum and wheat are often not clearly distinguished.

SOURCE: AHN, N, OSUNA, FIL. 586, EXPS. 10, 11, 21; 587, EXPS. 70, 259; 588, EXP. 2; 937, EXP. 4; 1.036, EXP. 1.

The growth in production shown by the table is deceptive, since it is heavily determined by the evolution of prices. Cereal price information in the Marquisate of Llombai suggests more than a threefold increase between the 1530s and the 1590s, in close agreement with the evolution of prices in Valencia.[14] The evidence of actual quantities collected, not available for all cases, seems in fact to indicate the stagnation of production. 250 *cahíces* (bushels) of wheat, 207 of sorghum and 328 of millet were collected in 1533. The figures for 1542 are 155 of wheat, 166 of sorghum and only 53 of millet. Late in the century figures were at similar levels. In 1589, 169 *cahíces* of wheat, 136 of sorghum and maize and barely 6 of millet were collected. Millet seems to have suffered the most

14 Manuel Ardit, *Creixement econòmic i conflicte social. La foia de Llombai entre els segles XIII i XIX* (Catarroja and Barcelona: Afers, 2004), 72–74.

because of the introduction of American maize, referred to as *dacsa d'Índies* in the sources. Despite harvest oscillations, the combined production of sorghum, maize and millet was generally larger than that of wheat; this seems to suggest that these cereals were favoured by the Moriscos in Llombai. The only product for which production increased significantly during the 16th century was the white mulberry, but unfortunately the relevant sources are incomplete.

As already mentioned, the records register monetary value instead of volume of produce, because payment was settled under agreement (*concordia* or *avinença*) signed by the lords and the *aljamas* (Morisco representative bodies). Despite this, the 600 pounds agreed for 1588 imply a forty-eight fold increase with regards to that of 1530, a growth that cannot be dismissed as an illusion caused by price rise. The cultivation of white mulberries and the amount of land consecrated to this must have grown significantly, as a response to the demand issued from silk factories in Toledo and Valencia.

The agrarian model of poor farming areas, such as the basin of Llombai, was rarely static, and normally adapted to market opportunities. In spite of this, in most cases the exploitation regime followed models of subsistence agriculture dominated by cereal and, to a lesser degree, olive trees. Vines were not significantly cultivated, as reflected in the small amounts paid to the lord for this practice.

The *capbreu* ("inventory," equivalent to the Castilian *apeo*) for 1581 shows additional features. Crops not based on tree or vine cultivation are poorly documented. All lands sown with cereal, vegetables and fodder were indistinctly labelled as *terra campa* or sowing land, without mentioning any specific crops, which naturally could change from year to year. By contrast other, more stable crops are mentioned, although this only applies to irrigated lands. The surface of non irrigated lands is nearly always left unrecorded. This seems to indicate that dryland agriculture was considered of little value, and probably also scarcely practiced. Sometimes reference to individual trees is made, which plausibly points to plots of a very small size. The distribution of irrigated crops by surface is expressed in Table 7.2.

The image that the 1581 *capbreu* offers about Morisco agriculture in the Marquisate of Llombai is consistent with that shown in rent records. It was a very traditional agricultural model based on cereals and other sown crops, with a discrete presence of vine, white mulberries and other trees. The olive tree was probably the most extended dryland crop, since the production figures offered by rent records do not tally with its very limited presence in irrigated lands.

This document also offers evidence about property structure and estate size distribution, as reflected in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.

TABLE 7.2 *Distribution of irrigated fields in the Marquisate of Llombai (1581)*[a]

Crops	Surface	%
"Sowing land"	1,825.14	86.8
White mulberry	109.50	5.2
Vines	63.75	3.0
Vines and associated crops	17.00	0.8
Fig trees	30.00	1.4
Fig trees and associated crops	25.75	1.2
Olive trees	19.74	0.9
Olive trees and associated crops	5.50	0.3
Carob tree	6.75	0.3
Orange	0.25	0.1
Total	2,103.38	100.0

a Surfaces expressed in Valencian *hanegadas*. 1 *hanegada* = 831 m^2.
SOURCE: AHN. N. OSUNA. FIL. 1.061. 1; 1.316. 1 AND 1.357. 1 AND 3.

TABLE 7.3 *Property structure in the huerta, Marquisate of Llombai (1581)*

Intervals	Owners	%	Surface (in *hanegadas*)	%
>0. <10	140	61.7	702.98	33.4
≥10. <20	71	31.3	941.45	44.7
≥20. <30	10	4.4	228.20	10.8
≥30. <40	4	1.8	130.75	6.2
≥40. <50	1	0.4	42.25	2.2
≥50. <60	1	0.4	57.75	2.7
Total	227	**100.0**	**2,103.38**	**100.0**

Land property was highly undifferentiated. Only 2 landowners possessed more than 40 *hanegadas* (3.3 ha.). Most, 93%, had properties under 20 *hanegadas* (1.7 ha.) but within this group those with less than 10 *hanegadas* (0.8 ha.) were predominant with 62%. Therefore, in this particular case the data confirm the truth behind Bleda's stereotype of the small size of Morisco properties. This is also the case with reference to estate size distribution, as reflected in Table 7.4.

Most plots (96%) were under 5 *hanegadas* (0.4 ha.) in size, and many of them were in fact considerably below that upper limit. In fact, the average

TABLE 7.4 *Estate size distribution in the huerta, Marquisate of Llombai (1581)*

Intervals	Estates	%	Surface (in *hanegadas*)	%
>0. <5	1,164	96.2	1,790.13	85.1
≥5. <10	42	3.5	256.25	12.2
≥10. <15	3	0.2	33.00	1.6
≥15. <20	0	0.0	0.00	0.0
≥20. <25	1	0.1	24.00	1.1
Total	**1,210**	**100.0**	**2,103.38**	**100.0**

size for irrigated plots was of 1.74 *hanegadas* (0.14 ha.). We might note that this was intensive agriculture, from which considerable yields must have been obtained, but this cannot be more than a supposition because we lack any information to that effect. For example, we ignore the extent to which animals were used for agricultural tasks. The 1510 census provides information about livestock present in the Llombai basin, giving a total figure of 6,687 heads, but without specifying the kind of animal.[15] Given the small size of the plots, it seems unlikely that working animals existed in great numbers, and fields must have been mainly worked by humans alone. This notwithstanding, the number of heads, almost 7,000, seems rather high for an area populated by somewhat over 1,400 inhabitants at the beginning of the 16th century. It is thus likely that animal breeding was an important sector, but we do not have the full details.

In the 16th century agriculture in the Marquisate of Llombai still preserved many features of Andalusi agriculture, albeit deeply transformed to respond to the demands of the feudal conquerors. The small size of properties and plots, which the new lords could not or would not change, is one of these typically Andalusi features. Cereals, although not altogether absent from Andalusi agriculture, now became paramount to attend seigneurial rents in kind. The cereals chosen for sowing, however, were predominantly of eastern origins (sorghum and millet) over wheat. It is likely that this produce was also exchanged within the Islamic communities, which preferred these cereals to wheat, and for this reason the lords abstained from promoting a change in crops. The increased presence of white mulberry from the mid 16th century must have been facilitated by the lords, because they contributed to increase the seigneurial rent. It was difficult to pay the rent in kind, because leaves must be cut green during

15 Archivo del Reino de Valencia (ARV), Real Cancillería, libro 514 ter, fol. 6or.

March, April and May in order to feed the silkworms, and for this reason an agreement and payment in cash system was preferred in this particular case.

In general, tax pressure in the Marquisate of Llombai was high, although the changes experienced throughout the 15th and 16th centuries were generally favourable to the vassals. Around the year 1479, when Cardinal Rodrigo de Borja, the future Pope Alexander VI, bought the barony of Llombai, the Muslims in the basin had to pay a number of contributions in kind and in cash, contributions that varied from one village to another. The main dues payable in coin were the *peita* and the *morabatí*. Some ephemeral products, ill adapted for payments in kind were satisfied in coin through a system called *alfarrassament* which involved an expert audit of the production.

The contributions in kind were far more significant. They could be fixed or proportional to the crop. The former included the *alcaidía* and the *fatra* or *fatera*. In Llombai and Catadau the *alcaidía* amounted to one Valencian fanega (33.5 litres) of wheat per *heredad* (surface unit equivalent to 8 or 10 *hanegadas*; the records are contradictory) and the *fatra* to one *almud* (4.19 litres) of millet per *heredad*. In Llombai and Catadau the proportional due normally amounted to one quarter in irrigated lands and one eighth in dry lands; for some produce, however, such as flax, olive oil and straw the proportion was in all cases one quarter.

In Alfarb and Alèdua contributions were higher and also more complex. In general, irrigated lands were taxed one third of production, whereas dry land only had to satisfy one eighth. The lords would also get the *luismo* due for patrimonial transactions *inter vivos*, which in Llombai and Catadau amounted to one quarter of purchase price. They also hold the right of first refusal or *fadiga*. In Alfarb the *luismo* was one third of the purchase price, but in Alèdua it was considerably smaller, only amounting to one fifth. It must be remarked that these *luismos* were considerably above the 10% established by Valencian laws.

As in most Valencian seigneurial lands, the lord in the Marquisate of Llombai also collected the *tercio diezmo*, or third part of ecclesiastical tithes. The Marquisate also held the monopoly on a number of services, the most significant of which were milling and grazing rights. In Llombai these also included the bakery, the tavern, the olive press, the shop and one which must have been hardly relevant, the so called *mel cutxa* or boiled honey cooled in water, which must have been a popular titbit among the Islamic population.

Corvées were common, but must have been of little economic value. They basically comprised paid or unpaid work days at the castle, the lord's vines or where "lo senyor volrà" (where the lord decides) frequent transport services, bales of hemp, chickens and eggs at the lord's price, etc. Throughout the 16th

century many of these dues, but not all, were substituted with payments in coin. Perhaps the most significant personal due was the unpaid obligation to transport the lord's wine and sharecropping dues in kind a distance of four or five leagues. The city of Valencia was within this distance, so the vassals not only paid dues but also helped the lord to commercialise them by providing the necessary transport.[16]

The situation of the Morisco population sharply contrasted with that of the few Christian inhabitants of the Marquisate of Llombai. The Christians were in all cases landowners rather than mere tenants. For this reason, they only paid *peita*, *morabatí*, ecclesiastical tithes and dues and the feudal contributions, such as the third of the tithe and the lord's monopolies. The nominal conversion of Valencian Muslims to Christianity in 1525 caused some delicate problems, since it could involve losses in the rents costumarily paid by the new Christians.[17] Finally, Moriscos – that is, the newly converted Christians – carried on paying in the same way as Muslims.

The transmission of property between Christian and Moriscos was, however, problematic, especially when the tenancy of a Morisco was transferred to that of a Christian. The biased, and incorrect, Christian interpretation of this was that the tenant's dues were of a personal instead of a real nature; therefore, when a Morisco tenancy was transferred to a Christian, he did not have to pay census or sharecropping dues. The Marquisate managers discussed this in 1541 and decided not to take action at that time "for moral reasons," even though according to the law tenancy had a real and not a personal quality.

Tenancy dues were so intertwined in the managers' ideology with the servile condition of Moriscos that transferring such dues to Christians would be morally reprehensible.[18] The Dukes of Segorbe had no doubts that the Moriscos must keep paying as usual. In the document letting out the dues from Vall d'Uixó and the region of Eslida for 1600, it was clearly specified that no demand for the reduction of the *aljamas* must be attended, and that all dues must be paid "conforme a la costum antiga" (following the old custom).[19]

The aforementioned differences between Llombai and Catadau on the one hand and Alfarb and Alèdua on the other disappeared sometime between 1535 and 1540. From this moment all irrigated properties paid one fourth of the production and dryland properties one eighth, so Alfarb and Alèdua had

16 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 586, 19; fil. 695, 2 (12) and 2 (18); fil. 1.028, 80.

17 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 587, 32.

18 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 594, 17a and b.

19 Carmen Barceló and Ana Labarta, *Archivos moriscos. Textos árabes de la minoría islámica valenciana, 1401–1608* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2009), 29.

TABLE 7.5 *Seigneurial rent structure in the Marquisate of Llombai* (*in percentages*).[a]

Years	Personal dues and *luismos*	Sharecropping	Azofras	Monopolies
1533	24.2	47.7	4.6	23.5
1540	18.5	51.7	4.5	25.3
1559	13.8	63.2	2.5	20.5
1590	10.7	64.6	1.2	23.5

a Ardit, *Creixement econòmic*, 77.

their conditions eased to that of the two other villages. Exceptions to these rules were vines, which in all cases paid one eleventh of the production, both in irrigated and in dry lands, and the so called *algoleja* properties (formed by river meanders and thus susceptible to disappearance in case of flood), which always paid a fifth. A few properties paid one sixth and a few others an amount defined by agreement.[20]

Sharecropping dues was not only the basis of seigneurial rents in the marquisate, but also gained in importance throughout the 16th century, whereas monetary personal dues and *azofras* diminished. I have been able to reproduce the structure of seigneurial dues for four years in the 16th century, although not as clearly as could have been desired because the available records mix personal dues and *luismos*. The results are shown in Table 7.5.

The growth of seigneurial rents in the century of the price revolution was based on the relative increase of proportional dues, while fixed payments in cash and personal services diminished. In most cases, the latter were transformed into fixed payments by agreement; monopolies remained stable.

Other Morisco Agricultural Models

The scarcity of studies about the issue presents us with the challenge of ascertaining whether the case posed by the Marquisate of Llombai is representative of Morisco agriculture. It is probably so regarding poorer areas of the interior, although we cannot define the Llombai basin as a completely marginal zone. The available information seems to suggest that the model followed in the village of Cortes de Pallars, in the Valle de Cofrentes (Valencia),

20 AHN, N, Osuna, fil. 1.061, 1; fil. 1.316, 1; fil. 1.537, 1 and 3.

was very different. The main activity was animal husbandry, and agriculture was poorly developed. Ownership of livestock was strongly concentrated.[21] It could perhaps be thought that animal husbandry and agriculture had very different features, but this was not the case. According to a livestock census from 1510 the number of heads possessed by Moriscos was lower than that possessed by Christians. In Carmen Barceló's words: "wherever Christians were practising animal husbandry, for the local wool industry (…) or for exports (…), Muslims always appear relegated."[22]

On the other hand, richer areas followed a very different agrarian model, for example in the *huerta* of Gandía. The most important crop there was sugar cane, probably in coexistence with cereals and garden vegetables, although the available evidence is inconclusive. We don't know for certain, for example, whether this sort of crop prompted the emergence of Morisco economic elites; it seems unlikely, however, since sugar cane paid a very high proportion of sharecropping dues and the work of the Moriscos in cane sugar mills was carried out in servile conditions.[23]

Finally, Morisco agriculture in the Valle del Vinalopó (Alicante) followed yet another model, especially in Elche, the best known settlement. There the main crop was olive oil, partially for human consumption but mostly for the production of soap. Morisco elites dedicated to commercial agriculture are also documented in Elche.[24]

Even in these more developed areas, however, some features of Andalusi agriculture can be detected, particularly the small size of properties, the prevalence of micro-plots and the limited social differentiation. In some cases, such as Elche, this becomes especially significant when compared with the dominant model among the Christian population.

In a groundbreaking work, Adelina Bataller showed the predominance of small properties in the areas of the *huerta* of Gandía irrigated by the River

21 Jorge A. Catalá and Pablo Pérez, *Los moriscos de Cortes y los Pallás. Documentos para su estudio* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2002), 61–64.

22 Carmen Barceló, *Minorías islámicas en el País Valenciano. Historia y dialecto*, (Valencia: Universitat de València and Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura, 1984), 79.

23 Santiago La Parra, *Los Borja y los moriscos* (*repobladores y "terratenientes" en la huerta de Gandía tras la expulsión de 1609*) (Valencia: Ediciones Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1992); Francisco Pons, *Aspectos socio-económicos del condado de Oliva* (*1500–1750*) (Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Oliva, 1981); Pau Viciano, "Capital mercantil i drets feudals en la difusió de la canya de sucre al País Valencià. La senyoria d'Oliva a l'inici del segle XV," *Afers* 32 (1999): 151–166.

24 Joaquim Serrano, *De patricis a burgesos* (*les transformacions d'una oligarquía terratinent; Elx, 1600–1855*) (Alicante: Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil-Albert, 1995), 45–48.

Vernissa, before and after the expulsion of the Moriscos.[25] The most significant results from this study are expressed in Table 7.6.

Subsequently, Santiago La Parra has used more extensive records to demonstrate that this was a common phenomenon in the whole of the *huerta* of Gandía, that is, all lands irrigated by the Vernissa and Serpis rivers.[26] In some cases, the differences in average property size between Moriscos and repopulating Christians can be qualified as spectacular. These data are shown in Table 7.7.

Eugenio Ciscar has studied land property and distribution in the neighbouring Cistercian estate in Valldigna, also belonging to the region of Safor. Irrigated plots were minute, dryland plots very small and those in marshes (*marjal*) somewhat bigger. As with the Marquisate of Llombai, even individual trees are sometimes recorded. Dryland farming was clearly scarcely practised, and sometimes the records say that sharecropping dues would be paid only if any crop was collected; in one occasion a short crop is justified by the poor quality of the lands in which this sort of agriculture was practised. Apart from wheat, sorghum and millet were cultivated, and from the late 16th century maize could be added to this list. Rice, cultivated in the *marjal* areas, was here quite important, as well as sugar cane, which was destined for the lord's mill. White mulberry was another significant crop, although we lack detailed data for this.[27] The property structure was as shown in Table 7.8.

TABLE 7.6 *Property structure in the areas of the huerta of Gandía irrigated by the River Vernissa* (*in percentages*)[a]

Extension (*hanegadas*)	**1593**		**1630**	
	Landowners	**Hanegadas**	**Landowners**	**Hanegadas**
≤ 10	75	38	39	13
>10. ≤ 30	22	42	48	46
> 30	3	20	13	41

a Bataller, "La expulsión de los moriscos," 94.

25 Adelina Bataller, "La expulsión de los moriscos: su repercusión en la propiedad y la población en la zona de los riegos del Vernisa," *Saitabi* X (1960): 81–100.

26 Santiago La Parra, *Los Borja y los moriscos*, *passim*.

27 Eugenio Ciscar, *La Valldigna, siglos XVI y XVII. Cambio y continuidad en el campo valenciano* (Valencia: Diputación de Valencia, 1997), 25–42.

TABLE 7.7 *Average agrarian property size in the Duchy of Gandia before and after the expulsion of the Moriscos* (*in* hanegadas)[a]

Areas irrigated by Vernissa River		
Settlement	1593	1630
Gandía	12.26	–
Arrabal de Gandía	5.76	–
Alcodar	4.72	18.17
Alqueria Nova	4.87	–
Alqueria de Martorell	7.41	29.25
Beniopa	7.91	13.59
Benipeixcar	6.78	15.32
Benirredrà	10.85	10.77
Real de Gandía	8.25	21.29
Areas irrigated by Serpis River		
Gandía	12.65	18.69

a Santiago La Parra, *El ducado de Gandía en el siglo XVII: la ruptura de una convivencia tras 1609* (PhD Thesis, Valencia: Universitat de València, 1990), 232.

TABLE 7.8 *Morisco property structure in Valldigna* (*1599–1600*) (*in percentages*)[a]

Hanegadas	**Landowners**	**Extension**
≤ 12	26.5	6.3
> 12. ≤ 24	31.6	19.3
> 24. ≤ 48	27.5	32.5
> 48. ≤ 96	9.1	20.9
> 96	5.1	20.6

a Ciscar, *La Valldigna*, 113. The aggregated percentage does not amount to 100, but these are the figures as presented by the author.

Valldigna shows the usual structure of small properties organised in micro-plots, but less pronouncedly than in the *huerta* of *Gandía*. In this case, a small oligarchy of landowners with bigger properties can be identified. Christian landowners in Simat, the village in the valley where the monastery stood, held larger, and more concentrated, properties.

The average property size in four Morisco villages in the lower valley of the Segura River, studied by David Bernabé, was again very small. Social

stratification was in this case negligible.[28] This is an awkward circumstance, perhaps explained by some unknown anomaly, because in many cases property was notoriously insufficient, and social differentiation almost nonexistent, as shown by Table 7.9.

In the next case, the plots do not correspond to Morisco villages, but to lands located around the Christian village of Nules (Castellón) and owned by Moriscos. The average size in this case is not quite as small as that shown by the irrigated lands around the Vernissa River and the lower Segura valley.[29] These data are presented in Table 7.10.

It is possible to list some more examples of Morisco mini-properties, although not with the degree of precision shown by the previous cases. In the Gallinera Valley (Alicante), Morisco property is known to have been of a very small size.[30] The same can be said of the small irrigated plots in the mountainous Sierra de Espadán (Castellón), studied by the Butzers and their collaborators.[31]

TABLE 7.9 *Property structure of land in the lower valley of the Segura River (1609) (in percentages)*[a]

Extension (*tahúllas*)	**Redován**		**Albatera**		**Cox**		**La Granja**	
	Prop.	**Ext.**	**Prop.**	**Ext.**	**Prop.**	**Ext.**	**Prop.**	**Ext.**
≤ 1	40.5	15.2	40.7	25.3	23.7	10.6	9.1	3.4
> 1. ≤ 2	31.1	21.3	51.3	59.5	48.4	45.3	15.9	12.7
> 2. ≤ 3	14.9	20.5	8.0	15.2	25.8	38.5	72.7	80.3
> 3	13.5	39.4	0.0	0.0	2.1	5.6	2.3	8.3

a Bernabé, "La Vega Baja," 73. The *tahúlla* is a variable measure, similar in extension to the *hanegada*.

28 David Bernabé, "La Vega Baja del Segura en vísperas de la expulsión de los moriscos: estructura de la propiedad de la tierra," in *Estructura y regímenes de tenencia de la tierra en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, 1987), 61–74.

29 Concha Domingo, *La Plana de Castellón. Formación de un paisaje agrario mediterráneo* (Castellón de la Plana: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Castellón, 1983).

30 Josep Torró, "Església i moriscos a la Vall de Gallinera (1578–1583). Aspectes econòmics de l'enfrontament," in *Ier Congrés d'Estudis de la Marina Alta* (Alicante: Instituto de Estudios Juan Gil Albert, 1986), 291–301.

31 Karl W. Butzer, Elizabeth K. Butzer and Joan F. Mateu, "Medieval Muslim Communities of the Sierra de Espadán, Kingdom of Valencia," *Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 17 (1986): 339–421; Karl W. Butzer, Elizabeth K. Butzer, Joan F. Mateu and Pavel Kraus, "L'origen dels sistemes de regadiu al País Valencià: romà o musulmà?" *Afers* 7 (1988–89):

TABLE 7.10 *Property structure in Morisco lands around Nules (Castellón), before and after the expulsion (in percentages)*[a]

Extension (*hanegadas*)	**1607**		**1622**	
	Landowners	**Extension**	**Landowners**	**Extension**
≤ 1	27.5	7.4	8.6	1.5
> 1. ≤ 2	24.3	13.6	21.3	7.0
> 2. ≤ 5	41.1	55.5	37.3	25.3
> 5. ≤ 10	5.1	13.8	22.6	32.4
> 10	2.0	9.7	10.2	33.8

a Domingo, *La Plana de Castellón*, 186, 195.

Although with some reservations due to methodological and evidence related problems, this Morisco mini-property is also represented in Vall d'Uixó, in the lands owned by Moriscos from Borriol in Castelló de la Plana and in the small villages of Benumea, Favara and Atzeneta, in the Pego valley (Alicante).[32] Pau Ferrer studied the properties tenanted by Moriscos in Christian lands owned by the king, and though the methodology is not altogether clear some interesting conclusions can be drawn.[33] In many settlements, such as Agullent and Penàguila we find again the usual scenario, characterised by small properties and little social stratification, but this is not unanimous. Morisco landowners in the *huerta* of Xàtiva and Sagunto accumulated considerable properties, and a discrete social differentiation can be detected.[34] Bleda's aforementioned

9–68; Karl W. Butzer, Joan F. Mateu, Elizabeth K. Butzer, "Orígenes de la distribución intercomunitaria del agua en la sierra de Espadán (País Valenciano)," in *Los paisajes del agua* (Valencia and Alicante: Universitat de València and Universitat d'Alacant, 1989), 223–228.

32 Leopoldo Peñarroja, *Moriscos y repobladores en el reino de Valencia: la Vall d'Uxó (1525–1625)* (Valencia: Del Cenia al Segura, 1984). This author uses a manifestly incorrect method to calculate land property based on irrigation rights. José R. Magdalena, "Propiedades agrícolas de mudéjares borriolenses en el término municipal de Castellón (1468)," *Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos* XXVII–XXVIII (1978–79): 179–195. M. José Sastre, Salvador Alemany and Silveria Moncho, *Dels moriscos als maulets. La Marina Alta al segle XVII* (Alicante: Caja de Ahorros Provincial, 1986).

33 Pau Ferrer, *Los moriscos de la Corona de Aragón. La propiedad morisca en los realengos de Valencia en 1609* (PhD Thesis, Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 1981).

34 Ferrer, *Los moriscos*, 106–115 (Agullent), 212–237 (huerta de Xàtiva), 259–319 (Sagunto) and 340–356 (Penàguila).

cliché, in which he stated that "they lost heart if they had to work a wide and big field" or that the Christians needed twice as much land as the Moriscos, was not completely baseless, but was also not of general application.

Morisco agriculture was the result of the transformation of the Andalusi agrarian model in response to the demands of the Christian conquerors, and in some cases these changes occurred on a significant scale. The best known case, as noted earlier, is that of Elche, well presented by Joaquim Serrano in a number of publications.[35] In Elche, Moriscos possessed considerable properties, which went beyond the so called *magram* area initially reserved for them, towards the *franc* area, predominantly owned by Christians. Here, property structure followed a very different model from the one we have been examining. As shown in Table 7.11, the average agricultural property was much larger and the distribution of this property much more concentrated.

In Elche there was a powerful Morisco oligarchy that exploited the possibilities offered by olive based commercial agriculture, as shown by the 3% that possessed over 151 *tahúllas* (about 14 ha.), 36% of the total agricultural land in cultivation. This notwithstanding, the average Morisco property size was still unable to compete with that of the Christians. If we compare it against the Christian properties in Asprelles, within the same Marquisate of Elche, the disadvantage of the Moriscos by comparison with the Christian oligarchy becomes apparent, as shown in Table 7.12.

TABLE 7.11 *Morisco property distribution in Elche (1600–1609) (in percentages)*[a]

Extension (*tahúllas*)	**Landowners**	**Extension**
< 5	33.8	3.7
≥ 5. < 19	39.8	14.6
≥ 19. < 61	18.5	24.4
≥ 61. < 151	4.9	21.0
≥ 151	3.0	36.3

a Serrano, *Estructures agràries*, 147–148.

35 Joaquim Serrano, *Estructures agràries al sud del País Valencià. Propietat, règim d'explotació i distribució social de la terra a Elx: de la problemática morisca a la consolidació de la revolució burgesa (1600–1855)* (PhD, Valencia: Universitat de València, 1990). Serrano, "Desenvolupament i destrucció d'una minoria: els moriscos del senyoriu d'Elx," *Recerques* 27 (1994): 53–72; Serrano, *De patricis a burgesos (Les transformacions d'una burgesia terratinent; Elx, 1600–1855)* (Alicante: Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil-Albert, 1995).

TABLE 7.12 *Property structure in Asprelles (1600–1609) (in percentages)*[a]

Extension (*tahúllas*)	Landowners		Extension	
	Christians	Moriscos	Christians	Moriscos
≤ 26	–	47.8	–	20.1
> 26. ≤ 101	68.7	63.3	50.1	53.2
> 101. ≤ 151	24.9	8.6	34.6	26.5
> 151	6.2	–	15.0	–

a Serrano, *Estructures agràries*, 162.

It seems that the integration of Morisco communities into Christian agricultural models was not exclusive of Elche. Ongoing research suggests that this phenomenon was also to be found in other areas along the Vinalopó valley, such as Crevillent, Aspe and Novelda (also in Alicante).[36] One of the main Morisco families in Elche, the Bensuar, has been carefully studied by Joaquim Serrano.[37] Although less well known, other significant members of the Morisco oligarchies in the Kingdom of Valencia have been identified, such as the Abenámir family from Benaguasil, a member of which, Cosme Abenámir, suffered an inquisitorial process published by Pascual Boronat, or the Baya and Ripoll families, from Benifairó de la Valldigna.[38] Eugenio Ciscar has closely studied the Morisco economic elite, identifying a fair number of well to do members of the community and offering in some cases detailed information on certain significant families, in particular the Abenámir and the Cherrín, from Benaguasil (Valencia).

The numerous Morisco properties in lands placed under the king's jurisdiction must be highlighted, as already pointed out by Pau Ferrer. These Moriscos either lived in their reserved settlements (*morerías*) or in nearby villages. It is possible that investment was attracted by the lower tax pressure. Ciscar

36 AA.VV, *Moriscos del sud valencià. Memòria d'un poble oblidat* (Elche: Institut d'Estudis Comarcals del Baix Vinalopó, 2009), 176–177.

37 Joaquim Serrano, "Llinatge i patrimoni al tomb del Cinc-cents: els 'moriscos' Bensuar del raval d'Elx," *Recerques* 60 (2010): 57–94.

38 Boronat, *Los moriscos españoles*, 1:540–570. Francesc Giner, "Capítols per a l'arrendament de l'aljama de Llaurí (1603–1809)," in *Primer Congreso de Historia del País Valenciano* (Valencia, 1976), 3, 319–326. Ciscar, *La Valldigna*, *passim*.

has also revealed the common participation of well to do Moriscos in the tax farming business on behalf of lords, which sometimes implied a considerable investment, or in money lending transactions. This fact shows how traditional Andalusi society was undergoing a progressive process of cultural and economic integration in spite of its subordinate position. It must not be forgotten, however, that the extensive list of well to do Moriscos unveiled by this author only represents a very limited proportion of the whole Morisco population in Valencia, and therefore, any conclusions questioning the differences between the Morisco and the dominant Christian societies must be strongly qualified.[39]

Settlement Pattern and Morisco Tax Regime

The peculiarities of Morisco agriculture are often attributed to the specificity of their settlement pattern. Already in the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun mentioned this circumstance in a frequently quoted passage of the *Muqaddimah*:

> The cost of agricultural labor also enters into the price of foodstuffs. It is reflected in these prices. This has happened in Spain at the present time. The Christians pushed the Muslims back to the seacoast and the rugged territory there, where (the soil) is poor for the cultivation of grain and little suited for (the growth of) vegetables. They themselves took possession of the fine soil and the good land, in order to improve the plants and agriculture there. This treatment required expensive labor (products) and materials, such as fertilizer and other things that had to be procured. Thus, their agricultural activities required considerable expenditures.[40]

Obviously, Ibn Khaldun was referring to the only territory in al-Andalus still in Muslim hands, the Kindgom of Granada, but the idea is also of application to previously conquered territories, in particular the Kingdom of Valencia.

Valencian scholars interested in these issues have frequently highlighted this feature of Morisco geography. Similarly, and strongly influenced by the work of Fernand Braudel, both Henri Lapeyre and Tulio Halperín Donghi stress the importance of mountainous regions in their geographical approach

39 Eugenio Ciscar, *Moriscos, nobles y repobladores. Estudios sobre el siglo XVII en Valencia* (Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim, 1993), 13–123.

40 Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 2, 278.

to Mediterranean history, and the latter author does so in particular.[41] More recently, Juan Piqueras has criticised this interpretation, which he considers excessively simplistic, particularly stressing the contradiction incurred by Halperín Donghi when featuring Morisco agrarian practices as fundamentally dryland agriculture while locating them in the inner mountainous region, which is dryer and poorer.[42] Piqueras' criticism is fundamentally correct, but he nevertheless misinterprets certain facts: he forgets that the extensive coastal *huertas*, such as those around the Mijares, Turia, Júcar and Segura rivers, were in Christian areas and also that mountainous regions and irrigation are not necessarily incompatible. In fact, this author highlights that most Morisco *huertas*, some of them rather large and complex, were located in mountainous regions.

The American scholar Eric Chaney has carefully studied this feature of Valencian Morisco geography. Using terrain elevation digital maps, this author has calculated the average altitude of the land attached to Morisco villages and also the slope or difference between the highest and lowest points. In both accounts Morisco villages clearly score much higher than Christian settlements, thus proving Morisco prevalence in mountainous areas. This does not mean that Morisco lands were necessarily very poor, but at any rate it seems to suggest that they were poorer than those in Christian hands. A more interesting conclusion, however, may be drawn from Chaney's study; this is the verification that dependence on their lords was a more significant factor for Valencian Morisco economy than geographical location. Wealth levels in Morisco areas were considerably lower than in Christian areas, a situation that as a matter of fact persisted until the 18th century, over one and a half centuries after the expulsion.

This conclusion, if considered sufficiently solid, would reopen an old debate on Valencian historiography, that surrounding the consequences of repopulation on Valencian economic development.[43] Initially, Eugenio Ciscar

41 Henri Lapeyre, *Géographie de l'Espagne morisque* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1959); Tulio Halperín Donghi, *Un conflicto nacional. Moriscos y cristianos viejos en Valencia* (Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1980; Universitat de València, 2008).

42 Juan Piqueras, "Geografía de la población morisca en el reino de Valencia a comienzos del siglo XVII," in *Entre tierra y fe. Los musulmanes en el reino cristiano de Valencia (1238–1609)* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2009), 173–199.

43 Eric Chaney, "Ethnic Cleansing and the Long-Term Persistence of Extractive Institutions: Evidence from the Expulsion of the Moriscos." University of Harvard, 2008 http://www.scholar.harvard.edu/chaney/publications (accessed May 2016), also translated into Catalan, "Els efectes a llarg termini de l'explotació i la neteja étnica. El testimoniatge de l'expulsió dels moriscos," *Afers* 62–63 (2009): 173–199.

maintained that the expulsion of the Moriscos and subsequent repopulation by the lords had severe stagnating effects and seriously compromised economic growth in Valencia.[44] Ciscar's thesis has been profusely discussed, but perhaps his critics, including myself, have not sufficiently considered that the conditions enjoyed by the new inhabitants may not have been as harsh as those suffered by the Moriscos, although they were undoubtedly worse than those prevailing in Christian settlements not directly affected by the expulsion, both under the lords' and under the king's jurisdiction.

The issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but that of the Morisco dependence on the lords needs to be further explored. With the decree ordering the forced conversion of all Valencian Muslims in 1525–26, the representatives of *aljamas* wrote to the king that

> although the Moors in this kingdom had to pay the king many taxes and suffer much toil for the reason that they remained Moors, there is no reason in them paying them any longer now that they are Christians.[45]

For the Morisco representatives, therefore, their taxation was justified by their condition as defeated Muslims, but became intolerable after the conversion. The Christian settlers arriving after 1609 defended similar arguments with even more propriety: they lived like Christians but paid like Muslims. Their claims would have been very difficult to grant, however, without risking ruin for the lords, but at least it reminds us of how dependent Valencian Moriscos were on their lords by virtue of the high taxation and the practically servile conditions endured.[46]

Indeed, Moriscos faced high taxation, especially regarding sharecropping dues, as already explained in reference to the Marquisate of Llombai. Although the rates were very variable, they paid around a fourth of the crops in irrigated lands and one eighth of dryland crops. Occasionally, the shares were even higher, for example with sugar cane fields in the Duchy of Gandía. In other cases, such as the monastic estate in Valldigna, taxes were lower, because

44 Eugenio Ciscar, *Tierra y señorío en el País Valenciano (1570–1620)* (Valencia: Del Cenia al Segura, 1977).

45 Original text reproduced by Boronat, *Los moriscos españoles*, 1, 425.

46 Josep Torró, "Del almagram a las particiones de frutos. Las cargas agrarias en las aljamas musulmanas del reino de Valencia," in *Los tributos de la tierra. Fiscalidad y agricultura en España (siglos XII–XX)*, ed. Rafael Vallejo (Valencia: Universidades de Córdoba, Santiago, Vigo and Valencia, 2008), 185–222; Torró, "Vivir como cristianos y pagar como moros. Genealogía medieval de la servidumbre morisca en el reino de Valencia," *Revista de Historia Moderna* 27 (2009): 11–40.

huertas paid a contribution in coin that devalued over time, especially as a consequence of the price revolution during the 16th century.[47] This was, however, an exceptional case that may have had an influence on the emergence of the aforementioned Morisco oligarchies in the area.

This connection between lower tax pressure and economic growth is enticing, but is still in need of confirmation. In Christian lands, sharecropping was not unheard of but was much less common, and whenever it existed they always was much more favourable to the tenant. At any rate, allodial property predominated over emphyteutic regimes. The substitution of Andalusi taxes in coin (*alfarda, magram*, *diezmo*) with contributions in kind, introduced by the feudal lords, caused important changes in Mudéjar agriculture, in particular the growth of cereals and vines, because the perishable produce of the *huerta* could not be used for payments in kind.[48]

The servile nature of the relationship with the lords is clearly shown by the obligation to transport the produce to the lord's warehouse, already processed into wine or raisins and oil in the case of grapes and olives, prior to the partition, aside from the transformation of the Andalusi *azofra* in personal services, either unpaid or paid below market price. Throughout the 15th and 16th centuries, many of these *azofras* were substituted with payments in coin, and in general amounted to a small proportion of total seigneurial duties, but they stood as a feature of serfdom. And last but not least, we must consider the limitations to free circulation suffered by Valencian Moriscos. Although not legally serfs, and therefore not chained to their land, they endured a series of obligations and restrictions that seriously curtailed their freedom of circulation.[49] All these circumstances explain the lesser degree of economic development shown by Morisco territories and by Morisco lands occupied by Christian settlers after the expulsion, as suggested by Chaney.

Morisco and Christian Irrigation

We have already indicated that the most significant feature of Morisco agriculture was the predominance of irrigation. The reasons for this were explained by Thomas Glick on the basis of the Eastern and North African origin of the settlers crossing the Gibraltar Straits from the 8th century. According to this author, when populations migrate to areas with different cultural traditions

47 Ciscar, *La Valldigna*, 191–209.

48 Torró, "Del almagram."

49 Torró, "Vivir como cristianos."

to their own, they tend to reproduce their ancestral agricultural systems, by occupying ecological niches suited to that purpose.[50] Arabs and North Africans settling in Spain from 711 came from arid ecosystems in which irrigation was crucial. Additionally, the Arabic-Muslim civilisation had already adopted a whole series of Asian vegetable crops from the Monsoonic regions which could not prosper in arid regions without irrigation. Even the preferred spring cereals, such as millet and sorghum, which grow during the summer, required irrigation.[51] This, in combination with the Andalusi tax model, mostly based on taxes payable in coin instead of kind, fully explains the preference for a multi-vegetable crop subsistence agricultural system.

The origins of Spanish irrigation agriculture, especially in Valencia, have been abundantly discussed. Today, Butzer's hypothesis of an origin in antiquity seems to have been discarded, which does not mean that Romans did not know and occasionally practice irrigation.[52] Most authors now favour the idea of Muslim origins for the irrigation agriculture, but the question around the scale and nature of the changes introduced by feudal lords remains open. It has been repeatedly stated that an irrigation system cannot be modified at will, because its original design derives from a specific water source which determines the so called "rigidity line," and changes must therefore involve redesigning and rebuilding, raising the dam when the water is taken from a river.[53]

In general, Andalusi irrigated spaces were of medium size, Butzer's so-called mesosystems, and often sourced from a well or mine (*qanāt*) instead of a river. In the *huerta* of Valencia, however, there is at least one case of an irrigation system from the Islamic period – that of the "seven *acequias"* plus the *acequia* of Moncada – which takes water from the River Turia, although a date in

50 Thomas F. Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

51 Carmen Trillo, "El paisaje vegetal en la Granada islámica y sus transformaciones después de la conquista castellana," *Historia Agraria* 17 (1999): 131–152, esp. 133–135; Josep Torró, "Terrasses irrigades a les muntanyes valencianes. Les transformacions de la colonització cristiana," *Afers* 51 (2005): 301–356, esp. 311.

52 Karl W. Butzer et al., "L'origen dels sistemes."

53 This is the opinion, justified in a wide range of publications, of Miquel Barceló. See especially: Barceló, "La arqueología extensiva y el estudio de la creación del espacio rural," *Arqueología medieval. En las afueras del "medievalismo*," ed. Miquel Barceló (Barcelona: Crítica, 1988), 195–274 and Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados en Al-Ándalus: un enunciado de principios generales," in *El agua en zonas áridas. Arqueología e historia. I Coloquio de historia y medio físico* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1989), 1, xv–l, reedited in Miquel Barceló, Helena Kirchner and Carmen Navarro, *El agua que no duerme. Fundamentos de la arqueología hidráulica andalusí* (Granada: El Legado Andalusí, 1996), 51–71.

Roman times has also been suggested.[54] It seems that all other fluvial irrigation systems in Valencia were the creation of the feudal lords, though integrating pre-existing Andalusi mesosystems. This is the case, for one, with the largest Valencian fluvial irrigation system, which is sourced from the River Júcar.[55]

As pointed out by Enric Guinot, even when physical continuity existed, for example in the *huerta* of Valencia, social uses of water were substantially transformed as a result of the substitution of a dispersed for a nucleated settlement pattern, more dense agricultural practices and a different crop system that gave primacy to irrigated cereals.[56] In those cases, probably the majority, in which both the physical design and the social uses of water changed, the transformations were deeper, but in neither case was a significant Andalusi, and consequently Morisco population, left in the 16th century, and we cannot therefore talk about Morisco irrigation. In the territory around the Júcar River Morisco settlements sat preferably in valleys subsidiary to the main river, and their water systems fed partly from the rivers and partly from wells or *qanāts*, for example in the Magro River. As far as we can tell, they were no different from similarly sized Christian irrigated fields.[57] As we have mentioned before, however, the Christian conquest would have a profound effect on the predominant agricultural models in the Marquisate of Llombai, supplied from the main of the irrigation systems attached to the river, by finishing with the traditionally nucleated settlement pattern and by promoting the cultivation of cereals.

Mountain irrigation systems, on the other hand, were more characteristically Andalusi, and therefore Morisco in nature. Josep Torró has studied these systems, based on dispersed *alquerías*. Many of these survived into the Morisco period, albeit officially integrated into broader municipalities. Christian settlers arriving during the middle ages or the modern period used these spaces differently, and frequently exhausted the water resources for a form of

54 Enric Guinot, "L'Horta de València a la baixa Edat Mitjana. De sistema hidràulic andalusí a feudal," *Afers* 51 (2005): 271–300.

55 Joan F. Mateu, "Assuts i vores fluvials regades al País Valencià medieval," in *Los paisajes del agua* (Valencia: Universitat de València, Universitat de Alicante, 1989), 165–185; Antoni Furió and Luis P. Martínez, "De la hidráulica andalusí a la feudal: continuïtat i ruptura. L'Horta de Cent a l'Alzira medieval," in *L'espai de l'aigua. Xarxes i sistemas d'irrigació a la Ribera del Xúquer en la perspectiva histórica*, ed. Antoni Furió and Aureliano Lairón (Valencia: Ajuntament d'Alzira and Universitat de València, 2000), 19–73.

56 Guinot, "L'Horta de València."

57 Manuel Ardit, "Los regadíos históricos del Magro hasta 1850," in *La arquitectura del agua en el riu Magre. Alcalans-Marquesat* (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 2004), 24–44.

exploitation known in Valencia as "improved dryland agriculture," which involves scanty and infrequent irrigation.[58]

The role played by watermills has received much attention. It is often considered that watermills had a subsidiary position with respect to agriculture, frequently, but not always, taking a low position within irrigation systems (known as *jussana* in the Kingdom of Valencia). In contrast, in feudal systems watermills were located at the top (*sobirana*), near the dam or *azud*, and this became to a certain extent the source of the system. This is a much debated issue, because the truth is that despite not consuming any water, watermills detain it, sometimes significantly altering irrigation turns. For this reason, seigneurial watermills tended to cause more conflicts than Andalusi ones. As far as our evidence goes, Valencian Morisco watermills responded to feudal demands and were generally built high within irrigation systems.[59]

Morisco Marriages

It is a distinct possibility that our sources misinterpret Morisco social structure by adapting it to the Christian model, and thus reading it with regards to nuclear families and individual private property.[60] It is likely that Morisco property was not exploited on an individual basis but by extended families, as suggested by Valencian archaeological studies on Andalusi and Morisco domestic structures. In contrast to Christian houses, built on previously allocated and defined plots of land, the Andalusi dwellings grew to respond to the needs of the extended family, without previous urban planning. The first model corresponds to a nuclear family model and the second to an extended one.[61]

58 Torró, "Terrasses irrigades," 347–350.

59 Thomas F. Glick, Enric Guinot and Luis P. Martínez, "El patrimoni hidràulic valencià i els nostres molins," in *Els molins hidràulics valencians. Tecnologia, història i context social* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 2000), 7–99.

60 Interpreting domestic structures with reference to nuclear families is a common mistake, even among archaeologists. See Antonio Malpica, "Economía rural en el reino de Granada. De la sociedad andalusí a las modificaciones castellanas," *Chronica Nova* 30 (2003–04): 265–316, esp. 298–299.

61 Josep Torró, "Formas de poblamiento y urbanismo. Cómo se organizaron los lugares de habitación de los musulmanes del reino de Valencia (siglos XIII–XVI)," in *Entre tierra y fe* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2009), 201–217; Torró, "Arqueologia de la conquesta. Registre material, substitució de poblacions i transformació de l'espai rural valencià (segles XIII–XIV)," in *El feudalisme comptat i debatut. Formació i expansió del feudalisme*

We do not know precisely to what extent Valencian Moriscos conserved their extended family social formula. A social study of the Morisco and Christian population in Chelva was somewhat frustrated by the poor quality of parish records in the 16th century, which did not allow for a correct identification of persons. The family names registered, however, suggests a narrower matrimonial market for Moriscos than for Christians, probably due to self-enforced family restrictions. Despite the dispositions set forth by the Council of Trent in 1563, records rarely register the existence of a Church dispensation in case of marriage between consanguine relatives, but in the only year in which this seems to be written down in a systematic way, 1573, all marriages between Moriscos required such a dispensation, though the degree of consanguinity is not recorded and only the word "dispensation" stands as a clue. No dispensation was registered that year for marriages between Christians.[62]

This tallies with the decree passed on July 17 1528, allowing the traditional Arabic and North African marriage between a man and his female patrilineal cousin "because of the great injury it would be done to these Moors otherwise."[63] It could be argued that this endogamy does not necessarily prove a collective property regime among the Moriscos, but a strategy for the reunification of plots of land previously divided in hereditary divisions. The question is, however, more complex than that, since it is likely that property itself was not collective but that extended families followed strategies based on a common use and management of the land possessed by their members.

We know very little about Morisco testamentary practices. Islamic testamentary law favours partition in equal shares, females excluded.[64] Castilian law, on the other hand, was also bent towards equal shares, but some

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català, ed. Miquel Barceló et al. (Barcelona and Valencia: Universitat de València and Museu d'Història de Catalunya, 2003), 153–200.

62 Twelve marriages between Moriscos were celebrated in 1573. Curiously, all twelve took place on November 28, in a collective ceremony in which two "old" Christians acted as best men for six of the couples, and another two for the other six couples. Archivo Parroquial de Chelva, Quinque Libri, book 2, fil. 190v–191r. This kind of collective celebration presided over by "old" Christians was also common in baptism ceremonies involving Moriscos.

63 Text reproduced by Boronat, *Los moriscos españoles*, 1, 424. The chronicler Gaspar Escolano refers to this decree in the following terms: "the Muslim sect permitted marriage between relatives up to the second degree." Gaspar Escolano, *Segunda parte de la Década primera de la historia de la insigne y coronada ciudad y reyno de Valencia* (Valencia: Pedro Patricio Mey, 1611), col. 1674.

64 Carmen Barceló, *Un tratado catalán medieval de derecho islámico: el Llibre de Çuna e Xara dels moros* (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 1989), 26–42.

concentration strategies were allowed through one fifth or one third of free disposition. Valencian regional law gave almost total freedom to the testator, thus giving way to any strategy regarding property. The few Morisco wills analysed by the author of the current paper in the Marquisate of Llombai follow a variety of strategies, probably reflecting different family relationships, but in almost every case small bequests to non relatives are made.[65] It is plausible that these correspond to commitments with members of the extended family, but this is difficult to confirm because the Christian names adopted by the Moriscos obscure the possible relationships and a more systematic genealogical survey would be necessary. This is a hard task, due to the poor quality of the parish records available for the 16th century.

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65 Ardit, *Creixement econòmic*, 43–44.

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CHAPTER 8

Iberian Colonisations and Water Distribution Systems (15th–16th c.): A Comparative Approach

Félix Retamero and Virgilio Martínez-Enamorado

Introduction

In a seminal article published in 1989, M. Barceló formulated the main principles followed in the construction and management of irrigation systems in al-Andalus.[1] One of these principles was that of rigidity (but not of immutability): this means that these systems tended to maintain the articulation of water catchment points, channels and irrigated fields, despite eventual changes in management criteria, such as those which occurred after al-Andalus was conquered by the Iberian feudal kingdoms, which is the case that we shall focus on in the following paragraphs. Despite the scantiness of the empirical evidence available to Barceló at the time, his proposal was solid, and it has been vindicated by the case studies carried out thereafter in different regions of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands.[2]

Before M. Barceló's work led to the development of this avenue of research, the methodology of which came to be known as "hydraulic archaeology," the notion of "design," borrowed from the field of 20th-century hydraulic

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1 Miquel Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados en Al-Andalus: un enunciado de principios generales," in *El agua en zonas áridas*, ed. Lorenzo Cara (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1989), XV–L.

2 The bibliography on this topic is enormous. For a recent state of the question, see Helena Kirchner, "Archeologia degli spazi irrigati medievali e le loro forme di gestione sociale," in *L'acqua nei secoli altomedievali. Atti delle LV Settimane, I* (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2008), 471–503; and, Enric Guinot and Ferran Esquilache, "La reorganización del paisaje agrario en la huerta de Valencia después de la conquista cristiana. El sistema hidráulico y el parcelario de Montcada y Benifaraig en el siglo XIII," *Debates de arqueología medieval* 2 (2012): 230–231.

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engineering, had already been used with reference to irrigation systems.[3] Also, the comparison of different irrigation systems in the regions of Valencia and Murcia (Spain) and in some areas in California, Colorado and Utah (USA), enabled A. Maass and R. Anderson to claim that these systems tend to be managed at a local level, thereby questioning the universal validity of K. Wittfogel's postulates.[4]

At any rate, local management – i.e. by the community or the municipality – of irrigation systems in the Iberian Peninsula had already been detected by Jaubert de Passà, C.C. Scott-Moncrieff and J. Brunhes, among others, at a much earlier date.[5] In Maass's and Anderson's opinion, the criteria that determined the management of irrigation systems, which were recognisable in the operating procedures followed by the agricultural communities, were the result of predetermined principles and values, which can be summarised as follows: ensuring equity in the distribution of water and in the resolution of conflicts, facilitating the efficiency of the system, and guaranteeing that management remained in local hands.[6] In order to ensure that the above-mentioned values were respected, the implementation of consistent operating procedures and a solid social organisation at a local level was mandatory, and included the imposition of clear limits on the dimensions of the system, the uses of water, and the composition of the community of irrigators. These rules, therefore, involved placing limitations on the growth of the system and the human

3 Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados"; Miquel Barceló et al., *El agua que no duerme. Fundamentos de la arqueología hidráulica andalusí* (Granada: Sierra Nevada 92/El Legado Andalusí, 1996); Thomas F. Glick and Helena Kirchner, "Hydraulic Systems and Technologies of Islamic Spain: History and Archaeology," in *Working with Water in Medieval Europe: Technology and Resource-Use*, ed. Paolo Squatriti (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2000), 267–329. Arthur Maass, *Design of Water-Resource Systems* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

4 Arthur Maass and Raymond L. Anderson, *...and the Desert shall Rejoice. Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments* (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieder Publishing Company Inc., 1986). Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1957).

5 Jean Brunhes, *L'irrigation dans la Péninsule Ibérique et dans l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: C. Naud 1902), 72, *passim*. Shortly before J. Brunhes, the Regenerationist Joaquín Costa paid close attention to the issue of community management of irrigation systems in his work *Colectivismo agrario en España* (Madrid: Imprenta de San Francisco de Sales, 1898), 533–546. Costa based his conclusions on Jaubert de Passà's *Voyage en Espagne* (Paris: Madame Huzard, 1823) and Maurice Aymard's, *Irrigations du midi de l'Espagne* (Paris: E. Lacroix, 1864). Scott-Moncrief also knew these works and noted the local management of irrigation systems during his trips in the Iberian Peninsula, France and Italy, between 1867 and 1868. Colin C. Scott-Moncrief, *Irrigation in Southern Europe* (London: E.& F.N. Spon, 1868), 122, 137–138.

6 Maass and Anderson, *...and the Desert shall Rejoice*, 83, *passim*.

community alike, which was the only way to avoid the dispersion of rights and the increase of risk.[7]

It follows that the size of the irrigation networks, and their management, had a decisive impact on the perdurability of traditional systems. So much so that, according to E. Ostrom, G. Hardin's "tragedy of the commons," which was implicit in the perversion of community management systems, could only be avoided if clear limits were established and ways of avoiding intrusive uses were enforced.[8] A number of researchers have examined this crucial aspect of community management policies and have tried to determine, on the basis of ethnographic observations, what the maximum dimensions of these traditionally managed irrigation systems were. While some authors have attempted to ascertain these limits in terms of physical dimensions, others, such as J.B. Mabry, consider that the key is the number of irrigators.[9]

In summary, both the institutional examination of the commons, along the lines postulated by Maass and Anderson, and the parallel research focus on design and structural perdurability, proposed by Barceló, support the idea that "traditional" irrigation systems and their associated management and social structures tended towards stability. It is worth remembering, at any rate, that the joint analysis of design, operating procedures and management criteria is still in its infancy, in comparison with the development that each of these fields has undergone separately. As pointed out by Th. Glick, the arrangements for apportioning water are as "technological" as the design and the physical devices of which irrigation systems consist, so both factors should always be studied in conjunction, along the lines of the "archaeological sense of hydraulic institutions" that he postulated.[10]

A good deal of Maass's and Anderson's observations on irrigation systems in the Iberian Peninsula were based on Th. Glick's seminal *Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia*, published in 1970. In this work, Glick examined water distribution arrangements in several medieval irrigation systems in the region of

7 Maass and Anderson, *...and the Desert shall Rejoice*, 114, 339, 368, *passim*.

8 Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162 (1968): 1243–1248.

9 Jonathan B. Mabry, "The ethnology of local irrigation," in *Canals and Communities. Small-Scale Irrigation Systems*, ed. Jonathan B. Mabry (Tucson: University of Arizona Press), 3–30.

10 Thomas F. Glick, "El sentido arqueológico de las instituciones hidráulicas," in *II Jornadas de Cultura Islámica: Aragón vive su historia* (Madrid: Instituto Occidental de Cultura Islámica, 1992), 165–171; Thomas F. Glick, "Cap a una història institucional dels regs: un mètode d'estudi comparatiu," *Taller d'història*, 3 (1) (1994): 39–46.

Valencia and suggested that these systems tended towards stability. In addition, he proposed that these systems were managed independently, not centrally, on the basis of proportionality, as had already been pointed out by 19th-century engineers and geographers. Glick also observed that this tendency towards stability could be recognised in the continuity of water distribution systems since the "time of the Moors," a recurrent expression in Spanish and Catalan documents dating to after the Christian conquests in the 13th century. Following this idea, Glick postulated the "direct transmission of Islamic customary arrangements to the new settlers."[11] Later, in an even more assertive tone, Glick talked about the "ultra-stable" nature of institutionalised forms of water allocation.[12]

As Ostrom warned, the perdurability of hydraulic systems does not imply that water allocation regulations or even the distribution networks cannot change over time.[13] Glick had already mentioned the possibility of change in his analysis of the expansion of the *huerta* of Valencia after the Christian conquest in the 13th century – a change which can be recognised in both the archival and the archaeological record.[14] The key issue in this case is to ascertain the possible relationship between changes in design – mostly enlargements – and eventual transformations in water allocation systems. The enlargement of the irrigated area, at any rate, did not automatically or immediately require a change in water allocation systems. As we shall shortly see with the case of Casarabonela (Málaga, southern Spain), not all expansions were followed by a substantial modification of irrigation rules. According to S. Garrido, sometimes peasant communities defined larger areas than were to be effectively irrigated thereafter.[15] As we shall see presently, this observation is essential for a full understanding of the relationship between the enlargement of hydraulic systems and the change in water allocation systems.

If, as suggested by Glick, the well-documented references to the maintenance of irrigation procedures "like in the time of the Moors" are to be understood as a reflection of this tendency towards "ultra-stability," how and in what conditions could these procedures be maintained in the aftermath

11 Thomas F. Glick, *Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 234–239. Thomas F. Glick, "Las técnicas hidráulicas antes y después de la conquista," in *En torno al 750 aniversario: antecedentes y consecuencias de la conquista de Valencia.I* (València: Conselleria de Cultura, 1989), 53–71.

12 Glick, "El sentido arqueológico," 165. On the basis of one of the principles enunciated by W. Ross Ashby with reference to living organisms. W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain: The Origin of Adaptive Behavior* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960)

13 Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*, 58.

14 Glick, *Irrigation and Society*, 241. Guinot and Esquilache, "La reorganización."

15 Samuel P. Garrido, "Las instituciones de riego en la España del este. Una reflexión a la luz de la obra de Elinor Ostrom," *Historia Agraria* 53 (2011): 13–42.

of the Christian conquests in the Iberian Peninsula? How did these systems reproduce when the productive targets were different? It seems clear that, in fact, this reproduction did not take place, because the new productive logic was oriented towards grain production and new levels of specialisation.[16] So, in that case, how did the working procedures adapt to the new context and, specifically, to the changes introduced in the irrigation systems?

The first aim of this paper is to address the question of the apparent survival of old Andalusi water distribution systems after the feudal conquest, in a context in which the new social order brought about substantial changes in the productive preferences. For this reason, we shall focus first on the water distribution systems in the *huerta* of Casarabonela after the Castilian conquest of 1485. Other examples, from the Kingdom of Granada, conquered in the 15th century; and the Balearic Islands, Valencia and Murcia, which were conquered earlier (13th century), will also be examined. As we shall presently see, the evidence shows that, both before and after the conquest, there was a wide variety of water distribution systems, although some patterns may be recognised. Following this, the chronology and context of the transformations undergone by the aforementioned examples is analysed. Finally, we attempt to compare the Iberian examples with others from the Canary Islands and the American continent. Although this comparison will be necessarily basic, it is aimed at developing one aspect within a much broader issue which has been paid little attention to date: the comparison of the new agrarian orders resulting form the late medieval and early modern Iberian, Atlantic and American conquests. Obviously, this analysis implies forfeiting the conventional academic distinction between medieval and modern history and also abandoning the notion that the so-called "reconquest" was an Iberian "internal affair," which can be considered to have been closed by 1492, and separated from the later Atlantic and American conquest and colonisation.[17]

16 Some examples in Carlos Laliena and Julián Ortega, "Formas feudales de especulación agraria: villas, viñas, acequias en el sur de Aragón (ca. 1170–1240)," in *Hidráulica agraria y sociedad feudal. Prácticas, técnicas, espacios*, ed. Josep Torró and Enric Guinot (València: Universitat de València, Valencia, 2012), 79–102, and papers by Kirchner (Balearic Islands), Ardit (Valencia) and Malpica (Granada) in this volume.

17 The bibliography on the use of the term "reconquest" is enormous. For a recent overview Francisco García Fitz, "La Reconquista: un estado de la cuestión," *Clío & Crimen* 6 (2009): 142–215. Some reasons to abandon the term in Josep Torró, "Pour en finir avec la 'Reconquête.' L'occupation chrétienne d'al-Andalus, la soumission et la disparition des populations musulmanes (XIIe–XIIIe siècle)," *Cahiers d'Histoire. Revue d'histoire critique* 78 (2000): 79–97. Also, Martín Ríos, *La Reconquista. Una construcción historiográfica* (*siglos XVI–XIX*) (Madrid: UNAM-IIH-Marcial Pons, 2011).

"Like in the time of the Moors"?

Andalusi irrigation systems in the *huerta* of Valencia were substantially modified after the Christian conquest. On the one hand, after the 13th century, water allocation systems were significantly different to those systems whose design and management had been set up in Andalusi times, as was pointed out by E. Guinot. On the other hand, the irrigated spaces were enlarged considerably shortly after the conquest. Water was elevated with the construction of dams and was directed towards the empty interstices between pre-existing irrigation blocks.[18] The example of Valencia illustrates how the productive strategy pursued by the colonial society that emerged in the wake of the conquest often had to develop in spaces where previous construction criteria and social values – both of which determined the choice of operating procedures that were available to the peasants – had left an imprint in the form of rigid irrigation networks.

Despite what the example from Valencia suggests, however, these developments did not always involve the immediate enlargement of irrigation areas. Much to the contrary. In Menorca, for instance, Andalusi irrigated spaces did not only not grow after the conquest in the late 13th century, some were abandoned and were not reconstructed until centuries later. In general, the enlargement of the Andalusi irrigation systems in the Balearic Islands did not take place until the 17th and 18th centuries.[19] The most important transformation, the "subversion" (in H. Kirchner's words) of the previous system, came with new watermills being constructed and preference being given to flour milling over irrigation. In Mallorca, Andalusi water allocation systems seem not to have survived the Christian conquest (1229), at least in most cases. In Sóller and Alaró, for instance, the duration of irrigation slots seems to have been drastically reduced in the late 13th century in order to guarantee the operation of the mills.[20] In this case, it follows, the changes introduced in the operational

18 Enric Guinot, "La construcció d'un paisatge medieval irrigat: l'Horta de la ciutat de València," in *Natura i desenvolupament. El medi ambient a l'Edat Mitjana,* ed. Flocel Sabaté (Lleida: Pagès editors, 2007), 191–220; Guinot and Esquilache, "La reorganización."

19 Miquel Barceló and Félix Retamero, eds., *Els barrancs tancats. L'ordre pagès al sud de Menorca en època andalusina* (Maó: Institut d'Estudis Menorquins, 2005). Helena Kirchner, "Original design, tribal management and modifications in Medieval hydraulic systems in the Balearic Islands (Spain)," *World Archaeology* 41 (1) (2009): 148–165.

20 Helena Kirchner, "'Colonització de lo regne de Mallorques qui és dins la mar.' La subversió feudal dels espais agraris andalusins a Mallorca," in *Histoire et archéologie des terres catalanes au Moyen Age*, ed. Philipe Sénac, (Perpignan: Université de Perpignan, 1995), 279–316; Maria A. Carbonero, *L'espai de l'aigua. Petita hidràulica tradicional a Mallorca* (Palma:

procedures were not connected with any transformation of the irrigation networks, in contrast with the Valencian example.

In Murcia, on the southwest of the Iberian Peninsula, the size of the *huertas* and the water allocation systems appear to have remained essentially the same after the conquest (1266). Later, following a period of disarray, new regulations were enacted which imposed fixed time slots and overturned the Andalusi proportional system. This was a short-lived phenomenon, because in 1353 the proportional allocation system in operation before the Castilian conquest was reintroduced.[21]

In Granada, on the other hand, most irrigation systems went the same way as those in Valencia after the Castilian conquest in the late 15th century. The earliest written records suggest that pre-existing water allocation criteria generally remained in operation, at least for a time. In some cases, for example around the Genil River, the records bear witness to the maintenance of the same water distribution systems between, at least, the 12th and the 16th centuries.[22] This initial conservatism does not exclude the implementation of progressive changes as the demand for water grew, as was recently observed by F. Vidal.[23] These changes were probably related to the extension of irrigation to land which had previously been used for dry land agriculture, for example in the hamlet of Armilla (Granada) in the early 16th century, and also to the introduction of crops which required large amounts of water, such as sugar cane, on the coast of Granada.[24]

In general, the mention in the record of customary Andalusi practices is connected with conflicts caused by the introduction of new procedures in systems

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Consell Insular de Mallorca, 1992), 309; Helena Kirchner, "Watermills in the Balearic Islands during the Muslim Period," *Ruralia* VIII (2011): 45–55. See also her contribution, "Feudal conquest and colonisation: an archaeological insight into the transformation of Andalusi irrigated spaces in the Balearic Islands," in this volume.

21 Denis Menjot, *Murcie castillane. Une ville au temps de la frontière (1243-milieu du XVe siècle), 2 vols.* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2002), 352–356. See also Garrido, "Las instituciones de riego," 18.

22 Miguel Garrido, *Los alquezares de Santa Fe* (1893), ed. Manuel Espinar (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1990).

23 Francisco Vidal, "La transmisión del uso y gestión del agua de al-Andalus al mundo cristiano," in *Las huellas del Islam*, eds. Fátima Roldán and Maria M. Delgado (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2008), 161–187.

24 Garrido, *Los alquezares*, 55–56; Antonio Malpica, *Medio físico y poblamiento en el delta del Guadalfeo. Salobreña y su territorio en época medieval* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1996). See also A. Fábregas, "Commercial crop or plantation system? Sugarcane production from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic," in this volume.

that had been built according to different criteria. These conflicts came about after new agricultural strategies caused disruption and placed pressure on older networks. In consequence, the record bears witness not to the placid continuation of older practices, but to the tensions introduced by the dissolution of former agricultural strategies and the imposition of new production and management criteria upon already existing irrigation networks. This disruption, however, did not preclude the transmission, even if "imperfect," of some basic principles and procedures, for example, the maintenance of a "descending" order for the allocation of irrigation turns and the organisation of time slots around prayer time.[25]

The example of Granada shows that the intention to maintain water allocation criteria "like it was done in the time of the Moors" (*conforme a como se hazia en tiempo de Moros*) was essentially related to the need to preserve a network of irrigation systems that became endangered after the 1492 conquest for lack of "expert knowledge," as a document dated to 1500 makes explicit.[26] Something similar had happened earlier in the *huerta* of Murcia, where in 1277 king Alfonso X issued a directive ordering irrigation to be carried out "as it was done in the time of the Moors" (*como solia en tiempo de moros*) as a response to the bad management of irrigation by Christian settlers, according to D. Menjot.[27]

Paradoxically, it follows that the maintenance of Andalusi procedures was nothing but a reaction to the effects of the dissolution of pre-existing management systems, to the conflicts caused by the imposition of new agricultural strategies and other forms of usurpation, and to the conflicts caused by the abandonment which had befallen the irrigation networks in the wake of the conquest. The survival of these systems was therefore merely circumstantial, the direct consequence of a radical transformation, and was followed by harsh adaptation processes.

The evidence available for Casarabonela (Málaga, southern Spain) offers a good insight into the organisation of irrigation in the village during the *Morisco* period, just before the final expulsion of the Andalusi inhabitants who

25 We borrow the expression "imperfect transmission" from Andrew Watson, "The Imperfect Transmission of Arab Agriculture into Medieval Europe," *Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 619 (1994): 199–212. Vidal, "La transmisión del uso."

26 Vidal, "La transmisión del uso," 170–171.

27 Denis Menjot, *Murcie castillane*, 1:44; 351–352; 354.

had remained after the 1485 conquest.[28] Property inventories listing the real estate owned by the expelled villagers and the distribution of land among new Castilian colonists, written soon after the expulsion in 1570, include references to water allocation systems in operation in the late 16th century. With this information, the earlier allocation criteria can also be inferred.[29] The operating procedures and the changes introduced after the conquest will be discussed in connection with the other examples mentioned above and other cases from the Kingdom of Granada. A broad correspondence between water allocation sequences and the construction phases detected in Casarabonela's main irrigation network will also be proposed. Finally, a comparison between these water allocation systems and those implemented in the colonial societies in the Atlantic colonies and the American continent will also be attempted.

Casarabonela as a Case Study

Casarabonela is a well-documented example of the transformation of an Andalusi hamlet (*qarya*) into a *villa*, a term used by the Castilians to refer to a village or *madīna* in the Kingdom of Granada. Casarabonela is located to the west of the province of Málaga, in a region known as the Algarbía (al-Garbīya).[30] In the 8th century, the settlement was included in the district of Cártama (*iqlīm* Qarṭama), which was created after the arrival of different Yemeni clans, detachments of the *jund* (army) of the Jordan, in the valley of the Guadalhorce River, specifically in the *chora* of Rayya (Málaga region).

28 *Moriscos*: "new Christians." Muslims forcefully converted to Christianity in the Kingdom of Granada after the Albaycín revolt (Granada) in 1501.

29 *Libro de Apeo de Casarabonela* (Archivo Histórico Provincial de Granada, L. 6467) and *Repartimiento* (Archivo Histórico Provincial de Granada, L.6468); Francisco Armada and Virgilio Martínez-Enamorado eds., *Repartimiento de los bienes de los moriscos de Casarabonela* (Málaga: Ayuntamiento de Casarabonela-Editorial Pinsapar, 2014).

30 On the Algarbía, or western Málaga, Virgilio Martínez-Enamorado, *Al-Andalus desde la periferia. La formación de una sociedad musulmana en tierras malagueñas* (*siglos VIII–X*) (Málaga: CEDMA, 2003). By the same author: "La Algarbía como realidad geo-histórica en el período de formación de al-Andalus. Una aproximación al estudio de su poblamiento rural," in *Arqueología y Patrimonio en la Algarbía malagueña*, ed. Juan A. Martín (Málaga: CEDMA, 2004), 57–94; "Precisiones sobre el significado concreto del término Algarbía en época andalusí," *Al Sur de al-Andalus. Guadalhorce. Actas de la Exposición y Jornadas itinerantes sobre el Medievo en el Valle del Guadalhorce*, (Málaga: Foro Guadalhorce-Consorcio Valle del Guadalhorce, 2006), 213–226.

We know for a fact that, at a very early date (the second half of the 8th century), under the government of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I al-Dākhil, a singular event took place in this hamlet, known as the time as Qaryat Bunīla: the acclimatisation of a kind of pomegranate by the Yemeni Safar ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Kalaʿī.[31] This kind of pomegranate, which came to be known thereafter as *safari* in recognition of the protagonist of the event (*al-rummān al-safarī*), was brought to al-Andalus by an ambassador sent to Syria to contact ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I's sister. There, the ambassador acquired several pomegranates of the kind being cultivated in the Ruṣāfa, which he then took back to al-Andalus, where a meeting with several members of the emir's circle was organised. Among them was Safar ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Kalāʿī, who was a member of the army of Jordan and was, therefore, an inhabitant of Rayya (Málaga region). Using the pomegranates obtained from ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I, Safar ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Kalāʿī carried out several experiments in his hamlet of Rayya (Casarabonela) until his results were ready to be presented to the emir. Finally, the ruler recognised his exertions by planting the species in the Ruṣāfa (Córdoba) and other gardens, and from there the species (which thenceforth would carry the agronomist's name – *al-rummān al-safarī*) spread throughout al-Andalus and the Maghreb. This kind of pomegranate is still a well-known variety in Morocco.

This event, which in itself appears to attest to an efficient transmission of agricultural knowledge, is also proof that the eastern and western Muslim worlds had adopted a coherent agricultural system from a very early date. In some cases, the Yemeni groups of the *jund* ("army") were pioneers in the dissemination of certain species.[32]

Thereafter, the evolution of Casarabonela, up to the Castilian conquest, is not so well attested. We know little about the change of toponym from Qaryat Bunīla to Qaṣr Bunayra, a form which was fixed at least as early as the 10th century. We also know of the settlement's involvement in Ibn Ḥafṣūn's *fitna* (rebellion), also in the 10th century, and of its capture by Yaḥyà ibn Zakariyā' ibn

31 This was published in Martínez-Enamorado, *Al-Andalus desde la periferia,* 114–116, shortly after the edition of the Arabic source on which the information is based. Ibn ʿAskar/Ibn Jamīs, *A'lām Mālaqa*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Targī, (Beirut, 1999), 350.

32 The most complete account of these events is the *Nafḥ*, the major compilation of the Maghrebi (of Andalusi origins) author al-Maqqarī, published in the 16th century. Al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-ṭīb min guṣn al-Andalus wa-l-raṭīb*, ed. I. ʿAbbās, 8 vols. (Beirut, 1968), 467–468. This work, translated by J. Samsó, gave no indication of where exactly in the *chora* of *Rayya* this acclimatisation took place, information which is provided by Ibn ʿAskar e Ibn Jamīs. Julio Samsó, *Las ciencias de los Antiguos en al-Andalus*, 2nd ed. with *addenda et corrigenda* by Julio Samsó and Miquel Forcada (Almería: Fundación Ibn Tufayl, 2011), 20–22.

Antuluh, who was initially one of Ibn Ḥafṣūn's supporters, in 923. Between this date and the Castilian conquest, the information concerning Casarabonela is sporadic and of little significance.

The Castilian conquest, which culminated on 2 June 1485, is recorded in detail in the chronicles.[33] It must be highlighted that, at that time, the Andalusi community in Casarabonela took decisions collectively through the *jamāʿa* of Qaṣr Bunayra and its communal institutions ('council of elders' or *jamāʿa al-šuyūḵh*). Soon after the conquest by the Catholic Monarchs, the village's "community, bailiff and mayor" (*comunidad, é alguacil, é alcaide*) sent a letter to the sovereigns, bending to their dominion and reminding them of the community's old rights of self-governance. This is a fine example of the internal operation of communities in the Kingdom of Granada before the conquest.[34] This would not be the last time that these rights were brandished: fourteen years after the conquest (on 13 June 1499) "by order of the commander Juan Gaitán, governor of said city, a meeting took place in the yard of the mosque [of Casarabonela], with the participation of the bailiff alfaqui and the old Moors and other inhabitants of the village," which means that these customs had not disappeared even in the face of the pressure posed by the new authorities.[35]

The "distribution" of Casarabonela, one of the many *repartimientos* carried out in the Kingdom of Granada in the late 15th century, illustrates the new conditions imposed by the conquerors. This distribution included allocating among the new Castilian settlers those properties that had been left "empty" by dead or escaped Muslims, for which distribution a comprehensive and thorough land register had to be completed. The remaining Muslims, now known as *Mudéjares*, were guaranteed, with conditions, the inviolability of their land and houses.[36] The earliest phase of distribution was executed in September

33 A study of the conquest by Rafael Bejarano in the introductory chapter of the edition of *Libro del Primer Repartimiento* (1487) entitled "Reconquista y Capitulación"; Rafael Bejarano, *El Repartimiento de Casarabonela* (Málaga: Diputación de Málaga, 1974), 19–32. Also in Rafael Bejarano, *Los Repartimientos de Málaga*, *IV* (Málaga: Ayuntamiento de Málaga, 2004).

34 Carmen Trillo, "El mundo rural nazarí, una evolución a partir de al-Andalus," in *Una sociedad rural en el Mediterráneo medieval: el mundo agrícola nazarí,* ed. Carmen Trillo (Granada: Colección Gog Magog, 2003), 11–152, esp. 110. For the reference to the community, the bailiff and the mayor as political agents of Casarabonela, see Hernando del Pulgar, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, in *Crónicas de los reyes de* Castilla, vol. III, ed. Cayetano Rosell (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1953), 422.

35 Archivo de la Catedral de Málaga (ACM), leg. 63, C-70.

36 *Mudéjar*: from the Arabic *mudajjan* > "subjected, domesticated"; Muslim who was allowed to remain under Christian authority. On the *Mudéjares* from the Kingdom of Granada, see

1487. In December 1492, *bachiller* Serrano reorganised this early *repartimiento*, as recorded in the document analysed by R. Bejarano.[37]

Casarabonela stayed under the Catholic Monarch's and the Crown's direct jurisdiction (*realengo*). After the conquest, Christian and Muslim peasants coexisted for nearly a century. They followed very different social norms, and their management of economic assets was traditionally opposed, but they shared the same urban and agricultural spaces. One decade after the conquest, the majority of the population was still *Mudéjar* in origin: the number of registered *Mudéjar* households in 1497 was 240, and the number increased to 280 in 1504.[38]

The 1492 correction of the *repartimiento* is tremendously interesting from a variety of perspectives, although, to date, it has only been examined by philologists.[39] The necessary identification of the *pagos* (agricultural land plots) and their relation to their *Mudéjar* or Castilian owners needs to be achieved through textual and archaeological analysis. The *Repartimiento* contains a detailed description of the small *madīna* of Qaṣr Bunayra after the conquest, which includes the arrival of the new colonists and also the distribution of property among the Andalusi peasants.

The 1502 order that forcefully converted *Mudéjares* into *Moriscos* created deep tensions within this dual society. The *viejo* Castilian Christian population concentrated land and was in control of the new bureaucracy. From the outset, the new Christian authorities failed to meet the terms of capitulation, a common phenomenon in many places throughout the Kingdom of Granada in general. A first attempt at rebellion in 1487 was promptly supressed. In a well-known *Real Cédula* dated to 1502, the *old* Christians from Casarabonela

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A. Malpica, "The Kingdom of Granada. Between the culmination of a process and the beginning of a new age," in this volume.

37 Bejarano, *El Repartimiento de Casarabonela*.

38 Ángel Galán and Rafael G. Peinado, *Hacienda regia y población en el Reino de Granada: La geografía morisca a comienzos del siglo XV* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2007), 222, table 4.

39 Juan A. Chavarría, "La toponimia árabe del Repartimiento de Casarabonela (Málaga). Aproximación a su estudio," *Jábega* 77 (1997): 11–31; Ana Gutiérrez, "Contribution au lexique arabo-andalou: un document roman de l'Andalousie orientale," *Hespéris-Tamuda* XXXI (1993): 9–20; by the same author, "Aproximación al estudio onomástico de la *kunya* en fuentes romances de Andalucía oriental," *Anaquel de Estudios Árabes* VII (1996): 15–43, and "Aproximación a la antroponimia mudéjar-morisca de Andalucía oriental reflejada a través de documentos romances relativos a la repoblación," in *Actas del VII Simposio Internacional de Mudejarismo* (Teruel: Centro de Estudios Mudéjares, 1999), 663–678.

were officially granted exemptions and privileges which did not extend to the Andalusi members of the community.[40] Between 1502 and 1568, a latent but palpable hostility pervaded the relationship between both communities. This crystallised in the lawsuit caused by the payment of *alcabalas* and *farda del mar*.[41] The dispute between the *new* Christians or *Moriscos*, who still made up the majority of the population before the great revolt (around 400 households), and the Castilians (with a little over 50 households), was rooted in the privileges and tax exemptions granted to the *old* Christians by the Catholic Monarchs in 1502.[42] These exemptions, if applied, would increase the fiscal pressure imposed upon the *Moriscos*, who would inevitably assume the payment of the amounts deducted from the other group. A court decision, dated 13 January 1561, finally ruled in favour of the *old* Christians, which meant a further affront to the *Morisco* community.[43]

This discriminative decision came in addition to the biased action of the Tribunal of the Holy Office (Inquisition), whose actions were regarded by *new* Christians as another clog in the state's fiscal apparatus, increasing even further the already high tax pressure suffered by the *Moriscos*. Despite this, the *Morisco* population of Casarabonela endured this pacifically. Casarabonela was, in fact, the base of operations for a contingent of 150 soldiers who had been sent from Málaga at the outset of the rebellion to fight the parties of in-

40 That same year, the Andalusi households were made to pay 1500 *maravedíes*; Ester Cruces and José M. Ruiz, *Inventario de acuerdos de las Actas Capitulares del Concejo de Málaga (1489–1516)* (Málaga: Universidad de Granada and Diputación de Málaga, 2004), 548, n° 2630.

41 The *alcabala* was a tax on sales, which applied to the whole of the Crown of Castile. In Arabic, *farda* was the capitation tax which each member of a group had to contribute to the overall fiscal obligations of their community. The Castilians turned this concept into a tax that was payable by all inhabitants of the Kingdom of Granada who spoke a language other than Spanish. In reality, only the small capitation tax or *tax of the sea* was demanded of the *Moriscos* (previously *Mudéjares*); the money was used for the maintenance of the coastal watchtowers. See María L. Campos, "Las rentas particulares del Reino de Granada tras la expulsión de los moriscos en 1570. La farda y la renta de población," *Chronica Nova* 16 (1998): 55–66.

42 It seems that the population had grown before the revolt, maybe because Casarabonela, which was considered a "pacified" settlement, had become a place of refuge for fleeing *Moriscos*. Archivo General del Sello, CC, leg. 2153, fol. 128.

43 Archivo de la Alhambra, A-84–89, L-46–44. In order to follow the court proceedings, several files had to be consulted, the references for which are available in María A. Moreno, *Catálogo del Archivo Histórico de la Alhambra*, (Granada: Patronato de la Alhambra y el Generalife, 1994), index s.v. "Casarabonela."

surgent *Moriscos*. It seems clear, on top of this, that "peaceful" *Moriscos* from other nearby settlements where they were in the minority, for example El Burgo and Yunquera, took refuge in the village of Casarabonela. The loyalty shown by these *Moriscos* did not stop the Crown from deporting them and distributing their land among *old* Christians. At the end of the war, in November 1570, the *Moriscos* of Casarabonela, a total of 290 households, were transported, via Antequera, to Écija and Carmona, in the province of Seville.[44]

After the deportations, the *apeo* (inventory) and *repartimiento* of the properties of the *Moriscos* could begin. In the two resulting documents, known as *libros de población* (population books), which complement one another, the village's territory is generically described and the rural properties are inventoried in detail. This inventory included both the land belonging to the expelled *Morisco* population and that in the hands of Castilian colonists.

Water Distribution: "However much water they need, and in the right order"

Asked about the order "used for the irrigation" in Casarabonela, the *Moriscos* who worked for the *apeo* of the properties confiscated after the 1570 expulsion, answered that the fields above the village were irrigated on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, between dawn and three in the afternoon. Those situated below the village, on the other hand, were irrigated on Thursdays, between three in the afternoon and sunset, plus Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays between dawn and sunset.[45] Four years after the first *apeo*, the former properties of the expelled *Moriscos* were distributed among the new Castilian settlers. The resulting *Libro de Repartimiento* (1574–75) includes further details of the water allocation system in operation in the village. The fields located above

44 The misfortunes suffered by the *Moriscos* of Casarabonela can be consulted in Juan Aranda and Marina Martín, "Evolución demográfica y estructura de la población morisca en la ciudad de Écija," in *Actas del III Congreso de Historia de la ciudad de Écija en la Edad Media y Renacimiento* (Seville: Ayuntamiento de Écija, 1993), 228–253; Juan Aranda, *Moriscos y cristianos en Córdoba. El drama de la expulsión* (Córdoba: Diputación de Córdoba, 2010); Manuel F. Fernández and Rafael M. Pérez, "Notas sobre la destrucción de las comunidades moriscas malagueñas y su reconstrucción en la campiña sevillana, 1569–1610," *Areas. Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales. Los moriscos y su expulsión: nuevas perspectivas* 30 (2011): 121–139. Also, Gómez and Martínez-Enamorado eds., *Repartimiento de los bienes*. Luis del Mármol, *Historia de la Rebelión y Castigo de los moriscos*, with an introduction by Ángel Galán (Málaga: Arguval, 1991), 267–268.

45 *Libro de Apeo de Casarabonela*. Archivo Histórico Provincial de Granada, L. 6467.

the village were irrigated between Monday and Thursday, "until the shadows hit the rock known as Hafataltalbal."[46] After this, water was re-diverted to the "river" (the main channel), and the irrigation turn for the fields below the village started. The fields of the *pagos* (blocks of land) Harça, Guasta, Garça, Carrayra and Caaçor were irrigated from Friday to Sunday. At night, all the available water was used to propel the flour and oil mills in the village (Fig. 8.1).[47]

This weekly organisation of irrigation was maintained without substantial changes until the second half of the 20th century. A notarial affidavit issued by the community of irrigators in 1968 referred to the validity of a set of rules



FIGURE 8.1 *Irrigation system of Casarabonela (Málaga)*

46 *Hafts al-Ṭabl* > "the rock or hill of Timbal."

47 Armada and Martínez-Enamorado, eds., *Repartimiento de los bienes*, fol. 197.

passed in 1849. According to these rules, water from the Comparate Spring, the main water source for the *huerta*, was allocated thus: "until three in the afternoon, for those *huertas* that are located above the village, and between three in the afternoon and the night prayer for those that are located below the village". This was of application between Monday and Thursday. In the areas irrigated between Friday and Sunday, all of which were located below the village, no division between morning and afternoon turns existed. At night, the water had to be left to run down the "river" in order to feed water troughs and irrigate other *huertas* located further down the valley.

As can be easily appreciated, the basic timeframe for irrigation remained basically the same between, at the latest, the 16th and the 20th centuries. Some essential alterations, however, took place. The 1571 *apeo* claims that irrigators took as much water as they needed, in descending order.[48] This "descending order" is not quite so clearly laid out in the *Libro de Repartimiento* written four years later. In this document, the order does not seem to correspond to the proximity of the water source, but to the order of arrival of irrigators. In any case, no limitation as to the volume of water taken and the duration of irrigation (within the basic time frame) seems to have been applied. As long as the irrigator kept a tree leaf with a stone on top, no one else could make use of his water. These "old and new rules," some of which were formalised in the 1492 dispositions, soon after the conquest, were enforced by the water bailiffs (*alcaldes del agua*).[49]

The system described by the 16th-century Castilian documents reveals the operation of a serial turn system with no limitations on the volume of water used, and with no allowance made for simultaneous irrigation. The record does not make it clear whether the order was based on topography or on the irrigators' specific demands at any given time, as was the case, for example, in Loja, in the province of Granada.[50] Similarly, it is not clear whether any changes in

48 *Libro de Apeo de Casarabonela*, fol. 7.

49 A petition filed to the civil governor of Málaga, and signed by a group of landowners from Casarabonela in November 1839, gives a description of the irrigation system followed in 1575: "the first to arrive to the spring leaves a signal – a leaf with a stone on top – to indicate that nobody else can take water until he is finished," (Archivo Histórico Municipal de Casarabonela, *Expediente sobre los riegos de Casarabonela*, 1839–1840, fol. 1). We want to thank Esteban López for providing us with this document, which seems to indicate that the 19th-century irrigators knew the old system well. The reference to old and new rules in Gómez and Martínez-Enamorado, eds., *Repartimiento de los bienes*, fol. 205 and Bejarano, *Los Repartimientos de Málaga*, 169–171.

50 One of the roles of the water bailiff in Loja was to inform the farmer who was requesting water which irrigators had priority over him. Miguel Jiménez, *Los regadíos tradicionales de Loja* (Granada: Fundación Ibn al-Jatib, 2007), 189.

water allocation criteria had been introduced between the *apeo* (1571) and the *repartimiento* (1574–75). In any case, the procedure followed is typical of a system in which water cannot be divorced from the size of the irrigated area and the varying needs of different crops.

The pattern followed in Casarabonela was similar or even identical to others being applied elsewhere in the Kingdom of Granada. For instance, in the nearby village of Monda, irrigators were allocated water according to their "seniority, *dulas* and proximity alone, depending on the block where each field is".[51] In Tolox, again in western Málaga, irrigation was organised according to "the proximity of the block where each field is, and seniority," and in Algarrobo (Axarquía, eastern Málaga), irrigation was similarly organised "from the top down" and each irrigator could take water "whenever he needed it." The order of irrigation within each block of properties was apportioned by lot.[52] On the other hand, as was the case with the mills in Casarabonela, Algarrobo's fulling mill was supplied only once the irrigation of the fields had finished. In this case, the association of the water with the irrigated space, without volume or time restrictions, reflected on the name of the *pagos*, which was known by the day on which they were allowed to irrigate.[53] A similar system, i.e. water distribution on demand, in a descending order and before milling, is also documented in Benamedá (Casares, western Málaga) and Alfacar (Granada), among others.[54]

In contrast, in some hydraulic systems in the Alpujarras (Granada), water distribution was based on volume and time limits. This system was adopted

51 *Dula*: from the Arabic *dawla* > "irrigation turn." See Manuel Espinar et al., "El término árabe 'turno de riego,' en una alquería de las tahas de Berja y Dalías: Ambroz," in *El agua en zonas áridas. I* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1989), 123–141. For some examples of the opinion of several learned scholars from al-Andalus and the Maghreb on the seniority and proximity criteria, Vincent Lagardère, *Histoire et société en occident musulman au Moyen Âge*, (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez-CSIC, 1995), III.73; V.357; V.359; V.362. On Monda: José A. Urbano, *La villa de Monda en el siglo XVI. Apeos y primeras ordenanzas*, (Coín: G.A. Ediciones coincidentes), 167, 185, *passim*.

52 *Libro de apeo de Tolox*, 1572, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Granada, L.6801, fol. 5v. Esteban López, *Aplicación de la "arqueología hidráulica" al estudio de las comunidades campesinas tardo-andalusíes: el caso de Tolox* (*Málaga*), Masters Dissertation, (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2013); http://hdl.handle.net/10481/28797 [Accessed 3 September 2014].

53 Juan J. Bravo, "La distribución del agua de riego en Algarrobo durante su etapa morisca," in *I Coloquio de Historia y Medio Físico. El agua en zonas áridas*, ed. Lorenzo Cara (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1989), 269–282.

54 Rafael Benítez, *Moriscos y cristianos en el condado de Casares* (Córdoba: Diputación Provincial de Córdoba, 1982), 376; Ángel Barrios, *Alfacar morisco* (Granada: Universidad de Granada-Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1984), 50, 150–151.

by the Castilian settlers after the conquest. The application of time slots seems to have been a common response to water scarcity, for instance in the hamlet of Berja (Almería), among others. In the hamlet of Godco (Alboloduy, Granada), and in the city of Granada itself, time limits applied, but when water was abundant each irrigator could take as much water as he wanted within his own time slot.[55]

Several authors have illustrated how diverse water distribution systems were in place around the city of Granada during the Nasrid period.[56] Prior to the Castilian conquest, in the 14th and 15th centuries, several commercial transactions involving water rights have been documented in Granada and also in Almería.[57] In Granada, the alienation of water rights occurred within a context of the increasing fragmentation of traditional irrigation time slots, which were organised around prayer time. This is, for example, the case in example of the Aynadamar *acequia*, which, after irrigating the land pertaining to the hamlet of Víznar, entered the city to irrigate the *cármenes*, which were estates specialised in grape production, often owned by important members

55 Carmen Trillo, *La Alpujarra antes y después de la conquista castellana* (Granada: Universidad de Granada-Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1994), 247–250. Carmen Trillo, *Agua, tierra y hombres en al-Andalus* (Granada: Ajbar Colección, 2004), 259–267. Espinar *et al.*, "El término árabe 'turno de riego.'"

56 Trillo, *La Alpujarra*, 247; Garrido, *Los alquezares*, 38–39. Maria T. de Diego, "Las ordenanzas de las aguas de Granada," *En la España Medieval* 4 (1984): 249–275. In Murcia and Orihuela, these systems were still in operation in the 20th century. Maass and Anderson, *... and the Desert shall Rejoice*, 95. Garrido, "Las instituciones de riego," 17–19. Carmen Trillo, "El tiempo del agua. El regadío y su organización en la Granada islámica," *Acta Historia et Archaeologica Mediaevalia* 23–24 (2003): 237. More recently, Luis Martínez-Vázquez, "De tiempo inmemorial a esta parte: Alfacar y los regadíos del borde nordeste de la Vega de Granada," *Debates de Arqueología Medieval* 1 (2011): 73–103; Miguel Jiménez, "Entre la gestión comunitaria y la privada. La distribución social del agua en las alquerías de la Vega de Granada," in *El paisaje y el análisis del territorio. Reflexiones sobre el sur de al-Andalus*, ed. Miguel Jiménez (Palma: Vessants, arqueologia i cultura SL, 2014), 57–102.

57 Antonio Malpica and Carmen Trillo, "La hidráulica nazarí. Análisis de una agricultura irrigada de origen andalusí," in *Asentamientos rurales y territorio en el Mediterráneo medieval*, ed. Carmen Trillo (Granada: Athos-Pergamos, 2002) 221–261. Trillo, *Agua, tierra y hombres*, 288. Francisco Vidal, "Water and farm estates in the Arabic documents of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada," in *From Al-Andalus to Khurasan. Documents from the Medieval Muslim World*, eds. Petra Sijpesteijn et al. (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), 39–58, esp. 47. Jiménez, "Entre la gestión comunitaria," 77–78. About Almería see María D. Segura, "Las fuentes de Alhadra. Abastecimiento urbano y regadío en la Almería musulmana y morisca," in *II Coloquio de Historia y Medio Físico. Agricultura y regadío*, eds. Lorenzo Cara et al. (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1996), 453–463.

of the Nasrid court.[58] A diversity of water allocation systems could sometimes be found within a single hamlet, for example in Padul, to the south of the city of Granada.[59]

In Casarabonela, turns were ascribed to large blocks of fields. If they were ever applied, turns allotted according to family relationships have left no trace. Within each time slot, irrigation was organised either topographically, from the top down, or according to the principle of "first-come, first-served," as we have seen before. As noted, morning and afternoon turns were allocated to different sets of *pagos*. There was, therefore, a time limit, although each irrigator could take as much water as he wished within that limit. Turns, it follows, applied to the block in general, and it was left to the irrigators in each block to establish their own priorities. Obviously, for this system to work smoothly, enough water to satisfy the requirements of every irrigator had to be available, and irrigators had to agree on how each of them was going to make use of the water.

Some *pagos* located below the village were irrigated from Friday to Sunday (Fig. 8.1). The regime which was applied in these fields was different from that applied in the *pagos* above the village. In these *pagos*, which are grouped in the 1574–75 *Libro de Repartimiento* under just one toponym (Guasta, from the Arabic *al-wasṭa*, "the middle one"), irrigation continued from morning till sunset. These fields were not supplied from the Comparate spring, unlike the *pagos* irrigated from Monday to Thursday, but from the mill of Los Cubos, which is mentioned in the 1492 *repartimiento* and which, in 1571, belonged to Don Cristóbal de Córdoba, the richest man in the village. This watermill (which is currently known as Los Mizos), was the point from which the fields located below the village were still irrigated in the mid-19th century.

58 For an early approach to the weakening of the kinship ties, see Antonio Malpica, "Relaciones entre el medio físico y los campos de cultivo en el reino de Granada antes y después de la conquista castellana (siglos XIII a XVI)," in *Homenaje a Tomás Quesada* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1998), 417–434; Malpica and Trillo, "La hidráulica rural nazarí"; Trillo, *Agua, tierra y hombres*, 288; Vidal, "Water and farm estates," 47. A. Malpica and C. Trillo think that the fragmentation of property and irrigation turns and the possibility of selling water rights are a sign of the decomposition of the Nasrid kinship-based irrigation organisation. Malpica and Trillo, in any case, do not discard the possibility that transactions involving water may have also be related to scarcity.

59 Juan F. García-Pérez, "Los sistemas hidráulicos y su evolución en el Valle de Lecrín: diseño de espacios irrigados y modalidades de riego tradicionales en la alquería de al-Baḏūl," in *El paisaje y su dimensión arqueológica. Estudios sobre el sur de la Península Ibérica en la Edad Media*, ed. Miguel Jiménez & Luca Mattei (Granada: Alhulia, 2010), 249–282.

It is possible to interpret this Friday-to-Sunday time slot as a later addition to a pre-existing system, which included the morning and afternoon Monday-to-Thursday time slots and *pagos*. To date, it has been impossible to ascertain when this extension took place, but that it did seems to be made clear by the different irrigation patterns and the physical layout of the system. In any case, the *pagos* that were irrigated from Friday to Sunday in the 16th century already existed before the 1485 Christian conquest, as shown by the 1492 *repartimiento*, which mentions fields, *huertas* and groves in the *pagos* located below the mill.[60]

Further down the system, the flat agricultural lands located outside the *huerta* (*vegas*) were also subject to irrigation. According to the report issued by Arévalo de Zuazo, *corregidor* of Málaga, after a visit to Casarabonela in 1571, these *vegas* were the same size (a hundred *fanegadas*, just over 30 hectares) as the *huertas* in the territory (*dezmería*) of Casarabonela.[61] Two thirds of these *vegas* were in the hands of *old* Christians, while the remaining third was the property of *Moriscos*. With regard to the *huertas* situated near the village, the proportion was inverted: Castilians only owned about one quarter. The 1571 visit also observed that, despite "there being water to irrigate much more" land, water was scarce "most years." It would, therefore, seem that by the time the *Moriscos* were expelled, irrigation had been extended beyond the perimeter of the *huertas* irrigated from Mondays to Sundays, and that this land was mostly in the hands of *old* Christians.

In addition, after the visit, the possibility of further expanding irrigation was suggested, even if the water available was not sufficient for the regular irrigation of the *huertas* and *vegas* located in the lower stretch of the system, according to Arévalo de Zuazo's report. At any rate, we have already noted that the extension of irrigation to the *vegas*, already attested for the late 16th century, did not modify the fact that the irrigators working the *huertas* located near the village could take as much water as they deemed necessary, as was confirmed a few years later by the 1574–75 *Libro de repartimiento*. Scarcity, it follows, must have been perceived as a problem mostly as far as the fields located outside the perimeter of the *huerta* were concerned (mostly the property of Castilians), and therefore only seen as an impediment for the further expansion of irrigation.

Notwithstanding the stability of the general framework from the 16th century onwards, the 1849 regulations reflected important changes, both in terms

60 Bejarano, *Los Repartimientos de Málaga*, 140, 142, 153, *passim*.

61 Archivo General del Sello (AGS), Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 2158, sf. We wish to thank Esteban López for informing us about this document and for transcribing it for us.

of the design of the system and of water allocation criteria. The most important of these was the introduction of fragmented hour-turns. This innovation was justified in the 1849 regulations by the "problems, complains and quarrels" caused by the old distribution system. In fact, in P. Madoz's *Diccionario*, published in 1847, mention was made of the "ill administration of the water flow" in Casarabonela, ill administration which posed problems for the irrigation of the maize fields and for the watering of the livestock in the lower part of the system in drought years.[62] The establishment of hour-turns within the previous framework aimed to solve the problems of water scarcity during the summer; these turns were connected with the organisation of irrigation along parallel, rather than sequential, lines, and, first and foremost, with the extension of irrigation to the *vegas* and *cortijos* (large country houses-cum-estate) located in the lower end of the system, the cultivation of species that required much water, and the watering of livestock.[63]

The new demands ultimately forced a fundamental transformation of the former water distribution criteria. As previously noted, during the *Morisco* period water distribution was not subject to any volume or time limitations within the turn system, which probably corresponded to the original mode of organisation. Hour-based time slots were not contemplated in the water allocation systems documented for the 16th century, and neither was the possibility of irrigating more than one field simultaneously. Each irrigator received as much water as was needed and for as long as was required according to the size of their field and the crop that they were growing at any given time. In contrast, the 1849 regulations made simultaneous irrigation (between two and four fields at a time) throughout the hourly slots possible. Therefore, the customary morning or afternoon turn could be used by a larger number of irrigators. The morning and afternoon turns documented for the 16th century were, therefore, still recognisable in the 19th-century system, but now they

62 Pascual Madoz, *Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de ultramar* (Madrid: P. Madoz y L. Sagasti, 1847), 27. The dictionary reproduces the complaint filed, through his representative, by the Duke of Arco and other *hacendados* (landowners) to the civil governor of Málaga in 1839. These landowners lamented that, with the old customs "the turn to irrigate the lower lands comes so late that little good can be done to the maize." Archivo Histórico Municipal de Casarabonela, *Expediente sobre los riegos de Casarabonela*, 1839–1840, fol. 1.

63 This explains the letter addressed to the mayor of Casarabonela in 1840 and signed by an irrigator who had become worse-off after changes were introduced to comply with the Duke of Arco's and other landowners' petitions. The letter mentions the scarcity resulting from the "needs of the many new *huertas* created in the last hundred years," (Archivo Municipal de Casarabonela, fol. 23).

were further divided by hour, half-hour, third-hour and quarter-hour turns according to mechanical clocks (despite the fact that the basic time turns were still regulated according to prayer time). These subdivided turns could be divided even more or accumulated.

This strict hour-based organisation system established in 1849, must have taken into consideration the surface to be irrigated during each turn, but not the differing needs of the diverse crops, which was a major factor of proportionality, according to Maass and Anderson.[64] The proportionality principle based on the crop, it follows, was superseded by the imposition of hour-based turns. Following the 1849 regulations, each irrigator knew at exactly what time he could start using water but did not know with certainty that the water so used would be sufficient to cover his needs. In any case, with the new system the differing needs could be adjusted by purchasing irrigation turns or fractions thereof.

In summary, irrigation in Casarabonela continued to be practised "as it was done in the time of the Moors" after the conquest and the expulsion of the *Moriscos* but only to a certain extent. The system was preserved untouched until the new demands posed by fields located outside the *huerta* forced the adoption of a system in which scarcity was a determinant factor. The tail-enders, who had suffered the consequences of the lack of water due to the expansion of irrigation most acutely, were particularly interested in promoting a new system which ensured that enough water reverted back to the channel to guarantee the viability of irrigation in the *vegas* and *cortijos* (estates) located towards the bottom end of the system. The expansion of irrigation, therefore, prompted the introduction of new principles which superseded the old proportionality criteria based on the needs of different crops.

In this regard, it does not appear that the management of scarcity was a major consideration in the water allocation criteria preserved after the expulsion of the *Moriscos*. This has not so much to do with the precipitation regime (annual average is 714 mm, but some years rainfall can be over 1000 mm) and the abundance of springs, but with the limitation of the irrigated area and the strictly controlled order followed for water distribution among the different blocks of land. No alternative use for the water, other than the irrigation of the *huertas* located inside the original system, was taken into consideration. At nights, water was used to propel the watermills situated within the perimeter

64 Maass and Anderson, *...and the Desert shall Rejoice*, 40. In fact, *Las ordenanzas de la Comunidad de regantes de Casarabonela*, which are still in force, determine that "no irrigator will be allowed to request a greater volume of water or longer turns on the basis of his crop, beyond what is due to him by right."

of the system. In 1849, however, the use of water during the night for irrigation and the watering of livestock outside the *huerta* were finally regulated.

The mid-19th-century regulations reveal a fundamental breach of the original system, the threshold of which – based on the strict adherence to the Monday-to-Thursday and Friday-to-Sunday turns – had been exceeded. As pointed out by Glick, a design based on these principles was hard to enlarge without compromising the balance between irrigation rights and the surface that was to be irrigated. The violation of the proportionality principle took place in Casarabonela when the system was subject to demands from outside the original layout, which amply exceeded the system's potential for enlargement and its operating principles. This reproduced a typical pattern, which had already been detected in Valencia by Glick himself, as well as on the coast of Granada, where the phenomenon was considerably faster and the capacity thresholds of the Nasrid systems were overtaken soon after the Castilian conquest in the 15th century, as shown by A. Malpica.[65] In this sense, the expansion of species which required much water, such as sugar cane, put excessive pressure on the old systems and their water distribution criteria.

As previously noted, water allocation systems based on proportionality were common and coexisted with others in which water distribution was based on hour-long turns, both in urban and suburban contexts in and around Granada and in the region of Las Alpujarras (also near Granada).[66] According to C. Trillo, in these cases the common ownership of water probably hampered the transfer of water rights to non-members of the community beyond, at most, the sale of surplus water.[67]

It seems clear that an hour-based system was better suited to the management and productive orientation that followed in the wake of the Christian

65 Glick, "Cap a una història institucional dels regs," 40; Antonio Malpica, "Medio físico y territorio: el ejemplo de la caña de azúcar a finales de la Edad Media," in *Paisajes del azúcar. Actas del v Seminario Internacional sobre la caña de azúcar*, ed. Antonio Malpica (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995), 11–40; Malpica, *Medio físico y poblamiento*. See also Adela Fábregas, "Commercial crop or plantation system? Sugarcane production from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic," in this volume.

66 Maria A. Carbonero, "Technologie hydraulique et système de distribution collective de l'eau en al-Andalus," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 45 (1) 1987: 133–141, esp. 136–137; Espinar et al., "El término árabe 'dawla,'" 133–134. Trillo, *La Alpujarra*, 247–250; Trillo, *Agua, tierra y hombres*, 266–267.

67 Malpica and Trillo, "La hidráulica nazarí," 16–20; Trillo, *Agua, tierra y hombres*, 266–272. Camilo Álvarez and Margarita Jiménez, "Pleitos de agua en Granada en tiempos de Carlos v. Colección de escrituras romanceadas," in *Carlos v. Los moriscos y el Islam*, ed. Maria J. Rubiera (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2001), 59–90.

conquest. As the example of Casarabonela has illustrated, this system did not involve an immediate and brusque shift from one system to the other. It seems clear that irrigating "as it was done in the time of the Moors" was still done, sometimes for centuries thereafter. As is illustrated by the example of Casarabonela, the introduction of hour-based turns had a lot to do with the system's ability to assimilate additional demands posed by the enlargement of the system or the large-scale cultivation of species which demanded much water. Once these new demands could not be fitted into the old criteria, hour-based, divisible turns were imposed and the possibility of exchanging water rights created. As observed by C. Trillo in Aynadamar (Granada), whenever the land and the water could be managed separately, the number of transactions involving water was also higher, even before the Christian conquest.[68] In Casarabonela, in contrast with the coast of Granada, the specialisation brought about by the conquest did not essentially take place in the old hydraulic systems, but in areas dominated by dry farming, with the introduction of extensive cereal cultivation and the planting of vineyards. As a consequence, water distribution systems did not have to be changed outright.

Despite the diversity of irrigation systems in operation before the conquest and the changes introduced thereafter, it seems clear that the tendency was not to change from hour-based systems to one where irrigators could use as much water as they needed (with the exception of hour-turn-based systems which permitted an unlimited amount of water to be used in periods of plenty). As noted, Murcia was one of the exceptions.[69] Generally, the transformations involved the imposition of hour-based turns. These changes need to be understood in the context of the new agrarian strategies imposed after the conquest, especially the introduction of specialised crops. That is, later hour-based systems were adopted in order to adapt to new social and productive demands, and they cannot be situated in the same category as the original time-based Andalusi systems, which were designed to manage scarcity from the onset.

Other Colonial Irrigation Systems

Studying the organisation of irrigation and hydraulic systems in other colonial (Atlantic and American) contexts can contribute to a better understanding of the transformation of Andalusi systems in the wake of the Christian conquest and vice versa. The transmission of technical knowledge has been one of the

68 Trillo, *Agua, tierra y hombres*, 275. Jiménez, "Entre la gestión comunitaria," 87.

69 Denis Menjot, *Murcie castillane*, 352–353.

main guidelines in the study and comparison of "ancestral" irrigation systems on both sides of the Atlantic.[70] Th. Glick's work on the origins of the irrigation system built in the 18th century by Canary colonists in San Antonio, Texas, is seminal to this kind of comparative effort.[71] The title chosen for this work alludes to the connection between the conquest and the emergence of new societies in the medieval and modern periods, which Ch. Verlinden refers to as "medieval precedents to the American colonies."[72] A few examples of how irrigation systems were managed in the Atlantic and American colonies will illustrate the need to gain a broader understanding of this crucial aspect of the relationship between the medieval and Mediterranean conquests on the one hand, and the modern and Atlantic colonies on the other.[73]

In Gran Canaria (Canary Islands), irrigation systems implemented in the late 15th century were determined by the hegemonic cultivation of sugar cane. The fields where this specialised crop was initially introduced made use of pre-existing indigenous irrigation networks.[74] It seems that the operational criteria followed after the conquest, however, did not continue the indigenous practices. After the first batches of European colonists established a wide variety of operational criteria in the late 15th century, a proportionality system based on the amount of land owned by each irrigator within a community (*adulados*) seems to have become predominant.[75] The amount of land cultivated with sugar cane and the construction of sugar processing factories soon posed new demands, creating a situation of scarcity and overturning the proportionality

70 Some examples in Jacinta Palerm, "Las galerías filtrantes o qanats en México: introducción y tipología de técnicas," *Agricultura, Sociedad y Desarrollo* 1(2) (2004): 133–145; *Riegos ancestrales en Iberoamérica*, ed. Tomás Martínez (Mexico City: Mundi-Prensa, 2009); *Sistemas ancestrales de riego a ambos lados del Atlántico*, eds. José Roldán and René Chipana (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2011).

71 Thomas F. Glick, *The Old World Background of the Irrigation System of San Antonio, Texas* (Texas Western Press, 1972). There is a Spanish translation, published by Universidad de Granada: *Los antecedentes en el viejo mundo del sistema de irrigación de San Antonio, Texas*, (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2010). The citations refer to the Spanish translation.

72 Charles Verlinden, *Précédents mediévaux de la colonie en Amérique* (México: Editorial Fournier, 1954).

73 For a comparative analysis of irrigation institutions in different regions, see Jacinta Palerm, "Comparative History of Irrigation Water Management, from the Sixteenth to Twentieth Centuries: Spain, Mexico, Chile, Mendoza (Argentina) and Peru," *Water Policy* 12 (6) (2010): 779–797.

74 Antonio Macías, "La colonización europea y el derecho de aguas. El ejemplo de Canarias, 1480–1525," *Hispania*, 233 (2009): 715–38.

75 Glick, *Los antecedentes en el viejo mundo*, pp. 20–27; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Canary Islands After the Conquest* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 93–113.

system, which was replaced by a system in which the use of water was alienated from the land and privatised; these actions set the foundations for the control exercised by the sugar-based oligarchy on the island in the first half of the 16th century. Initially, the extraordinary demands posed by the sugar industry were limited to "surplus water" (*aguas perdidas*), which was at first subject to the *ius regale*, but which ended up under the control of the Canary aristocracy of sugar.[76]

The corruption of the early colonial distribution system, which was plausibly adapted to the layout of indigenous hydraulic networks, was the result of pressure exercised from outside the main irrigated lands. As previously noted, the separation between water use and land took place once the initially contemplated irrigation thresholds were broken. As pointed out by Th. Glick, the breach of this principle of proportionality, according to which the amount of water used by each irrigator depended on the amount of land owned, was behind the privatisation of water distribution in the 19th century and the possibility of diverting it outside the irrigation systems.[77] It was, it follows, a response to supervened, rather than originally perceived, conditions of scarcity caused by the productive patterns implanted in the colonial period.

The hydraulic systems built in the 18th century by Canary settlers in San Antonio, Texas, present us with a similar example. Initially, irrigation was organised according to a proportion between the amount of water and the amount of land. According to Glick, this system limited conflict over water use until the demands posed by both residents and new arrivals broke the initially contemplated threshold (amounting to one fifth of the total water flow) and left no other option but to make water alienable (at first, only the surplus water – *sobras*).[78]

As in San Antonio, the hydraulic systems constructed in missions and other colonial settlements in northern New Spain from the 16th century onwards were focused on the cultivation of cereal and were generally built anew; the pre-existing Pueblo systems were regarded as inadequate for the new pro-

76 Fernández-Armesto, *The Canary Islands*, 107; Macías, "La colonización europea," 727–36. See Adela Fábregas, "Commercial crop or plantation system?," in this volume.

77 Glick, *Los antecedentes en el viejo mundo*, 45.

78 Glick, *Los antecedentes en el viejo mundo*, 75–78. Michael C. Meyer, *Water in the Hispanic Southwest. A Social and Legal History, 1550–1850* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996), 137.

ductive strategy, especially in terms of the cultivation of wheat and barley.[79] If there were connections between the old indigenous layouts and the new colonial networks, they seem to be hard to trace, both in the Canaries and New Spain. In both cases, irrigation was crucial to the settlement of Spanish colonists. It seems that the physical design and the water allocation systems adopted in the indigenous networks were deemed inadequate for colonial development. The specialisation in sugar in the Canaries and the importance placed on cereal cultivation in New Spain – aside from the important role played by stockbreeding – came into being after new networks were constructed or old systems were adapted beyond recognition.

The pre-Hispanic irrigation systems that managed to survive abandonment or the decimation of the indigenous population of New Spain were, on the other hand, preserved by indigenous communities and legally protected from alienation.[80] This, at least theoretical, protection, guaranteed the Pueblo communities independent access to water whenever the water supply was shared with missions, *presidios* or settlements were inhabited by colonists from central Mexico (creole, mix-raced or indigenous, for example the Tlaxcaltecas). Spanish landowners, however, had priority access to water.[81] This area did not witness an ubiquitous substitution of populations, as was for example the case with the Iberian conquests; colonisation was not, therefore, based on the systematic occupation and reuse of already existing, and well-defined spaces. The "promiscuous" coexistence of two peasant populations using the same irrigation systems did not take place either, not like in Casarabonela between the 1485 conquest and the expulsion of the *Moriscos* in 1570, to name but one example.

79 José A. Rivera, *Acequia Culture. Water, Land & Community in the Southwest* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 8; Mark T. Lycett, "Toward a Historical Ecology of the Mission in Seventeenth-Century New Mexico," in *Indigenous Landscapes and Spanish Missions. New Perspectives from Archaeology and Ethnohistory*, eds. Lee M. Panich and Tsim D. Schneider (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2014), 180–3.

80 Rivera, *Acequia Culture*, 3. Meyer, *Water in the Hispanic Southwest*, 51–8 and map on page 59.

81 Tomás Martínez-Saldaña, "El riego tradicional en el eriazo norteño mexicano: la expansión de la herencia hidráulica agrícola mesoamericana," in *Riegos ancestrales en Iberoamérica*, 53–62. Cándido González and Rosario Realpozo, "Los sistemas hidráulicos coloniales en Colotlán Jalisco, México," in *Riegos ancestrales en Iberoamérica*, 169–175. For the forced migration of Indians in order to ensure the availability of a sufficient workforce in the *estancias*, see François Chevalier, *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 69.

The first Spanish settlers arrived in the Rímac Valley, near Lima (Peru) in 1535. The colonists' settlement and their agricultural organisation were arranged around the construction of new irrigated spaces based on Old World models.[82] The pre-Hispanic hydraulic systems in the region coexisted with these new arrivals for several years, until the indigenous collapse caused by the massive depopulation that followed.[83] After the usual initial desarray, the land distributions and the imposition of water allocation rules promoted by Viceroy Toledo finally institutionalised a stable system among the colonists.[84] These systems were organised on the basis of the proportionality principle, between the amount of land owned and the volume of water that each irrigator was allowed to use.

Another essential aspect of the irrigation systems where Spaniards and Indians shared the same water source was the separation of the irrigation turns allotted to each group. The Indians were only allowed to irrigate after sunset, once the Spaniards had finished doing so. It is possible that this distribution of the irrigation turns also reflected the higher position of the lands owned by the Spanish, as the growth patterns identified in Moche Valley, in Peru's northern coast, seem to suggest.[85] Some texts refer to this segregation as a condition meant to "prevent injury being done to the Indians." As previously noted, the authorities of New Spain also pursued the same target with their measures.[86]

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82 Daniel Gade, "Landscape, system, and identity in the post-conquest Andes," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 82 (3) (1992): 460–77, 464.

83 Robert G. Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change. The Emergence of the Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast* (Cambridge (MA)-London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 122. For an archaeological analysis of the construction techniques and the phases of the irrigation systems of the Chimu, on Peru's northern coast, see Charles R. Ortloff, "Chimu Hydraulic Technology and Statecraft on the North Coast of Peru, A.D. 1000–1470," in *Economic Aspects of Water Management in the Prehispanic New World*, eds. Vernon L. Scarborough and Barry L. Isaac (Greenwich, Connecticut-London: Jai Pres Inc., 1993), 327–67. For a compendium of hydraulic systems in South America, see William M. Denevan, *Cultivated Landscapes of Native Amazonia and the Andes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

84 Robert G. Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change*, 123–7. Fernando Flores, *Haciendas y pueblos de Lima. Historia del valle del Rímac, III* (Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú-Municipalidad de Lima, 2012), 107–109, 113–114, *passim*.

85 Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change*, 126. Denevan, *Cultivated Landscapes*, 149. Something similar occurred in Surco, Lima, where the Spanish *haciendas* were situated up the water course and also had different turns to, and priority over, the land owned by the Indians. This changed when the Jesuits, who had a *hacienda* located below Indian land, pushed for a change of system. Nicolas P. Cushner, *Lords of the Land. Sugar, Wine and Jesuit Estates of Coastal Peru, 1600–1767* (Albany: State University of New York, 1980), 51–3.

86 Flores, *Haciendas y pueblos de Lima*, 105–6.

It seems clear, in any case, that the old and the new systems had different designs and followed different operational guidelines in order to respond to production and management strategies that were interchangeable only to a degree. This justifies the decision to dismiss the construction of the *reducción* of Chuntay, in Lima, in a place "where the Indians would be surrounded by Spaniards, which is convenient to no one in the republic."[87] It is likely that the Inca Garcilaso's reference to the Spaniard's lack of concern for the deterioration of indigenous irrigation systems after the conquest, especially in valley locations and on the coast, was connected with the construction of brand new hydraulic networks.[88]

In the Arequipa Valley, in southeast Peru, conditions were different. In the late 16th century, the Indian and Spanish *chácaras* near the city were mixed. This was caused by the opposition of *encomenderos* to the alienation of their Indian's land (land which they often ended up buying themselves) and by the fact that the Spanish preferred the land closest to the coast, where they created extensive and compact *heredades* for the cultivation of vines. Indeed, the coastal plain was the preferred location for the creation of large estates dedicated to the new colonial specialities.[89]

The Andean highlands did not witness the massive arrival of European immigrants or the construction of new irrigation systems. Spaniards did not regard these highlands as a suitable location for the settlement of new *vecinos*.[90] Colonial order – and the fortune of the *encomenderos* – was achieved through the concentration of Indians in *reducciones* situated at the foot of the mountains and the selective preservation of pre-Hispanic social practices, including some local management practices, in what J. Murra labelled the "vertical archipelago."[91] In temperate climate zones, for example in Oropesa

87 Flores, *Haciendas y pueblos de Lima*, 128.

88 Quoted in Denevan, *Cultivated Landscapes*, 145.

89 Keith A. Davies, *Landowners in Colonial Peru*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 31, 43, 122. Robin A. Donkin, *Agricultural Terracing in the Aboriginal New World* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1979), 25–30.

90 Jeremy R. Mumford, *Vertical Empire. The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012), 26, 34. Also, Karen Spaulding, *Huarochirí. An Andean Society Under Inca and Spanish Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 178.

91 John V. Murra, *Formaciones económicas y políticas del mundo andino* (Lima: IEP, 1975). Jeanette E. Sherbondy, "Water and Power: The Role of Irrigation Districts in the Transition from Inca to Spanish Cuzco," in *Irrigation at High Altitudes: The Social Organization of Water Control Systems in the Andes*, eds. William P. Mitchell and David Guillet (Arlington VA, Society for Latin American Anthropology Publication Series, 1994), 69–97. Donkin,

(later known as Cochabamba, Bolivia), some valley settlements controlled by Spanish and mixed-race *chacareros* and *estancieros* (landholders) used Indian Yanacona labour in agricultural spaces partially dedicated to specialised crops, which were later commercialised, in the most part, in the mining city of Potosí.[92] The village of Oropesa was one of the urban settlements that emerged as a result of the migration of European colonists in the 1560s.[93] In these valleys, the pre-existing irrigation sectors (*suyus*), as well as other pre-Hispanic institutions, were incorporated into the reorganised networks related to new *pueblos* and *haciendas* during the early colonial period.

The vindication of ancient practices was a common resource in lawsuits fought over the use of water, both by *encomenderos* and *hacendados* and also by the peasants themselves. As we have seen with regard to irrigation practices that were "done like in the time of the Moors," the vindication of Inca customs in Cochabamba took place within the framework of the fracture caused by the colonial usurpation of land, which was stimulated by the specialised cultivation of cereal and the priority granted to watermills.[94]

In Moquegua, in southern Peru, the new *heredades* destined for the cultivation of vine and wheat, and also the construction of a watermill, caused the violation of the indigenous water distribution systems and the establishment of new management criteria in the hydraulic networks situated in the Osmore Valley soon after the conquest. The record of the visit carried out by Garci Díez de San Miguel in 1567 also informs us that the Spaniards and the Indians operated segregated irrigation spaces, as in the example of the Rímac valley.[95] In the Arequipa Valley, in the mid-16th century, the *estancieros* broke the pre-Hispanic *acequias* in order to divert the water towards their pastures during the dry season.[96] In any case, the massive decrease in population numbers during

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Agricultural Terracing, 38. See also Inge Schjellerup, "Early colonial utilization and management in Peru," in this volume.

92 For *chácaras* and *estancias* worked by Yanacona Indians and slaves, see James Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 49 (3) (1969): 422–3. See J.M. Fradera, "The Peculiarity of the Spanish Empire (a comparative interpretation)," in this volume.

93 Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550–1900. Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 73–85.

94 Karl S. Zimmerer, "Rescaling Irrigation in Latin America: The Cultural Images and Political Ecology of Water Resources," *Ecumene* 7 (2) (2000): 165–7.

95 Prudence M. Rice, *Vintage Moquegua. History, Wine, and Archaeology on a Colonial Peruvian Periphery* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 156.

96 Davies, *Landowners*, 37.

the colonial period, especially on the Peruvian coast, was the cause of an unprecedented surplus of water, something which, presumably, also diminished the level of conflict. The growth of Andean populations in recent times and the generalisation of market crops and the privatisation of water have provoked a new situation of scarcity which has made tension rise again, as pointed out by P. Trawick.[97]

The Rímac, Moquegua and Cochabamba examples are illustrative of how water allocation systems were imposed after the conquest in order to adapt to new production strategies. It is equally true that the corruption of former water distribution systems did not always take place immediately, or everywhere. According to the description of pre-Hispanic irrigation systems included by the Inca Garcilaso in his *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, the order of water distribution followed the pattern set out by the physical position of the fields.[98] On the other hand, the amount of time which each irrigator had for accessing water was determined by the amount of land possessed. It is, however, hard to believe that a single system was applied to the whole of the Inca Empire. Trawick has, nevertheless, suggested that the proportionality principle and the uniformity conveyed by this system set the general pattern in the Andes after the demographic collapse caused by the conquest. As with other Andean institutions, the Incas selected, adapted and disseminated some pre-existing local customs.

According to Trawick, these pre-Hispanic principles of proportionality and uniformity can still be recognised in Huaynacotas (Cotahuasi Valley, Arequipa, Peru). In this valley, the procedures described by Garcilaso in the 16th century still apply.[99] The maintenance of indigenous –probably pre-Incan – principles and water allocation systems in Cotahuasi is an extreme example of the "ultra-stability" of irrigation institutions. The survival of the principles described by Garcilaso in this case must also be connected with the small size of the original irrigated surfaces. Otherwise, as previously noted, exterior demands would have created a situation of scarcity and forced water allocation systems to be redefined. It appears that this pressure, which had become insupportable in the long run in the other examples cited, did not materialise in Cotahuasi. As pointed out by Trawick, the decisive factor in this regard was that this area was, for centuries, bypassed by the *haciendas* system and the associated demands

97 Paul Trawick, "The Moral Economy of Water: Equity and Antiquity in the Andean Commons," *American Anthropologist* 103 (2) (2001): 361–379, esp. 363.

98 Quoted in Trawick, "The Moral Economy of Water," 363.

99 Trawick, "The Moral Economy of Water," 379.

posed by market crops, such as alfalfa, sugar cane and other plants with high water requirements.[100] In this case, the colonial order was imposed via the creation of a *reducción*: this included the creation of the current village and the rupture of the agricultural connections with neighbouring areas that were located at different altitudes, but the original water allocation systems were not broken as had been done, for instance, in Moquegua.

Conclusions

Obviously, the examples cited do not constitute an exhaustive sample of the potential transformation of water distribution systems in early colonial contexts. They are, however, sufficient for us to present a number of relevant questions from a comparative perspective, and they allow us to observe the medieval and Iberian precedents to the colonial management of irrigation systems in a different light. The example of Casarabonela is illustrative in this regard.

Water distribution in Casarabonela's main hydraulic system was based, during the *Morisco* period, and probably also before then, on proportionality. Although irrigation time was limited to half-day turns, each irrigator could take as much water as his crops needed. The limited duration of the turns forced the owners in each block of land to agree upon the amount of water that each could take.

There was another turn, from Friday to Sunday, which followed the same criteria. Irrigators in this block, which was somewhat bigger in size than the previous one, could irrigate three days a week, either in the morning or the afternoon, according to the internal distribution of the block. This block may be interpreted as an enlargement of the irrigated space which took place before the 1485 Castilian conquest. This enlargement, however, did not mean that individual turns were imposed, and the original system could be maintained without changes.

This distribution framework, including the proportionality principle and the turn sequence, was kept for centuries. The proportionality principle was institutionally abolished in the 19th century: the previous half-day turns were sub-divided into hour-turns, so irrigators had a fixed quota regardless of what they were growing. Similarly, the sequential organisation of irrigation was abandoned, and now up to four different irrigators could make use of the system at any given time. The volume of water that each irrigator could use corre-

100 Trawick, "The Moral Economy of Water," 362, 363, 371. On the limits of these specialisations in the *haciendas*, see Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda," 425.

sponded only to the amount of land possessed, regardless of the varying needs of different crops. This change was implemented long after the expulsion of the *Moriscos* in 1570. The need to impose a new distribution system was brought about by the new demands posed by *vegas* and *cortijos* situated lower down, outside the original hydraulic system. The original water allocation system did not provide for the use of water outside the system's limits, whereas the new criteria, which were formalised in the 1849 *Reglamento*, did. It is impossible, with the information available to date, to determine the chronology and intensity of these demands that, in the long run, broke the original thresholds of the system and demanded a new institutional setting.

Proportionality was a general principle of irrigation systems before and after the Iberian and American conquests. This proportionality could be based just on the amount of land, or it could also take into consideration the needs of the crop under cultivation. We have seen that the proportionality between the amount of land and the volume of water was used in very different contexts, for example in Cotahuasi, a presumably pre-Hispanic Andean system, on the Peruvian coast in the colonial period, in Casarabonela in the late 16th century, and in San Antonio, Texas, established by the Canary colonists in the 18th century. On the other hand, the alienation of water and land was also widespread and can be noted in, for instance, Nasrid Granada, the *adulamiento* in the Canaries after the conquest, the sale of water rights in Arequipa in the 1540s, or the recent privatisation of water in the Peruvian Andes. It is not possible, therefore, to talk about specific "indigenous" and "colonial" systems of water distribution in these terms. The possibility of alienating water was, initially, related to scarcity. The crucial question is whether scarcity was taken into account in the design of the original layout and the original water allocation criteria, or whether it was only considered a factor with the imposition of new productive and management strategies, either upon pre-existing systems or newly constructed ones.

As predicted by E. Ostrom, the aforementioned examples show that water demands, especially those posed from outside the system, were a determinant, if not the most determinant, factor in the "tragedy of the commons," which was initiated with the modification of the principles regulating the management and operation of hydraulic systems. The construction of the colonial society involved the adoption of new productive and management agricultural criteria, including the allocation of water rights. The decisive question is how to establish the chronology and nature of these processes of substitution, which sometimes took centuries to unfold. In this sense, the "growth" thresholds of the original systems have to be considered, since this was the point from

which the original water allocation system would have become obsolete and non-functional.

Another issue that lies in the comparison between the management of colonial societies is the different role that indigenous had in the management of irrigation systems. In Casarabonela, a large part of the original population remained after the conquest. Between the late 15th century and the 1570 expulsion, *Moriscos* and Castilian peasants lived in the same village and worked the fields, under a single water distribution system. The final solution, the annihilation of the Andalusi social order, demonstrates that this form of social engineering, which was put into practice in different regions of the Peninsula, sometimes for centuries, resulted in the violent coexistence of different agricultural choices; this was ultimately resolved by the expulsion and full substitution of the Andalusi peasantry. There is little doubt that this was a decisive experience in the Atlantic and American colonisation processes.[101] In 1535, the Spanish settling in the Rímac Valley, near future Lima, knew that any form of promiscuous coexistence had no place in the new order. This stage of the colonisation process did not involve the massive settlement of European farmers.[102] The *república de los españoles* and the *república de los indios* had to be precisely defined and neatly separated from one another.[103] This ideal organisation of colonial society was also reflected in some hydraulic systems, in which the Indians had their own *acequias*, or in which Indians and Spaniards had distinctly differentiated irrigation turns. The connection between the Iberian and American colonial processes is, in this field, as in so many others, a very promising field of research.

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101 George M. Foster's *Culture and Conquest. America's Spanish Heritage* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960) is still a mandatory reference work for the study of the processes of selection that determined which Iberian social practices were later to be reproduced in America.

102 Rather, the colonists were "men of affairs," in the words of James Lockhart's *The Men of Cajamarca: A Social and Biographical Study of the First Conquerors of Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972).

103 Jeremy R. Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 47–8. There were exceptions to this, such as the above noted Spanish and Indian *chácaras* near Arequipa. In Lima, the Indians lived in the district of Santiago. In Trujillo, on the northern coast of Peru, the Spanish and Indian houses were next to each other. We do not know with certainty if this was also the case with the *huertas*. Juan Castañeda, "Indígenas entre españoles. Trujillo del Perú, 1534–1619," *Nueva corónica* 1 (2013).

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CHAPTER 9

Commercial Crop or Plantation System? Sugar Cane Production from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic

Adela Fábregas García

Introduction

Al-Muʿtamid, king and lord of Seville, lives in his Abbadid court surrounded by luxury. His gardens are full of exotic plants, tended by the most experienced botanists. His household abounds in the most sophisticated spices and perfumes. One day, his wife Iʿtimād sees common women kneading clay with their feet to make bricks. She wishes to do so as well, and tells her husband. He, in order to please her, brings large quantities of sugar, ginger and perfumes to the palace courtyard, so she can knead the perfumed mud with her feet.[1]

In this piece, the poet al-Tiğānī tries to describe his mentor's court in its full splendour, adorning the tale with the scent of the most prized spices and the exquisite sweetness of sugar, sign of the utmost refinement. Because that is what sugar is: refinement, sophistication and luxury. This is so in 11th century Seville as well as in the heart of Islam, Mecca, where the use of sugar in the holy months of *ramaḍān*, *raǧab* and *šaʿbān* almost reaches the category of art. Human or fruit-shaped sugar figurines are sold in the shops throughout the city, heaped in colourful piles over the shop counters, catching the eye like flowers and encouraging the traveller to spend his last few coins.[2]

Sugar cane came to join other substances already in use for the satisfaction of the old craving for sweeteners. In pre-Islamic times, this taste was satiated with products such as honey – always a favourite in the West – *manna* and fruit. In fact, we know sugar to have played a secondary role in antiquity in comparison with other sweeteners, despite possessing some superb features such as a strong sweet flavour, the absence of secondary tastes and good qualities as a preservative. Sugar's position among sweeteners is related to its

1 Henri Pérès, *Esplendor de al-Andalus. La poesía andaluza en árabe clásico en el siglo XI. Sus aspectos generales, sus principales temas y su valor documental* (Paris: 1937; Madrid: Hiperión, 1983), 328. Citations refer to the Hiperión edition.

2 Ibn Jubayr, *Ibn Jobair. Voyages*, ed. and trans. M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1949), 5, 141–142.

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nature as a luxury product, even in the Eastern regions where it originates. It is likely that such a consideration springs from the complexity of processing. Of course, in the West sugar is a cultural loan, and consumption thus acquires a social dimension.[3] It is not strictly related to the satisfaction of basic needs. It is common for developing societies to incorporate new features – by cultural loan – which either create new needs or cover old needs in new, exotic and, therefore, useful ways for status competition.

What we mean to stress with this is that sugar is both an unnecessary and a replaceable good. The needs satisfied with sugar are not a priority in those societies where it is used, including those societies that also produce it.

It is therefore logical to presume that sugar production must have been initiated for reasons unrelated to the satisfaction of basic needs. Thus sugar production must be considered a commercial venture from the outset, aimed at profiting from its commercialisation as a luxury and not at the satisfaction of primary needs. Other products such as raisins, dried figs and almonds, albeit mostly falling into the category of market crops – perhaps even more so than sugar – also had a place in the regular diet of the peasant populations involved in their cultivation and processing.[4] This was not the case with sugar. For this reason, the only explanation for its adoption by medieval Mediterranean societies lies in a secure commercialisation.

This crop and the industrial processing which it implies were very costly. We shall not linger here to discuss this matter, which we believe to be sufficiently well known, but we shall stress that the satisfaction of the biological needs of this tropical plant in Mediterranean environments demanded exclusive use of valuable irrigated land; this land would therefore stay outside peasant agricultural systems, based on irrigation and high productivity rates and on the combination of subsistence crops. It also required costly, exclusive infrastructure and was labour intensive during the processing of the crop into sugar. It was particularly costly, however, since it did not contribute to maintain the social balance of the peasant society involved in its cultivation. This high cost and the absence of a social profit equivalent to the effort involved in its cultivation

3 In Maxime Rodinson's definition. Maxime Rodinson, "Les influences de la civilisation musulmane sur la civilisation européenne médiévale dans les domaines de la consomation et de la distraction: L'alimentation," in *Convegno Internazionale. Oriente e Occidente nel Medioevo: filosofia e scienze* (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1971), 479–499.

4 Antonio Malpica, "Il traffico commerciale nel mondo mediterraneo occidentale alla fine del Medioevo: Il regno di Granada," in *Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia Militare. Aspetti ed attualità del potere marittimo in Mediterraneo nei secoli XII–XVI* (Roma: Ufficio storico della marina militare, 1999), 351–381, esp. 352–353.

leave commercial gain as the only explanation for the adoption of the crop in the first place. From this point of view, its nature as a market crop from the outset seems beyond doubt.

As we have already stressed, commercial profit lies behind the adoption of this crop by societies such as the Andalusian. This implies a well defined strategic decision, outlined outside peasant parameters and which will occupy a marginal position in the agricultural system, both regarding areas of cultivation and of labour allocation, including the tending of the crop and its subsequent processing. This seems to be the case for the earliest stages of sugar cane production in the Middle Ages as well as for later phases, when the position of sugar in European markets is well established.

Sugar in the Medieval Mediterranean Context

The strategy involved in sugar cane production in the Islamic Mediterranean, organised in many regards beyond the parameters and internal dynamics of peasant society, becomes self evident when observed from a number of different angles. There is no shortage of direct evidence pointing towards the involvement of the highest social strata in this activity. The Sicilian case is well known. Until the mid 13th century, sugar for consumption in Ifriqīya was not only cultivated but also processed in Sicily under the direct control of the Fatimid caliphs.[5]

Sugar production in Syria and Palestine – among the first sugar producing regions in the Mediterranean, where sugar cane has been attested as early as the Ummayyad caliphate although its final consolidation did not take place until around the 10th century – is connected with palace environments, where rudimentary sugar processing infrastructures for the satisfaction of the needs of the royal house have been found. Although details of sugar production in this region throughout the 11th century are difficult to ascertain, it seems at least clear that production must have had the support of the state and of a minority elite capable of investing large amounts of capital.[6] The Egyptian case

5 ʿAbd Allāh Abū Bakr, *Kitāb Rīyāḍ an-nufūs fī Ṭabaqāt ʿulamāʾ Qayrawān wa Ifriqīyah*, trans. Michele Amari, Biblioteca Arabo-Sicula. Raccolta di testi arabici che toccano la Geografia, la Storia, la Biografia e la Bibliografia della Sicilia (Torino-Roma: F.A. Brockhaus, 1880), 1, 294–324, esp. 324.

6 Mohamed Ouerfelli, *Le sucre. Production, commercialisation et usages dans la Méditerranée médiévale* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 31–37.

also offers abundant examples of the involvement of the Fatimid caliphs, high-ranking officials, merchants and important landowners from an early stage.[7]

But this is not everything. In al-Andalus, several *taifa* governants also exhibited an interest in experimenting and learning ways to adapt the plant, ever present in the court's gardens; in rural areas, however, the new plant did not thrive to the same extent, and never shrugged off the label of exoticism with which it had arrived. It was present in al-Muʿtamid's (1069–91) Abbadid court garden, probably under the supervision of the Sevillian Abū l-Khayr, one of the most reputed Andalusian agronomists and author of one of the most detailed and accurate descriptions of the plant and of its maintenance, which he based on personal experience.[8] Far from being an exceptional case, this may have been the norm in the *taifas*, dinasties always on the lookout for elements with which to legitimise their recently acquired sovereignty, but also of new economic resources with which to guarantee their survival.[9] Their own nature gave these kingdoms an extraordinary dynamism and drove them towards novel economic practices and projects that even they termed as exotic. These were promoted by the sovereigns themselves – for example, in the *taifa* of Almería ruled by al-Muʿtaṣim. According to al-ʿUḏrī this included exotic crops such as several varieties of banana and sugar cane.[10]

The fact is that – due to the high esteem which commercial circles were already showing for sugar – this product offered excellent profit perspectives.

The careful selection of areas for the cultivation of this crop, which appears to respond to very specific criteria, is a clear indicator of the commercial orientation of sugar production from an early stage. Cultivation had to be carried out in easily accessible fields, equipped with the right infrastructures to ensure the efficient commercialisation of the produce, as abundantly shown by those areas which enjoyed an early commercial success.

This is the case, for example, of the Sūs region in Morocco, whence according to al-Bakrī (1028–94) sugar was already being exported to other parts of the Maghreb in the 11th century.[11] This region already produced good quality sugar, highly appreciated in commercial circles, since according to different

7 Ouerfelli, *Le sucre*, 73 and ff.

8 Abū l-Khayr, *Kitāb al-filāḥa. Tratado de agricultura*, ed. and trans. Julia M. Carabaza (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, 1991).

9 Félix Retamero, "La formalización del poder en las monedas de los *mulūk* de Denia (siglo V H./XI D.C.)," *Al-Qantara XXVII* (2006): 417–445.

10 Al-ʿUḏrī, *Tarsīʿ al-Ajbār*, trans. Manuel Sánchez, "La cora de Ilbīra en los siglos X y XI, según al-ʿUḏrī, (1003–1085)," *Cuadernos de Historia del Islam* 7 (1975–76): 5–82, esp. 45.

11 Al-Bakrī, *Kitāb al-masālik wa l-mamālik*, ed. and trans. Mac Guckin De Slane, *Description de l'Afrique Septentrionale* (Argel: A. Jourdan, 1911–13), 2, 305 of the trans.

authors it could be found ranging far and wide. According to Abū Hamid al-Andalusī, sugar produced in Sūs was exported worldwide, while Maqqarī highlights its quality.[12] Instances of the infrastructures necessary for the full realisation of profits, aimed at channelling the product into international commercial circuits, have been attested. For example, a sugar market in the nearby Marrakech.[13]

Earlier, in the 10th and 11th centuries, in the eastern Mediterranean region of the Levant, the main areas for sugar cane cultivation were close to the sea shore, around cities such as Tripoli, Beirut, Tyre, Sidon and Acre.[14] In the Nile Valley, an essential commercial route and a preferential region for sugar cane production, the crop concentrated around Fustat, Faiyum and Upper Egypt.[15]

The commercial orientation of sugar production in the Mediterranean from an early stage is therefore clear. This is even more evident, if possible, in the Latin orbit, where sugar was mostly adopted in a second phase of growth throughout the Mediterranean; Venetian Cyprus, Norman Sicily, Valencia and the Portuguese Algarve are particularly relevant and well known examples, which emerged alongside other regions still under Islamic rule but where the new economic logic was already becoming dominant.[16]

This was also the case of Nasri Granada, which gave a new boost to sugar production in response to the demands posed by the main commercial factors in the late medieval west. This activity, again fundamentally and inescapably backed by local powers, drifted even further away from the parameters

12 Abū Hamid al-Andalusī, *'Adjā'ib el-makhloukāt*, trans. E. Fagnan, *Extraits inédits relatifs au Maghreb* (*Géographie et Histoire*) (Argel: Ancienne Maison Bastide-Joudan, 1924), 1, 27–40, esp. 27. Al-Maqqarī, *Naf al- ṭīb*, trans. Pascual Gayangos, *The history of the Mohammedan dynasties in Spain; extracted from the Nafhu-t-Tib min Ghosni-l-andalusi-r-rattib wa Tárikh Lisánu-d-Dín Ibn-l-Khattib, by Ahmed Ibn Mohammed al-Makkarí, a native of Telemsán* (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1964), 1, 87. Gayangos attributes the work to Ibn Sa'īd, *Kitāb al-mušraq fī hulī l-mašriq*. The work is not preserved and very little is known about its author (p. 387, footnote 6).

13 Ibn 'Idārī al-Marrākušī, *Al-Bayān al-Mugrib fi Ijtiṣār Ajbār muluk al-Andalus wa al-Magrib*, trans. Ambrosio Huici, *Colección de Crónicas árabes de la Reconquista* (Tetuán: Editorial Marroquí, 1954), 2, 78.

14 Ouerfelli, *Le sucre*, 31–37.

15 Ouerfelli, *Le sucre*, 71 and ff.

16 In Cyprus sugar cane cultivation thrived especially under the promotion of the Venetian Cornaro family, which enthusiastically adopted this crop for strictly commercial reasons. Doris Stockly, "Commerce et rivalité a Chypre. Le transport du sucre par les Vénitiens dans les années 1440, d'après quelques documents génois," in *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna. Studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto (Genova: Brigati, 1997), 1133–1144.

followed by the peasant society which lay at the socio-economic foundations of these regions.[17] The few known references to sugar production from 14th century Granada insist on this association between cultivation and commercial infrastructures for exportation, openly revealing the commercial orientation that lay behind sugar production. We shall not fully reproduce here the well known texts by Al-ʿUmarī, Ibn al-Khaṭīb and al-Qalqašandī which stand as a clear evidence of this for Nasrid Granada, but we shall once again highlight that this was no local phenomenon.[18]

This mercantile-feudal impulse, as it has been defined by Malpica with reference to well known cases such as that of Valencia, and mainly because of the new stimulus introduced by commercially based capital, would herald the golden age in the medieval history of sugar.[19] From as early as the 13th, but especially from the 14th century, sugar became a major commercial success, with positive effects on production areas, both Latin and Islamic, which were now able – through the mediation of these commercial companies – to sell their products in the main European markets.

Although we shall not examine this issue in depth, we must mention that the immediate consequence of all this was an absolute increase in production and, foremost, the beginning of a trend towards the diversification of available sugar qualities, particularly of lower qualities aimed at a wider spectrum of the population and at less restricted consumption patterns. This phenomenon seems to be closely related with some production areas such as Granada or Sicily, which find their niche in the European market in the context of the trend

17 See a recent overview of the successive productive models involved in the first stages of sugar production in Antonio Malpica, "La caña de azúcar y la producción azucarera desde el mundo mediterráneo a las islas atlánticas. Una interpretación de 'modelos,'" in *Azúcar. Los ingenios en la colonización canaria* (*1487–1525*), ed. Ana Viña, Mariano Gambín and M. Dolores Chinea (Tenerife: MHA, 2008), 27–40.

18 Tunisia: Al-ʿUmarī, *Masālik el abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1927), 36–37. Morocco: Ibn al-Khatīb, *Mīʿyār al-ijtiyār fī ḍikr al-maʿāhid wa-l-diyār*, ed. and trans. Mohammed K. Chabana (Rabat, 1977), 54–55; Al-Qalqašandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿša fī kitābāt al-inšā*, trans. Luis Seco de Lucena (Valencia: Anubar, 1975), 25.

19 Malpica, "La caña de azúcar," 34. This incentive could materialise in very different ways, from the increase in demand, with the subsequent increase in tax collection – for example in Granada – to direct investment in new ventures for sugar production. This could result in the creation of fully private concerns, a common case for example in Cyprus, or in partnerships with the feudal lords. Adela Fábregas, *Producción y comercio de azúcar en el Mediterráneo medieval. El ejemplo del reino de Granada* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000); Jaume Castillo, "Els feudals i la introducció de la canyamel a la Safor del segle XV," *Afers* 32 (1999): 101–122.

towards increased diversification. These regions would also produce sugar of higher quality – although by no means comparable with the best Eastern sugars – but would have no qualms in supplying the market with much lower quality varieties, which the market easily absorbed. Sugar thus started to reach beyond the luxury circuits with had hitherto restricted its consumption. This would lay the groundwork for the future great explosion of the sugar industry.

This substantial step forward in the history of sugar, the decisive commercial impulse followed by a moderate increase in production and consumption, was not to go any further. And it could not go any further. That is why the comparison between the sugar sector in the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages and the spectacular explosion in sugar production in America is simply absurd. All comparisons will naturally reach the conclusion that, after the end of the Middle Ages, traditional sugar varieties were wiped out from the international markets by Atlantic and American varieties. And the equally natural conclusion will follow that these traditional varieties succumbed to the crisis produced by the emergence of the new ones. But how can we effectively relate medieval markets, even after the mercantile expansion – or even revolution – with the world market system supporting the American stage of sugar production?

Nasrid Granada Sugar in the Late Medieval Context

The case of Granada, especially well known to us despite the still considerable gaps in our knowledge, should be of help in illustrating our doubts. We have mentioned several times that, according to coeval authors, during its golden age in the 14th and 15th centuries, the sugar produced in Granada could flood the European markets. What amounts are we actually referring to when we talk about "flooding"? Let us try to be as precise as possible. The few available pieces of hard evidence allude to very small quantities; ridiculously so when compared with the mercantile-minded amounts of barely a century later, let alone current production figures. Although we only have precise production figures for 5 years during the Nasrid period, they are fully reliable since they source from the agricultural society in charge of exporting sugar from Granada.[20] Furthermore, the data correspond to the peak period of sugar production in Nasrid Granada. The figures are shown in Table 9.1.

20 Though not all sugar was the property of this agricultural society, a significant part of it was, and even the proportion that was not had to go through the society's control systems. At any rate, we believe that the sugar consignments bought by the society for direct

TABLE 9.1 *Value and volume of sugar production in Nasrid Granada*

	Value	Weight in arrobas	Weight in kg (based on Genoese arroba = 7,9 kg)	Weight in kg (based on Andalusi arroba = 7,2 kg)
1435	70,000 *besantes*	3168	25027	22809
1436	190,000 *besantes*	3078	24316	22161
1438	100,000 *besantes*			
1451	21,000 pounds (126,000 *besantes*)	2810	22199	20232
1454	72,000 *besantes*	1900	15010	13680

These figures tally with what we know about medieval sugar consumption according to the account of the *infante* Don Enrique. Concerned about the threat of collapse posed to the European markets by the growth of Madeiran sugar production, he recommends in 1469 not to exceed production quotas, set on 10,000 *arrobas* per year, which the markets are deemed capable of absorbing.[21] Not respecting these quotas caused an overproduction crisis and the general collapse of prices on the island, despite these being but the first steps of Madeiran sugar production, a timid announcement of what we shall see later in the early 16th century.[22] Already Madeira is operating at a completely different level: while 130 vases of Sicilian sugar are sold in the Valencian market in 1496, no less that 3,000 are imported from Madeira, despite Valencia being a traditional outlet for Sicilian sugar.[23]

commercialisation are highly representative of total production figures. See Adela Fábregas, "Vías de acceso del azúcar del reino de Granada al mercado europeo: la Sociedad de los Frutos (siglos XIV–XV)," in *Actas do II Seminario Internacional de História do Açúcar. Rotas e Mercados* (Funchal: Regiâo Autónoma da Maderia, 2002), 22–52; Idem, "Azúcar e italianos en el reino nazarí de Granada. Del éxito comercial a la intervención económica." *Cuadernos del CEMYR,* 22 (2014): 133–154.

21 In this case, we should talk about Madeiran *arrobas*, equivalent to 12.852 Kg and 14.852 from 1502. José Azevedo, *A Madeira e a construção do mundo atlántico* (*séculos XV–XVIII*) (Funchal: Secretaria Regional de Turismo e Cultura-CEHA, 1995), although we have collected this information from Antonio M. Macías, "Canarias, 1480–1550. Azúcares y crecimiento económico," in *Rotas e mercados*, 157–191, esp. p. 164, note 27.

22 Alberto Vieira, "A Madeira e o mercado do Açúcar. Séculos XV–XVI," in *Rotas e mercados*, 55–89, esp. 69–73.

23 Vieira, "A Madeira," 57.

The Canarian case is even more spectacular. From the first decade of the 16th century (1507–8), that is, barely ten years after the conquest of the archipelago, the production of Tenerife alone is of 69,090 Castilian *arrobas* (11.5 kg). The case of Gran Canaria is nothing short of incredible, with a production of 400,000 *arrobas* in 1502.[24]

The earliest production figures for Hispaniola reflect a reality which is already utterly out of proportion with European levels. An efficient *ingenio* can process around 8,000 *arrobas* in white sugar only per year, and the total production can reach 24,000 *arrobas* per year. A well furnished *trapiche* (sugar mill), although never reaching the level of an *ingenio*, could process 10,000 *arrobas* of sugar per year. At the prime of the sugar sector on the island in the mid 16th century, Hispaniola could export every year over 100,000 *arrobas* of sugar to Seville alone.[25]

Considering these data, is it possible to argue for the existence of spaces for competition? In fact, we do not perceive a productive crisis in the Mediterranean in connection with the new American factor, or at least we believe that the changes introduced in Europe should not be presented in such terms. The disappearance of Nasrid sugar from the international markets was not caused by a productive drop, but by an increase in local and regional demands which are now capable of absorbing the whole production. The truth is that the sugar industry in Granada never ceased growing, and certainly not after the Castilian conquest in the late 15th century. It is, however, a perfect illustration of the idea that we wish to suggest here: that Granada, the Mediterranean world at large, and the emerging Atlantic sector need to be considered at completely different levels. The sugar producing areas in the Mediterranean carried the weight of the initial increase in sugar production in the middle ages; this involved the development of a productive strategy which proved essential for the promotion of sugar as a commercially viable commodity, without which evolution could not have been carried any further and which would also widen consumption patterns, the final condition for commercial success. But from this stage the newly created needs could not be satisfied with the existing productive structure; sugar demanded a new productive system which would be difficult to apply in the Mediterranean.

24 Macías, "Canarias," 180, 182.

25 Genaro Rodríguez, "La economía azucarera de la Española en el siglo XVI," in *História e tecnologia do açúcar*, ed. Antonio Vieira (Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlántico, 2000), 117–160, esp. 143–145.

The Limited Expansion of Cultivated Areas

The difficulty of applying the new productive system is well understood and has been analysed by us elsewhere. At any rate, we believe that it is a topic worthy of further analysis, since many key points and details remain unknown. This will be our task henceforth. We will thus compare the main features of sugar production in Mediterranean regions with those which inherited, continued and overtook their productive model. A comprehensive insight into the situation and development in the sugar islands will be essential for a good understanding of the Mediterranean history of sugar. These new productive contexts, albeit clearly indebted to the Mediterranean experience, will exhibit their own features, which always point toward the supersession of the previous model and the constant search for new productive strategies. This has led some authors to label them as experimental areas.[26]

The first necessary step is to increase the areas dedicated to sugar cane production. The Mediterranean world could hardly assume such a reorganisation of the agricultural space, let alone do it at the required pace.

At this stage I must go into some factors already mentioned elsewhere (see the papers by Kirchner, and by Retamero and Martínez-Enamorado in this volume). Since they play a major role in my following arguments, however, I have no option but to make them explicit. In our best known example, Granada, the productive regime – a model of rural economy based on irrigation and with strong social implications – imposed important limitations and sugar cane could hardly do anything more than survive. Agrarian systems were closely determined by water management and intensive labour. The amount of land under cultivation was determined by the amount of water available from a river or spring. Once outlined, therefore, agricultural systems were difficult to alter, and their expansion involved significant technical challenges. On the other hand, the design of the perimeter of a given irrigation area responded to the needs of the community which exploited it. These areas were therefore assigned to a specific peasant community made up of small tenants and focused on subsistence agriculture – thus excluding monoculture – with very well defined tasks, multiple crops aimed at self-sufficiency and often a disperse property regime.

This kind of irrigation agriculture could assume the cultivation of sugar cane to a certain extent, which would otherwise find no niche in Mediterranean landscapes. In fact, sugar cane added commercial value to the crops, to

26 Alberto Vieira, "A Madeira, a expansão e história da tecnología do açúcar," in *História e Tecnologia do açúcar*, 7–27, esp. 8.

the point of becoming a bonus for exchange. The drawback is that the system did not allow for any concentration of production, as correctly pointed out by Antonio Malpica.[27] This agricultural regime opens up to the market as a consequence of high productivity and the specialised nature of production, but exchange is never allowed to become the basis of the economic system.[28] Additionally, peasant social dynamics would ensure that no substantial modifications were introduced to labour mechanisms. All these circumstances explain the limited importance given to sugar cane from the beginning. Therefore the restrictions to the cultivation of sugar cane – the development of which requires that certain specific conditions were met – in al-Andalus were not only responding to landscape features. The description of some of the areas where sugar cane was in cultivation will help us to better understand this issue.

Al-Nuwayrī recommended in the 13th century the use of flood basins in Egypt for sugar cane, while Ibn Ḥawqal referred to the surroundings of Palermo as an intensively cultivated agricultural area, crisscrossed by middle-sized fluvial courses, large enough to feed and power watermills. The lands near the shoreline are described as territory full of water plants also cultivated with sugar cane.[29]

The description of these small deltas could perfectly match that of some of our well known Andalusian sugar cane producing areas. Indeed, from the earliest cultivation of sugar cane in al-Andalus, marshland became a preferential location. The Sevillian marshes, where according to al-Rāzī the plains are covered by water even during the summer, were already described in the 10th century as a rich landscape, good for crops, game, pasture and sugar cane.[30]

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27 Malpica, "La caña de azúcar," 36.

28 Andrew M. Watson, "A case of non-diffusion: The Non-adoption by muslim Spain of the open-field system of Christian Europe. Causes and Consequences," in *Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islámico secc. XIII–XVIII. Atti della Trentottesima Settimana di Studi, 1–5 maggio 2006*, ed. Simoneta Cavaciocchi (Firenze: Fondazione Istituto Internazionale di studi economici "F. Datini," 2007), 241–265.

29 On Egypt, Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi, "L'agriculture dans l'empire mamluk au Moyen-Age d'après al-Nuwayrī," *Les cahiers de Tunisie* 85–86 (1974): 23–45, esp. 25. On Palermo, Ibn Ḥawqal, *Kitāb al-masālik*, trans. Michele Amari, Biblioteca Arabo-Sicula. Raccolta di testi arabici che toscano la Geografia, la Storia, la Biografia e la Bibliografia Della Sicilia (Torino and Roma: Loescher, 1880–1), 11–27.

30 Al-Rāzī, *Ajbār mulūk al-andalus*, multilingual edition by Diego Catalán and María S. de Andrés, *Crónica del moro Rasis. Versión del ajbār mulūk al-andalus de Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Mūsà al-Rāzī, 889–955; romanzada para el rey don Dionís de Portugal hacia 1300 por Mahomad, alarife y Gil Pérez, clérigo de don Perianes Porçel* (Madrid: Gredos, 1974), 94.

And shortly afterwards by al-ʿUḏrī in much more detail, describing the area known as al-Marayn as a place rich in water, with very fertile pastures that did not dry even during the summer. These conditions are extremely favourable to stockbreeding, which benefits from abundant pastures, and to certain crops such as sugar cane, which was particularly abundant in coastal areas.[31] Also, the delta of the River Guadalfeo, on Granada's coast, one of the most successful and long lasting sugar cane cultivation areas in the Iberian Peninsula, is subject to seasonal floods resulting in marshland. Al-Rāzī also highlighted the area's wealth of trees, cumin and sugar cane.[32]

This recommendation to choose humid and flood areas for the cultivation of sugar cane obviously responds to ecological criteria, but it is also true that these areas are rarely part, at least to a significant degree, of agricultural systems, being marginal areas around river basins. Their soil subtract is often sandy, of low agricultural quality and therefore unfit for traditional crops. In short, they are marginal areas with regard to agricultural irrigation spaces. Their main feature is permanent access to abundant water, which is essential for the survival and quality of sugar cane, covering the water needs of a demanding plant without interfering with the irrigated areas which play such a central role in the Islamic agricultural model.[33]

Sugar cane remains today, and certainly was in al-Andalus, which is the best known area for its production in the Mediterranean, a marginal crop awkwardly related to traditional peasant agricultural systems. It was always a labour intensive crop with a clearly secondary role, as reflected in the size and location of the fields dedicated to it. It leapt from the palatine gardens to the fields, but certainly not to occupy a position of privilege. In a few cases, sugar cane was cultivated in suburban areas in which new dynamics had begun to displace traditional peasant models.[34] It was also cultivated in lands which were the property of the Nasrid sultan, for example in the Vega de Salobreña, irrigated by the River Guadalfeo. These are the only sugar cane producing areas the ownership of

31 Al-ʿUḏrī, *Tarsīʿ al-Ajbār*, trans. Manuel Sánchez, *Fragmentos geográfico-históricos referentes a las coras de Elvira y Sevilla en la obra de Ahmad b. ʿUmar al ʿUḏrī (1003–1085). Estudio preliminar, traducción y notas*" (unpublished dissertation, Universidad de Granada, 1969), 118. A later translation was published in Rafael Valencia, "La cora de Sevilla en el Tarsīʿ al-Ajbār de Ahmad b. ʿUmar al ʿUḏrī,'" *Andalucía Islámica* IV–V (1983–86): 107–143, esp. 117.

32 Al-Rāzī, *Ajbār mulūk al-andalus*, 28.

33 Miquel Barceló, "El diseño de espacios irrigados en al-Andalus: un enunciado de principios generales," in *Actas del I Coloquio de Historia y medio físico. El agua en zonas áridas. Arqueología e historia* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1989), 1, XV–XL.

34 Antonio Malpica, *Turillas, alquería del alfoz sexitano.* (*Edición del Apeo de Turillas de 1505*) (Granada: Universidad de Granada-Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1984).

which are known, and the most illustrative example of mass production in the history of Andalusian sugar. Until very recently, the only known case was that recorded by Ibn al-Khaṭīb, but more examples have since come to light in the nearby city of Almuñécar.[35] Our knowledge of the lands belonging to the king or to the royal house on the coast of Granada increases day by day, and it is presumed that many of these properties were cultivated with sugar cane.[36]

It seems increasingly likely that the Nasri state itself was actively involved in this sort of commercially focused agricultural venture. Often, lease terms would be agreed with farmers for the exploitation of these lands under strict conditions and the compulsory and exclusive cultivation of sugar cane.[37] The highest levels of society would therefore be involved in the exploitation of sugar cane through the lease of lands for its production.[38] When the evolution of the sector imposed an increase in the area under sugar cane cultivation, new spaces had to be found in alternative locations in order not do dislocate the dominant agrarian structure and the social building attached to it. This expansion thus often occupied suburban areas where the peasant substratum had already been superseded.[39]

35 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Mi'yār al-ijtiyār*. 120–121. Antonio Malpica, "Las 'tierras del rey' y las ordenanzas de la acequia del río Verde en Almuñécar," in *Castilla y el mundo feudal. Homenaje al profesor Julio Valdeón*, ed. Isabel del Val and Pascual Martínez (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León-Universidad de Valladolid, 2009), 2, 167–178.

36 José E. López de Coca, "Granada y la ruta de Poniente: el tráfico de frutos secos (siglos XIV y XV)," in *Navegación marítima del Mediterráneo al Atlántico*, ed. Antonio Malpica (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2001), 149–177, esp. 175–177; Antonio Malpica, "Sobre el mundo agrícola nazarí. La alquería de Escóznar en el siglo XIV," in *Poder y sociedad en la Baja Edad Media hispánica. Estudios en homenaje al profesor Luis Vicente Díaz Martín*, ed. Carlos Reglero (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2002), 1007–1024. Emilio Molina, "El Mustajlas Andalusí (I) (s. VIII–XI)," *Revista del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada y su Reino* 14–14 (1999–2000): 99–189; Emilio Molina, "Más sobre el Mustajlas nazari," in *Estudios árabes dedicados D. Luis Seco de Lucena* (*en el XXV aniversario de su muerte*) (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1999), 107–118.

37 The production of sugar cane was regulated by the so called *musāqā* exploitation regime, or "irrigation contract." This is a lease of the exploitation rights of a plot of land planted with fruit trees and/or stem plants (cereal, sugar cane, etc. with the exclusion of vegetables) in exchange for a share (half, third, fifth, etc.) of the crop. Vincent Lagardère, "Les contrats de culture de la canne à sucre à Almuñécar et Salobreña aux XIII et XIV siècles," in *Paisajes del azúcar. Actas del V Seminario Internacional sobre la caña de azúcar*, ed. Antonio Malpica (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1995), 69–79.

38 Lagardère, "Les contrats," 69–79.

39 Malpica, *Turillas, alquería del alfoz sexitano*.

After the Castilian conquest, the new lords proved willing to assume the necessary investments for the adaptation of production to the new developments occurring in the sector, and efforts were made to impose new regimes, closer to monoculture, more competitive with regard to the Atlantic-American phenomenon, but success was nevertheless limited.[40] The scale of production realised by the new plantation system was impossible to reach.

These changes did, however, involve substantial alterations to the region's traditional agricultural regime. This was the source of conflicts such as that between Juan de Ulloa and Marco Squarzafigo and Miguel el Hanini, owners of an *ingenio* (sugar refinery) in Lojuela, Almuñécar, who argued about the need to expand the sugar cane production areas by occupying cereal fields. This would involve the rearrangement of the hydraulic system throughout the whole basin and a reorganisation of the labour structure in order to cover the new needs.[41] A similar problem is encountered in Algeciras (present province of Cádiz) where Francisco Piñar's wish to introduce sugar cane in Río de la Miel against the wholehearted opposition of the locals ended with the opening of a lawsuit in 1516.[42]

Indeed, not even the Madeiran case shows particularly revolutionary features regarding the property structure when compared with the Mediterranean systems, at least at first sight. In fact, and despite these outward similarities, the reality of both examples is completely different.

Madeira would be the destination of important population contingents from Portugal, as a part of the colonisation policy promoted by the Portuguese crown. The agricultural policy was based on the creation of small rural exploitations managed according to traditional agrarian regimes. By 1520 the exploitation of sugar cane was based around small properties, at least in part of the island. The area around Funchal would account for 33% of total sugar cane production, with 27% around Calheta and 20% around both Ribeira Brava and Ponta Delgada.[43] However, the social reality suggested by these farms, whose owners are known, was very different from the picture offered by traditional peasant systems. The evidence obviously records small and medium farmers, but also cobblers, barbers, carpenters, merchants, civil servants, officials, etc.

40 This was achieved by amalgamating previously uncultivated areas and the mini-plots which stood as the basis of the previous Andalusian system.

41 Malpica, "Las 'tierras del rey'."

42 Antonio Malpica, "Medio físico y territorio: el ejemplo de la caña de azúcar a finales de la Edad Media," in *Paisajes del azúcar*, 11–40, esp. 34–36.

43 José Pereira da Costa and Fernando Jasmins-Pereira, *Lívros de contas da ilha da Madeira (1504–1537). Registo da produção de açúcar*, (Funchal: Regiâo Autónoma da Madeira, 1989).

who see agriculture as secondary occupation with which to supplement their income.[44] On the other hand, the trend over time points towards the concentration of property in a few privileged hands, which did not amount to more than 1% of the total population.[45]

Regarding total area under sugar cane cultivation, the situation also changes substantially over time, and between 1450 and 1506 sugar cane becomes the predominant crop on the island.[46] Sugar cane becomes therefore a priority crop from a very early stage, and even though production largely remains in the hands of small farmers, these soon focus a significant part of their effort to the production of sugar cane.

In the Canaries the progression is even easier to trace. Land allotment for new settlers responded mainly to merits during the conquest, and therefore some members of the higher orders soon received large properties. Additionally, the shortage of water resources in the Canaries in comparison to Madeira made the allocation of rights over water a priority even with regard to the allotment of land itself.[47] These lords were given preference in the distribution of the best soils around the river basins, where irrigation systems can be easily arranged, to promote the development of highly productive agricultural environments. Sugar cane held a foremost position in these systems from the beginning.[48] These lords would dominate most of the islands' sugar cane production, not only because they were allotted the best available lands for this sort of crop, but also because the exploitation of sugar required of an initial capital investment for the construction of the *ingenios* – essential for the crop's profitability – which only they could afford. The minimum extension of land granted to anyone willing to cultivate sugar cane was of thirty *fanegas*.[49] Francisco Palomar, Genoese merchant residing in Valencia, bought in 1494 from Alonso de Lugo – governor in Tenerife – lands and a sugar *ingenio* in Agaete,

44 Virginia Rau and Jorge de Macedo, *O açúcar na Madeira nos fins do século XV: problemas de produçáo e comércio*, (Funchal: Junta Geral do Distrito Autónomo do Funchal, 1962), 22.

45 Alberto Vieira, "Sugar islands. The sugar economy of Madeira and Canaries, 1450–1650," in *Tropical Babylons. Sugar and the making of the Atlantic world, 1450–1680*, ed. Stuart B. Schwartz (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 42–84, esp. 45.

46 Vieira, "Sugar islands," 47.

47 Thomas Glick, *Los antecedentes en el Viejo Mundo del sistema de irrigación de San Antonio, Texas* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2010).

48 Macías, "Canarias," 182.

49 Eduardo Aznar and Ana Viña, "El azúcar en Canarias," in (*1450–1550*). *Actas del I Seminario Internacional* (Motril: Casa de la Palma, 1989), 173–188, esp. 178. Manuel Lobo, "El ingenio en Canarias," in *História e tecnologia do açúcar*, 105–115. Macías, "Canarias," 157–191.

including 90 *fanegas* of land, three buildings (*ingenio*, boiler room and draining house) and a nearby bread mill.[50]

In this way, although land was initially distributed to give priority to small exploitation units, Madeira and especially the Canaries soon witnessed a radical change in the property distribution of lands under sugar cane cultivation. The trend was to develop early prototypes of the plantation system, later to be fully realised in America, the key feature of which was monoculture. The predominance of extensive sugar cane production in Gran Canaria – made sustainable by the economic structure promoted by the Castilian crown in the archipelago, in which the economies of the different islands complemented one another –[51] was to become characteristic of the Atlantic islands and was the key for the qualitative leap involved in the full incorporation of sugar cane to the mechanisms of a pre-capitalist market economy, and the subsequent abandonment of traditional productive regimes, the external appearances of which were still, however, preserved. The occupation of the best lands by a dominant crop and the increasing size of the properties so engaged stand as signs of a hitherto unrealised flexibility in agricultural systems.

Changes in the Processing Facilities

The second condition for the adaptation of sugar processing to the new challenges posed by the international market is connected with processing infrastructures: *aduanas*, *trapiches* and *ingenios*. In this regard, developments in America were to introduce a completely new situation. Let us briefly consider the nature of an early sugar *ingenio* in America. The large amounts of sugar cane to be processed demanded optimised procedures, and strict operational guidelines for the synchronisation and coordination of all operations involved were imposed. This explains the inextricable relationship created between sugar cane plantations and sugar processing plants – always located side by side – the coordination of which can only be guaranteed by a single management. This proximity also means that both units were operated by the same work force, the control of which became a priority, explaining the resort to slave labour, which we shall cover below.

50 Archivo de la real Chancillería de Granada, cab. 512, leg. 2476, pieza 7; Archivo General de Simancas, RGS, 1496–II, fol 1.

51 Manuel Lobo, "La navegación entre las Islas Canarias en la Edad Moderna," in *Islas y sistemas de navegación durante las edades media y moderna*, ed. Adela Fábregas (Granada: Alhulia, 2010), 91–115.

The evidence available for the sort of *aduana* in operation during the Nasrid period sharply contrasts with this picture, but is perfectly consistent with what we know about their productive scale. While they reflect the importance of sugar cane cultivation in the region, they also lack the kind of structure or organisation capable of coping with a large volume of production. These were small structures for the processing of discrete production volumes which sometimes hardly extended beyond the domestic scale.[52] As we have outlined above, sugar cane – and other market crops – played a secondary role in the predominant agricultural system, in spite of their commercial profitability. The humble processing structures, therefore, faithfully reflect the limited volume of production.

We know, for example, that because of their small size, *trapiches* and *aduanas* were often called "houses;" the written descriptions locate them at the centre of settlements, and say that they were equipped with animal drawn mills. The Faqih Basti's property in Motril (Granada) is said to have had two grinding stones.[53] Another in Lojuela (Almuñécar, Granada), owned by Juan Castellanos, had only one boiler to boil and purge the juice. This made boiling potentially problematic, and for this reason Luis Fernández requested, as late as 1522, a second boiler as a condition of taking up the position of master boiler, purger and whitener.[54]

Material remains, most commonly dating to the Castilian period, confirm these impressions. In 2005 Antonio Malpica published the earliest remains of the only sugar aduana known to date on the coast of Granada. The structure, located within the precinct of the Castillo de San Miguel (Almuñécar), dates to the early 16th century. It is relatively small in size, and its mode of operation is still largely unknown, due to the partial nature of the excavations.[55]

The evidence also points towards there being a relatively small number of plants during the Nasrid period. To date, later Castilian documents have helped to identify four sugar *aduanas* in the Guadalfeo-Río Verde area, without doubt the most important region of Nasrid sugar production. The expansion of sugar cane production immediately after the Castilian conquest was accompanied

52 Antonio Malpica and Adela Fábregas, "La producción de azúcar en ámbito doméstico en el reino de Granada," in *O Acúcar e o Quotidiano. Actas do III Seminario Internacional de História do Açúcar* (Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlántico, 2004), 29–49.

53 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Diversos (Títulos y Familias), leg. 1794.

54 Archivo de Protocolos Notariales de Granada, Francisco Muñoz, fols. 586r–587r.

55 Antonio Malpica, "Aportaciones de la Arqueología a la Historia del Azúcar: el caso de la costa de Granada (Motril y Almuñécar)," in *Preços, medidas e fiscalidade. Actas do IV Seminario Internacional de História do Açúcar.* (Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Açúcar, 2006), 385–400.

by an equivalent increase in the number of sugar processing plants. Thus by the late 16th century the number of sugar processing concerns located between Salobreña (with three plants, two within the town itself and another one in the *alquería* of Lobres) and Motril (up to seven have been identified beyond doubt) had grown to 12, which is a considerable number for what is a relatively small area. This is indicative of an enlarged production and the inability of existing structures to cope with it, although we must not believe this increase to be of a spectacular kind. In fact, the new *aduanas* do not seem to incorporate significant structural changes. For example, the illustrative case of the *aduana* in Lojuela (Almuñécar) is known to have been operating with a single grinding stone as late as 1521.[56] In another example, one of the *aduanas* in Motril still had such limited capacity in 1553 for the reception and grinding of sugar cane and for the storage of unused moulds, that its owner complained about the lack of space to carry out even the necessary daily tasks of grinding.[57]

This, however, does not mean that processing facilities were readily affordable for small, family based exploitations, mostly enjoyed under a regime of tenancy for absentee landlords. Both the old and the new owners belonged to the highest levels of the social order. Nevertheless, processing plants remained limited in size and productivity, justifying the lack of significant investment. In view of their modest nature, the new lords would instead try to increase profits by cornering the existing framework of production, and so gearing the second re-structuring of Granada's productive architecture, immediately after the Castilian conquest.[58] On the other hand, the last stage of refining can take place outside the *aduana*, even in domestic environments.[59] This is the third major difference with the American model, which is characterised by the strict organisation and rationalisation of production necessary for the processing of vast quantities of sugar cane.

We know, however, of other *ingenios* which were far better prepared for the new production regimes. The sugar plant of La Palma, in Motril, was already a much more complicated business, a more substantial architectural complex in

56 Archivo de Protocolos Notariales de Granada, Francisco Muñoz, fols. 31r–32r.

57 "domes [are] so low and small that they are not sufficient to grind the sugar cane arriving every day." Archivo de la Alhambra, Leg. 167, pieza 18, fol. 71r.

58 Archivo Municipal de Vélez-Málaga, IV–4. Edited in José E. López de Coca, "Nuevo episodio en la historia del azúcar de caña. Las ordenanzas de Almuñécar (siglos XV–XVI)," in *En la España Medieval. La ciudad Hispánica* (*siglos XIII–XVI* 10 (1987): 459–488, re-edited in López de Coca, *El reino de Granada en la época de los reyes Católicos. Repoblación, comercio, frontera* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1989), 1, 205–239.

59 Juan Martínez, "Notas sobre el refinado del azúcar de caña entre los moriscos granadinos. Estudio léxico," *Revista de Dialectología y Tradiciones Populares* 20 (1964): 271–288; Malpica and Fábregas, "La producción de azúcar."

which the entire process could be carried out.[60] It had a spectacular pressing room, including at least four large beam presses, a milling room, not preserved, a boiling room, in the basement of the main building, and detached buildings for purging and refining. The most significant feature, however, is the rationalisation and organisation of space according to the working procedure, which allows for the process to be carried out uninterrupted. Nevertheless, although the building is dated to the late 16th or early 17th centuries, some innovations such as the hammer press, fully adopted by this stage in other sugar producing latitudes and necessary for the maximisation of results in terms of time and production, were still to be incorporated.

In Madeira, domestic environments also seem to play an important role in the processing of sugar during the early stages. There is a considerable presence of hand presses (*alçapremas*) along with more substantial structures. The latter did not normally belong to those in possession of the sugar cane fields, and they were not necessarily located near to said fields.[61]

In Canarias the situation is substantially different from the beginning. The colonisation policies aimed at making the island economically viable from the earliest possible moment encouraged land allotments in which sugar cane field and *ingenio* could grow side by side. As we have mentioned above, from the late 15th century the best lands were reserved for those willing to commit themselves to the construction of an *ingenio*, necessarily involving a substantial scale of production. The sector is therefore cornered by the Canary "sacarocracy."[62] This experience confirmed that the optimisation and maximisation of production demanded a neat rationalisation of all steps involved in sugar production, from the agricultural phases to the processing stages.

This does not completely eliminate the small property, and multiple sugar cane fields with an extension of just over 2 hectares existed. The processing of their crops was carried out in external *ingenios*. Unfortunately, to date the only evidence available about the larger *ingenios*, capable of processing between 4,000 and 5,000 *arrobas* per year, comes from the written record.[63] For this reason, we still lack detailed accounts of their internal structure and organisation.

60 Antonio Malpica, "Arqueología y azúcar. Estudio de un conjunto preindustrial azucarero en el Reino de Granada: La Palma (Motril)," in *La caña de azúcar en el Mediterráneo. Actas del II Seminario Internacional sobre la caña de azúcar* (Sevilla: Junta de Andalucía, 1991), 123–153.

61 Alberto Vieira, "O açúcar na Madeira: produção e comércio nos séculos XV a XVII," in *Producción y comercio del azúcar de caña en época preindustrial. Actas del III Seminario Internacional sobre la caña de azúcar* (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1993), 29–70, esp. 36.

62 Macías, "Canarias."

63 Macías, "Canarias," 45.

It is hoped that archaeological studies such as the one carried out in the Canarian *ingenio* of Agaete, dating to the early 16th century, will help to clarify the matter.

On the other hand, we must not believe that the situation that we have portrayed as characteristic in Granada reflects the whole Mediterranean picture of sugar production during the medieval period, being merely a result of the discrete volume of sugar cane to be processed. In this sense, there is clear evidence of substantial, and industrially organised, sugar processing plants in the Mediterranean from the 13th century, for example the fully equipped sugar cane processing factory (called *maʿsir*) described by the Egyptian Al-Nuwayrī.[64] Other sugar *ingenios* which have been subject to archaeological enquiry, for example in Cyprus and Palestine, show a compact and precisely designed layout.[65]

New Productive Regime and Labour

The last determining factor is far more significant, to the point of being considered by many the real drive behind the ultimate leap forward in sugar production: the massive use of slave labour. Slave labour and the strict organisation of working processes thus form a close dichotomy at the foundations of the new productive regime. We have thought best not to go into detail on how sugar cane is processed. It is important to stress, however, that it involves intensive and highly specialised procedures. For this reason, highly qualified technicians, in charge of such delicate stages as boiling and purging, worked alongside less qualified workers.[66] This was so for all stages involved in the process, from those requiring a careful touch to those demanding expediency.

64 It was divided into several rooms with different functions: the *dār al-qaṣab*, *bayt al-nuab*, identified as "washing room," rooms for grinding, equipped with grinding stones (*ḥağar*) and water-powered gears (*dawlā*, pl. *dawālīb*), the boiling room (*maṭbaj*), the fusion room (*bayt al-ṣabb*) and the refining room (*bayt al-dafn*). Chapoutot-Remadi, "L'agriculture," 34.

65 Marie-Louise Von Wartburg and Franz G. Maier, "Excavations at Kouklia (Palaepaphos). 15th Preliminary Report: Seasons 1987 and 1988," *Archäelogischer Anzaiger* (1988): 177–188; M. Louise Von Wartburg, "Design and tehcnology of medieval refineries of the sugar cane in Cyprus. A case of study in industrial archaeology," in *Paisajes del azúcar*, 81–116.

66 These specialists are already recorded in detail as early as the 8th century, alongside others such as feelers – who used their touch to decide when the canes were ripe – cutters, peelers, pilers, bearers, choppers, grinders and moulders. Jean Sauvaget, "Sur un papyrus arabe de la Bibliothèque Egyptienne," *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales* VII (1948): 29–38.

The history of sugar is conditioned by the need for a numerous and exclusive work force, at least for the more delicate stages. In any case, the new dimension that sugar acquired during the Atlantic and American stage only became a full reality after production volumes soared, which did not occur until the old agricultural regimes had been superseded. As is well known, massive slavery was absent from late medieval agriculture. The tasks involved in sugar cane production, therefore, fell mainly on local peasants, despite some views which see the Mediterranean stage as the first chapter in the dichotomy between sugar and slavery, an idea which has now been discarded.[67] Slavery was absent from Cyprus, where the system rested on peasants exploiting sugar cane fields under lease and on the imposition of *corveés* on certain local groups (*Parici*, *Paroikoi* and *Perperiarii*) and also from Valencia where, despite the fact that sugar cane production stayed from the beginning outside the margins of the traditional peasant regimes, the agricultural tasks involved were performed by the local peasants, encouraged or coerced into this in a variety of ways.[68] Slaves, at least in any significant numbers, also seem to be absent from processing plants.[69]

67 These approaches point to the Abbadid Zanŷ and, of course, Cyprus, the strongest case for the supporters of this theory. Alexandre Popovic, *La révolte des esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe siècle* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1976), 64–65. Jean Richard, "Une economie coloniale? Chypre et ses Ressources Agricoles au Moyen Age," *Bizantinische Forschungen* 5 (1977): 331–352. Sidney M. Greenfield, "Cyprus and the beginnings of modern sugar cane plantations and plantation slavery," in *La caña de azúcar en el Mediterráneo*, 23–42, esp. 37.

68 Studies on slavery in Valencia do not mention the involvement of slave labour in sugar production, at least in significant quantities. Debra Blumenthal, *Enemies and Familiars: Slavery and Mastery in Fifteenth-Century Valencia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009). On the other hand, Luis P. Martínez clearly establishes that "The production of sugar in Valencia neither rests on slave labour nor in feudal corveés, because the work of the local peasants, instead of being forced, was paid." Luis P. Martínez, "Feudalisme, capital mercantil i desenvolupament agrari a la Valencia del segle XV. El plet de la canyamel," *Afers* 32 (1999): 123–149. Equally, Francisco J. Marzal, *La esclavitud en Valencia durante la Baja Edad Media* (*1375–1425*) (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2006), p. 789, note 223, supports this idea, given the lack of contrary evidence. The suspicious case involving the purchase of 13 slaves from Almería by a group of partners which include Francesc Siurana, also a partner in a sugar-producing company, is hardly relevant. However, the possibility of slaves being occasionally employed in sugar production should not be discarded. Jacqueline Guiral-Hadziiossif, "Diffusion et production de la canne à sucre (XIII–XVIe siècles)," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 24 (1994): 225–245; Pau Viciano, "Capital mercantil i drets feudals en la difusió de la canya de sucre al País Valencià. La sensoria d'Oliva a l'inici del segle XV," *Afers* 32 (1999): 151–166.

69 According to the data available for the *trapiches* located in Gandia and the Ràfol de Valldigna for the years 1434 and 1554 respectively. Ferran Garcia-Oliver, "Les companyies del trapig," *Afers* 32 (1999): 167–194.

Meanwhile, the intervention of the grand mercantile and financial capital had boosted the re-emergence of the Sicilian production in the 15th century.[70] Although the sector showed important innovations with respect to the typical Mediterranean regime, it seems not to have made use of slave labour.[71] Work in Sicily was carried out by small peasants exploiting sugar cane fields under lease and by small landowners selling their crops, sometimes in advance. Processing plants would be manned by hired hands from nearby communities.[72]

In Morocco, sugar cane cultivation also rested on peasant labour. Once again, the communities located around productive centres carried the weight of sugar production.[73] In fact, regarding the province of Sūs, most work in sugar cane producing areas seems to have been in the hands of the Maṣmūda Berbers.[74]

In Granada, ownership of sugar cane fields was always outside traditional peasant groups, but the evidence does not support direct exploitation by these landowners nor, most especially, the employment of slave labour. Exploitation would be carried out by small tenant farmers who were probably also hired for processing the canes. Although hired labour seems not to be limited to the most specialised tasks involved in the process, these were indeed undertaken by itinerant highly skilled hired technicians operating in the area.

Even after American sugar plantations had demonstrated the profitability of slave labour, in Granada the harder and most intensive tasks involved in the process, such as planting, sowing or grinding, were still carried out by hired *Moriscos*.[75] We must not forget that in Castile, and consequently in Granada, slave labour still had a fundamentally urban nature.[76] In fact, some attempts to implement the slave-based formula in Castile, for example in Algeciras, were strongly opposed by the local population.[77] Local communities confronted

70 Henry Bresc, *Un monde méditerranéen. Économie et societé en Sicile, 1300–1450,* (Roma: École Française de Rome, 1986), 248.

71 Henry Bresc, "La canne à sucre dans la Sicile médiéval," in *La caña de azúcar en el Mediterráneo*, 117–171, and Antonino Morreale, "'Stigli,' 'machine' e 'mastrìe' nell'industria siciliana delo zucchero (secc. XV–XVII)," in *História e tecnologia do açúcar*, 29–58.

72 Bresc, "La canne à sucre," 48–49.

73 Luis del Mármol Carvajal, *L'Afrique de Marmol*, trans. Nicolas Perrot (Paris: Thomas Jolly, 1667), vol. II, book 3, Chap. XXIII, 31–32.

74 Mármol, *L'Afrique de Marmol*, vol. II, book 3, Chap. XX, pp. 28–29.

75 López de Coca, "Nuevo episodio."

76 Raúl González, *La esclavitud en Málaga a fines de la Edad Media* (Jaén: Universidad de Jaén, 2006); Alfonso Franco, *La esclavitud en Andalucía, 1450–1550* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1992).

77 Archivo de la real Chancillería de Granada, cab. 503, leg. 558, pieza 3.

these efforts to adapt traditional systems to the demands posed by new needs because of the threat these presented to their own survival as communities. The imposition of working regimes based on slave labour eliminates the possibility of hired work and of the leasing of lands which, should these new regimes succeed, would be directly exploited by their otherwise absentee owners whose main income, on the other hand, must have had other sources. Finally, these new regimes would also deprive local communities of acquired rights over the use of public lands, which would end up in private hands for their exclusive exploitation.

Indeed, only an agricultural system exclusively oriented towards the market and the detachment of the agrarian regime from the social structure deprives peasants of their autonomy.[78] Restriction of the labourers' mobility, or their de-contextualisation through forced migration and the supersession of their rights as a social group stand as *sine qua non* premises for the imposition of such a system. Geographical displacement will bring cultural rootlessness, in what Moreno-Fraginals defines as a deculturation process resulting in the disappearance of the individual's identity, and thus generating a society made up of: "aggregated instead of interacting individuals, whose action is coerced exclusively towards production."[79] Obviously, this sort of transformation cannot be imposed on peasant populations featuring a robust degree of social cohesion and strongly attached to the territory. These population groups show a strong attachment to their own territorial system, well established cultural and social habits and acquired rights; in short, a number of features which strongly oppose the application of such a deep process of disassociation from their own labour.

The new working regimes described would not even be fully applied in Madeira or the Canaries, where the emergence of the first capitalist ventures was to take place. Arguments in favour of the predominant use of slave labour in Madeira have also been severely questioned, among other things because the larger slave groups for which there is evidence, in Funchal and Ponta do Sol according to Alberto Vieira, do not seem to coincide with the main sugar cane producing areas, which in the 15th and 16th centuries were located around Partes do Fundo.[80] Slaves were clearly involved in sugar cane production, but

78 Alfredo Margarido, "Du commerce à l'écologie capitaliste," *Studia* 47 (1989): 291–309.

79 Manuel Moreno-Fraginals, "Aportes culturales y deculturación," in *La historia como arma y otros estudios sobre esclavos, ingenios y plantaciones*, ed. Manuel Moreno-Fraginals (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1983), 24–49, esp. 36.

80 Virginia Rau and Jorge de Macedo, *O açúcar na Madeira*. Sidney M. Greenfield, "Sugar cane in the Atlantic Islands," in *La caña de azúcar en tiempos de los grandes descubrimien-*

as part of a mixed system in which their work was not predominant. This is the case, for example, in the Canaries, where the system was somewhat more advanced than in Madeira. The presence of hired labour during the most important steps of the process, both in the field and in the processing plant, remains very significant.[81] The participation of slaves appears to be more frequent in the first stages of sugar processing (milling, grinding, etc.), but this does not exclude the presence of hired hands. At any rate, the idea that we wish to convey is that in such a system slave labour plays nothing but a secondary, supporting role.

These areas, however, were to add a new element which would ultimately prove to be crucial. They are new, uninhabited lands, free from any social or cultural premise – or where what culture there was had been wiped out. This makes them perfect fields for experimentation, and they were probably used as such. Although the development of the new formula was not fully realised, all the new factors to be combined in America were indeed being fine tuned.

The island of São Tomé was discovered in the late 15th century. It was completely deserted, and in this case the opportunity for experimentation was much better used than in previous instances. The difficulties involved in the colonisation of such a distant territory turned into the greatest opportunity for experimentation with the new formula. Additionally, the Portuguese crown began to favour predatory policies instead of the policy of agricultural colonisation carried out in colonies closer to home, and this attracted merchants interested in quick gains through trade – slaves, spices and dyes – rather than farmers. The consequence was that the consuetudinary social norms on which agrarian societies rest were altogether lacking, and without peasants imposing their own ancestral system over the crops, a new regime could at last be started from scratch. Merchants, which to date had merely played a partial role in sugar production, became the sole actors. Besides excessive humidity, which will ultimately affect the quality of the sugar, the island presents ideal conditions for the generalisation of the crop, which ripens in a mere 5 to 6 months all year round and, most importantly, without having to share the available space with

tos, 59–82. Charles Verlinden, "Dal Mediterraneo all'Atlantico," in *Contributi per la storia economica* (Prato: Fondazione Istituto Internazionale di studi economici "F. Datini," 1975), 29–51. Alberto Vieira, "Agua, trabalho e açúcar. O caso da Madeira nos séculos XVI e XVII," in *Agua, trabajo y azúcar. Actas del VI Seminario Internacional sobre la caña de azúcar.* (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1996), 101–146, esp. 120.

81 Manuel Lobo, "Azúcar y trabajo en Canarias," in *Agua, trabajo y azúcar*, 223–237, esp. 228–229.

subsistence crops with which to feed a peasant population. Only one factor is lacking: labour.

Since the previous exploitation systems – hired labour and land leases – were not available, the only option left for the production of sugar cane would be slave labour – those in possession of the sugar cane fields would also control the slave trade with Europe. Prisoners captured in war or *razzias* were no longer available in sufficient numbers as slaves, and the market had to be supplied with African captives.[82] Slave trade started around 1450, but the Portuguese monopoly was only verified in 1479. Slaves were shipped straight to the crown from factories located in Mauritania, the Gulf of Guinea and north-west Africa.[83] In addition to the activities sponsored by the crown, privately organised expeditions soon entered the business. These would carry the most weight in the spectacular growth of Portuguese slave trade between 1490 and 1510.[84] This growth coincided with a particularly intense phase of activity for the merchants based on São Tomé, which received 4,307 slaves only in 1516, and 7,000 the following year.[85] Many of these, as many as 12,000 according to Garfield, remained on the island and were put to work in sugar cane plantations. In Castro-Henriques' words, here they finally learned how to produce plantation slaves, breaking their social rules, behaviour and freedom.[86]

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82 Isabel Castro-Henriques, "L'invention sociale de São Tomé et Principe au XVIe siècle," in *Les assises du pouvoir. Temps médiévaux, territoires africains*, ed. Jean Devisse (Saint-Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vicennes, 1994), 199–211.

83 Ivana Elbl, "The volume of the early atlantic slave trade, 1450–1521," *The Journal of African History* 38 (1997): 31–75. See also António Mendes, "Portugal, Morocco and Guinea: reconfiguration of the North Atlantic at the end of the Middle Ages," in this volume.

84 Elbl, "The volume," 59.

85 Elbl, "The volume," 72.

86 Castro-Henriques, "L'invention sociale de São Tomé," 203.

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CHAPTER 10

Early Colonial Utilization and Management in Peru

Inge Schjellerup

The First Encounter, Incas and Spaniards

A conquest culture is the result of processes that screen the more dynamic, expanding culture, winnowing out and discarding a high percentage of all traits, complexes, and configurations found in it and determining new contexts and combinations. It is the result of a process in which the new face of the conquest culture is precipitated out of the infinite variety of original forms and enriched by the elements produced by the contact situation itself.[1]

The following chapter will address some aspects of the early conquest period of the Spanish invasion of the Inca Empire seen in changes in the utilization of the environment. The first part will introduce the setting of the land and the people, the next provide information of the Spanish colonial politics and the last focus on the introduction of new crops, animals, technology and timber extraction which brought consequences for the Andean population.

Material culture and technology are tied to landscape alterations as part of the cultural history and may be deducted from archaeological, historical and anthropological studies. The Spaniards were mostly interested in bringing their own culture into the New World and had little understanding for the new environment. Very few accounts exist of landscapes, only the most exotic and different examples were noticed.

In the beginning of the 16th century the Spaniards set out to conquer Tawantinsuyu, the Inca Empire – called Peru by the Spaniards on the western side of the South American continent. The Inca Empire was the last in a series of cultural developments during the last 15,000 years that had adapted to a mountainous terrain and altered the Andean landscape.[2] The impressive mountain landscapes in the Andean Cordillera we observe today are not pristine and untouched, as one could be tempted to believe.

1 George M. Foster, *Culture and Conquest. America's Spanish heritage* (Chicago: Quadrangel Books, 1960), 12.

2 Thomas F. Lynch, *Guitarrero Cave. Early Man in the Andes* (New York: Academic press, 1980). Karen Olsen Bruhns, *Ancient South America* (New York: Cambridge World University, 1994).

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When the Spaniards arrived at the unknown continent the Inca Empire had only recently become the largest state formation on the southern hemisphere, covering the southern part of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and parts of Chile and Argentina. In surprisingly short time, Inca road systems, standardized architecture and certain agricultural products had appeared all over the enormous region. Because of the Inca rulers' supreme power and commands (being divine as sons of the Sun god) large scale agricultural works were undertaken for the consumption of food in a reciprocity-redistribution system.[3]

Thus the Spaniards came to a highly developed civilization with no writing system based on an advanced agro-pastoral culture in extremely different landscapes consisting of three main geographical and climatic zones: the coast, *la sierra* and *la selva*. To the west, the coast is a dry desert interrupted by fertile floodplains with rivers carrying water from the highlands towards the west into the Pacific Ocean. The amount of water depends on the rainfall during the rainy season in the mountains from November to March/April. Earlier cultures had here developed large-scale irrigation systems and sunken fields in the desert.[4] The Andean mountain range, *la sierra*, rises immediately to altitudes of 6,000 m above sea level and contains a myriad of microclimatic ecological zones, however, only 3% of the rugged landscape is arable. During the Inca period it is estimated that agricultural land was increased by approximately 10% by the construction of stone and earth terracing systems.[5] Stone terraces did not only enhance the expanding agricultural system but were also necessary to support the mountain slopes in the development of settlements (Fig. 10.1).

Valleys became covered with agricultural terraces used mainly for the cultivation of maize, which was considered most prestigious and used in the ceremonies.

Similar mountainous landscapes and terraces were found in Spain at that time but here on a much larger scale. *La selva*, the eastern lowlands, was covered with dense forests and considered savage land by the Incas but was of interest for hunting and certain luxury goods. Landscape was sacred to the Incas who deified natural forces and changed the environment according to

3 Craig Morris, "The Archaeological Study of Andean Exchange Systems," in *Social Archaeology: beyond Subsistence and Dating*, ed. Charles L. Redman et al., 303–327 (New York: Academic Press, 1978).

4 Inge Schjellerup, "Sunken Fields in Peru," *Egyptian Journal of Environmental Change* (Special issue 1, 2009): 23–31.

5 John V. Murra, *The Economic Organization of the Inka State*, Research in Economic Anthropology. Supplement 1 (Connecticut: JAI Press, 1980), 210.

FIGURE 10.1 *Inca terraces at Pisac*
PHOTO INGE SCHJELLERUP

their cosmology, modifying rock outcrops and constructing sacred and secular structures as a symbol of their power and they incorporated natural features like springs, rocks, special trees in the mountainous environment (Fig. 10.2).

The Early Colonial World

With the invasion of the Spaniards, a totally foreign world and conception were brought to the New World utterly alien to the mental concepts of the Indians.

Columbus' second voyage in 1493 with 1200 men carried plants and animals to cultivate the Caribbean Islands. They brought horses, cattle, goats and sheep together with wheat and seeds for horticulture as chickpeas, melons, onions, radishes, grape vines, sugar cane, bananas as well as fruit trees.[6] These first animals may have suffered or been killed by the indigenous people as Columbus requested that Spain bring more sheep and lambs, calves and young heifers, male and female asses and mares. During the third voyage in 1498–1500 he got permission to bring "enough oxen, mares and asses to make up twenty yokes

6 Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange. Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*. Contribution in American Studies, 2. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972), 67.

FIGURE 10.2 *Machu Picchu, the Inca site built on a modified and leveled saddleridge*

of draft animals for cultivation."[7] All the introduced animals multiplied rapidly as they had no natural enemies on the islands and this had without doubt also to do with the extinction of certain plants, and gardens they encroached upon.

In 1502, Francisco Pizarro, the Spanish conquistador of Tawantinsuyu, went to Hispaniola and later received a *repartimiento* in Panama where he became a cattle farmer before he went south. All ships at that time carried live animals and food on board to survive the long voyages and the whole complex of European agriculture and animals was part of the newcomers' identity. It was thus the animals having been bred in the Caribbean islands and in Panama that were taken to Peru.

During the conquest in 1532 Francisco Pizarro came with 36 horses and 180 men. Horses made a great impression upon the Indians. A horseman was first regarded as one animal, which to the Indians surprise went into two pieces when the rider fell off the horse. They believed that the Spaniards were ineffective when dismounted and that the horses were powerless without saddles and impotent at night. This was the reason that Atahualpa, the last Inca

7 John B. Hattendorf (ed.), *Maritime History: The Age of Discovery* (New York: Krieger Publishing Company, 1996), 185, 192, 199.

ruler waited to meet the Spaniards for the first and fatal time in Cajamarca after dusk.[8]

After the conquest Inca society collapsed and the Inca settlements, water channels, part of the road system and agricultural land were left. A contributing factor was that at least half of the population was wiped out by diseases introduced by the Europeans.[9] Also, Spanish colonial policy caused a major change in the Andean landscape and was of great importance for the relationship between the Spaniards and the Indians in the first forty years after the conquest. A contributing factor was the introduction of a writing system which was basic for the legislation on land titles among other things and the governance of the Spaniards. Some of the most important policies were the *encomienda*/*corregimiento* institutions and the church, the extraction of tribute and the policy of *reducciones*.

The *encomienda* was a political and economic unit within a defined area of land given by the Spanish Crown to meritorious conquistadors and their descendants for two or three generations. The key feature of this institution was receiving a certain number of Indians in *encomienda* – "in custody" to use their labor free to extract tribute. The *encomendero* was responsible for the good treatment of the Indians and their education in the Christian faith. Officially the indigenous population should just become good Christians. The *encomendero* often appointed the priest and he should provide his salary and food as well as the Indians whom the priest served.[10] The tribute of food was in the beginning collected from the Indians by force, and in order to inspire fear in their minds, the priests had provided themselves with guards, prisons and dungeons.[11]

The *encomienda* did not give any rights of ownership or use rights concerning the land. The Spanish Crown was sovereign possessor of all land. It was the intention of the Spanish Crown that the Indians should still enjoy the usufruct of their land with the same rights as before the conquest, but the *encomendero* often moved "his" Indians away from their land to use their labor somewhere else. European crops, especially wheat and barley, were introduced

8 George Kubler, "The Quechua in the Colonial World," *Handbook of South American Indians*, 143 (2) (1946): 331–410, esp. 380.

9 Noble D. Cook, *Demographic Collapse; Indian Peru 1520–1620* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

10 Fernando Montesinos, "Anales del Perú," in *Historia del Perú*, ed. Víctor M. Maurtua (Madrid: Imprenta de Gabriel L. y del Horno, 1908), 7, 272–273.

11 Arthur F. Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo, Fifth Viceroy of Peru 1569–1581* (Idaho: Caldwell, 1938), 24.

where possible on the land of the Indians together with European animals: cattle, horses, sheep, goats and poultry. The original crops such as maize and tuber crops as the potato *que es pan cotidiano* and native animals, llamas and alpacas, were superseded.

Spanish law forbade the *encomendero* to live among "his" Indians, but it was often violated. The Indian *caciques* received the title of *don* and were exempted from paying tribute and *mita* (forced labor) because of their status, but they were obliged to collect the tribute of their subjects and conscript them for the *mita*, besides attending to the cultivation of the lands.[12] When the *encomendero*, who got his rights directly from the Spanish Crown, was not satisfied with the *cacique* of "his" Indians, he replaced him. It is worth noting that several of the contemporary autonomous *comunidades campesinas,* or peasant communities, and *haciendas* have their common origin in *encomiendas*.[13] However, despite the foreign influence, many of the isolated peasant communities continued their traditional way of living under the rubric of *común de indios* – community of Indians.

These peasant communities were incorporated into the Spanish political structure by legislation, an indirect display of force by the crown, which imposed communal as well as individual labor upon them. During Inca times people paid tribute in labor time not in certain amounts of products and it was a self-sufficient economy in *naturalia*. The Spaniards' tribute was based on a monetary system but part of the tribute was always to be given in European introduced plants and animal products such as certain amounts of wheat, barley, sheep, and poultry and in native products as maize, cotton, silver and gold depending on the location.

The Viceroy Francisco de Toledo was annoyed to see a non restricted amount of tribute given to the local priests so he ordered that only one llama should be given to them every week for meat. This was not satisfactory for the priests so Toledo had to allow them two sheep a week, a chicken or two quails a day, and on meat free days a dozen eggs.[14] Many Indian populations were reluctant to accept the new animals and crops, as both treatment and technology were entirely different from their ancient traditions. Many escaped to the east into the *selva*.

12 John H. Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 37 (1957): 159.

13 F. LaMond Tullis, *Lord and Peasant in Peru. A Paradigm of Political and Social Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 80.

14 Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo*, 77.

A contributory cause of the greater opportunities of the Spaniards to encroach upon the lands of the Indians was the legislation of the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1570. Among his various reforms was the law authorizing the *reducciones*, where the resettlement of the Indian population from their villages or from their dispersed habitat was the most radical. The king in Spain had already earlier proposed to gather the Indians in villages but it had not been done. The populations were replaced in new villages, which were laid out in a grid pattern with a church and an open plaza. The inspiration for the grid pattern is said to have come from the layout of the garrison in Santa Fe near Granada founded by Queen Isabella in 1491.[15]

The population size was dependent upon the resources that they had to support a priest and up to the number of about four hundred tribute paying Indians in a *doctrina*.[16] The purpose was to facilitate the Spanish political administration, particularly the collection of tribute and the religious indoctrination. The problems with the transfers were numerous – ethnic groups and kin groups were ignored, political units divided and the authority of the ethnic leaders broken down. Some of them were awarded an "independent" status in the legislation by the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo with rights to certain autonomy in their territory, so their cultural identity could be maintained to some degree.

The rights of a territory given by Toledo were not absolute. As mentioned before, they concerned usufruct rights but not total ownership of the land. The communities were not allowed to sell, pawn or mortgage it. The Spaniards asserted that any contract reducing the standard of the Indians would immediately be declared invalid. The fixed boundaries were only laid down until a new official revision changed them, so the eternal usufruct became doubtful. If the population declined in number or died out the Spanish Crown could sell the lands if the few surviving Indians did not themselves take care of their legal interests. In the 17th century many Indian *caciques* played on both sides and used the Spanish juridical institutions to gain more land.

In several periods the Spanish Crown sold land which could not be proven to belong to the Indians or be under the protection of the *encomendero* system. An attempt to get more money for the bad financial situation of Spain was to sell "remaining" lands, which were often land in fallow. But it was also a practical means of opening up possibilities for other Spaniards to buy land and thus avoid the threat from the *encomenderos*. Consequently several land disputes

15 Diego L. Molinari, *Descubrimiento y conquista de América* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1983), 67.

16 Carlos A. Romero, "Libro de la visita general del virrey Don Francisco de Toledo 1570–1575," *Revista Histórica* VII (1921): 174.

began with the Indians. A land dispute over a single piece of land, to which an Indian family had gained usufruct by the community, meant a dispute involving the whole community and not only between the involved parties.[17]

Of greater importance for the Andean economic structure was the disintegration of the vertical ecological complementarity, that is to say, the exploitation of the several agricultural zones in different altitudes by the peasant communities.[18] Several settlements were placed in higher altitude zones in the pre-Inca and Inca periods, but were now transferred to the transitional zone between cereals and tuber crops. The reason was the new focus on the self-sufficiency in the respective peasant communities because the tribute to the Spaniards was to be given in European crops resulting in a higher concentration of cultivation in ecological zones in the lower altitudes.

New Crops, Animals and Technology

When Agustín de Zárate arrived to Peru a decade after the conquest he commented upon the nature of the land:

> This land is so rich and fertile and yields such abundant crops yet they do not to have ard-plough to till the soil, but some pointed spades with which the Indians merely turn over the earth and they plant wheat grains making a hole with a stick where they put the grain as we do in Spain when planting horse beans.[19]

The new crops, animals and new technologies in farming produced a colonial society where selective processes and strategies became the solution for the Indian population. Some were accepted as they were considered useful, others neglected and others were being forced upon the Indians. Many of the animals had to acclimatize, horses e.g. could not be bred in high altitudes and many sheep died in the rainy season in the highlands.[20] The varied landscape

17 Inge Schjellerup, *Incas and Spaniards in the Conquest of the Chachapoyas. Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Research in the North-Eastern Andes of Peru*, (PhD Thesis GOTARC, Series B. No.7, Göteborg: Göteborg University, 1997), 81.

18 John V. Murra, "El control vertical de un máximo de pisos ecológicos en la economía de las sociedades andinas," in *Formaciones económicas y políticas del mundo andino*, Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975, 59–115.

19 Agustín de Zárate, *Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista del Perú* (1577) (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 1995), 46.

20 Schjellerup, *Incas and Spaniards*, 98.

formations and different climatic conditions were of course contributory factors. Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the agricultural traditions of the Old World and those of the New is in the basic attitude towards the crop plant itself. In Indian farming, each crop received individual attention with the mattock, whilst the Spaniards introduced a kind of agriculture in which the basic tool, the ox-drawn ard, was used to cultivate the land for a group of plants and the sickle to gather the crop (Fig. 10.3).[21]

When the first grains of wheat by chance were found in a barrel of rice they were planted in Lima in 1535. The first mills were constructed already in 1537.[22] At that time there was sufficient wheat to make bread, which was consumed by the Spaniards. Wheat thus became a very important tribute item to be produced by the Indians near the Spanish towns. But outside the towns in both Ecuador and Peru they only grew sufficient wheat to pay their tribute as they preferred their traditional food.[23] With the introduction of grains, threshing floors were needed with the use of cattle or horses to tread out the grain. The *tribulum* was never introduced in Peru.[24] The Indians used a flat milling stone for the grinding of chili pepper and maize for making porridge not for making bread (Fig. 10.4).

Crosby mentions that if a Spaniard is to eat he must have wheat, if he is to drink, he must have wine. He further mentions that a Spanish priest drew the conclusion that if God had not himself made it possible for the Indians to make sacramental wine, then he obviously had no intention that they ever be made Christians.[25] The introduction of the foreign livestock as sheep, goats, cats, dogs, cattle, horses, donkeys, mules, oxen and fowl was an overwhelming experience, as they were only familiar with their domestic indigenous animals as llamas, alpacas, guinea pigs and other rodents. From the 1530 cattle ties were brought into the New World. A petition from a Fernán Gutiérrez to allow cattle in Lima was given in 1539 but Francisco Pizarro having been a cattle farmer was probably the first to introduce not only cattle but also swine. The Incas never used the llamas as a source of milk, and the idea of milking them had probably

21 Daniel W. Gade, *Plants, Man and the Land in the Vilcanota Valley of Peru* (The Hague: Junk Publishers, 1975), 36.

22 Bernabé Cobo, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo*, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 91–2 (First published 1653. Madrid: Atlas, 1964), 407.

23 *Relaciones Geográficas de Indias* [1557–86], ed. Marcos Jiménez. Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 183 (Madrid: Atlas, 1965), 175.

24 Foster, *Culture and Conquest*, 68.

25 Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange*, 71.

FIGURE 10.3 Indians weeding and thrilling. *Martínez Compañón Vol II, 1787.*

FIGURE 10.4 *A woman grinding maize in Chuquibamba*
PHOTO INGE SCHJELLERUP

not occurred to them.[26] Milking a cow gave rise to a whole new experience with a different kind of nutrition and technology for the fabrication of cheese.

The acquaintance of draft animals was a major surprise to the Indians as they were used to the llamas as carrying animals. Garcilaso de la Vega remembers the first oxen team from his years in Cuzco:

> The first oxen I saw ploughing was in the valley of Cuzco, in fifteen hundred and fifty one more or less, and they belonged to a gentleman named Juan Rodríguez of Villalobos, a native of Cáceres; there were no less than three teams together; they called one of them Chaparro, the other Naranjo and the third Castle; he took me to see them with a host of Indians from all over who were going to see the same, amazed and astonished at such a monstrous and totally new [animals] for them and for me. They said that the Spaniards were lazy at work, and forced those large animals to do the work for them that they should do themselves. I do remember well all this, because the feast of the oxen cost me two dozen lashes: half given by my father, because I did not go to school; the other given by my teacher because I missed school. The land that was ploughed was a very beautiful terrace, one above the other … the farmhands who tilled were Indians; the ox teams were tamed outside the city in a farm, and when they were skilled, they were brought to Cuzco, and I think that the most solemn triumphs of the greatness of Rome were not more appreciated than the oxen that day.[27]

No wonder that the Indians were afraid of the oxen and cows from the Old World and it must have taken some time to maneuver a team but they were accepted. They were useful (Fig. 10.5). The cost of the animals were in the early years quite high but went down as soon as they multiplied rapidly especially in the warmer valleys. Cattle hides were transported back to Spain by the thousands. Another chronicler, Bernabé Cobo, mentions that:

> Because there is such an abundance of hides from cattle, it serves in this land not only as it is used in Spain, but in many other ways, for making ropes, baskets, panniers, beds, trunks and a thousand other things. Most of the grease is used for candles for lighting at night in the houses, which they did not know before the coming of the Spaniards, they did

26 Daniel W. Gade, "The llama, alpaca and vicuña: Fact vs. fiction," *Journal of Geography* 68 (6) (1969): 342.

27 Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios*, 816.

FIGURE 10.5 *Tilling the land with the ard and sowing potatoes at the* altiplano *near Puno*
PHOTO INGE SCHJELLERUP

> not have more light than the light from heaven and from the fireplace in their houses to get warm and for cooking. They have now such high regard for the use of candles, that once when I asked an intelligent Indian what seemed the most useful thing for human life brought from the Spaniards, he answered that the use of candles, because with them the life got longer, making night into day. The grease from cows is not insignificant because it goes from one province to another to make candles and for repairing the ships.[28]

Viceroy Toledo forced the introduction of the Mediterranean type plough into unwilling peasant communities:

> I command and order, that in the places and areas where it is possible to prepare the ground with oxen, the Corregidor of such a district look at the land and the fields that may be tilled and ploughed with ards and oxen, and get the Indians to buy and maintain them so that they till their fields with them, thus giving the method and diligence which they must have, so that they with more work and occupation and time to plough, will benefit and that such oxen, ard-ploughs and shares are purchased

28 Cobo, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo*, 383.

> from the assets of the community and serve all of them, without the benefit and advantage for just the principal chiefs, but it will be common for all the poor Indians, which have to be dealt with most diligently by the Corregidor, and if not, he will be punished with rigor.[29]

It is likely that the introduction of the ard was not such a positive element. Especially the rugged terrain with steep mountain slopes does not make it very practical and useful in many places. The result was that many of the stone terraces were torn down. One of the requirements for maintaining an ard was the presence of a blacksmith, or more or less easy access to one for manufacturing of the share. In many places hard wood replaced the iron share. Today the manufacturing of an ard in the highlands belongs to *algunos curiosos*, who know of the special properties of the different kinds of wood for an ard.[30] The wooden plough drawn by horses or oxen creates deeper furrows, thus making the topsoil more vulnerable to erosion, than did the more gentle cultivation techniques of the indigenous people. No further development took place in the Andean region. The pressure on the use of land was considerably higher even taking into consideration the drastic depopulation.

The introduced animals had other habits. For example, the swine grubs the soil of the newly sown fields in order to eat the tubers. The cattle roam all year round and do not have to be corralled every night, as do llamas and alpacas. With all these roaming animals also newly formed bushes and trees were simply eaten by the livestock. Thus all fields had to be closed with live hedges or stones. Viceroy Toledo had to make new regulations and he ordered the judges to make sure that no animals were put into the newly sown fields:

> During the sowing time the *alcaldes* and chiefs must take special care that no one takes the cattle into the places and areas where there are sowings of corn, wheat, potatoes, and other seeds, but into places where they do not harm. Damage will be punished for the interest of all parties, to whom the cattle has done such damage, and others will be punished by the *alcaldes* according to the damage that has taken place.[31]

29 Roberto Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles, Siglo XVI. Tomo VIII. Ordenanzas del Virrey Toledo*, Colección de Publicaciones Históricas de la Biblioteca del Congreso Argentino (Madrid: Imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1925), 333.

30 Inge Schjellerup, "Andenes y camellones en la region de Chachapoyas," in *Andenes y camellones en el Perú andino. Historia, Presente y Futuro*, ed. Carlos de la Torre y Manuel Burga (Lima: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, 1986), 133–150.

31 Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú*, 333.

Cattle grazing is responsible for maintaining open grasslands as the natural replacement, as the resprouting of tree trunks and seedlings is not possible. Unrestricted cattle breeding and overgrazing became possible after the property of the Indians had been reduced drastically. Today cattle grazing are the worst threat against the forests in the Andean highlands as in the Amazonian lowlands.

Forest and Demand for Timber

In the Andes patches of forests are only seen in the inaccessible gorges and untouched places. Trees were extremely scarce around the settlements in the Inca period. The collection of firewood for the state was placed according to the Inca politics in storage facilities for redistribution. Much wood came from groves called *moyas*, protected forests, whose cutting was strictly controlled.[32]

The Incas were aware of the shortage and there is evidence of protected forests, controlled use and small-scale reforestation in the area around the Inca capital Cuzco in the central highlands. Firewood was paid as a product in the Inca Empire and continued to be so throughout the colonial period. On one of the *quipu*'s (the Incas counting system on knots on a string) it was recorded from one area, that they should bring split firewood and small pieced firewood, besides charcoal, herbs and straw as tribute into the early colonial times.

The Spaniards very soon became aware of the shortage of timber in the coastal valleys. Already in 1535 the town council of Lima ordered each Spaniard to plant 300 *sauces* (willow trees, *Salix* sp.) and other trees, to stop the deforestation. It does not seem to have been done as the order was repeated the next year.[33] Regulations were ordered to restrict the exploitation of wood resources so essential as fuel for cooking fuel. Cobo has an interesting observation:

> In all the houses, no matter how small they may be, there is a stove behind the door; it is shaped like a very small clay furnace, no more than one span high; it is entirely covered, except for a small hole for stoking the fire, and on top there are two or three round holes where the pots are set. This stove uses very little wood, and they never put anything in it but

32 Juan Polo de Ondegardo, *El mundo de los Incas*, ed. Laura Gonzales and Alicia Alonso (First published 1560; Madrid: Historia 16, 1990).

33 María Rostworowski, *Recursos naturales renovables y pesca, siglos XVI y XVII* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981).

FIGURE 10.6 *The pre-columbian oven at the archaeological site of Churru*
PHOTO INGE SCHJELLERUP

> two small sticks placed straight in, as the sticks burn they stir them up. And just one of our ovens consumes more firewood than twenty of the Indians' houses.[34] (Fig. 10.6).

Why this kind of kitchen disappeared is an enigma. In the colonial period not only was the firewood consumption higher in the open fireplaces in kitchens per family, but also the Mediterranean oven is a greedy firewood consumer. The domed shaped oven which is used for baking bread and other foods, takes two loads of firewood (as much as a mule can carry) each time (Fig. 10.7). It is used according to the individual household's capacity of procuring firewood, flour and other ingredients – and also according to the possibility of getting the bread sold. The disappearance of the forests and the scarcity of firewood were soon felt in Peru and Ecuador and it forced the small enterprises to substitute the firewood, with the fibre waste from the sugar cane.[35] There were no serious efforts of management of the forests.

34 Cobo, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo*, 243.

35 Carlos S. Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial. Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982).

FIGURE 10.7 *The Mediterranean introduced oven at Chilchos*
PHOTO INGE SCHJELLERUP

The colonial period also brought new technologies into the building of houses and making tiles and bricks, fabrication of glass, mine shafts and the smelting of metals.[36] Large quantities of timber of *aliso* (*Alnus acuminata*), alder tree,

36 Enrique Torres, *Libro Primero de Cabildos de Lima*, 52.

was used in the house building in Cuzco, causing much deforestation in the area. The firing of bricks and roof tiles was introduced and had to be learned by the indigenous population.

In the Pre-Hispanic world, all the roofs, for both the aristocracy and peasants, were constructed of *ichu* grass or straw put on a frame of timber. The straw or grass could be cut and coloured in different patterns. The Spaniards wanted their houses to resemble that of their homeland. In 1555 all the wealthy Spanish houses in the ancient Inca capital Cuzco were covered with red roof tiles.

Today most of the peasant communities in the Andean highlands produce roof tiles. Very often it is only one or two families, who specialize in the production of tiles, besides being farmers. In the larger towns, there are professional brick and tile labourers, who produce tiles by order. When the tiles are shaped and ready to be fired, they are placed on an open stack on top of a large amount of firewood. Once all the tiles have been set in a circle, they are covered with more firewood and straw on the outside, and set on fire.

In the highlands, in Pre-Hispanic times, the houses were constructed of *tapia*, a technique using shutter boards, where wet earth mixed with straw and pebbles are compressed. On the dry desert coast, most of the buildings were constructed of adobe, sun dried clay bricks. But the Spaniards expressed that they wanted their houses made of a more noble material. Large scale tile manufactures with big kilns and many brickyard workers increased, nearby the main towns and smaller enterprises in the rural areas engaged themselves in producing bricks. The *haciendas* in the countryside, the churches and the more important houses in the towns, therefore became constructed of bricks.

Another new technique was introduced with the production of glass, which needed large amounts of firewood for the firing. Various kinds of glass bottles were needed for the wine production, olive oil and *aguardiente* (distilled spirits).[37] This was bound up with the introduction of new agricultural products, beside the cereals. Large sugar cane plantations were laid out in the fertile coastal valleys. The sugar cane mill itself is constructed of timber and the wheel drawn by oxen or mules. The very early colonial sugar mill can still be found in the countryside (Fig. 10.8). The cane is squeezed in the mill, and the resulting liquid cooked for several hours, before it is poured into a wooden mold, where it dries as *chancaca* (sugar loaves). Another product is the distilled liquid which gives *aguardiente*.

A large fabrication of charcoal was another big consumer of trees. Strict regulations provided interesting information on how the people tried to do

37 Juan Ansión, *El árbol y el bosque en la sociedad andina* (Lima: Ministerio de Agricultura. Instituto Nacional Forestal y de Fauna, 1986), 55.

FIGURE 10.8 *Sugar mill made of hard wood in the Valley of Chilchos, Peru*
PHOTO INGE SCHJELLERUP

it anyway. Slaves were not allowed to make charcoal within a certain distance of tree grooves. If they did it the owner had to pay a fine. An Indian who had lost some carbon had to go to prison for ten days and a slave would receive a hundred lashes and also had to pay a fine. If the fabrication of charcoal was continued the punishment was even harder.[38]

Another industry which demanded large amounts of timber was shipbuilding. The Pre-Hispanic sea transportation consisted of large rafts made of balsa tree. However, the Spaniards were used to quite another style of ships, and the ongoing contact with the other side of the ocean meant the need of more vessels. The dangerous journey on the Pacific to Panama, where the goods were unloaded to be shipped onto the Atlantic, also caused great losses of ships.[39]

The real motive behind the Spaniards taking up residence in the Andean countries was the gold hunger and fever. The Inca gold was a symbol of the ruler as the son of the Sun, the gold and silver had been obtained from ores in

38 Torres, *Libro Primero de Cabildos de Lima*, 52.

39 Ansión, *El árbol y el bosque*, 55.

the mountains, where the miners dug minor holes. With the Spaniards arrival, they brought new techniques onto them. The mines required enormous amounts of wood for two reasons: first, as firewood for melting, and second, as timber for construction support in the long and narrow mine shafts. In the central Andean highlands, in what is now Bolivia, the silver mine of Potosí was discovered in the early Spanish colonial period and in 1650 it was the largest city in the Americas, with a population of 160,000 inhabitants.[40]

Three thousand natives worked on a daily basis in the famous silver mine at Potosí, Bolivia. The lack of trees on the high plateau and the necessity of firewood entailed an enormous amount of *takia* (dried llama dung). In the beginning of the 17th century 600,000 loads of *takia* was brought on llama caravans to Potosí, and firewood for the houses was transported from the eastern slopes of the Andes.

Summary

The Spanish encounter with the New World set into motion complex processes and unprecedented changes. One of the most devastating consequences of contact was the epidemic diseases from Europe that had a mortal rate up to least half of the population. With the arrival of the Spaniards a new European order was imposed that changed not only the environment fundamentally but the world view of the natives. The many contemporary witnesses testify to the incredible changes that happened in the first years of the colonization process.

The original Indian settlements were uprooted with the reduction policy of Viceroy Toledo. New villages and towns were founded and harbours and roads were laid out. The rights of the conquest gave Spanish municipalities the authority to grant written entitlements to private property within their jurisdiction. In many places the land once held in common by the Indians was granted or sold to private Spaniards or divided into other native communities. The native author Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala emphasizes the importance of the written word in one of his drawings where a priest writes a letter on behalf of a chief against one of the Spanish authorites (Fig. 10.9).

The new world brought challenges within almost all aspects of human life. But the natives were not simply passive recipients of the introductions of new animals, food and technology. The labour force changed from labour in time to labour in amounts of products that were converted into a monetary system, an

40 Ansión, *El árbol y el bosque*, 53.

FIGURE 10.9 *Drawing by Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala c. 1615. A priest writes a letter on behalf of a chief against one of the Spanish authorities.*

unfamiliar concept for the natives. The changed agro-cultural situation gave possibilities to cultivate many new crops giving a more varied diet and other flavours. The Indians selected those elements that enabled them to better survive the uncertainties of crop production. The livestock addition expanded meat consumption and altered the cultural-ecological system and thus the environment. But the old world rodents and domesticated species began to compete for resources. The hoofed mammals changed the ecology with their herding habits. The environment became even more deforested and along the coast scores of sugar plantations were established.

The *encomenderos* tried to strengthen the working relation with their caciques and their people in order to rule over the Andes and to extract as much wealth as possible. The Indians accepted in many regions an alliance with victorious foreigners as a way to advance local interests and to limit colonial demands and abuses. They developed strategies to protect their self-sufficiency and sued the courts to lower tribute and others. The indigenous society had to develop new strategies that would still be valid within their cultural values. The landscape and perceptions of the indigenous people thus changed significantly during the first decades of the Spanish conquest.

A large number of new technologies was introduced to an astounded population where their traditional farming methods were challenged. They had to learn new skills in house building and ship building. To be able to illuminate the houses at night with grease from the new animals was rapidly adopted as an invaluable good. New diet and drinking habits needed different casks, boxes and bottles and caused additional pressure on the environment not to mention the mining industry where the vast devastated landscape is seen even today around Potosí.

Indian life and land became explicitly inter-tangled and were combined with the conquering European ideology and concepts. This whole different dominating conquest culture brought to the Indians gave rise to other behaviours and other cultural choices but their former cosmology and perception of the world was broken.

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PART 3

The Political Organisation of the New Colonial Societies. The Management of the Conquered Populations and Lands

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CHAPTER 11

Servants, Slaves or Subjects? Jews, Muslims and Indians as Royal Property

David Abulafia

I

A striking feature of late fifteenth-century Spain is that the erosion, conversion and expulsion of the Jewish and (in many areas) of the Muslim communities took place at a time when the Catholic Monarchs were establishing their rule over other non-Christian peoples: the Canary islanders, first of all, and then the inhabitants of several of the major Caribbean islands. This essay poses a question rather than offering an answer: in what respects did the status accorded to the Jews and Muslims within the Christian kingdoms of Spain influence thinking about the status of the newly-discovered and newly-conquered peoples of the Atlantic world? And to what extent did the opening of the Atlantic lead to the creation of essentially new categories in which to place the non-Christian population of the Canary islands and the Caribbean?[1]

Recently there have been a few attempts to make these connections. Adriano Prosperi, one of the leading Italian historians of the Inquisition, has reminded readers, in his short but powerful book *Il seme dell'intolleranza*, that the de-humanization of the Jews in Spain, including the doctrine of *limpieza de sangre*, or "purity of blood," developed at the same time as the Catholic Monarchs were extending their rule over peoples who were neither Christian nor Muslim nor Jewish, in the Caribbean and in the Canary Islands.[2] Jonathan Boyarin has discussed similar issues from a theoretical perspective in *The Unconverted Self*, of 2009.[3] He deals with the ways Jews and also Muslims or Moriscos were compared to the newly discovered Indians, pointing out, for instance,

1 See David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind: Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) for reactions to the peoples of the eastern and western Atlantic before about 1520. Spanish edition: *El descubrimiento de la humanidad* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2009); Italian edition: *La scoperta dell'umanità* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).

2 Adriano Prosperi, *Il seme dell'intolleranza: ebrei, eretici, selvaggi: Granada 1492* (Bari: Laterza, 2012).

3 Jonathan Boyarin, *The Unconverted Self: Jews, Indians, and the Identity of Christian Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

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that there were occasional attempts to argue that the Indians were descended from the Ten Lost Tribes of ancient Israel. Jews and Indians were both accused of obstinacy, of immersing themselves in a carnal existence, even of not being, in the fullest sense, human, because of an inability to act according to reason. Such views did, of course, have their opponents, and Bartolomé de las Casas was the most famous defender of the Indians (though not of the Jews) against such accusations. Western Europeans grappled with the problem of how to fit newly-discovered peoples in an unsuspected New World into their understanding of God's creation and of the history of mankind. And, whether or not one finds his analogies between attitudes to Jews and attitudes to Indians helpful, Boyarin does not address the issues, such as the legal status of the non-Christian population and the evolution of the *encomienda*, that lie at the centre of the discussion offered here; his book omits more than it includes.

In asking the question how the status of the Jews and Muslims influenced that of the Indians several reservations need to be made. One is that the status of the American Indians, as described in texts such as the *Leyes de Burgos*, was interpreted differently by lawyers and theologians at the court of King Ferdinand to the hard and harsh reality of what was happening on the ground in Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica and Puerto Rico, not to mention the treatment of the subject population in the Canary islands.[4] A second reservation arises from the novelty of the discoveries made by Columbus, and the slow evolution of a policy determining the treatment of the native population of the Greater Antilles. The Laws of Burgos were framed twenty years after the first trans-Atlantic voyage of Columbus. As they were being enacted, Spanish conquistadores were making their first steps in the conquest of Cuba, even though it had been visited by Columbus in the early stages of his first voyage. The *encomienda* system, which can be traced back to late medieval Spain, evolved significantly in the twenty years before the conquest of Cuba, and continued to evolve after the conquest of New Spain, though it is not possible to deal here with developments on the American mainland – a subject for which much archival material still remains to be exploited in the *Archivo de las Indias* in Seville, and elsewhere.[5]

In other words, we are not looking at the rapid, hard-and-fast adoption of ideas about the status of the Indians, but at the gradual evolution of a set of

4 *The Laws of Burgos of 1512–1513: Royal Ordinances for the Good Government and Treatment of the Indians*, ed. Lesley B. Simpson (San Francisco: J. Howell Books, 1960).

5 Equally, I have not sought to exploit similar archival material in Seville that is constantly coming to light concerning the evolution of the *encomienda* system in the Caribbean islands; I am grateful to Alexander Stone-Lunde for showing me his continuing research in this area.

ideas about their rights, obligations and relationship to the Crown of Castile – questions and answers, often inconsistent with one another, that sometimes set out an ideal view of how the Indians would be treated, and were often applied with a severity that was not in accordance with the declared intentions of documents such as the *Leyes de Burgos*. And, while historians such as Anthony Pagden have rightly laid emphasis on the influence of Aristotelian ideas about the "barbarian" on thinking about the American Indians, other strands of thought also need to be considered, including those generated by social conditions within medieval Iberia.[6] It is with one of those strands of thought, the idea of the non-Christian as the king's *servus*, that this discussion is concerned. At the very least we can see important analogies between the status ascribed to Jews or Muslims in late medieval Spain and that ascribed to the Taínos of the Caribbean, who both served and were free (even though, according to some authorities, they subsisted in a condition of "natural slavery," a mental rather than legal condition). A further reservation concerns the relationship between Islamic attitudes to Jews and Christians under Muslim rule, the *dhimmis*, and the treatment of American Indians, especially as it was enunciated in the strange document known as *El Requerimiento*. Here, Patricia Seed has written suggestively about the possible origins of the "Requirement" in Muslim and even Biblical teaching about how to treat conquered peoples who submitted peacefully to the new order.[7] This is yet another strand of thought that contributed to the formulation of notions of how to treat subject Indians in the Americas that deserves analysis here.

II

An immediate reaction to the suggestion that there might be a link between the concept of Jews and Muslims as the *servi* of the kings of Castile, Aragon, Navarre or Portugal and the status of the Indians might well be that Queen Isabella, in particular, was very insistent upon the free status of her new subjects in the Caribbean, expressing strong displeasure when she received reports that they were being carried into slavery. As we shall see, King Ferdinand was informed by one of his more influential legal advisers that they were *liberi et ingenui*, the term *ingenuus* being used by the Roman legal writer Gaius to

6 Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1986).

7 Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

mean free-born. The answer to the question posed in this article therefore depends significantly on what is understood by the term *servus*, a word that had a vast number of possible meanings. The interpretation of this word as "slave" has been repeated by several historians, most recently in an ambitious new book entitled *Slaves of the king: Jews and Muslims in the kingdom of Aragon, 1076–1176*, published in Israel.[8] However, this approach fails to understand the real nature of the shifting relationship between the Jews and the *mudéjares* on the one hand, and the Crown in Castile, Aragon and Portugal on the other.[9] In the late twelfth century, beginning with the law-codes of Teruel (Aragon, 1176–7) and Cuenca (Castile, 1190), the status of the Jews as the king's *servi* is enunciated for the first time in these terms, later much-repeated: *Nam iudei servi Regis sunt et semper fisco regio deputati.*[10]

The statutes of Teruel were recopied many times, including versions in the vernacular, and had a powerful influence in the Spanish kingdoms around 1200:[11] *Qual los jodios sieruos son del sennor Rey et sienpre a la real bolsa son*

8 Ilan Shoval, *'Avde ha-melekh: Yehudim u-Muslemim be-mamlekhet Aragon, 1076–1176: ukhlusiyot mi'uṭim be-ḥevrat sefar ha-gevul ha-Notsrit bi-yeme ha-benayim* (Jerusalem, 2010, in Hebrew); and, in English, "*Servi regis* re-examined: On the significance of the earliest appearance of the term in Aragon, 1176," *Hispania Judaica Bulletin*, 4 (2004), 22–69.

9 My own approach can be seen at greater length in the following articles: "The servitude of Jews and Muslims in the medieval Mediterranean," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, 112 (2000), 687–714; "'*Nam iudei servi regis sunt et semper fisco regio deputati*': los judios en el fuero de Teruel (1176–7)," in *XVII Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 2003) 2:1–10; "'*Nam iudei servi regis sunt et semper fisco regio deputati*': the Jews in the municipal fuero of Teruel (1176–7)," in *Jews, Muslims and Christians in and around the Crown of Aragon: Essays in Honour of Professor Elena Lourie*, ed. Harvey J. Hames (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 97–123; "The first *servi camere regie* in Sicily," in *Mediterraneo, Mezzogiorno, Europa. Studi in onore di Cosimo Damiano Fonseca*, ed. Giancarlo Andenna and Hubert Houben (Bari, Adda: 2004), 1:1–14; "The king and the Jews; the Jews in the ruler's service," in *The Jews of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. Christoph Cluse (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 43–54.

10 *Forum Turolii regnante in Aragonia Adefonso rege anno dominice natiuitatis MCLXXVI*, ed. Francisco Aznar (Saragossa: Universidad de Zaragoza, 1905), 228; another edition is *El fuero latino de Teruel*, ed. Jaime Caruana (Teruel: Instituto de Estudios Turolenses, 1974), Ch. 425. See too the partial edition of Fritz Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien*, Teil 1, *Urkunden und Regesten*, 1, *Aragonien und Navarra*, new ed. H. Beinart (Farnborough: Ashgate, 1970; first edition Berlin: Gregg, 1929), 1039–1043, based on Aznar but with notes comparing the text to references to the Jews in the other *fueros*.

11 For the history of the text see the important study by Ana María Barrero, *El Fuero de Teruel. Su historia, proceso de formación y reconstrucción critica de sus fuentes* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turolenses, 1979). Also, more generally, see Jesús Lalinde, *Los fueros de Aragón* (Saragossa: Librería General, 1976), esp. p. 389, with a useful bibliography of

co[*n*]*tados*.[12] Within the Crown of Castile, the Cuenca code had considerable influence as far away as La Mancha and Extremadura, to judge from manuscripts of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[13] Castilian communities that based their *fueros* on Cuenca included Alarcón, Andújar, Baeza, Bejar, Iznatoraf, Moya, Úbeda, Villaescusa de Haro, Zorita de los Canes and possibly Plasencia.[14] There is no agreement about whether the Teruel text influenced that of Cuenca or whether both texts drew their common ideas, including their designation of the Jews as *servi*, from a lost common source; suffice it to say that the kings of Aragon and Castile, Alfonso II and Alfonso VIII, fought side by side in the conquest of Cuenca in 1177, and it is therefore easy to see how a newly-formulated Aragonese law-code could have influenced that of a Castilian town not very far distant.

It is important to realise that this concept had both positive and negative aspects: historians have emphasized the appearance in Germany, under Emperor Frederick II, of the idea of the Jew as a *servus camere nostre*, and its extension to Sicily under Frederick or his successors; studies of not merely the Jews in late medieval Spain but of the *mudéjar* communities have shown how important to the Crown was the claim that subject Jews and Muslims were part of the royal treasure. In fourteenth-century Catalonia and Mallorca the Jews are not merely *nostri proprii*, but they are also the *cofres del Senyor Rey*, the *tresor e cosa nostra propria*, the *peculium et thesaurus noster*.[15] The importance of this concept also lies in the way it was extended to cover subject Muslims, both in the Iberian kingdoms and in southern Italy, by about 1300.[16] In the fourteenth

printed *fueros*, pp. 159–160; and James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War. The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 219–229.

12 *El Fuero de Teruel*, ed. Max Gorosch (Stockholm, 1950), 320.

13 *Forum Conche-Fuero de Cuenca: the Latin Text of the Municipal Charter and Laws of the City of Cuenca, Spain*, ed. George H. Allen (Cincinnati: University Studies published by the University of Cincinnati, 1909–10), 8–9.

14 James F. Powers, trans., *The Code of Cuenca: Municipal Law on the Twelfth-Century Castilian Frontier* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 17.

15 Yom Tov Assis, *The Golden Age of Aragonese Jewry. Community and Society in the Crown of Aragon, 1213–1327*, (London: Littman, 1997), 9; cf. Fritz (later known as Yitzhak) Baer, *Studien zur Geschichte der Juden im Königreich Aragonien während des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1913), 13.

16 David Abulafia, "Monarchs and minorities in the late medieval Mediterranean: Lucera and its analogues," in *Christendom and its Discontents. Exclusion, Persecution and Rebellion, 1000–1500*, ed. Scott L. Waugh and Peter D. Diehl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 234–263, reprinted in David Abulafia, *Mediterranean Encounters, Economic, Religious, Political, 1100–1550* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2000).

century, the Muslims of Aragon-Catalonia are described as *thesauri regii speciales*; *son nuestro tresor e estan a nuestro voler*; *són nostres propris*; and of both Jews and Muslims it is stated in 1360 that *iudei et sarraceni servi sunt camere nostre*.[17] A good example of this phenomenon, drawn from the *Fuero General* of Navarre, is this: *car todos los moros et todas las moras o que sean o de quien sean, son propis speciales del Rey et assi deuen ser por dreyts et por fuero*.[18] Such statements refer in the first instance to what historians otherwise call "free Muslims." Clearly, there were also many Muslims who were privately-owned slaves, and the relationship between their status and that of the free Muslims needs further consideration. A working definition of the distinction would emphasize the difference between free Muslims as direct dependents of the king (or the queen, or a great noble) and unfree Muslims as private property of their owner.[19]

The idea of the Jews as dependents of the royal fisc was by no means unique to the Iberian kingdoms. It can be found in twelfth and thirteenth-century Germany, notably in the Jewry privilege of Frederick II of 1236, where the Jews are defined as *servi camere nostre*, and Frederick even insisted that a certain amount of respect was due to the Jews, insofar as they were the special servants of the Crown itself. Analogous concepts appear in thirteenth-century France and England, with the use of the terms *tanquam servi* and *ki serfs il sunt* to describe the king's Jews.[20] The great English legal historian Frederic William Maitland observed that the English Jews were free in respect of everyone except the king.[21] In other words, Jewish (and Muslim) servitude expressed a condition of immediate dependence upon the ruler. They were neither slaves nor serfs – perhaps the best translation of *servi* is "ministers," and if there is one group that compares closely with the emperor's Jews in medieval Germany it is the unfree knights known as *ministeriales*, especially those who were in the direct service of the ruler.[22] Similarly, we find in twelfth-century Catalonia and Aragon a number of prominent Jews, often described by the ruler as

17 John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure. Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), 30, n. 1.

18 Mercedes García-Arenal and Beatrice Leroy, *Moros y judíos en Navarra en la baja Edad Media* (Madrid: Hiperión, 1984), 51, citing lib. 3, tit. 8.

19 On noble claims to authority over the Jews that challenged royal ones see now Thomas Barton, *Contested Treasure: Jews and Authority in the Crown of Aragon* (University Park: Penn State Press, 2015).

20 Abulafia, "Servitude of Jews and Muslims."

21 Frederic W. Maitland and Frederick Pollock, *History of English Law before the Time of Edward I* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1898) 1:472, and more generally, 468–475.

22 Benjamin Arnold, *German Knighthood, 1050–1300* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

"my Jews," who provided the count-king with various *servicia*, for which they received rewards. From Germany Frederick II introduced this concept to Sicily, where it was used at first to describe the bond between individual Jews (or Muslims) and the king, rather than as a description of the whole community of Jews or Muslims. There are some grounds for arguing that the concept was re-introduced to Aragon-Catalonia when Peter the Great acquired Sicily in 1282.[23] By then, however, the idea of the Muslims as *servi camere* was being applied to the entire community of Saracens settled in Lucera, in Puglia, by Frederick II. Since Charles II of Naples saw them as assets of the Crown, he was willing to sell them into private slavery in 1300, to raise funds for his war against the house of Barcelona.[24]

A similar process can be seen in Spain: a concept applied to the Jews was then extended to the Muslims, as the Christian kings in Iberia tried to find a category in which to fit the increasing number of Muslim subjects who surrendered to Christian armies. And yet, when applied to Jews (though not to Muslims) the concept carried with it important theological overtones, rooted in the thinking of St Augustine and in the law-codes of the first Christian Roman emperors.[25] Here, the image was one of the Jew who was condemned to perpetual servitude as a result of his refusal to accept Christ. St Augustine portrayed the Jews as *servi* of the Christians who performed a valuable service by carrying the books of the Old Testament, which they did not fully understand, for their Christian masters: *Attendite mysterium. Ecce Iudaeus servus est Christiani.*[26]

These ideas were incorporated within papal legislation of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, such as the bull *Sicut Iudaeis non* of 1190, which was re-issued again and again and became a sort of papal constitution for the Jews. Hostiensis stated: "although the Jews are enemies of our faith, they are our *servi* and are tolerated and defended by us."[27] The theological concept of the perpetual servitude of the Jew undoubtedly helped to create and to lock into place the idea of the Jew as the king's *servus*, while the treatment of the Jews in the Roman law codes ensured that they were not denied the right to

23 Abulafia, "First *servi camere regie* in Sicily."

24 Abulafia, "Monarchs and minorities," 239–246.

25 Anna S. Abulafia, *Christian-Jewish Relations 1000–1300: Jews in the Service of Medieval Christendom* (Harlow: Longman, 2010).

26 Augustine of Hippo, *Sermones*, in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 38, col. 56.

27 Cited in Anna S. Abulafia, *Christians and Jews in Dispute: Disputational Literature and the Rise of Anti-Judaism in the West* (*c. 1000–1150*) (Aldershot: Variorum, Ashgate, 1998), essay I, 182.

live within Christian society or – very importantly – to practise their religion, within closely defined limits.

The Roman law codes insisted that a Jew should not exercise authority over Christians. It was in this spirit that the *Corts* of Catalonia demanded the dismissal of the king's Jewish financial advisers by Peter the Great, as the price to be paid for their support against the French invasion.[28] Yet Jews continued to exercise significant functions, especially in financial administration, in Aragon, Castile and Portugal. It could be argued, though, that as the king's *servi* any authority they exercised was not theirs but the king's. They were agents of royal power, and exercised no power of their own. They were proud to appropriate the royal coat-of-arms on their seals; even in the decoration of the Tránsito Synagogue that still survives in Toledo, the use of the Castilian castle on the shield of the king's treasurer, Don Samuel Abulafia, was also an indication of the ties binding all Castilian Jews to the king. Jews certainly benefited from the advantages of royal protection, whether in times of tumult, when pogroms threatened, or in times of peace, when their economic activities brought the Crown much needed resources. Yom Tov Assis has argued, in fact, that the proprietorship of the Jews by the Aragonese kings "contributed to the relative stability enjoyed by the Jews of the realm till 1391."[29] In that year the Jews often sought refuge in royal palaces and castles to escape the mobs that sought their conversion or even slaughter in a good number of cities in Castile and the Crown of Aragon.

The Spanish kings were aware that in defending their Jews they were defending their own assets. These were, nonetheless, disposable assets. For this status also provided grounds for tough action against the Jews in 1492. By then, Ferdinand of Aragon was willing to use the "servitude" of the Jews as grounds for dispossessing and expelling them. To cite his decree of expulsion:

> bearing in mind that the bodies of all the Jews who are in our kingdoms and lordships are ours, concerning which we may by our royal power and supreme authority ordain and dispose according to our will, using our power and authority for this very urgent and necessary task … by this royal edict, perpetually valid, we order to leave and we expel from all our kingdoms and lordships western and eastern all the Jews and Jewesses large and small which are to be found in our kingdoms and lordships, as

28 David Romano, *Judíos al servicio de Pedro el Grande de Aragón, 1276–1285* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983), 175–178.

29 Assis, *The Golden Age*, 9.

> much in the royal lands as in those of the Church and those of any other subjects…[30]

Clearly the "soft" interpretation of Jewish service, as something honourable and as a means of direct access to the king's person had weakened greatly since the twelfth century. What we see in operation in the late fifteenth century is a "hard" interpretation, according to which the Jews have been subjected to Christian rule in return for their crimes of disloyalty to God and, more recently, attempts to undermine the loyalty of the *conversos* to their new faith. It was, of course, this theological dimension that was largely lacking in the treatment of Muslims as *servi regis*, and indeed it was the theological dimension that contributed to the decision to expel Jews, but not Muslims, in 1492.

On the other hand, the act of expelling the Jews did not deprive the king and queen of large numbers of other dependants: the *mudéjar* communities, now including the Muslims of Granada. In the acts and capitulations from the period of the conquest of Granada, the king and queen were more concerned to offer the Muslims guarantees of their safety and of the right to practise Islam than they were to insist on the "servitude" of their new subjects. In this respect they were following in the tradition of "surrender treaties," such as those analysed by Father Robert Burns and Míkel de Epalza from thirteenth-century Valencia.[31] Here, the influence of Islamic practice, itself strongly influenced by Biblical texts and Byzantine practice, is patent; within Spain, the obvious point of comparison is the Tudmir treaty of 713, in which the Muslim invaders guaranteed the right of the Christians in south-eastern Spain to practise their religion and to govern themselves, subject to payment of taxes and recognition of the higher authority of the conquerors. Islam had offered the choice between subjection (that is, *islam*) to Allah, as Muslim converts, or to the Muslim authorities, as *dhimmis*. Under Christian rule, the *jizyah* survived as a payment made by Muslims to Christians, rather than the other way around, and the Aragonese Muslims were still paying their *peyta* in the fourteenth century.

Payment of the poll-tax was seen by Muslims and Christians as an expression of subjection, but, as in the surrender treaties, there was an element of reciprocity: these taxes guaranteed the safety and autonomy of the subject religious communities.

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30 Text in: Rafael Conde, *La Expulsión de los Judíos de la Corona de Aragón. Documentos para su estudio* (Saragossa: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1991), 41–44, doc. 4.

31 Robert I. Burns, Paul Chevedden and Míkel de Epalza, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

The concept of the *mudéjar* as part of the "Royal Treasure" was grafted on to these practices. As with the Jews, the application of the idea that the Muslims were the property of the Crown was applied with greater strictness as time passed. Ferdinand II's Muslim subjects in Valencia and Aragon were described as "servants of our chamber" and "our coffers," and, as Mark Meyerson has argued, this was "not empty rhetoric," since the king freely imposed *servicios graciosos* and *donativos* on the Valencian and Aragonese Muslims (and, until 1492, the Jews), whether or not they assented. In 1485, for instance, the Muslim *aljamas* of the kingdom of Valencia and the Jews of Morvedre – the last major Jewish centre in the kingdom – were obliged to make substantial payments in support of the war against Nasrid Granada, an obligation that the Muslims cannot have found it easy to accept. In 1482 a very large subsidy (over 15,000 s.) was demanded when Queen Isabella visited the kingdom of Valencia.[32] These dispositions left some of the nobility ill at ease, as John Boswell showed in his study of the Muslims in late fourteenth-century Aragon, appropriately entitled *The Royal Treasure*.[33] Nobles too claimed jurisdiction over "their" *Moros*, and even, occasionally, over their own Jews (at least one lord pointlessly argued that he could retain his Jewish community after the expulsion, since the Jews were his and not the king's). Broadly speaking, the Crown accepted seigneurial jurisdiction over some *mudéjares*, while assuming that it reserved final jurisdiction over all free Muslims and Jews in Aragon or Castile.

We can thus see that a distinct category of servitude was created to accommodate Jews and Muslims. Applied to these groups, the term *servi* had a special meaning, for it was an almost infinitely flexible term in a world where (at least back in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) almost everyone, from the pope downwards, was in one sense or another the *servus* of someone else. Free Muslims and Jews could still be *servi* of the Crown. But at the end of the fifteenth century the number of non-Christian peoples subject to the Crown grew massively and suddenly. How, then, did this evolving set of attitudes to the non-Christian population of Iberia influence attitudes to the non-Christian populations who fell under Castilian rule, whether in the Canary islands or in the Caribbean?

32 Mark D. Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Co-existence and Crusade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); also his *A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), for Morvedre.

33 Boswell, *The Royal Treasure*.

III

It took twenty years from Columbus' first discoveries for legislation to be framed in Spain that determined how the newly conquered peoples of Hispaniola and neighbouring territories should be treated. During this long delay, the *encomienda* system continued to develop and expand, beginning with Columbus' demands for the periodic delivery by every adult male Indian of a specified amount of gold (sufficient to fill a hawk's bell); one of the *caciques* tried to persuade him to demand cotton instead, but the admiral's preferences were clear, especially when the queen made plain her distaste for the enslavement of those she regarded as the new subjects of the Castilian Crown (I shall deal further with the *encomienda* system in a moment, when looking at the *Leyes de Burgos*). In 1501, Isabella's instructions to Ovando stressed that the Indians "are our subjects and vassals," and that they therefore could not be enslaved. When Queen Isabella wrote to Ovando again in 1503, instructing him to apply an *encomienda* system based on that in operation in parts of conquered Granada, she demanded that the Indians work for the Christians of Hispaniola "as free persons, which they are, and not as slaves." It is important to bear in mind the oft-repeated distinction between these Indians and other Indians who could be enslaved – by and large, those described as Caribs, whose wars against the Taínos and the Spaniards justified their capture and enslavement, quite apart from the cannibalism attributed to them. Caribs could be, and were, traded as slaves, and there is evidence that unscrupulous slave-traders also captured and sold Taínos when no one was looking too closely.[34]

What was at stake was royal authority. A significant feature of the fifteenth-century Castilian *encomienda* was the retention or extension of royal authority over the *encomenderos*, most notably over the *comendadores* of the Military Orders, institutions that Ferdinand the Catholic successfully brought under his control.[35] The spread of the *encomienda* therefore offered some potential for the assertion of royal control in Hispaniola, despite the chaotic circumstances created by tension between Columbus and the officials sent effectively to replace him, and despite the increasing tension between the Spaniards and the Taíno Indians. Isabella recalled that she had already insisted in earlier instructions "that the Indian inhabitants of the island of Hispaniola are free and not

34 Abulafia, *Discovery of Mankind*, 259.

35 Robert S. Chamberlain, "The roots of Lordship: the *encomienda* in medieval Castile," in *From Reconquest to Empire: the Iberian Background to Latin American History*, ed. Harold B. Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 124–147.

servile"; however, in an interesting qualification, she stressed that there were limits to this liberty:

> We are now informed that because of the excessive liberty enjoyed by the said Indians they avoid contact and community with the Spaniards, to such an extent that they will not work even for wages, but wander about idle.[36]

The emphasis, while Isabella was alive, was thus on the free status of the Indians, which, even in the *encomienda* system, was formally recognised: the gold the Indians had to provide was a tax or tribute, and indeed precisely because it was a tribute it confirmed that they were not slaves but subjects with obligations; equally, the Indians were entitled to claim wages, though (as Isabella's instructions already hinted) these were not always offered. Isabella thus aspired towards a system reminiscent of that obtaining in the regions of Spain still inhabited by *mudéjares*: the Crown attempted to offer protection to its non-Christian subjects, but they were expected to respond by making payments – it was to be a reciprocal relationship.

Managing such a relationship was, needless to say, impossible, not merely because of the great distance involved, but because of the constant strife between the Columbus family and their rivals, such as Ovando. In addition, Columbus' monopoly over trans-Atlantic shipping was broken by interlopers, often intent on carrying away captured Indians as slaves. Here the Catholic Monarchs continued to espouse the policies they had adopted during the conquest of Gran Canaria and Tenerife, treating those who accepted their dominion as subjects who should be protected from enslavement, though there are several examples to show that this was not always achieved. From the start, Columbus was strongly discouraged from following the Portuguese example, which he knew well, and substituting enslaved Taíno Indians for the gold and precious stones he was promising the king and queen, but only delivering in small quantities. In 1503 Luis Guerra and his brother were reprimanded on their return from the New World for taking Caribbean slaves, "the said Indians being our subjects," and therefore immune from enslavement, and when they set out again in 1504 to capture American Indians they were warned not to poach on Columbus' territories, nor those of the king of Portugal (which they had raided in the past) – they could prey on the apparently cannibalistic Caribs, who lived in areas beyond Spanish control, but not on peaceful Taínos,

36 Cited in *Laws of Burgos*, 4–5.

who could surely be brought to the true faith – even though efforts to convert them were feeble and intermittent.

What King Ferdinand needed was a reasoned argument by a highly skilled lawyer, a tract that would set out clearly the case for Spanish dominion across the Ocean Sea. Dr Juan López de Palacios Rubios was a distinguished professor of law from Salamanca and Valladolid who proved to be a warm supporter of King Ferdinand, writing in defence of his ruthless seizure of Navarre in 1512; he was also an expert on Aristotle's *Politics*, on which he had written a commentary and which had such influence on thinking about "barbarians" – it was here that Aristotle expounded his view of "natural slavery," a condition quite distinct from legal slavery. Between 1512 and 1516, most probably in the first half of this period, López de Palacios Rubios wrote his "Book about the Ocean islanders," *Libellus de insulanis oceanis*.[37] López de Palacios Rubios' book was a highly conservative one, written in the mode of a late medieval scholastic tract, full of references to Biblical and legal texts, and to major classical authorities, especially Aristotle; it did not seek to find a novel answer to a novel problem – the discovery of what would prove to be many millions of unbaptised people in an unsuspected corner of the world – but to tease out of these older texts an answer to the question of Spain's rights in the New World. Like so much of the early literature about the American Indians, the book offered a combination of positive and negative images, but it was the negative images that prevailed, much to the irritation of las Casas, who read and annotated with colourful remarks the only surviving manuscript of the book, now preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid. Las Casas lost his temper when López de Palacios Rubios described the Indians as "at liberty and free" (*liberi et ingenui*), which might seem quite a favourable comment, but not to someone who saw there the roots of massive hypocrisy. Some of his angry marginal notes read "absurd," "false," "heretical."[38]

López de Palacios Rubios remarked very early on: "In these islands, according to what I have learned from trustworthy accounts, they have met rational men, tame, peaceful and capable of understanding our Faith. Among themselves they do not have private property."[39] This lack of property meant that the question whether the Castilian Crown had the right to assume control over

37 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional: MS 17641; I do not know of any full edition of the Latin text. Wherever possible, references are given here to both folios in the manuscript and to pages in the Spanish translation: Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas del mar Océano*, ed. and trans. Silvio Zavala and Agustín Millares Carlo (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954).

38 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, ff. 50r, 51v, 52v, 53r; pp. 108, 112, etc.

39 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, f. 4r; p. 9.

their property following the conquest of the Greater Antilles was in many respects a non-question.[40]

López de Palacios Rubios closely analysed the question of their right to be free, for as Aristotle and Aquinas had indicated, "some were marked out from birth to serve and others to rule."[41] Different people, he observed, have different levels of intelligence, and this gave some the right to dominate others, though he accepted that non-Christian peoples were entitled to govern themselves so long as they caused no offence to Christians or so long as the lands they inhabited had not once been in Christian hands, like the kingdom of Granada.[42] But, once the islands in the Ocean Sea were brought under Spanish rule, the Crown's subjects were obliged to perform the same services and duties as any other subjects of the Crown anywhere else.[43] Had not the Emperor Augustus imposed tribute throughout the Roman Empire, tribute that had to be paid in gold, silver, iron and salt?[44] In other words, the Spanish Crown had a perfect right to levy the taxes it required.

López de Palacios Rubios addressed the question of servitude in important sections of his tract. He argued, on the basis of Justinian's *Digest*, that enslavement was an alternative to a much worse fate, the killing of captives by their conquerors, but it was a product of the law of nations rather than divine law. Slavery could be traced back to Noah, more precisely to the incident when Ham (often regarded as the ancestor of black people) mocked his drunken and naked father and his father condemned him to serve his brothers. But primitive peoples, whether or not they were "natural slaves" by Aristotle's definition, did not know slavery, as could be seen from the ancient Germans (here he must be alluding to Tacitus' *De Germania*).[45] The peoples of the Caribbean, he suggested, fell into this category, living under the primitive or basic law that conferred *ingenuitas* and *libertas* on each person, and this free status was in no way compromised when Indians accepted Christian baptism. If Indians simply submitted to Christian rule, without accepting baptism, they still did not lose their personal freedom, so long as they paid tribute and offered service to the Crown.[46] Two points emerge from this part of López de Palacios Rubios'

40 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas,* f. 16r-v; p. 39.

41 Aristotle, *Politics* 1254a24; Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, f. 11r and p. 25 and n.2. Cf. Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 239; and Pagden, *Fall of Natural Man*, 67–78.

42 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, ff. 11v, 16r-24r, 35v, 26r-27r, and pp. 26, 39–55, 58, 60–61; cf. Vitoria, pp. 244, 246–247.

43 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, f. 65v; p. 149.

44 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas,* f. 70r-v; pp. 163–165.

45 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, 28–30.

46 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, f. 13r; pp. 32–33.

discussion. One is that he lays some stress on the obligation to provide service to the Crown: serving the Crown is not the same as being a slave of the Crown. A second point, drawn from the medieval *Decretals*, is that he distinguishes between the service offered by free subject Indians and that supplied by Jews, for the Jews, he insists, had become *servi* as a result of their sin, "the Jews being *servi* of the Christians and possessed by them."[47] The Jews, like the Indians, must pay tribute, but they were subject to restrictions, such as their right to give evidence in court, that did not apply to free men (and had not applied to them, in fact, in the far-off days of the Cuenca and Teruel *fueros*). If Jews converted to Christianity, however, they could retain those goods that they had acquired legitimately, that is, not by usury or other illicit means. This point was sufficient to prove that converted Indians too could retain their old property (even though he had already observed, basing himself on Peter Martyr's letters, that they did not possess property).[48] López de Palacios Rubios was thus well aware of past discussions about the status of Jews in Christian society. He was prepared to accept that Christians should as far as they were capable love and cherish Jews and Muslims, and by extension the heathen peoples of the New World, relying once again on what he read in the *Decretals*. Even if infidels did not accept baptism, the pope had the right to castigate and correct them when they erred against the law or when they acted immorally. His examples of Christian intervention in acts by followers of other religions were the burning of the Talmud by thirteenth-century popes, who found the work contrary to the teaching of both the Old and the New Testament, and irregularities or misbehaviour in marriage.[49]

This sustained contrast between the status of the Jews as the king's *servi* and the status of the Indians as the *liberi et ingenui* subjects of the Crown might appear to wreck any argument that the concept of Jews or Muslims as the "Royal Treasure" had significant influence on how the status of the Indians was understood. However, we are looking at only one text, and we have to remember that López de Palacios Rubios is following a particular line, emphasizing the theological dimension to Jewish servitude. The practical reality of Jewish status in fifteenth-century Spain had been closer to the Indian case than he was willing to argue: Jews paid heavy tribute, were granted autonomy, and were under pressure to convert but not (before 1492) under an obligation to do so if they wished to remain in Spain. Since López de Palacios Rubios was born in 1450, he must have encountered Jews, not to mention the many *conversos* who

47 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, 48, 51.

48 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, 42.

49 López de Palacios Rubios, *De las islas*, 104–105.

still populated Spanish universities. And yet, by 1512, the question of Jewish status had become a theoretical one, at least within Spain, and not surprisingly the learned doctor relied heavily on the established texts of canon law. The status he was trying to define for the Indians in fact had significant analogies with that of Jews and Muslims in late medieval Spain, while his emphasis on the fact that the Indians were both free and subjects, paying tribute, enabled him to justify the extension of Spanish Christian rule over heathens.

There was a second area where Palacios Rubios and the Spanish lawyers attempted to determine the fate of the Indians. Around the time López de Palacios Rubios wrote his tract on the islanders of the Ocean Sea, the first set of laws concerning the treatment of the Indians was issued, the *Leyes de Burgos* of December 1512. Here, the emphasis shifts from the insistence on their legal freedom to a description of their obligations as subjects of the Crown, and the obligations of the *encomenderos* who are held responsible for their spiritual and physical care. In working for the Spaniards, the Indians were mainly expected to collect gold, which functioned as tribute to the Castilian Crown (a few areas remote from the mines were allowed to specialise in the rearing of pigs and the manufacture of hammocks and cotton clothing).[50] The difference from the earlier practice of Columbus was that the Admiral had demanded the gold without organising in detail its collection. This law code concerned itself with the very structure of Taíno society. The Laws of Burgos are certainly full of paradoxes. On the one hand the *encomenderos* are to provide the Indians with communal houses (*bohíos*) and hammocks, as well as chickens and maize seed, which they are to enjoy as their own property, entirely belonging to the Indians to whom they have been given. On the other hand, the Indians are themselves "given" and "belong" in *encomienda*, and are obliged to sow cassava, cotton and other plants.[51] On the one hand the Indians are to be redistributed in new settlements across Hispaniola, closer to Christian settlements; on the other hand, they are to accept this redistribution voluntarily, and Don Diego Colón is to achieve this by persuasion and encouragement.[52] The Indians are to be paid wages for their work, which was the subject of old complaints, for if they were legally free why were they made to work for nothing? Churches are to be constructed for each *encomienda*, and the Indians must be taught the basic prayers and doctrines of Christianity, at least if they have "the capacity and ability to learn them"; new-born infants are to be baptised within a week of birth.[53]

50 *Laws of Burgos*, xxv, 32–33.

51 "Given" and "belonging": *Laws of Burgos*, xxi, 29.

52 *Laws of Burgos*, xix–xx, 28–29.

53 *Laws of Burgos*, i–x, 14–22.

In the traditional spirit of respect for established native authority, the authority of the *caciques* as headmen in their communities was recognised, and they were even assigned better clothes and their own servants (analogies with the treatment of their Muslim counterparts in Spain are obvious).[54] It was accepted that among those Indians who were brought to Hispaniola from neighbouring islands there would be some slaves, whose treatment was not subject to this set of laws, even though they were to be treated "with much love and gentleness," so that they would turn towards the Christian faith. But the majority of Taínos found themselves locked into the *encomienda* system in squads of between forty and 150 workers; thus the existence of the *encomienda* was now formalised.[55] There were some humane clauses: women more than four months pregnant were excused labour in the mines, though they were expected to perform domestic tasks;[56] Indians were not to be physically punished: "we order and command that no person or persons shall dare to beat any Indians with sticks, or whip him, or call him dog, or address him by any name other than his proper name alone."[57]

Respect for the Indians was to be founded on two principles: that they were legally free (a principle implicit but not explicit in these laws) and that they were being educated in the true faith (a point made right at the start of the code of law). Yet all the evidence suggests that these regulations were honoured in the breach. The creation of Indian villages close to Christian settlements was partly negated by the demand that Indians should travel to the gold fields for five months at a time, away from home, to be followed by forty days of rest; "and the day they cease their labour of extracting gold shall be noted on a certificate, which shall be given to the miners who go to the mines."[58] The application of these laws was not rendered easier by the political conflicts that continued in the New World; while the laws were being issued, Ovando and Diego Columbus battled for supremacy not just in Hispaniola but across the water in Puerto Rico. In other words, the Laws of Burgos regulated relations between the Spaniards and the Indians in theory, but did little to change what was happening on the ground. The Laws of Burgos did not make extensive use of the theme of Indian freedom being formulated around this time by López de Palacios Rubios, laying much more stress on the theme of tribute payment

54 *Laws of Burgos*, xx, xxii, 28–31.

55 *Laws of Burgos*, xxxv, 38.

56 *Laws of Burgos*, xviii, 34.

57 *Laws of Burgos*, xxiv, 32.

58 *Laws of Burgos*, xiii, 24.

by the Indians as subjects of the Castilian Crown. In effect, the Laws of Burgos created a distinctive category of subject: in a word, the Indian.

A third area where López de Palacios Rubios made a very distinctive contribution was in helping to draw up *El Requerimiento*, a document which was required to be read publicly to those who were about to have their lands brought under Spanish rule.[59] Unlike the *Leyes de Burgos*, *El Requerimiento* is explicit about the freedom of the Indians, but it is a conditional freedom, dependent on their willingness to accept Christian rule and instruction in the Christian faith. The text is well-known and it is only necessary to mention those aspects that bear on the argument of this article. We are told that, while the pope had the right "to judge and govern all Christians, Moors, Jews, Gentiles, and all other sects," he had in fact "made donation of these isles and the mainland to the aforesaid king and queen and to their successors, our lords, with all that there are in these territories." Some lands have already willingly fallen under the sway of the king and queen, and have accepted Christian preachers who have converted some of the inhabitants, acting out of their own free will. Ferdinand and Juana "have commanded them to be treated as their subjects and vassals; and you too are held and obliged to do the same." There was a valuable reward for accepting Spanish authority: "we in their name shall receive you in all love and charity, and shall leave you, your wives, and your children, and your lands, free without servitude," and you will be able to act as "you like and think best." This, then, was the way in which the Indians and other conquered peoples could guarantee their status as free subjects rather than as slaves of the Crown. The king and queen promised many privileges and benefits to those who accepted their rule, but did not define what these were. There was no actual obligation to accept baptism: "they shall not compel you to turn Christians, unless you yourselves, when informed of the truth, should wish to be converted to our Holy Catholic Faith."

The Requirement ruthlessly set out the alternatives for those who did not comply, expressing with startling clarity the two extremes of the Spanish reaction to native peoples:

> we shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all

59 Preserved in Seville, Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia de Panamá, Leg. 233, lib. 1, ff. 49–50v; http://users.dickinson.edu/~borges/Resources-Requerimiento.htm [Accessed 9 August 2016].

> the mischief and damage that we can, as to vassals who do not obey, and refuse to receive their lord.

All this would, of course, be announced in due legal form, and a notary would keep a formal record that the proclamation had been read and witnessed. By 1513 the document was in use, though it soon came to be mocked as a statement that was incomprehensible to those who heard it recited. It was highly paradoxical requirement voluntarily to accept the authority of the Crown and of the Church.

The roots of The Requirement lay not just in papal doctrine about the authority of the successors to St Peter. Patricia Seed has traced the origins of The Requirement back to Islamic and even ancient Israelite practices in time of war.[60] She observes that there was some similarity between the tribute in gold demanded by the Spaniards in the New World and the tribute in money or kind demanded by Muslims from Christian and Jewish subjects. By 1518 the Indian tribute had settled at three *pesos* for each Indian man aged 20 upwards.[61] As has been seen, the role of the *caciques* as heads of their communities was very similar to the way the Muslims permitted self-government to Jews and Christians, expecting them to administer their own laws. Once the Christians gained the upper hand in Spain, from the thirteenth century onwards, a comparable practice was enshrined in many of the "surrender treaties" which allowed the Moors to submit to Christian rule on what both sides agreed were honourable terms. Thus in the late Middle Ages, the *aljama* or community of Moors or Jews in cities such as Valencia was self-governing, and communities were often obliged to live in defined areas, just as the Indians had to move to special villages close to the Spanish settlements in the New World.

Finally, Spanish lawyers and theologians thought back to the words of *Deuteronomy*: "When you draw near to a town to fight against it, offer it terms of peace. If it accepts your terms of peace and surrenders to you, then all the people in it shall serve you in forced labour…"[62] López de Palacios Rubios cited these very words in his book on the islanders of the Ocean Sea, setting off an argument with Las Casas, who recorded his own very forceful views in the margins of the surviving manuscript.[63] López de Palacios Rubios clearly did not consider that legal freedom and forced labour were incompatible.

60 Seed, *Ceremonies*, 69–99.

61 Seed, *Ceremonies*, 78–83.

62 *Deuteronomy*, 20: 10–13

63 López de Palacios Rubios, f. 15r-v; pp. 36–37.

IV

Thus in the New World we find a combination of (to use the Biblical term) forced labour, tribute or tax payment and free status. This puzzling combination can be explained several ways. Being "free" meant that the Indians could not be enslaved by private parties, because they and the lands they inhabited lay under the direct authority of the king and queen. There may be analogies here to the "freedom" conferred on emancipated serfs in western Europe at this period, which in some regions (including parts of Iberia) saw the dissolution of the bonds of serfdom, and the expansion of wage labour; the resistance of the Catalan nobles and the *remença* rebellions are, of course, an important theme in the history of the Crown of Aragon during the fifteenth-century. Paul Freedman has shown how the accusation that the Catalan peasantry had welcomed the original Muslim invaders in the eighth century was utilised in defence of their continuing unfreedom.[64] Within Castile, possible analogies can be found among the peasants in lands of *realengo*, or royal dominion. Isabella freed the peasants on the seigneurial lands of *solariego* from servile bonds in 1480.[65] This did not release peasants inhabiting either type of estate from payments of taxes to their lord. A second analogy, already discussed, is with the status of free Muslims, although ten years before the Laws of Burgos were issued they had been required either to convert or to leave Castilian lands (though not Aragon-Valencia).[66]

In these cases, then, we can think of a circumscribed freedom being conferred on Christian peasants, *mudéjares* and Indians. Similar conditions applied to Canary islanders who accepted Spanish rule, for whom the Crown took responsibility, even returning illicitly captured islanders from Spain to their homeland. There are also analogies with the status of the Jews, but a note of caution is required here. The idea that the Jews were under the direct protection of the king, expressed in the concept that they were his immediate *servi*, evolved towards a strong interpretation according to which the Jews and their property were fully possessed by the monarch. Here the ecclesiastical idea of the perpetual servitude of Jews to Christians, traceable back to Augustine, and

64 Paul Freedman, "Cowardice, heroism and the legendary origins of Catalonia," *Past and Present* 121 (1988): 3–28; also his *The Origins of Peasant Servitude in Medieval Catalonia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

65 Chamberlain, "The roots of Lordship," 134–135.

66 Chamberlain, "The roots of Lordship," 146; and Meyerson, *Muslims of Valencia*, for the remaining *mudéjares*.

reiterated in papal legislation either side of 1200, was deployed to deny free status to the Jews, even though, way back in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, they had been *vecinos* of Castilian and Aragonese towns (including Teruel and Cuenca). Yet in all these cases – Indians, Canary islanders, Muslims and Jews – a fundamental common principle remained, the assertion of royal protection and, in consequence, a prohibition on the enslavement of members of these communities by private individuals. Still, one is bound to agree with Robert Chamberlain, who wrote as far back as 1939: "to attempt to establish analogies with regard to status which are completely valid on a legal basis, however, is extremely difficult." It is rendered even more difficult by the insistence of López de Palacios Rubios that Jews were unfree but Indians were free. Law and practice diverged in any number of ways.

Even so, what we are observing is a line of descent from the special status accorded to the Jews, which was then, *faute de mieux*, conferred on the Muslims, to the status of the Indians. This complex heritage had the strange result that the Indians were described as free but (as Las Casas rightly insisted) treated like animals, or worse – worse, indeed, he says at one point, than the excrement left by animals in the middle of the road. More important than the terms "free" or "unfree" is the idea of immediate royal protection, control and taxation of these communities. Las Casas bears witness to the extreme ineffectiveness of royal protection over the Indians, while events in Iberia ensured that the "Royal Treasure" of Jews and Muslims officially ceased to exist between 1492 and 1525. The Catholic Monarchs did not find a neat solution to the problem of the status of their new non-Christian subjects. In consequence, those subjects discovered that their "freedom" was almost completely worthless.

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CHAPTER 12

The Kingdom of Granada: Between the Culmination of a Process and the Beginning of a New Age

Antonio Malpica

Introduction

When thinking about the final days of al-Andalus, which occurred, at least from the viewpoint of political history, early in 1492, it is rarely remembered that this climax was the result of a drive started with the formalisation of feudalism and carried through by a continuous war of conquest against the "infidel." In this war, the enemy was not thought to belong to the same "moral category" as Christians. Christian values offered cultural validation to the war against the "others," which were not considered merely adversaries but the embodiment of all anti-Christian values. The valour of one side was contrasted with the cowardice of the other. Chivalric ideals were presented in a war waged in the name of Christ, while the enemy was represented as weak, or cowardly, but always representative of evil.

Thus the Muslims were the essential enemy, and their way of life was a sign of their similarity with animals, of their barely human nature. By contrast, Christians enjoyed a natural and equally essential moral authority.[1] This principle was lateral to feudal ideology, which achieved its maximum expression in the myth of Gog and Magog.[2] These were the two demons that would come to the world to announce the end of time.[3] For medieval Christians, they were

1 Pierre Jonin, "Introduction," in *La Chanson de Roland*, ed. Pierre Jonin (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 7–49.

2 Raoul Manselli, "I popoli immaginari: Gog e Magog," in *Popoli e paesi nella cultura altomedievale. XXIX Settimana di studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo*, 2 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 1983), 489–497.

3 The *Book of Revelation* says: "And when the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison. And shall go out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth, Gog, and Magog, to gather them together for battle: the number of whom is as the sand of the sea" (*Revelation* XX, 7–8). It must also be pointed out that Gog and Magog are also mentioned in the Quran: "They said, 'O Dhul-Qarnayn, indeed Gog and Magog are [great] corrupters in the land. So may we assign for you an expenditure that you might make between us and them a barrier?'" (Quran 18, 95).

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incarnated by many external peoples, envisaged as a threat to the existence of Christianity.

"Preventive war" *avant la lettre* was, no doubt, the best strategy. The unachievable target – to convince these devils of their error and convert them – was not always aimed for, and generally gave way to the more modest target of expelling them from the land that they called theirs, but which was in fact Christian, and, if necessary, annihilating them. The enemy were the Islamic non-feudal societies, which were well organised and structured; for which war was not the only immediate horizon, and in fact played but a minor socio-political role.

From being an end in itself, war would turn into a means for the acquisition of booty through violent expropriation. Over time, the target would become the permanent conquest of land for its economic exploitation with the more or less willing participation of the vanquished. This resulted in a contradiction which sooner or later had to come to a head: the implantation of a feudal system in lands which were not empty, but fully occupied and productive. These pre-existing non-feudal societies clashed against the victors, who at first aspired to impose a superior system but who in the end would wipe out all systems but their own.

By the end of the Middle Ages, when the last of the Muslim territories in Andalusia had been conquered, Castilian society was no longer ruled by the same feudal system that had expelled the Muslims from western Andalusia in the 13th century. The metamorphosis of feudal society was in fact already well under way towards the stronger definition of the state, the transformation of the king from a master of vassals into a sovereign of subjects, and the imposition of codified legal systems upon the government. Indeed, by the late 15th century the state had already evolved into a modern form, losing most of the feudal nature from which it had, nevertheless, emerged. The army, for example, had reached organisational levels, and thus a potential, that were totally unimaginable at the time of the medieval hosts. Bureaucracy was an increasingly complex machine, as clearly shown by the number of documents issued by each section of the royal chancelleries. In this regard, the sovereign himself had delegated his legal capacity to the chancelleries of Valladolid and Ciudad Real -the latter was moved to Granada in the early 16th century. A quick glance at economic life renders quite apparent the generalisation of commercial activities, under the organisation and control of a well prepared bourgeoisie. Although their activities would be fundamentally urban in nature, they also had an impact on the countryside.

This last subject may help us to understand two strange, not to say incomprehensible, points. One of them is the maintenance, and on at least a few

occasions, the expansion of irrigated agriculture. This could be due to the unquestionable difficulties involved in transforming irrigated areas. On the other hand, we must also take into consideration the equally unquestionable need to transform the agricultural system to respond to new demands connected with more than merely food production. Among the demands, a special position must be awarded to the growing pressure from stockbreeding, much more significant in the Castilian than in the Andalusi economy. The second point is the demand for new products from already existing crops. This is the case for wine, which was much less consumed prior to the Castilian conquest.

We are thus confronted with the development of two different economies in a space previously occupied by just one. Some factors in this situation need to be stressed. First, certain products of the Nasrid economy, for example sugarcane, underwent a swift process of development up to the point of taking over whole areas, as in the valley of the Guadalfeo around Salobreña and Motril. The commercial possibilities of these economic sectors appealed to the new Castilian inhabitants, especially those belonging to the upper classes. By putting their lands up for lease they obtained a secure and regular income. The primary takers often then sub-let these lands, in this case through short-term leases. It was also common for large landowners to invest in facilities and factories for the transformation of agricultural goods such as sugar cane.[4] The expansion of large properties is, in summary, a clearly discernible phenomenon in the early 16th century. Additionally, surfaces dedicated to dry land agriculture clearly multiplied in size, encroaching on hillsides and other secondary lands. This type of agriculture already existed around Granada, but it now became much more significant.

This process was accompanied, as can easily be discerned, by different levels of political pressure and control. The policies implemented with regard to the conquered would not only have the effect of reducing their total numbers, but also of limiting the number of settlements in which they were present. These effects became apparent very soon after the war. Their lives were also regimented, generally limiting their chances of social mobility. There were, of course, mechanisms for social promotion and material advancement, but they were almost exclusively related to the definition of a small aristocracy and to the occupation of administrative positions increasingly important for the Castilian government and for the control of the new lands and their inhabitants.

All of these issues will be examined presently, but we must now remember that the end of the war in Spain did not stop Castile's progress in two

4 See the paper by Adela Fábregas, "Comercial crop or plantation system? Sugarcane production from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic," in this volume.

directions: one pointed to northern Africa, and the other to the Atlantic, following in both cases the Portuguese lead. In fact, the change of focus of both Christians and Muslims, between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, was already a clear trend during the Middle Ages. The Almohads drafted this Atlantic option, but never fully pushed it forth.[5] The Christians progressively imposed their control over the Mediterranean, facilitating contact between Italians and Portuguese.[6] The main steps were taken by the House of Aviz, linked to the House of Lancaster through the marriage of the first of the dynasty's kings, João I, with Philippa of Lancaster.

The drive for discovery and conquest focused on the Atlantic, first on the Atlantic islands, then on the Caribbean, and finally on the new continent of America. The circumnavigation of Africa and the creation of commercial factories in Asia were more like the earliest, medieval, form of expansion than this second type. The adoption of such a strategy by Spanish and Portuguese, already victors over the Iberian Muslims, and the preference given to the American route was based on the certainty that the new peoples encountered were not capable of resisting the Christian military machinery. For all of these reasons, we understand that the process of conquest and occupation of the Nasrid kingdom in Granada has to be considered as but one step in a wider phenomenon that went much further; the expansion of feudal society.

The Occupation of the Kingdom of Granada

During the decade invested in the conquest of Granada and the years that followed, the number of new settlers arriving in the kingdom has been calculated to have been between around 30,000 and 40,000. These figures are not entirely precise, because they are essentially based on the known *Libros de Repartimiento*. There can be little doubt that there were more arrivals, because we know of further allocations of property, some of which are in fact recorded but remain to date unpublished. On the other hand, some population movements

5 Christophe Picard, *L'Océan Atlantique musulman: de la conquête arabe à l'époque almohade: navigation et mise en valeur des côtes d'al-Andalus et du Maghreb occidental* (*Portugal-Espagne-Maroc*) (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose,1987); and *La mer et les musulmans d'occident au moyen age: VIIIe–XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997).

6 Pinuccia F. Simbula, "Apertura de las rutas comerciales de las flotas italianas hacia el Atlántico," in *Navegación marítima del Mediterráneo al Atlántico*, ed. Antonio Malpica (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2001), 207–258.

are difficult to compute. This is for example the case of the city of Granada itself, which was not made the subject of a *repartimiento*.

This long process has generated an abundant bibliography.[7] The process can be seen to run from the onset of the offensive campaign (begun in 1482 with the conquest and later defence of Alhama) to well into the 16th century. Most of the new settlers arriving in the territory of Granada came from the crown of Castile, especially from Andalusia.[8] The demographics of their places of origin during this period are still imperfectly known. We need to explain the apparent population growth in western Andalusia and their migration towards the newly conquered lands. Similarly, we need to know more about how these migrations started and which criteria were followed. It must not be forgotten that the aristocracy, always one of the main factors in these processes, were entrusted with the repopulation of certain territories, including lands belonging to others. This fundamentally affected the middle tier of the Castilian aristocracy, especially those noblemen acting as officials of the crown.

The Catholic Monarchs controlled the process more or less overtly through a handful of men of unquestioned loyalty (for example Íñigo López de Mendoza, Andrés Calderón and Hernando de Zafra, among others). Underlying this upper executive tier, however, was the pyramidal machinery based on personal relationships that eventually fulfilled the original target, which was the assimilation of the kingdom of Granada into Castile at the smallest possible cost.

We must not forget that these new settlers arrived in areas previously organised by Muslim groups. Also, although a great number of these groups had been displaced, many others remained to serve the new masters. The repopulation and *repartimiento* of lands had an immediate and obvious impact on the indigenous population. The first question that needs to be addressed refers

7 For example, general works such as Miguel Á. Ladero, "La repoblación del Reino de Granada anterior al año 1500," *Hispania* 110 (1968): 489–563; and "Mercedes reales en Granada anteriores al año 1500. Catálogo y comentario," *Hispania* 112 (1969): 355–424; Antonio Malpica, "De la Granada nazarí al reino de Granada," in *De al-Andalus a la sociedad feudal: los repartimientos bajomedievales* (Barcelona: CSIC, 1990), 119–153; Rafael G. Peinado, "El Reino de Granada después de la conquista: La sociedad repobladora según los libros de repartimiento," in *La Península Ibérica en la Era de los Descubrimientos* (*1391–1492*). *Actas de las III Jornadas Hispano-Portuguesas de Historia Medieval*, ed. Manuel González Jiménez (Seville: 1997), 2, 1575–1630.

8 Rafael G. Peinado, "La sociedad repobladora: el control y la distribución del espacio," in *Historia del reino de Granada. I. De los orígenes a la época mudéjar* (*hasta 1502*), ed. Rafael G. Peinado (Granada: 2000), 477–524, esp. 506. The author has calculated the proportion of Castilians as 93.30%, and of people from Andalusia as 52.03%.

to the problem posed by the Muslims from Granada, the former owners of the lands now to be occupied by Castilians.

The right of conquest, clearly valid from the Castilian point of view, justified the free appropriation of the possessions of the vanquished by the victors. There was, however, a technical difficulty in most cases. Most of the towns and cities had surrendered to the Castilians. There was thus a series of pacts and conditions that, although the details vary, in general allowed the owners of land to stay in their properties as new subjects of the monarchy.

Many of these pacts between the surrendering cities and the Catholic Monarchs and their successors have been preserved. Quite a few have been published.[9] However, it is difficult to enumerate a set of general conditions to cover all cases. As pointed out by Ángel Galán, this is due to the fact that each case responded to the needs of a specific community in a unique context.[10] It was not really possible to negotiate with a state, the Nasrid, that was already defeated and approaching disintegration, in stark contrast with the Castilian crown. The lack of a valid central representative was resolved by resorting to negotiation at the local level. In some cases, parley was even undertaken with dignataries or with members of the Nasrid royal family.

From our perspective, these capitulations reveal the strength and the superiority of basic, urban and rural, social structures over a political power that was absent from multiple aspects of social and economic life. This topic deserves more in-depth scrutiny, because the evidence examined to date remains insufficient for the analysis of a wider topic than hitherto suspected. In summary, these agreements show that local groups had as much ability in negotiation as they had been shown to have in defending themselves, among other things.

There is no doubt that the course of the war was determinant of the nature of the agreements. This long war was aimed, in our opinion, at the occupation of territory and the seizure of goods, and was consequently carried out with care not to destroy more than was absolutely necessary. This was no war of annihilation. In fact, the Castilian fighting techniques show that their army was approaching the typically Modern model. It was strictly organised into

9 Manuel Garrido, *Las capitulaciones para la entrega de Granada* (Granada: Paulino Ventura, 1910).

10 Ángel Galán, "Los vencidos: exilio, integración y resistencia," in *Historia del reino de Granada. I*, 525–565, esp. 531: "Since the Muslims did not all come down under the same covenant but each community signed a different pact with the monarchs there is no single pattern to encompass the totality of *Mudejares* from Granada. There is a diversity of specific examples, depending on how favourable the negotiation was and regardless of a certain trend to unify the treatment of all Mudejares."

well-defined units, with an increasingly important role for artillery and highly trained specialists. Naturally, traditional practices were still carried out. For example, during sieges the *huestes* under the command of the high aristocracy continued to operate like feudal cavalry. Also, the use of artillery – and its direct fire – required sappers to clear the roads and open the way. At any rate, the use of cannon was decisive and to a certain degree the key to Castilian superiority.

Feudal *huestes* and council militias were an important factor but the increasing professionalization of men or arms was introducing important changes in the ways of war. It must also be pointed out that, as seen in the siege of Baza, the Castilian troops were constantly supplied *in situ* by a logistics train, running from as far as the ports near Almería.[11] In other sieges, enormous and perfectly well organised camps were built, with the camp around Real de Gozco setting the pattern for the camp in Santa Fe, the most complete example.

The course of the war determined the bargaining position of each side. Ladero, who has studied this matter in detail, divides the process of conquest and negotiation into three stages.[12] The first stage (1484 to 1487) was without doubt the harshest for the vanquished, as shown by the conquest of Málaga (1487), where no capitulation ensued; only defeat and slavery for the defeated, who had resisted stubbornly before yielding. However, certain qualifications have been made to this model on the basis of new evidence emerging after the publication of Ladero's work.[13] The war was hardly as straightforward for the Christians as it was hitherto believed to have been and many problems, often of a financial nature, had to be solved. This resulted in a progressive improvement of the conditions for the Muslim garrisons, as shown by the signing of the 1488 and 1489 capitulations in the eastern regions of the Nasrid kingdom, culminating in the Baza campaign which also brought the surrender of Guadix, Almeria and a good deal of the remaining Muslim coastline.

The latter episodes must be understood as a corollary, a set of agreements with Muḥammad XII for the surrender of the last, indefensible territories around Granada. In fact, the prolongation of the war in the last few years was due, not to a lack of Castilian ardour or, even less, of military capacity, but to a premeditated and patient strategy aimed at bringing the enemy to ripen and to meekly accept the conditions set forth by the Castilian crown. These

11 Miguel Á. Ladero, *Milicia y economía en la guerra de Granada: el cerco de Baza* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1967).

12 Miguel Á. Ladero, *Los mudéjares de Castilla en tiempos de Isabel I* (Valladolid: Instituto "Isabel la Católica" de Historia Eclesiástica, 1969), 31.

13 Galán, "Los vencidos," 531–533.

agreements had a series of common points, regardless of the course of previous military events. It seems logical that the first condition imposed on the Muslims was to depose and give up their arms; in some cases this also included everyday tools with no apparent military value. Obviously, Nasrid fortresses had to be abandoned for their reoccupation by Castilian garrisons and governors.

Theoretically, military defeat also involved the surrender of all goods. There are several qualifications for this. The property of the state – a highly ambiguous concept in al-Andalus and most particularly in the sultanate of Granada – passed to the crown of Castile. By personal request of the monarchs, the property of mosques and other religious and charitable institutions were handed over to the Church. The remaining property was allowed to remain in the hands of the Muslim community, now subject to the Castilian monarchs who acted as legal guarantors of their property. This involved a change of status of the Muslims of Granada with regard to their sovereigns and also to their fiscal obligations. This implied the need to protect the customs and religion of surrendered Muslims. The problem of how to build the right legal structure under the general submission to the crown soon ensued. Coexistence was, furthermore, not easy, and the implicit sensation that it would be but a provisional setting predominated. In consequence, the emigration of Muslim populations to North Africa was encouraged.

Problems started at an early stage. Coexistence, despite the arguments set forth by a biased historiographical school, was very fragile. Christians and Muslims did not have the same rights and obligations. In the same year that the war ended, 1492, the Jews, the third religious community in the Peninsula, were expelled in an explicit statement of Christian supremacy. The *Mudéjar* revolt of 1500–1501, therefore, closed one episode and opened a new one that resulted in the expulsion of the *Moriscos*. At last, the second capitulations following the war fought in the early 16th century openly expressed the new reality, which in the period between the surrender of Granada and the Muslim revolt had only been implied. In this case no definitive expulsion was carried out, in contrast with earlier policies, for example in the Guadalquivir valley. This may have been caused by the need to maintain the economic productivity of the territory of Granada; Castilians had already developed the ability to orient production towards foreign trade, which the Nasrids had also done, although to a limited extent.

There is no doubt that the brunt of the problems caused by coexistence fell upon the new settlers, who were the ones who had to actually live in contact with the Muslim population. In effect, their arrival had the semblance of an occupation. It has been pointed out that these new colonists not only had to act as farmers but also as soldiers, but meeting productive and military obligations

simultaneously was not that easy, as pointed out by López de Coca.[14] It is true that many castles and strongholds were abandoned and also that there was an increasing concentration of military power. This was not always followed by the repopulation of the territories thus abandoned, in contrast with the coastal areas, which became a true military Christian frontier.

The Repopulation of the Territory and the Distribution of Property

There is little doubt that the incorporation of the Kingdom of Granada into the crown of Castile was rife with many and grave contradictions. The crown did not adopt a thorough colonial policy but decided instead to leave the old populations relatively undisturbed, at least in principle. This caused a conflict that went beyond strictly military matters. The new settlers did not arrive to directly dominate the defeated population. They were not unproductive folk that aimed at subjecting the vanquished groups, but settlers come to till the land and to carry out other economic activities. Repopulation was undertaken by farmers and people with other occupations, which were on many counts different from the economic activities of the Muslim population.

Settlement involved the occupation of vacant lands and was made possible by the abandonment of lands and other property by the Muslims. The strategy was to transform the landscape, at least as far as this was possible because some elements were not easy to change, such as the irrigation systems or the road network, the transformation of which was a long-term undertaking.[15] As shown by plentiful evidence the Castilians also ploughed hitherto uncultivated lands. Some examples of this can be read in the documents describing land distribution in Loja and the second *repartimiento* in Baza, to mention just two examples.

14 Peinado, "La sociedad repobladora," 476: "the best and cheapest way to control the territory was to repopulate it. That is, distribute lands in the conviction that the new settlers would double as farmers and soldiers, in the best tradition of Byzantine *thematói* (…) This was just an ideal: in practice, defence and repopulation were not only different activities, but were sometimes contradictory." José E. López de Coca, "Poblamiento y frontera en el obispado de Málaga a fines del siglo XV," *Cuadernos de Estudios Medievales* II–III (1974–5): 367–407, esp. 375: "This does not mean that repopulation was a substitute for the military apparatus, or that repopulation was orchestrated as a way to spend fewer resources on garrisons. This was not so."

15 See the paper by F. Retamero and V. Martínez-Enamorado, "Conquests and water distribution systems. The case of Casarabonela (Málaga. Spain) in the 16th century," in this volume.

These operations were always carried out around urban centres. Already during the Nasrid period urban centres acted as territorial nuclei, a character that was thereafter intensified. In most cases, with the notable exception of Granada, the old inhabitants left after the conquest, and the Catholic Monarchs had the urban spaces and their respective hinterlands at their disposal. Since cities and towns were surrounded by defensive walls the Monarchs kept them under their direct control by putting them in the hands of men in whom they had complete confidence or who commanded an unequivocal prestige in Castilian society: Diego de Ulloa, royal accountant, in Almuñécar; Francisco de Madrid, royal secretary, in Salobreña; Álvaro de Luna, in Loja; and the king's uncle Don Enrique Enríquez, in Baza, among others.

Repopulation by *repartimiento* was the most commonly used mechanism for the organisation of the new kingdom. The specific procedures and even the measures taken to implement them have been extensively examined by historiography.[16] The distribution system was based on the principles of social division. Despite recent changes 15th century Castilian society was still divided into more or less closed social groups, and the settlement policies were adapted to this social structure. The property allocated to knights and villains was qualitatively and quantitatively different (the former group were given more land, which was also more accessible from their residences). This was, in the words of López de Coca, "the original inequality in land property distribution."[17]

Social position was determined by birth, and it is therefore not strange that the guiding social principles were of application to every aspect of life. For this reason, the beneficiaries of land distributions were treated accordingly with their status, but settlement in the new lands also offered the opportunity for a degree of social promotion. The new opportunities palliated, to a limited extent, this original inequality.

On the other hand, the Monarchs, as the sources of the law, had the capacity to make exceptions for an individual or a group by granting them more rewards (or tax exemptions) than the general normative determined. This was usually done to recompense special services or to pay debts and obligations.

16 Among the many books published on this issue, see the still valuable José E. López de Coca, *La tierra de Málaga a fines del siglo XV* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1977), and Manuel Acién, *Ronda y su Serranía en tiempo de los Reyes Católicos* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1979). Also see Antonio Malpica, *El concejo de Loja (1486–1508)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1982).

17 López de Coca, "Poblamiento y frontera," 377.

For this reason, the beneficiaries of the royal grace were in general members of the upper social tier.

All of this is easily perceived in the way the distribution of land and other forms of property was organised and implemented. In fact, we can say that the property to be distributed was divided into three or four blocks. The first included lands for distribution among all colonists willing to register as citizens of the land, who would receive full rights over their land on fulfilment of a minimum term of residence, complete with building a house and having a family. This period was generally of the order of five or ten years. The second block included lands reserved for royal grants, which can be said to have corrected the normative according to the royal will. The third and fourth blocks included lands reserved for the constitution of ecclesiastical and municipal property.[18]

The sovereignty of the Monarchs was present at every step of the way, but was made more explicit in certain cases. In order to push their policies forth they confided in men capable of carrying out their instructions precisely. For example, they could ensure the repopulation of certain regions by granting royal favours which their delegates could, for their part, bestow on the colonists, some of whom they had personally brought from their regions of origin. This was the case with the colonisation of Loja by the followers of Álvaro de Luna, a descendant of the famous Constable of Castile, from Cañete (Cuenca).

The Organisation of the New Power

We cannot forget that the implementation of the new authority was based on the distribution of crown land and on the participation of men in whom the Monarchs trusted fully. Their base would be in major towns and cities. In some cases these men were assigned extensive areas, for example around Granada, with the Alpujarra, the Valley of Lecrín and the coastline between Almuñécar and Albuñol, besides the Vega and the frontier towns. Similarly, another part of the kingdom was left under the jurisdiction of aristocratic lords and therefore outside of direct royal control. Lands under the royal and aristocratic jurisdictions were distributed throughout the territory according to a pattern, against what is suggested by the arguments of E. Soria.[19] To agree with Soria's

18 Peinado, "El Reino de Granada," 515.

19 Enrique Soria, *Señores y oligarcas: los señoríos del Reino de Granada en la Edad Moderna* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1997), 57: "It is true that the central regions of the kingdom were granted to the cities, the same strategy followed in the Guadalquivir Valley from the 13th century onwards. The heart of the kingdoms of Seville, Córdoba and

opinion is to accept that the Catholic Monarchs failed to act in one key area for the organisation of the kingdom of Granada. Apart from placing some of their trusted men in charge of certain areas, the Count of Tendilla – an important figure in the reorganisation of the kingdom – was appointed Captain General; the chief magistrate Calderón was put at the head of the territory designated for the city of Granada; Zafra was commissioned with the task of guaranteeing that the royal plans were carried out; and Fray Hernando de Talavera was entrusted with the creation of a Church of Granada.

Regarding manorial lands, we must clarify a few points. Several researchers, for example López de Coca, have insisted on the significance of the Monarchs' hand in the manorial map, which was according to this idea designed after a pattern.[20] The issue must thus be approached in detail, as with other topics such as the property of the land and its exploitation, and therefore only the more relevant aspects will be mentioned here. At the time, the map of Castile was distributed between crown land and manorial land, and Granada would not be an exception. The royal policy had a twofold aim: to ensure the success of the repopulation process and to control most of the agricultural production and related commerce, which persisted and to some degree grew.

Although some attempts have been made to prove that the distribution of the territory between crown land and manorial properties followed Nasrid patterns, the truth is that it was a direct consequence of the Castilian social structure. In fact, the presumed contradiction between crown land and manorial properties was not as significant as could be thought from a legal point of view. The participation of great landowners in the political life of the councils of the kingdom must not come as a surprise, whether or not they were considered nobles (*de facto* or *de iure*), because this was a common practice in Castile. Furthermore, this practice was often used to monitor the councils and the prevention of potential conflicts emanating from a contraposition of interests, a

Jaén was left as crown land, very often until the sales of the Habsburgs. Granada also reproduced the model, conceived as a way to ensure that the cities collected sufficient *alfoces* for their survival. Although this point is beyond doubt I am not satisfied with the traditional thesis that the manorial lands were created in *Mudéjar* areas in order to put a layer of authority between the defeated society and the crown. This explanation does not clarify why some such regions were put under aristocratic jurisdiction and others were not. Moreover, if this had indeed been the strategy, what could have been better than putting all the Alpujarra, a sparsely populated and hard to administer region, under the command of lords? Only three *tahas* out of many escaped the royal jurisdiction there."

20 José E. López de Coca, "Los señoríos del reino de Granada (1490–1568). Introducción a su estudio," in *Señorío y feudalismo en la Península Ibérica* (*ss. XII–XIX*), eds. Esteban Sarasa and Eliseo Serrrano (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1993), 129–173.

control which the Catholic Monarchs sometimes had to exercise personally. This simple expedient permitted legal regulations connected with the granting of charters, privileges, etc., to be bypassed. The monarchs intentionally sought to place their most trusted men in those positions regarded as crucial for a good and conflict-free territorial organisation. This is particularly visible in small and medium-sized cities, which were always at risk of becoming the battlefield of different factions. The known cases are numerous.

Castilian penetration into rural districts was a necessary measure. It was the only way to acquire extra power and rents in the context of a very rigid and hierarchical social system. In this manner, the villages in each jurisdiction progressively fell into the hands of the most important persons in the new councils: in Loja, for example, ownership of the village of Huétor passed to the governor D. Álvaro de Luna, and that of Salar to Fernando Pérez del Pulgar. In the area of Almuñécar, Cázulas was bought by the warden of the urban fortress, Rodrigo de Ulloa; Jate, after belonging to the queen's physician, entered the property of Captain Diego Bernal; finally, Turillas, after being abandoned by its inhabitants, was purchased by the treasurer Alonso de Morales.

In other areas this process bore an interesting edge. In the district of Baza, the territory originally granted to the city was progressively dismembered. The settlements near to the old frontier were handed over to several figures with no interests beyond the line of division, preventing the expansion of neighbouring lords in the customary manner of gradual appropriation of nearby lands. A traditional practice in Muslim areas, livestock grazing, was now interrupted with the arrival of new owners and future lords.[21] In some cases, these grazing areas were incorporated into their existing properties, for example in the controversy between Archidona and Loja. The Count of Urueña, lord in the former, ultimately laid his hands on the area of Contarín, where livestock had grazed in the Nasrid period and where there were salt exploitation facilities.[22]

21 Antonio Malpica, "La vida económica en la frontera nazarí-castellana. Ganadería y sal en la zona nororiental del reino de Granada," in *Le monde du sel. Mélanges offerts à Jean Claude Hocquet. Journal of Salt-History*, 8–9, ed. Carol D. Lichfield, Rudolf Palme and Peter Piasecki, 101–124 (Hall in Tirol: Bernkamp Verlag, 2000–1), 101–124. Antonio Malpica, "Territorio y poblamiento en la frontera nororiental granadina. La hoya de Baza y el altiplano" (forthcoming).

22 Antonio Malpica, "Las salinas en la frontera del reino nazarí de Granada y su papel en la economía ganadera castellana," *Thesis. Wissenschaftliche Zietschrift der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar* 48, 4/5 (2002): 236–246. Antonio Malpica, "Agriculture, livestock and salt in the Kingdom of Granada. A study of the economy and territory of the Nazari Zone," in *Festschrift Rudolf Palme*, eds. Wolfgang Ingenhaeff, Roland Staudinger and Kurt Ebert (Innsbruck: Berenkamp Verlag, 2002), 337–352.

If the manorial lands created in the Kingdom of Granada after the conquest are examined in detail it is possible to appreciate how the processes of repopulation and land distribution are connected with territorial organisation; these phenomena are complementary. There is, therefore, an internal logic for the distribution of manorial lands, rooted in the social and political conditions in Late Medieval Castile.

The implantation of manorial properties can be divided into two processes: an early one, the creation of such properties in the initial distribution of the conquered territory; and, thereafter, the creation of new ones following the definitive settlement of Castilian populations. From the very first moment the Catholic Monarchs granted landed properties as repayment of debts incurred during the war against Granada. López de Coca says in this regard: "The debts and commitments incurred by the Monarchs were the cause of the emergence of manorial lands in Granada."[23] It is perhaps for this reason that there are manorial properties belonging to the same family on both sides of the old frontier, such as the *Mudéjar* lands granted to the Marquis of Cádiz in 1490 in the Serranía de Villaluenga. His significant contribution to the war chest of ten million *maravedíes* also explains the concession in 1491 of Casares, in Sierra Bermeja. Although the original intention was to recover this property in due time, the following year the grant was made final in exchange for the handing over of Cádiz to the crown.

This same policy aimed at regaining the large cities for the crown explains the cession of Vélez to the Fajardo family, which in exchange gave up Cartagena. The renouncing of some lands in Granada may be considered an exceptional measure due to the debts incurred and also to the policy of recovering important villages and cities hitherto under aristocratic jurisdiction outside the Kingdom of Granada. A number of cases have been extensively dealt with in the bibliography, and no further clarifications are necessary here.[24]

Generally, the policy was that land granted to the aristocracy was not adjacent to other properties owned by the same nobles across the old frontier, because that would have put the repopulation policy at risk. The loss of some land was inevitable for the crown, but this had to be carried out with consideration

23 López de Coca, "Los señoríos del reino de Granada," 131.

24 Aside from the already cited López de Coca, "Los señoríos del reino de Granada," and Soria, *Señores y oligarcas*, see also Enrique Pérez, *Moriscos y cristianos en los señoríos del Reino de Granada (1490–1568)* (Granada, Universidad de Granada: 1997); and "Los señoríos y el mundo rural," in *Historia del reino de Granada. I*, 567–610. Equally, although the topic somewhat deviates from our concern here, Federico Devís, *Mayorazgo y cambio político. Estudios sobre el mayorazgo de la Casa de Arcos al final de la Edad Media* (Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1999).

of repopulation needs. In some cases, at any rate, royal favours resulted in the emergence of significant manorial properties, which were merely territorial in nature at the time of the Catholic Monarchs but which also became jurisdictional during the 16th century. Some of these lords found settlers to put these lands into cultivation, ensuring a smooth settlement process.

Repopulation and distribution of property responded to the logic of Castilian society and politics. In other words, the organisation of the Kingdom of Granada and, therefore, its integration into the crown of Castile was effected simultaneously with the settlement process.

Economic Reorganisation

The above discussion compels us to examine the issue of the economic reorganisation of the Kingdom of Granada. It is possible to distinguish between two different superposed agrarian economies which, to some degree, interfered with one another. One was the continuation of the Nasrid system, and the other involved the economic practices brought in by the new Castilian lords and settlers. The former system was fundamentally, but not exclusively, based on irrigation. The economic strategy was the practice of subsistence agriculture, although a significant proportion of the produce was commercialised. The development of monocultures was barred by the social structure of the peasant groups that built and managed these irrigation systems.

Dry land agriculture was also present, sometimes following agricultural expansion. Initially the aim was to obtain a food surplus, especially grain, for times of scarcity, but soon some of the crops were also directed towards a growing external trade. This is the case with almond trees and vines, the produce of which is easy to process, store and finally bring to the growing European markets. Some irrigated crops were also highly sought abroad, for example sugar cane, the cultivation of which was reduced to limited ecological niches, and the mulberry tree, the leaves of which were used to feed silk worms. Since expansion is limited to ecological conditions, the structural limits of the system and the need to keep labour input to a minimum (at the risk of alienating labour from its traditional uses), the introduction of monoculture would involve a deep transformation.

In principle the agricultural regime imposed by the Castilians was based on small and medium-sized properties shaped after the original distribution of a significant part of the kingdom. There were also large properties, generally conceded as royal grants and often enlarged with the early purchase of properties that had in principle remained in the hands of the defeated groups or were part of the lands handed over to new colonists. Although many of the

existing vegetable gardens were not transformed, in a partial continuation of the previous system based on irrigation agriculture, a significant proportion of the available land was dedicated to the new, extensive agriculture regime (cereals/olive tree/vines), involving a considerable expansion of dry land agriculture and in some cases of irrigation agriculture itself.[25]

In this issue, it is essential to understand the fundamental differences between the two agricultural regimes. The need to produce a sufficient surplus to feed a population of new settlers capable of defending the kingdom clashed with the traditional organisation of production around irrigation. Irrigated areas were negatively affected by a new approach to production requiring a reduction in crop variety and, sometimes, even monoculture. These new conditions, also involving the expansion of cultivation – which unhinged the natural ecosystems of irrigation agriculture – could only be perpetuated through the use of *Mudéjar* and *Morisco* labour. The living conditions of the peasants inhabiting the territory deteriorated accordingly. All of this caused the displacement of the labour force and the uprooting of groups, resulting in an increase in violence and the strengthening of defensive measures, to the benefit of the upper classes. The diaspora to northern Africa left empty entire regions, including fields and settlements, and caused the increasing concentration and exploitation of the defeated populations.

This is the history of the Kingdom of Granada in the transition between the Nasrid and the Castilian periods, a process that forecast in some aspects what was to occur in continental America.

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25 Carmen Trillo, "El agua y el paisaje rural de la Alpujarra en época nazarí. Las *ta'a*/s de Marchena y Alboloduy," in *El agua. Mitos, ritos y realidades*, ed. José A. González and Antonio Malpica (Granada: Anthropos, 1995), 287–307.

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CHAPTER 13

Portugal, Morocco and Guinea: Reconfiguration of the North Atlantic at the End of the Middle Ages

António de Almeida Mendes

1415: The Awakening of Portugal in the West Mediterranean

25th July, 1415. An impressive armada heads out from Portuguese shores in the direction of the harbour of Ceuta, at the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar. On paper, the enterprise is not particularly promising. The State coffers are empty, and the military nobility is exhausted after thirty years of conflict with Castile. And yet, on the 21st of August 1415, the troops led by the Infantes Henry and Peter break through the imposing wall towering 16m above the Mediterranean Sea, to storm the fortified citadel of Afrag. Three days later, on the 23rd of August 1415, King John I enters the Arab town and raises the banner of the Aviz dynasty's coat of arms. Rapid progress was made in the post-war negotiations due to agreement between Christian and Muslim parties on corresponding systems of taxation (*quarto* and *vintena*) and on a reduction in the capture of prisoners ("just war"). The connection of the European and Moroccan Algarve gave rise to economies built around the circulation of men, goods, practices, and knowledge.[1]

This work focuses on the conditions resulting in the awakening of Portugal in the Mediterranean at the end of the Middle Ages and its long term effects. Recent historiography has considerably developed our understanding of the historical processes behind the European colonisation of the Atlantic before and after Ceuta.[2] Medievalists have stressed that the eventual expansion into Africa and Asia was first signalled in the Aragonese, Castilian, Anglo-Norman,

* I would like to thank Sylvie and Thierry Aprile, Leila Maziane and Jacques Rougerie with whom I have had the pleasure of discovering the Portuguese territories in Morocco during the summer of 2011.

1 In the Middle Ages, Arab and Christian geographers and historians used the term Algarve or Gharb to designate the territories situated to the south of Lisbon. Christophe Picard, *Le Portugal musulman* (*VIIIe–XIIIe siècles*)*: l'Occident d'Al-Andalus sous domination islamique* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000).

2 Luís Filipe Thomaz, *Le Portugal et l'Afrique au XVe siècle: les débuts de l'expansion* (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 1989); Jean Aubin, *Le latin et l'astrolabe: recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales* (Lisbon,

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and Portuguese expansionist movements that from the 13th century affected the eastern Mediterranean islands, the Balearic and the Canaries.[3] The thesis of a historical rupture between medieval and modern practices, between Mediterranean slavery and the Atlantic trade, of a clash of civilisations, is now extinct. After 1415 the Atlantic became, and was to remain for five centuries, a frontier contested between the Portuguese and the Africans.

The Portuguese colonisation of the Atlantic was undertaken at sea and on land, on the archipelago of Cape Verde, in the fortresses of Morocco and the trading posts of Guinea. The geographical proximity of the lands necessitated neither expensive logistics nor the invention of new commercial or financial practices. In this near Atlantic, the fishermen of the Algarve, the farmers of Alentejo, the Moorish and Jewish minorities were the great agents of economic development and the coastal colonisation of Africa. In this Atlantic, as in the Mediterranean, raiding, pillaging, and an economy of regulated barter (*resgate*) were the main sources for the acquisition of slaves, fish, metals, or manufactured products. These exchanges paved the way for the construction of a common economic, social, and political space.[4] Until its fall in 1910, the Portuguese monarchy could claim possession of lands on European and African shores in the Mediterranean, and bore the titles, "kings of the Algarve, of every side of the African sea, Lords of Guinea, and of conquest, navigation, and commerce in Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India by the grace of God." The African policy pursued by the mercantile and military elites drove Portuguese economy and society to diverge from the western model of socio-economic development. Thus, Portugal was to remain until the 1990s a nation of peasant farmers, in spite of agriculturally unfavourable conditions: slavery and coercion had built

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Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700. A Political and Economic History* (London and New York: Longman, 1983).

3 Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial* (Lisbon: Presença, 1991); Luís Adão da Fonseca, *Navegación y corso en el Mediterráneo occidental: los Portugueses a mediados del siglo XV* (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1978); Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus: Explorations and Colonisation from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229–1492* (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1987); Jérôme Baschet, *La civilisation féodale. De l'an Mil à la colonisation de l'Amérique* (Paris: Flammarion, 2006), and David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind. Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

4 António de Almeida Mendes, "Le premier Atlantique portugais entre deux Méditerranées (XVe–XVIe siècles). Comment les Africains ont développé le Vieux Monde," in *Les esclavages en Méditerranée. Espaces et dynamiques économiques*, ed. Fabienne Guillén and Salah Trabelsi (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2012), 151–170.

an economy and a society in which inequality and discrimination were among the most embedded in Europe.

The evidence requires deconstruction, moving away from the images disseminated by the "great discoveries" school of thought. This re-reading of the evidence must be neither simple narrative nor list of historical personages, but must set forth the interaction between the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. What gave birth to the crazy idea of uniting Portugal, Morocco, and Guinea, and of bringing together these disparate worlds? "Crazy idea," because what could the societies of southern Europe, northern Africa, and Guinea have in common? Southern Europeans, the majority Christian; North Africans, Berbers and Muslims; and Guineans of multiple ethnicities: all suddenly united by a historical turn marked more by violence than by the desire to live together.

From the Captives of Ceuta to the Fish Shoals of Arguin

The 1400s. In Lisbon, an atmosphere of arms prevails. The monetary devaluation, a permanent state of war, bad harvests, and attacks on Portuguese shores from Basque, Breton and Muslim pirates all raise the question of the kingdom's economic and political survival. For the Aviz monarchy, the early years of the 15th century were critical. "The agitation of the people is so great that on more than one occasion it was on the point of passing all limitations" wrote King John I in 1405.[5] The crown sought solutions to the chronic crises affecting the State's finances and campaigns. Making up only 2% of the population of Europe, and with an economy in crisis, the kingdom had little power. The monetary devaluation, decreed by John I between 1380 and 1410 was woven into the European context of precious metal shortage. The great depression following the Black Death which hit southern Europe in the late Middle Ages was accompanied in Portugal by widespread abandonment of the countryside in favour of coastal cities. In 1400, large portions of the kingdom were empty or abandoned to the wild. The repopulation of border zones and the great cereal plains of the south stalled, despite the large scale policy of forced displacement and the establishment of family groups in the *coutos*.[6] The great depression

5 Eduardo Freire de Oliveira, *Elementos para a história do Municipio de Lisboa. 1ª Parte* (Lisbon: Tipographia Universal, 1882).

6 The *coutos* were colonies of exiles created in the Middle Ages near the southern border with Castile. Timothy J. Coates, *Convicts and Orphans: Forced and State-Sponsored Colonizers in the Portuguese Empire, 1550–1755* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2001).

that had struck the kingdom in the previous century continued, eroding public accounts and weakening the peasant society. Year after year, month after month, men abandoned the countryside for coastal cities. The measures taken between the end of the 14th and the first half of the 15th century for tackling poor agricultural productivity and facilitating the transmission of rural offices could not halt the depopulation of the centre of the kingdom.[7]

The reality of the situation was that this poor, regressing state was at that moment readying itself to set upon the conquest of its powerful Moroccan neighbour. The battle plan, under preparation from 1407, was unprecedented in scale: many thousands of men were mobilised from the four corners of Europe to fight the Infidel. For John I's advisors, the Moroccan adventure presented a unique opportunity.[8] Control of the coastlines, abundant in fish, the rich soils of the North Moroccan coastal basins (Gharb, Doukkala), and Morocco's manpower were more powerful motivators than the quest for the legendary African gold mines, the search for the kingdom of Prester John, or control of the Indian spice routes. In reality, the Portuguese campaign in Morocco stemmed from a survival strategy rather than pursuit of the ideal of the medieval *Reconquista*. In 1341, King Alfonso VI obtained a further Bull of the Crusade to attack the Infidels and direct with the aid of Genoese ship owners the first attempts at expansion into the near Atlantic in the direction of the Canaries.[9] These early overseas conquests remained short-lived, but they reflect the power of the Portuguese navy, capable of operating in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The papacy, wary of the Castilian kings, whom they perceived as somewhat interventionist, after 1400 awarded the "Most Faithful" title to the king of Portugal.[10]

In the following centuries, the papacy was to grant generous ecclesiastical pensions to the kings of Portugal, in exchange for the continuation of war

7 The Law of the *Sesmarias* (1375) established the principle of the expropriation of property in cases where the terrain was uncultivated.

8 Luís Filipe Thomaz, "A evolução da política expansionista portuguesa na primeira metade de Quatrocentos," in *De Ceuta a Timor* (Lisbon: Difel, 1994), 43–147.

9 Saturnino Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha portuguesa* (Lisbon: Sá da Costa, 1989), 21–24.

10 The title of "Most Faithful" king received from Rome created an association that was to unite the Portuguese dynasty and the Roman church for almost a century. Thus, between 1418 and 1493, over a dozen bulls were promulgated in favour of Portugal. On this subject see Charles-Martial de Witte, "Les bulles pontificales et l'expansion portugaise au XVe siècle," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 48 (1953): 683–718; 49 (1954): 483–461; 51 (1956): 413–453, 908–936; 53 (1958): 5–46, 443–471.

against the Infidel.[11] On the 21st of August, 1415, the old Arab town was hit hard by a force of common criminals (*homiziados*) and unreliable foreign mercenaries, who in return for their military service received the promise of substantial gains. Half the population of Ceuta was massacred in the field; the other half taken into captivity. The fate of the captives had been sealed for a long time. Before going to war, the Portuguese had negotiated with the Bailiff of Valencia their placement on the Aragonese market.[12] The Florentine and Genoese trading companies, traditional partners of the Valencian authorities, were asked to make their ships and crews available for this purpose, the first mass deportation of human beings in modern times. In 1416, the Infante Henry received the rule over the Moroccan territories and, in 1419, the jurisdiction of the Portuguese Algarve and the Atlantic islands. Pedro de Meneses, descendant of one of the most illustrious families in the kingdom (the Teles de Meneses), was granted extensive rights by John I in the *além-mar* territories: the right to distribute land, to appoint officials, to collect the fifth of the produce of land and sea, "the right of life and death over those that have, by the Law, Duty, and God been made unequal."[13] The Portuguese claims relied on a Papal Bull of 1417, in which they were granted exclusive navigation rights as far as the Canaries and

11 In 1435 the official chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara, *Crónica da tomada de Ceuta por El Rei dom João I*, ed. Francisco M. Esteves Pereira (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, 1915) gave an account of the conquest of Ceuta in which one can divine the desire to restore Portuguese grandeur with an enterprise that was in fact an act of rare savagery with reference to the codes of modern warfare. For the history of the first Moroccan enterprises the reader is referred to António Dias Farinha, *Os Portugueses em Marrocos* (Lisbon: Instituto Camões, 1999); Maria de Lurdes Rosa, "Mortos 'tidos por vivos': o tribunal régio e a capacidade sucessória das 'almas em glória' (campanhas norte-africanas, 1472–c. 1542)" *Anais de História de Além-mar* 6 (2005): 9–46; and Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq, *L'Ibérie chrétienne et le Maghreb XIIe–XVe siècles* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1990).

12 *Monumenta Henricina*, ed. Manuel Lopes de Almeida, Idalino Ferreira da Costa Brochado, António Joaquim Dias Dinis (Coimbra: Comissão Executiva das Commemorações de V Centenario da Morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1960–73), II, doc. 57.

13 Namely the "good government." The Portuguese term *governança* encompasses for the Modern Era the management of material goods and mercantile and economic activities. The eventful life of Pedro de Meneses is not well known. It is reported in the works of Nuno M. Silva Campos, *D. Pedro de Meneses e a construção da casa de Vila Real* (*1415–1437*) (Lisbon: Colibri, 2004); and *D. Pedro de Meneses. O primeiro capitão de Ceuta* (Lisbon: Sete Caminhos, 2008). See also André Pinto de Sousa Dias Teixeira, "Uma linhagem ao serviço da 'ideia imperial manuelina': Noronhas e Meneses de Vila Real, em Marrocos e na Índia," in *A alta nobreza e a fundação do Estado da Índia*, ed. João Paulo Oliveira e Costa and Vítor Luís Gaspar Rodrigues (Lisbon: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2004), 109–174.

which decreed that all realms, duchies, counties, and principalities conquered in Morocco were to pass under the domination of the king of Portugal.[14]

The geography of the actions taken against Ceuta during the twenty years of Pedro de Meneses' government (1415–37) testifies to the Portuguese desire to create an exclusive manhunting zone around the Gibraltar Straits. Upon the death of Pedro de Meneses in 1437, more than five or six thousand Moroccans had already been deported to the Iberian Peninsula. The arrival of these individuals to the Peninsula followed a formal procedure. On placing his foot on Christian soil, the captive was subject to individual examination, at which moment he had to state his name and those of his parents, his age, profession, place of birth, the name of his master and the conditions under which he was captured. It was only after the royal official had examined the legitimacy of the captivity that the owner received (or was denied) a certificate declaring that this was a "good war" captive, legally acquired and thus authorised, once the correct taxes had been paid, to be introduced into the Iberian Peninsula.[15] The answers provided by the Muslim captives are to be treated with a certain measure of reservation, as the investigation was often conducted in the presence of those responsible for the capture. This was no mere formality, however: several owners had their right to ownership of a captive rejected due to his illegal capture.[16] For the administration, the investigation had an official character. In assuring the honesty of the master's words, the State sought to ensure that the captive Moor would receive a strict religious and moral education. For as much as captivity in Iberian lands was a factory for slaves, it was also a forge for Christians, which enabled the Moors entrance into the Iberian Christian community. In the Middle Ages this was but an episodic activity, but by the 15th century it had become a permanent system of labour acquisition for the inhabitants of the ports in the Algarve.

The legitimisation of these practices by the State and by Rome on the model of the "just war," which served as a basis for international law, contributed a

14 Witte, "Les bulles pontificales."

15 This documentation has not yet been the object of systematic study. For an initial statistical approach to the flow of Moroccan captives between the two sides see Vicenta Cortés Alonso, *La esclavitud en Valencia durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos* (*1479–1516*) (Valencia: Publicaciones del Archivo Municipal, 1964); Filipe Themudo Barata, "Le rachat des captifs. Une affaire d'Etat au Portugal au XVe siècle," in *Le commerce des captifs: les intermédiaires dans l'échange et le rachat des prisonniers en Méditerranée, XVe–XVIIIe siècles*, ed. Wolfgang Kaiser (Rome: École française de Rome, 2008), 109–122.

16 See Filipe Themudo Barata, *Navegação, Comércio e Relações Políticas: os Portugueses no Mediterrâneo Ocidental* (*1385–1466*) (Lisbon: JNICT / Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1998), 404 and ff.

model to the trade in Moroccan captives which was to be transposed to sub-Saharan Africa.[17]

In 1434, the caravels of Gil Eanes rounded Cape Bojador off the coast of Mauritania in the name of the Infante Henry. The attraction of these coasts for Portuguese sailors lay in the fish-bearing waters of the banks of Arguin, off the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal. Nuno Tristão and many of the sailors who explored the coasts of Africa made their careers in the fish-rich seas that extended from Sagres to Lagos, the revenues of which were granted to the Infante Henry in 1433.

The exportation of tuna and sardine from the Moroccan Atlantic to the Mediterranean was a source of considerable revenue for the Portuguese crown. It was without a doubt the most profitable activity until the 1450s.[18] The revenue obtained from the resale of tons of fish in European ports permitted the financing of Portuguese cod-fishing ventures in Iceland and expeditions of discovery to Sub-Saharan Africa; the sea made the fortune of the communities of the Algarve. The exploitation of the Moroccan fish banks had regional political and economic effects that affected the North Atlantic. In 1442, the Portuguese established a trading post which they called Arguin on an islet situated off the Western Saharan coast. The islet was inhospitable, but the presence of a source of freshwater and progress in navigation allowed the opening of a regular route between the trading post and the port of Lagos, at the extreme south of Portugal. In 1461 the trading post was fortified and took the name of Arguin Castle. It was given a garrison, a priest, and an *alcaide mor*. The small number of colonists did not seek to integrate into local society but to reproduce the structure of their societies of origin. It is true that they were only intending to stay in Africa temporarily with the specific mission of establishing links with the merchant communities in the Sahara. Although Arguin's maritime activity had strong links with harbours in both Moroccan politically independent territories and the Algarve, its main focus was to interact with coastal Berber tribes. The merchant Berber and Jewish communities, in Portuguese sources included under the term "Moors," bought their peace by becoming a part of the Portuguese economic system.[19] In reality, they anticipated a colonial division

17 For a general approach to the phenomenon of captivity read Michel Fontenay, *La Méditerranée entre la Croix et le Croissant. Navigation, commerce, course et piraterie* (*XVIe–XIXe siècle*) (Paris: Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2010).

18 António Miguel Galvão, *Um século de história da Companhia de Pescarias do Algarve* (Faro: Edição da Companhia das Pescarias, 1948).

19 The term Moor served to designate the Berbers of North Africa and the Africans thought to come from Mauritania, the "country of the Moors."

of Morocco which, in opening a completely new chapter for the region, would allow them to play once more a major role in regional trade. The establishment of peaceful interaction channels between Christians and Berber Muslims was the prelude to the first Atlantic treaty in Europe.

The Incorporation of Arguin into the Portuguese Black Slave Trade

Cooperation with Mauritanian Berbers was an ancient dream of Europeans. It was not to be realised in the 13th century when the Catalans, Dieppians, Florentines, Provencals, Venetians and Genoese entered those arid coasts.[20] But by the 15th century the context had changed, and the political communities of the Sahel found themselves at a crossroads.[21] The Portuguese took advantage of the disorder following the military assertion of the Wattasids, to become privileged partners.[22]

The Christian control exercised over coastal navigation contributed to the asphyxiation of the caravan cities of south-west Morocco and the Adrar (Mauritania) which until the Middle Ages had been at the crossroads of trans-Saharan commerce. Economically weakened and divided by internal strife, the heads of the Berber tribes were forced to sign treaties with the Portuguese.[23] The Zenata and the Nasiriya were the first tribes to declare themselves vassals to the King of Portugal. They knew that the caravels were ready to take the place of the caravans. It is true that the Portuguese had installed a solid

20 Robert Ricard, "Les Portugais et le Sahara atlantique au XVe siècle," *Hesperis* 11 (1930): 97–110, and Georges Jehel, *Les Génois en Méditerranée occidentale: fin XIe–début XIVe siècle. Ebauche d'une stratégie pour un empire* (Paris: Université d'Amiens, 1993).

21 This period of Moroccan history is poorly known. See the founding works of Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, notably *A Economia dos descobrimentos henriquinos* (Lisbon: Sá da Costa, 1962).

22 The Wattasids exercised regency under the last Marinid, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq (1428–65). In 1465, they became independent. After a violent transition, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Šaykh Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā commenced a reconquest of the territory of the Marinid sultanate and founded the kingdom of Fes in 1472: Dominique and Janine Sourdel, *Dictionnaire historique de l'Islam* (Paris: PUF, Quadrige, 2004).

23 Jean Devisse, "Routes de commerce et échanges en Afrique occidentale en relation avec la Méditerranée. Un essai sur le commerce africain médiéval du XIe au XVIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* 50:1, 50:3 (1972): 42–73, 357–397; Jacob Oliel, *Les juifs au Sahara. Le Touat au Moyen Âge* (Paris: CNRS, 1994); and Roger Botte, "Les réseaux transsahariens de la traite de l'or et des esclaves au haut Moyen Âge: VIIIe–XIe siècle," *L'Année du Maghreb* 7 (2011): 27–59.

network of consuls and factors in all the main ports of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic: at Agadir, Barcelona, Genoa, Florence, Malaga, Oran, Safi, Seville, Tunis, and Valencia. In 1471, King Alfonso V concluded with the Sharif of Arzila a pact of hospitality and mutual defence for a period of twenty years. He added to his title of "King of Portugal" that of king "of the Algarve and every coast on the African sea." The tribute demanded by the Portuguese marked the ties between the two parties; the acceptance of the tribute and trade agreements by the elites and by the inhabitants of these sovereign territories relied on the Portuguese capacity to associate the greatest number of agents with the Atlantic dream.

In 1486, an agreement of economic collaboration was signed between the representatives of King John II and the inhabitants of the town of Azemmour, and then in 1488 with the merchants of Safi.[24] The *alformas* procured slaves from the heart of the Sahel and conveyed them to the Portuguese trading posts.[25] The transaction was governed by a table of equivalence between the value of the merchandise issued from North African artisanal production, the price of gold, and that of slaves. *Burnous*, *djellabas*, *haïks*, carpets, stirrups, copper basins came out by the thousands from the Moroccan workshops of Safi before being shipped to Arguin where they were destined to be used as *traités*, that is to say bartered in exchange for black slaves. This system of equivalency between goods and slaves was linked to the ransoms practiced in Moroccan areas. The Portuguese contract of the treaty clearly refers to ransom and to the Arabic treaty. The word *resgate* (redemption) thus served to name the ransom paid by the captive for the restitution of their freedom and to associate a value with the slave acquired (*escravo de resgate*) on the islet of Arguin and the coasts of Mauritania in exchange for a given number of articles made in Azemmour and, mainly, in Safi. The tradition of artisanal processing of hides, skins, and metals facilitated the creation of large workshops around Safi.

These manufactured thousands of items of horse tack, saddlery, copper basins, *djellabas*, *hambels*, *burnous*, covers or caps, all destined for the Senegambian states. The barter system (slaves for goods) could not have grown on a vast scale without the use of Indo-Arabic numeration, the Portuguese adoption of traditionally trans-Saharan administrative customs, and the introduction

24 Vítor Luís Gaspar Rodrigues, "Organização militar e práticas de guerra dos Portugueses em Marrocos no século XV, princípios do século XVI: sua importância como modelo referencial para a expansão portuguesa no Oriente," *Anais de História de Além Mar* 2 (2001): 157–168.

25 The term *alformas* was used by the Portuguese to designate their local intermediaries.

of the Portuguese monetary system into the Maghreb.[26] The availability of an accounting solution offering compatibility between paper, arithmetic and currency allowed rapid progress in the development of relationships of trust. Scratching the paper to alter or falsify the information left traces that were visible to all. Science came to the aid of commerce by providing a legal framework. For lawyers, the science of numbers was an "art in essence demonstrative. It allows the knowledge of many things, it permits men to speak the truth, to love the truth and to reject falsehood."[27] Transactions recorded on paper and expressed in an arithmetic understood by all were of great potential appeal to Muslim law.

For half a century the trading post of Safi occupied a central place in the Portuguese system. A large community of Portuguese Jews settled there in the 1480s.[28] These were the official representatives of the Portuguese monarchy and they acquired a great notoriety among the Muslim populations following the example of Abraão Benzemeiro (Abraham Ben Zmirou), who was in charge of supervising payment to the Portuguese troops posted to Safi and Azemmour; or his brother, Aaron, who presided in person over the signature of the peace and commercial treaties between the Wattasid Sharifs and the King of Portugal.[29]

At the end of the 15th century, Safi was the most populous town on the Moroccan shore and the most fortified Portuguese holding on the Atlantic coast. In 1499, Pope Alexander VI consecrated the Archbishopric of Safi and, in 1519, John III of Portugal undertook the construction of a cathedral in the

26 The early adoption of paper and its combination with Arabic numerals for trans-Saharan transaction in the 8th century had increased the efficiency of Muslim and Jewish commercial networks in the Sahara and the eastern Mediterranean. On this subject see the works of renowned specialist in the study of Islam in Africa, Nehemia Levtzion, *Islam in Africa and the Middle East. Studies on Conversion and Renewal* (Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate, 2007); and more recently of Ghislaine Lydon, *On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

27 *Ordenaçoens do senhor Rey D. Affonso V (1446)* (Coimbra: Real Imprensa da Universidade, 1792).

28 José Alberto da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão portuguesa em Marrocos durante o século XVI: origens e actividades duma comunidade* (Braga: APPACDM, 1997); Mercedes Garcia-Arenal ed., *Entre el Islam y Occidente. Los judios magrebíes en la Edad moderna* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004).

29 Kredya Brahim, *Pages de l'histoire des Juifs de Safi* (Paris: Auteurs du monde, 2009). Nicole Serfaty, *Les courtisans juifs des sultans marocains: Hommes politiques et hauts dignitaires, XIIIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: Bouchène, 1999).

Portuguese part of the city. The settlers' survival was reliant on a regular supply of cereals from the islands of Madeira and the Azores and a permanent military presence. In Safi, as in most of the Moroccan territories, there prevailed a great legal heteronomy and a religious and linguistic heterodoxy. The traditional prohibitions on the granting of powers to non-Muslims were shaken up in Morocco by the new political and economic realities of Atlantic trade.

The export of Moroccan manufactured products to Guinea set the rhythm for the trading posts. At Arguin, Safi, and Santiago, the Portuguese scribes were busy: they had to add or subtract ounces and carats of gold, pieces and half pieces of slaves, the number of *djellabas*, to delete, to cross out… The use of the Indo-Arabic numeration and the adoption of paper in the Portuguese administration allowed rapid progress in the development of relationships of trust and allowed the more traditional sectors of the local economy to participate in the great Atlantic economy. The consolidation of market flows between Europe and Africa led to the creation in the 1450s of the *Casa de Arguin*, organised to replace the *Casa de Ceuta*, and to the construction in 1456 of a second Negro warehouse on the island of Santiago, Cape Verde, facing Senegal. In 1490, John II initiated the construction of the gigantic magazines of the *Casa da Guiné e da Mina* of Lisbon, focal point of the entire Portuguese administration. Every year tens of hundreds of slaves and tons of fish were bartered in the two trading posts of Arguin and Santiago, Cape Verde. Slaves and fish arrived at the warehouses of Lisbon and Seville, the two ports which held the trading monopoly with Africa, before ending up in the Mediterranean markets (Valencia, Barcelona, Genoa) and the hinterland of southern Europe (Alentejo, the Algarve, Andalusia). The State encouraged the growth of the private sector to take up the slack, and favoured it with tax exemptions to invest yet more substantial sums in the Atlantic economy. In the Atlantic, the Portuguese established one of the most effective taxation and spending systems in the whole of Europe, permitting them to open up the market to foreigners. In the 1480s, the Florentine Bartolomeo Marchionni bought a monopoly on the trade in slaves, spices, and ivory from the "rivers of the south" and the waters of the Gulf of Guinea. Between 1488 and 1493, the ships of Bartolomeo Marchionni alone brought an average of 500 to 600 African slaves a year to the Mediterranean. The account books kept by the factors installed in the trading post of Santiago, Cape Verde, are remarkably accurate.

In a Portuguese economy strongly monetised following the entry into Europe of the gold of São Jorge da Mina (1482), mathematics became the model of management of the Atlantic economy. Mathematics allowed quantification and maximised the chances of success, envisaging the extension of frontiers. At the start of the 16th century, finance and mathematical literacy had a central

role in the transfer of what was now named the *trato dos Negros*, the trade in Negros to the south Atlantic and to the Spanish Caribbean. The tropical agriculture practiced in the south Atlantic and the Caribbean demanded a more intensive labour model, as well as risk management, technical know-how, and capital. The *fazendas* of the small island of São Tomé alone received almost 40,000 Congolese slaves between 1510 and 1527, an average of 2,000 slaves per year. In 1510, the plantation system of São Tomé traversed the Atlantic fuelled by the boldness of Italian and Flemish financiers. At this date, Ferdinand of Aragon authorised the first shipment of 50 African slaves from Seville to the colonies of Santo Domingo (the island of Hispaniola) and Puerto Rico.

The complexity of the trans-Atlantic circuit and the mobilisation of resources for the benefit of the sugar economy are testament to the new economic model. The comings and goings between Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean multiplied after 1525, when the Caribbean sugar cycle replaced the mining cycle. In 1527, an initial voyage connected directly the trading post of Santiago, Cape Verde, with that of Santo Domingo, on the isle of Hispaniola. Aboard were a hundred slaves destined for the first sugarcane fields in the Caribbean world. From 1535, a regular maritime route connected the island of São Tomé with the wider Caribbean (Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba), which supplied the Spanish islands with a majority of male bonded labour. The loads were now greater – up to 250 slaves per ship – and the conditions of transport had changed. The storage of slaves in the bilges, an innovation on the American routes, affected the survival rate of the men during the crossing, the level of violence exercised on board and the profitability of the voyage. Frequently, over half of the slaves on board died and revolts during boarding or in the course of the journey multiplied. In 1540, over 15,000 enslaved Wolof, Serer, Mina, and Congolese people were introduced to the Greater Antilles. At the same time, the arrival of Africans in southern Europe experienced its first decline.

The concordance between the Portuguese expansion in Morocco, the beginnings of the black slave trade in Senegambia and the development of new slaving practices in southern Europe and the Atlantic isles is complete. A clear acculturation process can be detected among the emerging Iberian societies with the adoption in the late Middle Ages of a system that had otherwise almost disappeared in western Europe. There had been slaves in Portugal since Antiquity, but the majority were in a temporary state of slavery. Prisoners, captives, and bondsmen all had the chance of redemption and return to liberty. Atlantic slavery operated under a different system. The probability of death due to malaria or exhaustion in the unhealthy marshes or in the rice and sugar fields of Gandia, the Algarve, Madeira, or São Tomé was so high that a universal system of slavery for life was adopted instead. Since slaves, in fact, transferred

their servile status to their children, by the 16th century slavery had become a pillar of the Iberian economy. It was to become one of the crucial features of Iberian societies and their overseas colonies until modern times.

Migration and Slavery

In the 15th century the fate of Moroccan captives in Portugal did not cause a great stir in the West. The northern European governments were more divided over the interpretation of witness accounts. The legitimate framework of the "just war" against the Infidel with which the Portuguese explained the arrival of tens of thousands of Africans at Lisbon, Seville, and Valencia did not readily convince the western powers. Foreign observers were disturbed by the arrival on the Christian soil of Europe of thousands of Moroccans and Africans. The Portuguese were far less concerned. They had sufficient confidence in the laws of land capital (property) and symbolic capital (lineage) not to be unduly worried by the presence of thousands of Africans in their towns. The state, the law, and tradition had over the course of centuries constructed a legal society "of the blood" (of kinship and heritage) in which the key element was the transmission of *naturalidade*. Far from the *Siete Partidas* of Alfonso X "the Learned King" (1252–84),[30] the concept of *naturalidade* enveloped the rights and the duties of men from birth. It was based on the subjective definition of the links between an individual a territory and a lineage. Kinship was at the root of the traditional Portuguese family model, based on agricultural wealth and lordship. The elders ensured the future of their children through the transmission of property, which in its turn conditioned their lives.[31] Knowledge of domestic systems of organisation, the practices of inheritance and the transmission of property was indispensable for the comprehension of the way Portuguese nobility and society worked as a whole.

The aristocracy, which acquired honour and prestige in the holy war against the enemies of the faith, was equally constructed on the basis of heredity and blood lineage. The *morgadio* system of inheritance and the *Lei Mental* promulgated by King Edward in 1434 to protect the "property of the Crown" imposed hereditary succession according to the principles of masculinity and primogeniture. This system of retention of property in the lineage and of

30 *Las Siete Partidas del Rey don Alfonso el Sabio*, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1807).

31 José Mattoso, *Naquele Tempo. Ensaios de História Medieval* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2009).

the indivisibility of landed wealth was one of the conditions of the survival of the name of the family, of the House, of patriarchal organisation and of the attached large domestic household.[32] Material, ideological, and symbolic, the "House" determined domestic and social conduct as well as individual and group strategies of transmission.

The success of these strategies demonstrates the moral convergence of internal family factors and external social constraints. The realisation that equal sharing would destroy the viability of agricultural exploitation resulting in systemic socio-economic instability and the atomisation of property prompted the survival of a collective institution to which the fate of individuals was subordinate. Children born outside marriage, daughters and younger sons were the great victims of this regime of succession. Daughters married the elder or younger sons of other families in the village, or more often of neighbouring villages, and benefitted from their legitimacy with a dowry. The younger sons were left three strategies for survival: marriage outside the House, the Church and emigration. Over the years, the historical organisation of the "House" became an institutional unit with strong ideological and symbolic overtones.

The social structure resulting from these customs was set forth theoretically as a whole in the *Ordenações afonsinas*. This legislative corpus, started under the reign of John I and ending in 1446 by Alfonso, brought together all the rules and laws that organised social life in the kingdom and in the possessions of the Portuguese king. It is no coincidence that it makes a digression into the medieval foundations of logic and the transmission of "blood." Dated to the 13th September 1413, the article of the law entitled "The usage that the nobles, to whom the king has granted lands, must make of the courts," establishes the inequality between the three religions of the book, and between the rights of men and those of women. "When God created men, those given rights as much as those deprived of them, he made sure that they were not all equal, and he placed each one according to his merits and powers, and he classed them according to blood…" At the summit of the nation figured "the few naturals of the kingdom," families who received a superior degree of criminal and civil

32 For the definition of the "House" I allow myself to cite Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, "La 'mère cruelle.' Maternité, veuvage et dot dans la Florence des XIVe–XVe siècles," in *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 38:5 (1983): 1097: "In the 14th and 15th centuries, the 'house/home,' *a casa*, designated the material house where a domestic unit resided and it is in this sense that it is used in many documents, legal or fiscal, but it also represents the agnatic kinship group. In addition, the *casa* designated all dead ancestors and all living members of the lineage carrying the same blood and the same name who claimed a common eponymous hero ancestor from whom the group drew its identity."

jurisdiction "*cum mero et mixto imperio* on the burghs, towns and territories of the kingdom" by the grace of God and of the last king of the Burgundy dynasty, Ferdinand I (1367–83).[33]

In a Portuguese society built upon inequality, where some were born to command and others to serve according to the terms of the law, possession of slaves was a natural phenomenon. The assertion of a modern merchant state surrounding a world capital (Lisbon) drove the transfer of a large part of human activity from town and countryside to the mercantile sphere. The great city offered new opportunities for work in the public and private domains, in industry or craftsmanship. The monetary measurement of these activities gave them legal visibility. The exercise of any urban activity offered individuals, free or slave, an extremely broad legal protection, while the various royal legislations, the confraternities and religious institutions, and the professional associations facilitated the regularisation of formal relationships between men and the curbing of forms violence or abuse. This did not improve the material conditions of labour. On the contrary, the rapid growth of employment opportunities in the service, industrial and commercial sectors drove freeborn men and women to turn away from domestic service, a category that encompassed a series of tasks with no social value. To clean, to launder, to fetch water or prepare food were not neutral activities. These were unattractive, menial and degrading occupations, reserved to certain categories of the population: Muslim captives and above all, black slaves. In the private domestic space, these tasks essentially belonged to women.

The numerical importance of these activities is difficult to quantify because they were not usually subject to market transactions and only rarely involved remunerations. The rapid expansion of the population of the capital led the State to organise a few basic services, such as water supply, the safety of the *urbs* and the regulation of the job market on a corporate basis. In the mid-16th century, with 100,000 inhabitants, Lisbon was one of the most populated and prosperous cities in Europe. It was also the city with the highest number of black slaves (almost 10,000). At the end of the 16th century, 10–15% of the inhabitants of the capital were of direct African or north African descent. This was the highest proportion anywhere in the West. Indeed, as pointed out in 1534 by Garcia de Resende, keen observer of the social changes of his

33 *Ordenaçoens do senhor Rey D. Affonso V*, book II, Ch. 63: "De como devem usar das Juridiçoens os Fidalgos, aquelles, a que pelos reyx som outrogadas algumas Terras," available online at the following address: http://www1.ci.uc.pt/ihti/proj/afonsinas/l2p394.htm [Accessed 9 August 2016].

time: "captives arrive in the kingdom to the rhythm of natural departures."[34] Portuguese society lived in a state of profound strain.

The many complaints placed before the kingdom's courts by blacks and Moors reflects the tensions between "naturals" and "outsiders." For a part of the population, the permanence of the African and Muslim presence, and the cultural crossbreeding and transformations that resulted, were the marks of change and thus of decadence.[35] The phenomenon was not new. We know, for example, the Iberian answer to the "Jewish" question. In 1497, the Portuguese Jews were forced by Manuel I to face a cruel choice: convert to Christianity or leave the kingdom. Thus begins the clandestine history of the "new Christians." The establishment of the Inquisition in 1536, followed by the obligation to wear distinctive signs imposed by King John III served to push them into a state of permanent precariousness. The presence of black people also aroused the fear of moral, cultural and racial contamination among the general population. Some years later, the poems of Gil Vicent parodied the "language of the Negro" (*língua de preto*) and the contamination of speech by "Africanisms."[36] This linguistic mix was the result of complicity between whites and blacks, of the sharing of the same work places and social spaces, but above all of mixed unions. There is no doubt that renewed urbanism, real estate speculation, and the creation of immigrant quarters favoured the maintenance of African solidarity. The district of Bairro Alto, totally reconstructed after the earthquake of 1531, had become predominantly populated by blacks and mulattos. No longer the invisible worker or workhorse of the past, the slave started to become a visible participant in a black community. Wet nurses, servants, cooks, black peddlers numbered in their thousands in Lisbon and Evora.

> One thousand five hundred Negro women wash linen; one thousand others, a pannier on the head, clean the streets where the inhabitants dump their waste; a thousand others, the 'pot Negresses,' furnish houses with water; four hundred others circulate selling seafood, cooked rice and sweets; two hundred black children serve as note runners. Black women

34 Garcia de Resende, *Miscelanea e variedade de historias, costumes, casos, e cousas que em seu tempo aconteceram* (Coimbra: França Amado, 1917).

35 Manuel Severim de Faria, *Notícias de Portugal*, ed. Francisco António Lourenço Vaz (Lisbon: Colibri, 2003).

36 Paul Teyssier, *La langue de Gil Vicente* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1959); José Ramos Tinhorão, *Os negros em Portugal. Uma presença silenciosa* (Lisbon: Caminho 1988).

> were conducting the most vile and thankless tasks refused by free workers: carrying water, and excrement.[37]

The division of work between "naturals" and "outsiders" contributed to keep any bonds between the former and the latter groups unrecognised. This was an obstacle to the "humanisation" of the society. In reality the fate of black slaves was less the result of a lack of compassion on the part of their Portuguese masters than of the logic of a society that emphasised the business of men while denigrating "minor" groups. Prior to the arrival of black slaves those jobs of little social value were left to the poor, the weak, women, children, religious minorities and Muslim captives. Foreigners coming from northern Europe did not hesitate to stress Portugal's defining features and to use them as the epitome of the country's backwardness: despite its "grandeur" Lisbon was less urban, less civilised, less orderly and more chaotic than the cities of the north. In 1517, Erasmus refused to visit the Iberian Peninsula, stating that in his eyes the Portuguese had ceased to be a (good) Christian people. The orthodoxy of Erasmus explained nothing. References to the depraved morals of Portuguese men and women, to the impurity of their extraction, contaminated with the blood of savages, to the violence of their society are numerous in the literature of the time. A single example: in 1535, Nicolas Clénard stated in his private correspondence,

> Everywhere here is full of slaves. These are all Negroes and Moorish captives. Portugal is so full of this type of person that I truly believe that in Lisbon there are more slaves of both sexes than there are free Portuguese. Just find a house that doesn't have, at the least, a slave girl. This girl goes out to buy all that is necessary; washes the clothes; cleans the floors; goes for the water; removes, when the moment comes, all species of human and domestic waste. In brief, she is a slave and, apart from appearance, differs in no way from a beast of burden.[38]

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37 Cristóvão Rodrigues de Oliveira, *Lisboa em 1551. Sumário* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1987); Frei Nicolau de Oliveira, *Livro das Grandezas de Lisboa* (*1551*) (Lisbon: Vega, 1991). On all these questions see Didier Lahon, *O negro no coração do império. Uma memória a resgatar, séculos XV–XIX* (Lisbon: Entreculturas, 1999).

38 Nicolas Clénard, *Correspondance*, ed. Alphonse Roersch (Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique, 1941): 3:32, "Lettre no 24 à Jacques Latomus (26–3–1535)." See the approach of Jorge Fonseca, "Black Africans in Portugal during Cleynaert's visit," in *Black Africans in Renaissance Europe*, eds. Thomas F. Earle, and Kate J.P. Lowe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 113–124.

The indeterminate colour of many Portuguese, the physical proximity between free people and slaves, the confusion between the status of captive, slave, and servant were the marks of the moral degeneration of the kingdom, the flip-side of empire. The Flemish Nicolas Clénard described Lisbon in 1533 as the "city of the devil," in which the Portuguese were "accommodated to the reign of Negroes"; "a race" which "alone would suffice to set me running."[39] Race, slavery and colour were from now on fully connected in the Portuguese age of slavery.

The Right to Migrate and to Mixed Marriages

Europe goes through a moral crisis. New dynamics mark the retraction to a "national" identity during the 1530s. The Dominicans and the Franciscans rise against the religious ignorance and immorality of the people. Missionaries continue with their work, educating the working classes, in particular in the context of the nuclear family. This also concerned the conquest or reconquest of new lands by the Catholic faith, with the reiteration of the prohibitions (nudity, polygamy, idolatry, sorcery and sodomy) and the sacraments (marriage, baptism, burial) that contributed to mark the difference between civilised men and barbarians, between Christians and non-Christians.[40] Heresy and the rise of popular religiosity in the kingdom added to the concerns of the Papacy and the secular clergy with the evangelisation of the northern African and Sub-Saharan territories. Christian credentials made men similar, if not equal. Social peace was achieved through order; society was made up of well-defined groups: slaves, foreigners, women, children, peasants, blacks, whites, *dignes* and *indignes*. The Church and the Portuguese monarchy reacted by distancing themselves from this now cumbersome African heritage. The comparative horizon of the Portuguese was that of the "Republic of Mulattoes" which flourished at that time on the islands of Cape Verde. There were Banhuns, Wolofs, Serers, Mandinkas, Balantes … Muslims, Animists, Christians, Jews. A society thus constituted, notably on the island of Santiago, interfered with the social and colour-based hierarchies of the home country, even though, locally, to be or to be seen as white constituted the premier form of distinction.

The integration of slaves, freedmen and minority groups within the framework of Cape Verdean society was rapid. In a few years mulattoes passed

39 Clénard, *Correspondance*.

40 Pierre-Antoine Fabre and Bernard Vincent, eds., *Missions religieuses modernes. "Notre lieu est le monde"* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2007).

from having the status of slaves or freedmen to that of subjects, consumers of goods and producers of wealth: they dressed in Portuguese style, with the most wealthy adopting the fashions of the blood aristocracy, and they developed a taste for luxury, investing in the Transatlantic economy. This quickly led to them demanding the same place as the *reinois* (those originally from the kingdom of Portugal) in the churches, confraternities, courts and the administration. In 1546, the free mulattoes and blacks of Santiago participated in the decisions of the Municipal Assembly and could take their position against the "mighty men" of the island. The rapid ascension of a local elite of mulattoes, free "coloured" men and "sons of the land" (*filhos da terra*), who called themselves "whites of the land," called into question the traditional hierarchies and privileges inscribed in the laws of the Portuguese nation and aroused the apprehension of the inhabitants of Portugal who saw in these *crioulos* the symbol of a bastardised society born of illegitimate unions.[41]

The people of the time were fearful of these places of mixing and hybridity. The crisis of conscience that accompanied the colonial encounter was even more acute in the home country, where nature had not ceased since the origins of the nation to send catastrophes to the inhabitants.[42] In the 16th century, Latin and Muslim laws were invoked to find legal responses to the mobility of men, to explain the status of the descendants of Africans and Muslims who lived in Portugal but also that of the descendants of Christians who lived in African lands. Should the emphasis lie on that which separates (religious history or skin colour) or that which unites (religion and land) individuals? The treatises of Francisco de Vitoria, Tomas de Mercado, Luís Moline and Ahmad Baba reveal a thorough reflection on the "land" and the "blood" which was to profoundly mark the definition of native and foreigner in Iberian and Maghrebian societies and, from the 16th century, in the Portuguese African societies.

In Portugal, strict control over access to "natural" Portuguese status was accompanied by a definition of the statuses of "immigrant" and "foreigner." The debate between the proponents of a strict nativity, for whom "blood" and origins determined the purity of lineage, and the proponents of the "ground,"

41 "Whites of the land": Descendants of Portuguese, often mixed race, born in overseas territories. See Maria João Soares, "'Crioulos Indómitos' e Vadios: Identidade e Crioulização em Cabo Verde. Séculos XVII–XVIII," in *Actas do Congresso Internacional Espaço Atlântico de Antigo Regime: poderes e sociedades* (Lisbon: CHAM, 2005), available online: http://cvc.instituto-camoes.pt/eaar/coloquio/comunicacoes/maria_joao_soares.pdf [Accessed 9 August 2016]. Luís de Albuquerque and Maria Emília Madeira Santos, eds., *História Geral de Cabo Verde* (Lisbon and Praia: CEHCA, INIC, 2001), vol. 1.

42 The tragic episodes of the Plague and the violent earthquake of 1386 carried significant weight in Lisbon's collective memory.

who proposed a broad nativity which encompassed all individuals born to free, Christian parents in the home country or in the colonies. Should it now be put forward what distinguishes (free ancestry and skin colour) or what unites (religion and territory) men?

The definition of Francisco de Vitoria of a universal "right to migrate" was clearly exploited by Portuguese merchants and provided a legal basis on which the Atlantic slave trade was able to develop.[43] It allowed the descendants of black slaves to gradually obtain a right to reside in the Iberian Peninsula.

In the 16th century, the sovereign territories of Morocco, the trading posts of Guinea, and Lisbon were ports to another world. Thousands of inhabitants of the African continent followed the route to the North. In the opposite direction, Africa was a land of exile for many whites. The first colonisation of the Atlantic was the work of religious minorities (Jews and new Christians), of renegades and of young men who abandoned their villages to seek a better life in the towns.[44] On both sides the fertile land drove off the men that it no longer supported. Many Portuguese, Moroccan and African migrants kept an emotional attachment to the land and to rural society. They were never to return. The majority of Portuguese migrants left their homeland without official authorisation, that is to say without receiving a *licença*. They became illegal, and the enemies of the nation. The repressive policies of the crown did not prevent departures; quite the contrary, it was what brought these men to envisage strategies of integration and naturalisation into African societies on arrival. In the remote locations in which they settled (Brazil, India, or Africa), the Portuguese "forgot their origins and their culture."

A similar process occurred with the Muslims and Africans who entered Portugal.[45] The imposition of taxes on mobility required an extensive usage of gold coins and the existence of a market economy in Africa. The generalisation of the right to migrate and to settle was accompanied by the establishment of

43 Luciano Pereña, *La idea de justicia en la conquista de América* (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992).

44 See Jacques Revel, ed., *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris: EHESS, Gallimard, Seuil, 1996). For an understanding of the different levels of the Portuguese empire, read António Manuel Hespanha, "A constituição do Império português. Revisão de alguns enviesamentos correntes," in *O Antigo Regime nos trópicos*, eds. João Fragoso, Maria Fernando Bicalho and Maria de Fátima Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização, 2001), 163–188. We return also to the recent synthesis of Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History, Power and the politics of Difference* (Princeton University Press: 2010).

45 Garcia de Resende was the private secretary of King John II (1481–95) and his successor Manuel I (1495–1521). His presence at court and his critical perspective on social change resulted in the production of remarkable analyses of early 16th century Portuguese society, in particular his already cited *Miscelanea*, written about 1531.

a system of licences to circulate, passes aimed at limiting illegal transactions but more particularly at framing the social and economic mobility of individuals. The Moroccans took advantage of the maritime routes linking the sovereign territories to Lisbon to migrate in the thousands between 1520 and 1600. They were fleeing from persecution and poverty, but they were also attracted by the development of Lisbon at that time. The Maghrebians comprised a large and cheap workforce that found itself confined to service activities (domestic servants, squires, muleteers, washerwomen) in Lisbon, and to craft and rural activities in the Alentejo.[46] For all, enslaved or free, baptism and conversion to Christianity was a precondition for the right to reside in Portugal. The godfather presiding over the baptism, chosen from among respectable men, had to accompany the catechumen in their approach, and to acquaint them with the rights and duties associated with the status of *mourisco*. Were all of these men Muslim prior to their conversion? Many *mouriscos* had grown up within a Judeo-Muslim cultural substratum, and others were Judaised Berbers.[47]

These pluralistic origins were the source of strongly endogamic blood communities, whether in Lisbon, where two thirds of these individuals lived, or in the towns of Elvas and Evora (Alentejo) where the other third resided. Living conditions were not the same for Francisco, 20 years of age, *mourisco forro* (free) and for João, 37 years of age, "*mourisco* captive slave" of the wife of Alvaro de Abranches, captain of Tangier and then of Azemmour from 1526 to 1536. The first were *libres*: they had a greater degree of geographic mobility, easily crossing borders. The *mouriscos* of free condition were joined in Portugal by relatives, by brothers, by sisters and by their social peers, from among whom they often chose their spouses. With the arrival of women and the birth of children, the *mouriscos* entered the public space. Faced with this situation, the Jesuits founded in Lisbon the Royal College of Catechumens (1584) with the objective of offering religious instruction to Moors. A century before, in 1476, the kings of Portugal had created in the capital the first religious confraternities reserved for blacks, whether of free or servile condition.[48]

46 For comparison we refer to the very detailed study provided by Debra Blumenthal on medieval slavery in Valencia: *Enemies and Familiars: Slavery and Mastery in Fifteenth-Century Valencia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

47 Shlomo Sand, *Comment le peuple juif fut inventé* (Paris: Fayard, 2008).

48 Didier Lahon, "Exclusion, intégration et métissage dans les confréries noires au Portugal (XVIe–XIXe siècles)," in *Negros, mulatos, zambaigos. Derroteros africanos en los mundos ibéricos*, eds. Berta Ares and Alessandro Stella (Seville: CSIC, 2000), 275–311; Bernard Vincent, "Les Confréries de noirs dans la Péninsule Ibérique," in *Religiosidad y costumbres populares en Iberoamérica*, ed. David González (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2000), 17–28.

These first great migratory movements of the Modern Era brought Portuguese and African elites to realise the porosity of cultural and biological frontiers in Portugal. In the 16th century, Islam and Judaism were once more religions in Portugal, and Christianity was one of the religions of Africa. At the end of the 16th century, tens of thousands of men, women and children descended from Berbers, from Muslims, from Jews or from Africans lived in Lisbon in its hinterland. According to Ahmed Bouchard, the Moroccan community in Portugal could count up to 20,000 members in the middle of the 16th century.[49] The descendants of Africans were without doubt four or five times as many.[50] In the sovereign territories of Morocco, in the trading posts of Guinea and Cape Verde, the descendants of whites also numbered in the thousands. The sovereign territories were defended by more or less large strategically located stone fortresses. Governed by a military leader with extended powers, the *capitão-governador*, the population of European origin enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence thanks to the military forces put into place by the state. On the coasts of Guinea, the trading posts had given way to *praças* protected by wooden palisades. The population of "whites of the land" were protected by mercenary militias, with the administration also in the hands of a *capitão-feitor*, often from the Creole community, appointed and supervised by the central government.

In 1580, with the arrival of Spaniards on the throne of Portugal, there was not yet a unified status for those of Portuguese descent overseas. This arrived with the *Ordenações Filipinas*, a legal code written by Philip II in 1595 and put into effect in 1603 and which defined for the first time a general status for those called the "natives of the Kingdom of Portugal and the conquests (*Senhorios*)." When a natural of the kingdom had had one or more children in the colonies with a native woman, their condition as natural of the kingdom was granted if, and only if their father's departure from the kingdom had been authorised or "mandated by the crown." On the other hand, when the individual had "left the kingdom in which he was born of his own accord" without obtaining the *licence* his descendants were excluded from inherited privileges and the right to be considered Portuguese naturals.[51] The definition of the status of

49 Ahmed Boucharb, *Os Pseudo-mouriscos de Portugal no séc. XVI: estudo de uma especificidade a partir das fontes inquisitoriais* (Lisbon: Hugin, 2004).

50 António de Almeida Mendes, "Child Slaves in the Early North Atlantic Trade (XV–XVI centuries)," in *Children in Slavery: A Global History, Vol. 1, Children and Slavery Through the Ages*, eds. Suzane Miers and Joseph Miller (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press: 2009), 19–34.

51 *Ordenações Filipinas*, ed. Candido Mendes de Almeida (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Philomathico, 1870) book 2, Ch. 55: "Das pessoas, que devem ser havidas por naturais

the Portuguese natural was thus, to a large degree, a mechanism devised to control naturalization by blood, like the statutes on the purity of blood. The investigation of descent proved to be particularly difficult in the Guinean context, where the woman's free or servile and Christian or non-Christian condition was deemed relevant. The monarchy entrusted relevant figures of the Cape Verdean aristocracy – Francisco de Andrade, André Álvares de Almada and André Donelha – to carry out detailed land surveys while Jesuit missionaries were sent to improve moral standards in society. On their arrival in Guinea, in 1604, the first Jesuits were concerned by the degeneration of these Portuguese who lived like "idolaters, perjurers, miscreants, murderers, degenerates, traitors, and thieves."

The Portuguese Experience in the Atlantic

The immigration of Africans and Moroccans to Portugal, be it free or forced, cannot be isolated from the emigration of Portuguese to Africa. This story of migrations and of parallel lives makes up a continuous, rich narrative split equally between Portugal, northern Africa, and Guinea. Cross migration contributed to the formation of territories preoccupied by the question of origin, blood lines, and the status of individuals. The perpetuation of captivity and "productive" slavery in the Iberian and Moroccan worlds produced specific standards, institutions and complex social relationships. The abolition of slavery was gradual, going hand in hand with other social and economic transformations. The decrease in the arrival of African slaves in the cities after 1550 was compensated for by rural female "immigration." In the 18th century, the development of new sectors of proto-industrial activity and the mechanisation of production processes was accompanied by a restructuring of the urban domestic market when the Portuguese Enlightenment started pressing towards the end of slavery in Portugal.[52] The royal resolutions of 1761 and 1773 forbade the entry of blacks into the kingdom. In 1856, a new decree freed the slaves belonging to the State, municipal councils, charitable institutions and the Church. In 1858, the decree of the Marquis of Sá da Bandeira promised the abolition of slavery at the end of a twenty year period with payment of

destes reinos." Available online at the site: http://www1.ci.uc.pt/ihti/proj/filipinas/l2p489.htm [Accessed 9 August 2016].

52 João Pedro Marques, *Os Sons do Silêncio. O Portugal de Oitocentos e a Abolição do Tráfico de Escravos* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 1999), and *Sá da Bandeira e o fim da escravidão* (Lisbon: ICS, 2008).

compensation to the owners. Slavery was finally abolished in 1869, but continued until the 20th century in practice. At the beginning of the 20th century the ethnologist José Leite de Vasconcelos encountered communities descended from slaves in many villages in the Alentejo: Alcácer, São Romão, Ribeira do Sado.[53] In Portugal, freedom and constraint were and were to remain for a long time relative notions.

The decline of slavery as an institution was paralleled by the affirmation of an individualist, secular and industrial society, more than a change in moral conscience. In Portugal, the reduction in family size, the decline in revenues of many sections of the elite, the modification of family structure, the decrease in the number of children, the new outlook of the urban bourgeoisie on family structure, and the legal and social transformation of the status of domestic servants were so many factors in the abolition laws that put an end to slavery.

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53 José Leite de Vasconcelos, *Etnografia portuguesa* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1933–88). For the study of the African presence in southern Portugal in the Modern Era see Jorge Fonseca, *Escravos no sul de Portugal: séculos XVI–XVII* (Lisbon: Vulgata, 2002). A. Boucharb (*Os pseudo-mouriscos*) was one of the first authors to study the Moroccan migrations to Portugal in the Modern Era.

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CHAPTER 14

The Peculiarity of the Spanish Empire: A Comparative Interpretation

Josep M. Fradera

The Demographical Collapse

There is no agreement on how the principal institutions of the Spanish empire were constructed or how they managed to root themselves in the dramatic social landscape of the sixteenth century. It would seem that this gap with regard to such a key historiographic question indicates the larger difficulty of adequately recognizing the enormity of the "destruction of the Indies" beyond its purely demographic impact.

The Indies indeed crossed a long Century of *destrucción*, if by that we mean the impossibility of ever reproducing pre-Colombian social structures, with the exception of a few enclaves on the edge of the empire. In the first phase of colonization and pillage in the Caribbean, not only were the bases of any sort of autoctonous social reproduction undermined, but the reproduction of all human life whatsoever was nearly entirely eliminated. Therefore the Antillean world after 1530 cannot be regarded as a continuation of the world as it existed before the fateful year of 1492, even if old patterns of land use and agricultural organization may have left their imprint on the subsequent Hispanic world. With that important caveat aside, it is accepted that the heirs of those legacies cannot in any fashion be identified with the inhabitants of societies before the devastating death toll at the turn of the century, whose only ethnographically identifiable survivors withdrew in small groups to small and distant islands. Society in that desolate landscape after the devastation was different from the one seen by the first Europeans. The Spanish Caribbean was repopulated as a result of a trickle of immigrants from the Iberian peninsula and the arrival of forced labour from Africa; the latter, thanks to financial agreements with the Portuguese for the purchase of slaves, constituted the labour force essential for the emergence of the economies of sugar, tobacco, and vegetable dyestuffs.[1] The Caribbean was repopulated with peoples from other continents, and immigrants would continue arriving at its shores in the following centuries.

1 Enrique Otte and Conchita Ruiz, "Los portugueses en la trata de esclavos negros en las postrimerías del siglo XVI," *Moneda y Crédito* 85 (1963): 3–40.

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But the conquest of most of the continent in an extraordinarily brief time, during which the pre-Colombian empires were destroyed, brought about demographic decline and dislocation on a much more vast human and geographic scale. Once again, understanding that dramatic cycle of destruction, plunder, and the establishment of new control mechanisms turns out to be a minefield, starting with the statistics presented by the scholars Woodrow Borah and Sherburne Cook, at the University of California, which entirely changed the field. Their seminal work, along with works by the linguist Angel Rosenblat and the epidemiologist Henry Dobyns, the devastating criticism of the latter by the Africanist David Henige, and research by William Denevan, Thomas Witmore, and Alfred W. Crosby turned sixteenth-century American demography into a true intellectual discipline.[2] But despite the outpouring of work, it was difficult to reach any agreement on the numbers, and the difficulty occasionally led to sterile revisionism, such as that pointed to by Robert McCaa when he responded to Francis J. Brooks's worthless textual reconstruction of the impact of smallpox in New Spain.[3] Beyond the statistics, however, there was little doubt as to the differences between the demographic collapse of the Caribbean and that of the mainland. While in the former the population essentially became extinct, in the latter the survival of a sufficiently broad population allowed for the establishment of a lasting and complex colonial society.

The historiographic debates concerned themselves only episodically with the effect of the demographic collapse on the definition of institutions and the colonization model following the conquest. For decades, the main point of discussion was the moral exemplarity of the Spanish imperial project, as advanced by Lewis Hanke and Spanish historians, or its complete denigration, by the Protestant and liberal economic consortium that dominated contemporary liberal

2 David Henige, *Numbers from Nowhere: The American Indian Contact Population Debate* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988). William M. Denevan, ed. *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992). Thomas Witmore, *Disease and Death in Early Colonial Mexico: Stimulating Amerindian Depopulation* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992). Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). For Borah's understanding of the debate (what Rosenblat referred to as The Polemic) see "The Historical Demography of Aboriginal and Colonial America: An Attempt at Perspective," in Denevan, *The Native Population*, 13–34.

3 Francis J. Brooks, "Revising the Conquest of Mexico: Smallpox, Sources, and Populations," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 24:1 (1993): 1–29; Robert McCaa, "Spanish and Nahuatl Views on Smallpox and Demographic Catastrophe in the Conquest of Mexico," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 25:3 (1995): 397–431.

culture in Great Britain and the United States. One must point out, however, that the historians and demographers mentioned earlier in no way situated themselves within this Anglophone tendency; one clear example pointing to the dissimilarity is Borah's foundational work on the Indian Tribunal (*Juzgado de Indios*) in New Spain, in which the author displayed a sophisticated understanding of the contradictions between the paternalist mission of the Spanish authorities and the imperatives of imperial economics and politics.[4] Borah and Cook, but also Lesley B. Simpson, Charles Gibson, and John Leddy Phelan, that is, the leading renovators of Spanish-American studies in the postwar era, transcended narrow ideological quarrels of the past to illuminate new historiographic challenges. One of the constant threads of their effort was to define both the destruction of the pre-Hispanic societies and the construction of the Spanish colonial world. But despite their enormous efforts, this productive connection between general history and historical demography left many questions unanswered, as both disciplines were inevitably subject to compartmentalization. In general, depopulation was studied by scholars of epidemics, along the lines of Noble David Cook's work on Andean and American demography and Elizabeth Fenn's contribution on North America in a later period, both of them admirable pieces of scholarship.[5] General questions, meanwhile, shifted toward historical anthropology, archaeology, and ethnohistory, though the object of study of these fields tended to blur as pre-Hispanic populations were extinguished or violently turned into something else.

Mining and Cities in the Construction of a New Society

The question of how a new society took shape after the conquest, therefore, remained unanswered, a challenge that had been identified but not resolved (if anything in the social sciences may be said to be resolved). Aside from what one may think of older scholarly contributions, it is clear that that question affects, even determines, our comprehension of the genesis of the modern world. The extraordinary dimensions of the historiographic project should not cause us to lose sight of significant progress, however. For example, Carlos Sempat Assadourian, an Argentine historian working in Mexico,

4 Woodrow Borah, *El Juzgado General de Indios en la Nueva España* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985).

5 Noble D. Cook, *Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru, 1520–1620* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Elizabeth Fenn, *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–82* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).

published an article, "Indigenous depopulation in Peru and New Spain in the sixteenth century and the Formation of the Colonial Economy," published in *Historia Mexicana* in 1989, which is not only a seminal piece of research that adds to other work in the same line, but, as its title suggests, it is an ambitious attempt to understand the nexus between epidemiology, the demographic debacle, and the formation of the colonial economy in the second half of the sixteenth century.[6] The article's thesis, both simple and coherent with previous historical demographic work, is that in response to the massive slaughter the crown's objectives shifted from imperial fiscal policy toward more intensive exploitation of Indian labour. In other words, fiscal pressure shifted beyond the mere extraction of personal tribute – which, for obvious reasons, was on the decline – such as the system organized after the conquest to distribute the local population among the *encomenderos*.

In New Spain, for example, this initial method of massive tributary exaction, which did not entail drastic replacement in Indian work patterns, changed notably after the famous first Audiencia (1528–1530). After passing through that institutional threshold, the movement toward more intensive labour enabled the emergence of the most dynamic sector of the new colonial economy, mining. This shift of the incipient colonial economy's center of gravity can be seen clearly by looking at silver mining in northern Mexico (centered in Zacatecas, in the state of the same name) and in the Andes in Potosí (in modern-day Bolivia, but belonging to the Charcas Audiencia during the colonial era.) Once the technical problem of separating valuable minerals from gangue was resolved by using mercury, known as *amalgama en frío* (literally, "cold amalgam"), silver mining became extremely successful.[7]

Increased mining production led to two crucially important processes. First, purchasing power rose in the American economies and in the transplanted European world of the Indies, whose basic and sumptuary practices attempted to compete with those of the aristocracy and urban elites in the metropolis. High international prices for precious metals guaranteed the liquidity of Spanish silver. This favorable appreciation had its origins in several causes, outstanding among which was the permanent European trade deficit

6 Carlos S. Assadourian, "La despoblación indígena en Perú y Nueva España durante el siglo XVI y la formación de la economía colonial," *Historia Mexicana* 38:3 (1989): 419–454.

7 Modesto Bargalló, *La amalgamación de los minerales de plata en Hispanoamérica colonial* (Mexico City: Compañía Fundidora de Hierro y Acero de Monterrey, 1969); Peter J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Peter J. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labour in Potosí, 1545–1650* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).

vis-à-vis Asia, which only increased thanks to the favorable exchange rate of silver in the great Asian empires; for example, in late sixteenth-century China, during the late Ming dynasty, exchange was eased through the increase of silver in the monetary system.[8] That was also the case in Mughal India when the last of the Timurids learned to "live without silver," using the expression coined by John Deyell.[9] These differences in the price of precious metals, which made colonial production highly profitable, would persist despite the growing technological gap between American and European mining in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Alexander von Humboldt explained the sector's survival and importance by pointing to something that Carlos Sempat Assadourian and the tradition of studies on American mining show, which is the strategic advantage of the low cost of labour. The cost difference was no mystery for those who were well informed. Sixty years before Humboldt, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa had described (and criticized) the common cruelty of a minimal nominal wage, tribute payments, and tiny plots of land, which combined to keep the price of Indian labour permanently low.[10] This was no accident, but rather the conscious result of salary calculations based on forced labour by the *repartimiento* Indians (the most important of which was the *mita* in the Andes mines); the practice of *k'urpa* (a Quechua word literally meaning a clump of mineral), or payment in specie; and the possibility of turning to African slave labour. The latter option was crucial in the silver mining areas of northern New Spain and in the gold mines of the Chocó Valley in New Granada (present-day Colombia) during the eighteenth century.[11] This complex ensemble of contract, forced, and servile labour was as lasting as it was necessary, so much so that it perdured even after the imperial institutions that created it.[12]

The second process was related to the monarchy's priorities. Dragged down by the relentless spiral of indigenous depopulation, the principal tax method of the early conquest, which relied on personal tribute by the Indians (in cash or kind) quickly showed signs of inherent rigidity. In fact, the amount of tribute

8 Dennis O. Flynn, *World Silver and Monetary History in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996).

9 John Deyell, *Living Without Silver: The Monetary History of Early Medieval North India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

10 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América*, ed. Luis J. Ramos Gómez (Madrid: Historia 16, 1991).

11 William F. Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish Frontier: The Colombia Chocó, 1680–1810* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981).

12 Jeffrey A. Cole. *The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700. Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Enrique Tandeter, *Coacción y mercado: La minería de la plata en el Perú colonial, 1692–1826* (Madrid: Siglo XXI Editores, 1992).

was determined as much by demography as by social factors typical of colonial relations, such as Indians fleeing their communities or not including first-generation Indians of mixed blood on tax rolls. Under these circumstances, only involvement by royal officials as intermediaries among various social sectors could secure new economic activities and therefore increase potential collections.

The high degree of protection afforded to the mining business – which can be seen in the solutions to the complex problem of quicksilver and mercury as well as the delicate problem of *repartimientos* and slave labour – was the key to the new situation. This was a phenomenon with lasting consequences that can be described as a gradual distancing from the economic and social patterns of the pre-Columbian world. It was not simply a matter of providing needed protection to this new sector, the source of income with unheard-of elasticity, but also of providing the appropriate institutional framework so that the booming production of precious metals could stimulate the rest of the economy. If that were the case, the multiple local economies that emerged throughout the landscape of destruction after the conquest could come together to constitute a vast and integrated economic space, stimulated from the center by the great mining enclaves. On this point, Assadourian's works on Peru, which predate the above-referenced article, are equally important in describing this formative process.[13]

The organization of the large mining region and the inter-American silver circuits placed urgent demands on all sectors of the colonial economy. Assadourian vividly describes these demands as circles situated around the mining centers. Indeed, demands from Potosí and the Peruvian Andes spread out in varying directions and reached the most remote corners. The same was true with Zacatecas and the mining centers of northern New Spain. Certain regional products were essential (e.g. coca, blankets, corn, and other food products) but so too were products from more distant places, sometimes even on the empire's very boundaries: wheat, wine, oil, meat, pack animals, and *mate* and other euphoria-causing vegetable products. All these products were shipped in large quantities to the areas of precious metal production, which had a negative balance in nearly everything else.[14]

13 Carlos S. Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial. El mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982); Assadourian, *Transiciones hacia el sistema colonial andino* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1994).

14 The only possible comparison are the Caribbean plantation enclaves developed by Northern Europeans starting in the late seventeenth century.

But the products of the land were insufficient, and it was necessary to complement them with products from Europe and Africa such as, for example, the mercury crucial for the amalgam process and the African slaves whose services were essential for the mines in northern New Spain. There was less obvious merchandise traveling along these same routes, such as weapons and peninsular metal products, cord, paper, and an endless list more. But in short, the multiplier effect of the market centered on the great mining centers can and should be seen on a large scale in the establishment of long-distance trade. Trade here had its own rules, easily misunderstood if compared with those operative in the northern Atlantic in later centuries. The first was that the colonial world paid with precious metals for everything coming from Europe and Africa: capital goods for mining, products for the Spanish ethnic market, shipping and insurance, and the protection and institutional development that the empire both guaranteed and demanded. Only mining's dramatic growth and the high price of precious metals could ensure that these exchange patterns continued. These economic underpinnings constituted the basis of social life in the Indies, which for centuries drew a modest but continual flow of peninsular colonists. Earl J. Hamilton's work made clear the extent to which mining was the foundation of the entire new transatlantic imperial model.[15] The most famous of the imperial viceroys in Peru, Francisco de Toledo, put it concisely to his sovereign: "Without silver, there is no Peru."

We have known for many years, at least since Charles Gibson published his pathbreaking study of the central Mexican valleys, that the development of large cities brought about similar effects on the surrounding areas and even on more distant areas.[16] One could use conceptual and graphic descriptions like Assadourian's of the Peruvian Andes to describe these developments in similar modeling terms. Nevertheless, there is a crucial distinction: the Peruvian mining centers were producers and consumers, while the great imperial cities were basically just centers of consumption, both ordinary and luxury, where most of the Spaniards and their descendents, be they lay or religious, were concentrated.

The social ramifications of this integration around silver circuits can be explored from the center of the colonial economy – the large cities and mining areas – but also from relatively peripheral regions. Felipe Castro has conducted some interesting research on local responses to pressures resulting from the

15 Earl J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Rise of Capitalism, 1501–1650* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934).

16 Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs Under the Spanish Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

needs of New Spain's colonial agglomerations, showing contradictions in the localities that supported the new colonial society and economy.[17] In some cases, Indians left their usual places of residence, the most radical way of escaping the pressure of labour obligations and other demands associated with the mining centers; in other cases, they sought, either as individuals or collectively, monetary salaries in mining centers or in public works. Access to monetary salaries allowed them to respond to the increasingly monetary demands by *encomenderos* and by those who collected native tribute. The choice posed a serious dilemma for indigenous leaders, a social group subject to continual changes and the systematic erosion of its erstwhile prestige.

Another way of viewing the articulation of the late-sixteenth-century American economic and social scene is to look at the integration of peripheral regions. An excellent example, for its empirical and conceptual sophistication, is the work on the Peruvian province of Huarochirí by the ethnohistorian Karen Spalding.[18] Her work is relevant not only in its analysis of the dramatic rupture in social and economic organizational forms as a result of the conquest – she draws on ideas found in the works of John Murra, Steve Stern (Huamanga), Josep M. Barnadas (Charcas), and Brooke Larson (Cochabamba) – but also in its ability to integrate the two vectors that gave rise to the problematic constitution of the viceroyalty as a new economic unit.[19]

Here I refer, first, to the vector of the stimulus from the great Potosí market and the precise and calculated demands that the Spanish empire projected onto local societies, often far distant from the Peruvian mining nucleus of the political axis of Callao-Lima-Cuzco; and second, the obligations, be they in labour or in cash, that modifed indigenous social patterns. In a previous article, Spalding formalized the model of hierarchical relations that local communities were up against: older patterns of behavior from the Inca Tawantinsuyu (labour), or newly-introduced truly colonial patterns (cash tribute payments), or a combination of both. This prior work by Spalding, part of an edited volume called *The Inca and Aztec States, 1400–1600*, shows the reproductive norms

17 Felipe Castro, *La rebelión de los indios y la paz de los españoles* (Mexico City: CIESA, 1996), 49.

18 Karen Spalding. *Huarochirí: An Andean Society Under Inca and Spanish Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

19 Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); Josep M. Barnadas, *Charcas. Orígenes históricos de una sociedad colonial, 1535–1565* (La Paz: Centro de Investigaciones y Promoción del Campesinado, 1973); Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550–1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

of the cycle of labour services, monetary salaries, tribute payment, and acquisition of commodities from administrative centers in adjacent regions.[20]

This circular movement, always subject to renovation, could be modulated by various social agents, by the extractive capacities of viceroyal authority and its local agents (governors, *corregidores de indios*, judges), or by resistance by communities weighed down by tributary obligations of cash, specie, or semiforced labour. Extractive capacity could be modulated but never endangered, for that would put an end to the colonial order, a possibility that was not conceived of until the great Andean uprisings of 1782, when linkages began showing serious signs of weakness.[21] By then, the function of Quechua and Aymara intermediaries in the reproduction of the colonial model was essential back to sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Andean utopia of a return to the past, as Alberto Flores referred to it, included within itself the paradox of the impossible return to the pre-Hispanic world.[22]

A Multiethnic Empire

The world that emerged from these and other processes in the latter part of the sixteenth century were radically different from earlier historical challenges and from other contemporary experiences made possible by northern European exploration and piracy. Nevertheless, the particularity of the situation traditionally has not drawn the historiographic attention it deserved. To delve further into that problem, I would like to turn my attention here to the relevant bibliography and then make some final comments.

The Spanish empire was the first truly multiethnic empire in world history. I mean by that that it was an empire built upon colonial foundations within which there coexisted diverse social groups, but it was resolved in one single construction, clearly separated from the earlier world by the circumstances discussed previously in this essay. Its institutions and juridical bases represented, in their novelty, an indescribably huge challenge to contemporary ways of thinking. It is no coincidence that the multiethnic imperial model of the late sixteenth century would not be replicated until the rise of colonialism in

20 George Allen Collier, Renato Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth, *The Inca and Aztec States, 1400–1600* (New York: Academic Press, 1982).

21 That is the thesis in Sergio Serulnikov, *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Colonial Rule in the Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

22 Alberto Flores, *Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes* (Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1986).

northern India and in Dutch Java, and then only under the pressure of circumstances and appreciable rectifications. It was in the second half of the eighteenth century, in fact, when the privileged joint-stock trading companies of England and Holland unexpectedly began exercising territorial control and direct tribute over peasants who were roundly detested by the rulers of the new political economy. As I suggested earlier, not even then did the construction of the nineteenth-century imperial colonial foundation follow the complex multiethnic pattern established by Spaniards in their American possessions. A few taxonomic points will better explain what I mean and will point to the scope of the proposed definition.

The two Iberian empires were entirely different from each other. The great historian of the Portuguese and Dutch empires, C.R. Boxer, proposed a definition of the former: "a seaborne empire cast in a military and ecclesiastical mold."[23] More recently, another expert on the Portuguese world, Sanjay Subramanyam, expressed a similar idea when he referred to the maritime nature of the empire, being that the link between Lisbon and Macao, Goa, Sofala, Luanda, Ouidah, and Bahía was, obviously, mercantile. Subramanyam referred to the Spanish empire as land-based, a definition that does not allow one to see what was distinctive about both cases.[24]

The Portuguese *Estado da India* and its projection toward Southeast Asia and China was undoubtedly a commercial, maritime, and military effort, if we exclude the occasional attempts, generally unsuccessful, to impose agriculture on the west coast of India and Sri Lanka in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whether because of Dutch pressure, resistance by local political entities, or the intrinsic failure of cases such as the "pepper empire" in central India, these experiments turned the Portuguese empire back to its mercantile and maritime reality.[25] However if we look at the powerful theoretical work of Luiz Felipe de Alencastro on the relations between Africa and colonial Brazil

23 "The old Portuguese colonial empire was essentially a thalassocracy, a maritime and commercial empire, whether concerned with the spices of the East, the slaves of West Africa, or the sugar, tobacco and gold of Brazil. It was, however, a seaborne empire cast in a military and ecclesiastical mould." *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415–1825* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), 2.

24 Sanjay Subramanyam, "Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640," *American Historical Review* 112:5 (2007): 1359–85; and by the same author, "A Tale of Three Empires: Mughals, Ottomans, and Habsburgs in a Comparative Perspective," *Common Knowledge* 12:1 (2006): 66–92.

25 Anthony Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Historical Studies, 1978); Geneviève Bouchon, "Le crepuscle de l'empire de Poivre," in *Inde Découverte, Inde Retrouvé,*

from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Atlantic aspect is characterized more by the combination of sugar mills and slave traffic than by the abilities of merchants, sailors, and the military forces of the impressive Portuguese diaspora.[26]

The question at the heart of Alencastro's analysis perhaps is better appreciated in Asia, though Mozambique for centuries was a slave colony oriented toward the slave trade with the subcontinent and integrated into the *Estado da India*'s political structures. From these comparisons one can see the novelty and potential behind the formation of slave societies as the material basis of the political imperial constructions of the Atlantic. This is not a small issue, but rather the essential factor underlying colonial and post-colonial Brazil in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. The slave plantation also was the engine behind the repopulation and rise of the Dutch, English, Danish, French, and Spanish Caribbean during the same period. And, of course, it drove the development that eventually would divide the economies of the New England colonies from the expansive, slave economies centered in Virginia and Chesapeake.[27]

These considerations lead to an elementary conclusion: if the Portuguese empire (along with the early developments of the Dutch East India and the East India companies) essentially was a maritime and commercial empire, its prosperity in the southern Atlantic reflected an additional factor. The massive exportation of tropical agricultural products thanks to slave labour from Africa did not contradict the role of merchants and sailors, though it did incorporate new elements. One of these elements was crucial in this historical era: the formation of units of agricultural production on a scale and of an intensity never before seen. If that is so, the northern European mercantile commercial empires, so often presented as "empires of liberty" in contrast to the Catholic-Iberian empire, were more than simply political entities governed by the economic and cultural ethos of commerce, which in the opinion of Montesquieu and the classical economists were the necessary condition for their success. At moments of critical introspection such as that in Britain after the Declaration of Independence of the thirteen colonies, it was their complex nature that led to the dismantling of the slave trade through the humanitarian abolition

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1498–1630. Études d'histoire indoportuguaise (Lisbon: Fundaçao Calouste Gulbenkian, 1999), 375–382.

26 Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, *O trato dos viventes. Formaçao do Brasil no contexto do Atlântico Sul, séculos XVI e XVII* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000).

27 Jack P. Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness. The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

movement, giving rise to Burke's utopia of an empire united by ties of affection and sentiment.[28]

But it is not enough to confirm the fallacy of the simple opposition between mercantile empires and those of freedom, on the one hand, and mercantilist, regulated empires, on the other, or between maritime and land-based empires. If the Spanish empire was not based on mercantile ties nor was it a purely maritime empire nor one articulated upon the world of slavery; if it was not nor could it be an ancient, tributary, or "asiatic" empire, then what was it? How to define it precisely on a conceptual level, and not merely descriptively or taxonomically? The answers to these questions go far beyond comparisons, though they may be relevant. The most ambitious reply since the times of William Robertson, a historian of both the Spanish empire and of early British India, and of the powerhouses from the 1940s and 1950s such as C.R. Boxer, H. Furber, and J.H. Parry, has come from John H. Elliott, in his excellent book about the two Atlantic empires.[29] Yet despite the admirable panorama he depicts, passionate in its detail, narrative, and breadth, he does not propose a resolution to the questions raised here. Elliott's panorama observes the essence of the British empire mainly from New England, despite the fact that the colonies, founded by Calvinists, were not the basis of support for the whole. The heart of the first Anglo-British empire was toward the south, in the Barbados-Chesapeake diagonal, where slave labour was decisive until the Declaration of Independence by the thirteen colonies in 1776 and afterward during the republican era.

In fact, the question raised earlier regarding the specificity of each empire has an answer only on a case-by-case basis, and therefore one must go back to the situation described above. In the first place, it is essential to interpret the significance of the withdrawal and decline of a colonial model that was imposed on societies subject to demographic collapse. Second, one must understand the significance of the emergence of mining centers and large cities, two closely related phenomena, on the articulation of the entire economy and colonial institutions. The dynamism of this development, which involved moving away from pre-Hispanic social and economic organizational forms, depended on two essential factors: international demand for precious metals and the ability to use cheap indigenous labour through colonial institutions such as tribute and the "voluntary" labour associated with the *repartimiento*, among

28 Christopher L. Brown, *Moral Capital. Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

29 John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

which expressions it was the *mita minera* of Potosí. The difference between those experiments of labour organization and those of the aboriginal societies were not only of scale but of content. Moreover, the way those transformations reorganized labor and taxes altogether distanced colonial realities in the Spanish America from the ones in Asia and Europe. In short: any expectations Spaniards could have dreamed of to reproduce a kind of European landscape were immediately doomed to fail. The essential difference with the past lay in the novelty of the social and economic model that was being imposed with absolutely no plan, the abandonment of autoctonous models, and the hypothetical reproduction of the European agrarian landscape in New Spain (with the undeniable aid of the Indians).

The particular resolution of the various facets of that socioeconomic model led to the construction of a society with multiethnic origins that was both unitary and developed along very complex ethnic lines. When this model – no longer one of imposition by a small number of Europeans over an immense majority of Indians – took form in the late sixteenth century, we can see the quintessential features of a unique colonial society both in type and in time. In brief, it was the only such society whose institutions excluded the slavery of Indians, allowing for some necessary exceptions and nuances. There is no doubt that slavery was an essential variable in the first conquest and colonization, both with regard to Indians forced into labour on the pretext of war and the Africans brought over thanks to contracts with the Portuguese. In the 1540s and 1550s, nearly ten thousand slaves per year were sent south from Panama, following the bloody trail left by Pizarro and his cruel followers.[30] This is not, then, an unimportant side topic.

Nevertheless, the consolidation of a new colonial society in the late sixteenth century – all the institutions that regulated the division of labour and long-distance exchange with Seville and Manila – was based on Indian labour complemented by slave labour, the secular companion of empire. The logical order of the previous sentence is essential. In the center of this new society lay the exaction of tribute from natives, the basis of imperial power; the continual transfer of labour between the survivors of the autochthonous economy and the emerging sectors in the hands of Spaniards, and the basis for the regulation and distribution of Indian obligations with regard to the church, local authorities, and the European world in general. This mesh of obligations was a heavy burden for the Indians, as much for its complementarity and superimposition as for the amount of tribute per se, though the latter was the basis for it all.

30 José R. Jouve, *Esclavos en la ciudad letrada. Esclavitud, escritura y colonialismo en Lima (1650–1700)* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2005).

These lines of colonial development are not, in and of themselves, particularly surprising. It was the situations and behavior of the social actors in a particular local or regional framework that displayed the dizzying complexity of specific resolutions. There, the power of the community and traditional norms, the continual negotiations among parties, and the blending and dissimulation by Indians in a social landscape that was impossible to control forced the Spaniards to add new classifications to their tributary obligations. Therefore, and because it was a multiethnic society, tribute lists were the colonial tool *par excellence* for defining the obligations of the majority and the privileges awarded to the coopted, indispensible collaborators, *principalía* and *señores de naturales*. Not being on the tribute rolls, or being temporarily exempt from paying, defined people's status, their social position, and their abilities. The number of excellent monographs on this and other questions – for example, the controversial process of Christianization that guided the construction and legitimation of a society of that type – allow us to clearly describe the formation of a society that in many ways was different from its predecessors and from contemporary societies in the Atlantic colonial world.[31]

The Particularity of the Spanish Empire

But we are still faced with the essential problem of describing the particularity of an empire built upon these foundations. This did not resolve itself solely in America; rather, it affected the entire empire as a vast transoceanic political construction. If we do not understand that particularity, it is impossible to identify the legacy of that pioneering experience. The primary obstacle is not the amount of available empirical research to be processed, synthesized, and theoretically conceptualized. Rather, the problem lies in the difficulty of capturing the specificity, the particularity of such a vast historical experiment. It was distinguished from its European competitors by the secondary and complementary nature of slavery, which was absolutely essential for the English, French, and Portuguese efforts in the Caribbean and in the northern and southern Atlantic.

31 Two recent anthologies in this sense are Ilona Katzew and Susan Deans-Smith, eds., *Race and Classification. The Case of Mexican America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew O'Hara, eds., *Imperial Subjects. Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). For a particular monograph, see M. Elena Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions. Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

I do not wish to enter into a discussion here regarding how Spain's rivals managed to incorporate such disparate societies within viable political structures, how they regulated relationships among mercantile situations and interests (the highly autonomous worlds of the charter companies), versions of the northern European agrarian world based on the ideal of the peasant household, and societies articulated around slave plantations. Both in North America and in the Caribbean, after a certain point all these variations involved the expulsion or destruction of the native population. The word "empire" is generally used to refer to these transoceanic worlds, bound together with such close and formalized ties, and to the ensemble of connections with the European metropolis. Without slavery as a foundation, in all probability the rest of the pieces of this puzzle would have failed; in any case, things would have developed differently. In short, only slavery guaranteed the revenue with which to pay for the colonies, the interior protection costs, and the wars with native or imperial rivals. Slavery also offered rules of social organization and pointed colonial development in a particular direction. It did so in such a plausible and universally accepted manner that we cannot know if there were hypotheses of alternative developments, though Samuel Johnson, in a well-known and ironic solipsism, attempted to raise the issue. In other words, no Atlantic empire could do without slavery, not even the Spaniards. The place of the institution of slavery in the imperial social structure is another question, the question that points to the differences among these worlds.

The Spanish empire was different both from those that preceded it and from its contemporary rivals. It differed from its European and Asian antecedents and those that continued in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries in China, India, and central Asia in that the social changes it imposed on America ended up formalized as a viable and stable foundation based on the expansion of mining and multiethnic integration which did not arise from the sort of tributary arrangements between imperial center and periphery that were the mark of ancient empires and medieval and modern Asian empires.[32] If these arrangements turned out not to be workable or were resisted, there was another possibility, always there, like the sword of Damocles: the extinction or forced ruin of the dominated population. There existed the alarming possibility of the removal or extinction of entire societies, to be replaced purely and simply by other societies more appropriate to imperial objectives as a whole. This latter hypothesis, seen clearly with the collapse of the Caribbean population after 1492, has been investigated by the medievalist Miquel Barceló

32 Peter F. Bang and Christopher A. Bayly, eds., *Tributary Empires in Global History*. Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

with regard to the eastern Iberian peninsula and the Balearic islands in the thirteenth century.[33]

Returning now to the beginning of this paper, let me review some conclusions. The Spanish empire was an immense producer of precious metals; that was its *raison d'être* in the world division of labour. To fulfill that role, it had to entirely recreate the social structure of the conquered world to the point that there was a balance between metropolitan demands and American needs in accordance with new social patterns. A revolutionary aspiration of this sort can be found only in the history of modern colonialism – in Asia starting in 1757 with the triumph of the East India Company in Bengal and in 1830, with the Dutch victory in Java, and in Africa after the 1880s. In the pioneering case of the Spanish empire, the massive destruction of the sixteenth century was the condition both for the possibility and the need for that entirely new social construction. But there was a crucial difference between the modern imperial colonizing state and its predecessor. While the former disposed of many essential instruments for planning and developing policies in accordance with its objectives, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish empire could achieve those objectives through means that still cannot be fully identified. Therefore, insofar as the sixteenth-century Spanish world is a quite unknown territory – and the flaming collapse of the idea of the two "republics" is an eloquent example – the instruments of its construction reflect a remarkable exercise of historical imagination. I do not intend to try to resolve this complex problem. I simply wish to indicate that the key to the problem surely lies in the successful construction of a pluriethnic society, one constructed according to precise lines of ethnic division and adaptation both between the native populations and those from Europe and Africa as well as between these latter groups and their descendents. This was not "divide and conquer," but rather "amalgamate and confuse." This social development has erroneously been termed a "caste society" in a well-meaning but mistaken effort to define a badly-understood reality. The task would later be abandoned by social history, and no further attention would be paid to the huge problem that lay beneath that deceptive definition.[34] In fact, that society should be referred to as one *with* castes, for

33 Miquel Barceló, et al. *El agua que no duerme: Fundamentos de la arqueología hidráulica andalusí* (Granada: Sierra Nevada 95/El legado andalusí, 1996); Miquel Barceló, *El sol que salió por Occidente. Estudios sobre el estado Omeya en el al-Andalus* (Jaén: Universidad de Jaén, 1997).

34 Magnus Mörner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

they were a key piece of a social structure whose logic we still do not understand. Castes, then, as a metaphor for distribution along ethnic lines, constantly subject to redefinition and always open; for the labour demanded by the empire; and as a space of recognition among competing social groups.[35] This was both a fluid and hierarchical construction, born both from the projections of a nearly absent state and from the needs of American societies themselves in the exercise of privilege, exemption, and the marriage market.

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35 This long-run transformation obviously has many aspects. For one analysis of cultural change in the case of New Spain Indians see James Lockhart, *The Nauhas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

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